

Published Essays by V. Subramanya Iyer

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MAN'S INTEREST IN PHILOSOPHY.
(contemporary Indian Philosophy)

Biographical. Eight of my direct ancestors devoted their lives entirely to philosophy. While at the Madras Christian College, as a youth, I commenced my studies under Charles Cooper (Dr) Professor of Logic and Philosophy, who kindled in me a passionate love for metaphysics. Then, after a course of philosophy under Dr J.R. Henderson, Professor of Biology, in the same college, I felt a deep interest in Thomas Huxley and Herbert Spencer, which made me turn to physical science and Mathematics, under Dr John Cook, at the Bangalore Central College. I next privately pursued a course of Natural and Social Sciences. Subsequently I spent a number of years in learning Vedanta under the late Swami, the Jagadguru of Sringeri, who was held in highest esteem as a most learned and genuine philosopher. As Registrar of the University and as president of the Board of Sanskrit Studies and Examinations in Mysore, I have had occasion to come into close contact with many distinguished Pandits and Professors of Eastern and Western thought, which was an education in itself. Among modern interpreters of Indian Philosophy or Life, no one can ignore the most outstanding figure of Sir S. Radhakrishnan, whose striking originality has often called up new vistas of thought in me. My knowledge has been considerably widened by my association with those who have studied and are still studying philosophy under my guidance some of whom are among the leading members of the famous religio-philosophical body, the Sri Ramakrishna Order. Far greater is my indebtedness to an eminent royal personage whose exceptional interest in

(continued from the previous page) philosophy reminds one of Marcus Aurelius. During the past fourteen years I have had the valuable privilege of being a Reader in Philosophy to His Highness Sri Krishnaraja Wodiyar Bahadur IV Maharaja of Mysore, a ruler of remarkable metaphysical insight and attainments, who has been referred to, in contemporary literature, as a modern "example of Plato's conception of the Philosopher-King."

1. WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY. As is well known in India and was acknowledged by many a scholar and thinker of the West, one of India's distinguished philosopher of our own times was the late Sri Sacchidananda Sivabhinava Narasimha Bharati of Sringeri, in Mysore. It was while sitting at his feet as a pupil that I learnt some of the most valuable lessons in this subject. One of them is that philosophy is knowledge that rises above creed and scripture, vision and ecstasy, art and science, its sole object being a complete realisation of all that life implies. He used to say: Whoever has wants physical or mental, and fears present or prospective, is impelled to satisfy the former and overcome the latter. Various are the attempts to attain these objects, and various are the degrees of success attending them, all of which are comprehended under one or more of the heads: religion, art, science and their numerous developments. The endeavours of most men cease when they are satisfied with whatever they achieve. But to some men remedies incomplete or tentative, or applicable only to individuals and groups of men, or of an ascetic character, or lastly of the nature of promises to be fulfilled after death, fail to appeal sufficiently. They ask whether all

(continued from the previous page) wants (including the craving for knowledge), and all fears wherever found, cannot be perfectly satisfied or eradicated in this life. They evidently aspire to an absolute or universal and verifiable solution to their question. For this purpose they seek a knowledge of all that exists. Exceedingly unpractical or unattainable as the quest may appear, those who pursue it nevertheless are known in India as philosophical enquirers.

But before the solution is finally reached and tested in life doubts arise as to whether the enquiries are proceeding on right lines. And the disappointments in them, which imply error or ignorance, further stimulate the urge to get at truth, which seems to recede farther as men seek to approach it. The necessity, therefore, for a clear knowledge of it, is felt at every stage of the enquiries. So the Swami often said that the student of philosophy must first be able to distinguish between "Tattvam" and "Matam", i.e. between philosophy on one hand and Religion, Theology, Scholasticism, Mysticism, Art, Aesthetic experience and science on the other, especially because the latter have often been mistaken for Philosophy. Philosophy is what seeks, as the end of all thinking, the truth that admits of no difference of views and of no doubts whatever. Or, as the Hindu thinker would put it philosophy seeks a complete eradication of ignorance, the cause of all error. And as two plus two are equal to four is true for all, so must the truth sought by philosophy, as its aim implies, be universal and necessary. Contrariwise, in all matter of knowledge other than this, in so far as they

(continued from the previous page) are communicable, there always exists some actual or possible difference of view. Hence, the disagreeing views are known as Matam which is private or individual; whereas Tattvam is public or common.

Enquirers in general being eager to find satisfaction as quickly as possible, take satisfaction to be truth or the final test of truth, but experience shows that satisfaction often fails to reveal truth, which has therefore to be sought independently, though satisfaction invariably follows truth. For satisfaction is often found in error also. Hence its unreliability. Even the earliest Indian Philosophers held that the highest satisfaction (Anandam) is but a cover (Kosa) that should be dropped before reaching differenceless truth. Those who seek truth by making satisfaction the test, like those who make satisfaction itself the ultimate goal, as do the mystics and others, belong to the world of Matam.

Philosophic enquiry naturally proceeds by steps which are by some termed "degrees" or "Kinds" of truth, the goal being denominated by the "highest" or "ultimate" truth. Religions, revelations, ecstatic experiences, intuitions, visions, opinions hypotheses are all not merely valuable, but indispensable, as steps. What characterises the steps are various degrees of difference of view, actual or possible, in respect of truth. Among them truths of science rank highest, science being the nearest gateway to philosophy. For science, to a greater degree than all others, aims at differencelessness in its conception of truth, though not absolutely, as does

(continued from the previous page) philosophy. Even in the past, they who tried to reach the heights of philosophy, through religious paths, had subsequently to pass through the gates of Scientific Method, though they did not call it "Science."

Progress in philosophy does not mean in India the attainment of new concepts of ultimate truth, but the starting, as knowledge advances, at higher levels and the finding of less difficult approaches, if possible, to the same peak of Tattvam.

Lastly, in India the philosopher seeks "That knowledge which, if attained, makes everything known." Philosophy is, therefore not only the "science of sciences," and the art of arts," but also as the Indian philosopher holds the "Truth of Truth" and "end of all knowledge." But this end means also the fulfilment of the purpose of life; for, to him nothing remains unknown, and nothing remains unattained in life.

Philosophy in India, therefore does not subscribe to Fichte's view that "The Kind of philosophy that a man chooses depends upon the kind of man that he is". This idea of philosophy is matam; for it is matam that so varies, not Tattvam.

2. A FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE. To some philosophy is only "speculation" and Ultimate truth a chimera. It is argued by many, that if the highest knowledge of philosophy cannot remove wants and fears, its pursuit could be no better than an exercise—or a diversion in solving a problem in chess or geometry. Some say that philosophy yields only conceptual knowledge, whereas religion and mysticism lead to actual felt experience,

(continued from the previous page) and that therefore they naturally appeal to the largest number. They even declare that "truth" value with which philosophy is concerned is not of so much consequence as other values. They start with the belief that whatever idea or object they are most attached to must be ultimate and point to the absolute reality. But the fact that others do differ or may differ is proof that such values cannot be ultimate. Europe has felt the need for taking a higher step towards what it calls "Transvaluation of Values."

A most marked tendency among the great scientists and philosophers of our day, when they attempt to deal with ultimate facts, is to lose themselves in mysticism of some kind. That is due, as the Indian philosophers long ago observed, to a lack of the strength and courage needed to pursue truth to the end. To the Western speculative philosopher, his Eastern brother who avers the possibility of attaining ultimate truth and eradicating pain and want, is either a mystic, or a religious fanatic, or a primitive, self-deluded being. But what constitutes philosophy in India, is the rational knowledge, that directly results in the removal of wants and fears. It is verified only by appeal to life, as a whole, That knowledge and life are intimately connected is known to every one. But what complete knowledge might reveal as regards their relation is not known to all. A fundamental issue, therefore, is whether knowledge is a means or an end or both in life. If knowledge be only a means of the attainment of some reality other than knowledge itself, is there any means of ascertaining whether knowledge reveals this reality beyond all possibility

(continued from the previous page) of doubt.

This is somewhat skin to the question of the relation between what are known in the West as "Thought" knowledge and "Sense" knowledge.

KNOWLEDGE. To many knowledge seems to signify something different from what it means to the Indian philosopher. To the former it is what is "known" of the external or the internal world (matter and mind). To the latter, however, it implies something more, which can never be included in the "known." For the "known" cannot comprehend the knowing agent or factor, i.e. "awareness" which is something entirely different in character from everything known or knowable. Awareness is always the knower, which is distinguished from knowledge and the known. When we try to know or think of awareness, we only betake ourselves to a thought, which is only something known. We never get at awareness itself as the knower. Again, if there be more awareness than one, how is one to be distinguished from another? Nor is awareness known to have any limits like those of a body or an external object. Nothing can be outside of it. The West does not treat awareness as something distinct from the mental contents of which it is aware. Even the 'I' the ego, the self as generally understood, is only something thought of or "known." The latter changes, while the former perceives the change. It is therefore unique. The knower or awareness is not the same as the self, which is used in several senses.

Again, it is generally held that by knowledge is meant what is known or thought about in the waking state. The West though it has

(continued from the previous page) specially studied dream and deep-sleep psychologically and physiologically, has not enquired into them metaphysically. Their reflections from the metaphysical standpoint are confined to the waking state alone. Whereas the Indian philosopher's metaphysics covers the whole field of the three states. The others consider all experiences, assuming the waking experience to be the standard of reality, the rest being treated as less than real. The fact, however, is that all the three states are on the same level, they being the known. And the objects of the waking state are as much ideal or real as those of the dream. The common distinction between what is internal (mental) or ideal and what is external (material) or real, is of comparatively less philosophic consequence; for "externality" and "internality" obtain with equal force in the fundamental world of dreams also. The argument that in the waking state others witness the same objects and contribute to our common knowledge has no special force because this holds true of the experience in dreams also. As it is with objects, so it is with space in which they exist, or with time and cause by which they are bound. So long as the dream lasts, it is as real as the waking state. The distinction of real and ideal has value only so far as the waking state, or as it is called the practical world goes. But from the philosophical standpoint it is of less importance. When one starts with the assumption that the waking world is real, he is a realist. When one realises that the waking world is like the dream, an idea, he is an idealist. The idealist's view or "mentalism" as some prefer

(continued from the previous page) to call it, is being reached by the modern scientific thinker also.

But the Indian philosopher does not stop with the dream. When he proceeds to a consideration of deep-sleep he finds that all objects, external (material) and internal (mental) of both dream states, disappear then. They being all ideas are refunded into or are absorbed by the mind. Even the body and the "I" to which one is so strongly attached, being but ideas, cease to exist as such. The "I" is a something of which "awareness" becomes cognisant, and which, therefore, belongs to the world of the "known" or object (mental). Next, it does not signify the same thing every time it presents itself to consciousness or awareness. The import of the notion "I" when one is doing business as a shopkeeper or a banker is not the same as he himself understands it when he thinks himself a father or a brother. These different connotations change endlessly life. The "I" therefore, instead of being a factor of the "greatest certainty" as some philosophers hold, is a most unreliable, nay unreal, something.

This may appear ridiculous. For, it will be said that the universe does not consist of one man alone. Others see that material objects while one is asleep. But this is to forget that the entire universe is "idea." Unless one abjures one's love of truth and science, one cannot help recognizing this fact. As for the "I" (personality or self) in particular, the phenomena of double and multiple personalities will bear out in the waking state itself what has been just said.

(continued from the previous page) All the states disappear into and reappear from that which in the waking state is called "mind", but which is really, by itself, indescribable. This is sometimes pointed to as the Fourth, in as much as it is that which is aware of the appearance and the disappearance of the other three states. Here is no solipsism as will be evident from the sequel.

At this stage the standpoint is neither that of the realist nor that of the idealist. The known is unreal or illusory. But though there is nothing of the known in deep-sleep, this does not imply absolute non-existence; for, non-existence is not known as such then. Here one must guard against the mistake of thinking that if this beautiful material world and more beautiful world of thought or mind, which though called ideal or unreal, disappear every day in deep-sleep, one must be the greatest loser. But the truth is "Nothing ever lost." The appearance and the disappearance of the universe, only proves that it is made of the same "stuff" or "essence" as that into which it disappears. As such essence, the entire universe is ever indestructible. If one chooses to call this essence of the all X or Y or reality, the all would be X or Y or real. But truly it is beyond the reach of world and thought.

The rationale of the three states that in the world of the known, totality of data gives us the whole truth, part of the data gives only fractional truth. The waking or the dream state or even both lead only to fractional truth. The three states which yield fulness of data are what philosophy

(continued from the previous page) is concerned with. If to this totality of the known be added the factor of the knower or awareness, then this added totality, or what is more, than totality, is what reason is concerned with. It may be noted that the term totality or whole implies parts which are found in the known only. What knowledge implies in addition, is awareness which has no parts.

That there is variety (many) in the waking state is universally admitted. But the West appears not to note that there is non-variety in deep-sleep.

REASON, INTELLECT AND INTUITION. Once again it has to be pointed out that many in Europe and America seem to confine reason to a part of which is really such. It is confounded with intellect which is Reason limited to the experience of waking and dream states. Reason is the highest court of appeal in the world of thought. That intellect is Reason working in a limited sphere is evident from the fact that logic, the science of intellectual processes, invariably assumes universality and uniformity which the mind derives only from Reason. Without this assumption, logical process can have little value. Further, Reason reveals the limitations and contradictions of not only intellectual processes but all knowledge based upon the fractional data of single or double states. And the intellect, whenever it rises to its original level as Reason frankly admits its inherent defects; nay, even points to a something unknown, beyond itself.

Many a thinker when he becomes alive to this feature of the intellect, jumps to

(continued from the previous page) intuition which vainly seeks exemption from the criticism of intellect or Reason. Reason points out the vagaries and contradictions of intuition also. And knowledge based on it disappears like that based on intellect, in deep sleep. Intuition being something "known" has validity only in the single state of either waking or dream. But those that know that "intellect" is only Reason cribbed or cabined, seek to free the intellect, instead of appealing to intuition. This freeing process is what is known in India as "purifying" the intellect or "sharpening" it or making it "onepointed." As this process brings the intellect nearer its original, Reason, it sees more of the ultimate truth, based on the oneness of life than either of the former. In India, therefore, philosophy is based finally upon Reason—not authority, tradition, revelation, intellect or intuition and the like, though all these with their data are needed for enabling one to rise from intellect or intuition to "Reason." The sole function of Reason is to detect and eliminate the cause of error whether of intellect or of intuition.

What is instinct at a lower level is intuition at a higher. Intuition is the natural or raw knowledge yet untested by intellect as to its truth-value. Intellect tests it by comparing intuitive experience with the experiences of the waking and dream states. Intuition implies a something known and therefore implies a duality which is the field of intellectual criticism. Whereas Reason, which comprehends deep-sleep also, rises above duality and compares intuition with deep-sleep experience as well. Reason declares intuition

(continued from the previous page) to belong to the sphere below the Ultimate Truth, i.e. to the world of duality. Reason negates all duality, in seeking the Ultimate truth or Truth beyond all doubt.

OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF TOTALITY. 1. The modern psychologist will tell us that it is only primitive, infantile or insane minds that mistake dream objects for the real ones of the waking state. But what the Indian Philosopher does is to label both "dream" and "waking" objects alike. If the dream world be not real, the waking is not real either. If the latter be real, the former also would be the same. Or again, both could be called ideal. Some of the sanest minds of the world have felt the waking world to be no more than a dream. The Indian philosopher does not consider dream objects real and the waking unreal.

2. Some critics think that idealism, when pressed too far lands one in solipsism which, though not a logical fallacy, is opposed to all common sense. Indian philosophy fully recognises the weakness of solipsism, and does not find it in its view of idealism. It is only in half-baked idealism that solipsism is met with. Once again it has to be pointed out that by idealism the West seems to understand only a part of what it means. Idealism fully understood points to the "Ideal" character of unreality of the 'I' (ego) on the assumed reality of which solipsism depends. Solipsism is a warning against halting half-way in idealism. The "three-states" comprehend evidently more than one, the waking. In the waking state we take full account of all the experiences and thoughts of other men.

(continued from the previous page) To this are added our experiences of dream and deep-sleep. Indian philosophy does not omit anything so as to be liable to the charge of solipsism, which has a meaning in waking experience only. For in it alone it is possible to think of others and of ignoring others' knowledge.

3. Critics may say that what pervades the reality of external objects of the waking world is the irrepressible sense of reality. But the same sense is equally forcibly felt in dreams while they last. In fact, the dream while it lasts is felt to be waking. There also exists the sense of "givenness" on which the realist so firmly relies. When the two states are compared "givenness" is found to be no distinguishing mark of the reality of external objects of the waking. Should it be argued that the "givenness" of the waking world does not depend upon the mind's own creative power, whereas that of the dream is so dependent, the reply is, first, that the "givenness" of external objects in dreams is also felt to be non-dependent. Next the "given" of the waking as well as the dream disappears alike in deep-sleep. The sense of reality, untested by reason, is no criterion of reality.

4. If the standpoint of the "three-states" proves the futility of the feeling or sense of reality, what does this feeling or sense signify? This taking the unreal to be the real is perhaps the greatest problem in life. There are two stages in understanding it. First, we ask what this material universe is. And we learn that it is a mental construct (Idea or thought), like a dream, a conclusion

(continued from the previous page) confirmed by the latest scientific investigations also. Next we ask what an "idea" or "thought" is. And, as the Indian philosopher says, we learn that it is a non-entity inasmuch as it disappears or dissolves into the mind every moment, and beyond all doubt during deep sleep. Lastly, we find that both the material and the mental universes are in themselves non-separate¹ entities, illusions, therefore unreal. How then are we to account for the feeling or sense of reality? Since all ideas or thoughts are of the same stuff as the mind essence, the only reality existing, they are, as such stuff, real, and that always. The unreal, therefore, appears as real. When the states are analysed, it is seen that the entire factor the "known" is unreal, which is no theory but fact.

5. If in deep-sleep all the "known" should disappear, including my own self, my own body and my intuitions of the highest realities, can there be any basis for ethical life? Is there any use in living? It has already been said that deep-sleep does not mean a blank (non-existence): it is that into which the universe, the known is refunded. As the universe reappears, entity cannot come out of non-entity. So long as the existence of other men and beings is admitted, as it is, in the waking state, ethical life is indispensable and its value is fully recognised. Its significance will be further considered under ethics.

6. If the entire universe (mental and material) be only ideas, and if they completely disappear in deep-sleep what becomes of the eternal God and visions of Him, which are

¹ The original editor inserted "separate" by hand

(continued from the previous page) among men's dearest possessions? The ideas called God and visions of Him are absorbed into that which is called "mind" in which no distinctions exist as in deep-sleep. If this is the truth and if even God Himself disappears, is truth higher than God? In answering, we have three alternatives before us: God is higher, truth is higher, or both are on the same level or non-different. That God is higher than truth and that Truth itself cannot reach God but can only point to Him is the view of religion. And logically relies upon faith. That truth is higher than God is held by many a thinker who makes the Absolute, the Unconditioned the Unknowable or the Supreme Existence, the truth. But there are other philosophers who say that Ultimate truth is itself God, the two being non-different. Now, if God be something "known" He does disappear in deep-sleep. If He be not known He must be the knower; or He does not exist at all.

TRUTH. We have proceeded till now assuming that we know what is meant by truth. For truth as commonly understood is one's knowledge of some item of experience, internal or external. In respect of truth also, as in that of knowledge, many thinkers seem to confine it to a part of it. They ignore the knower as something different from the "I" or other contents of the mind. The whole mind including its contents, such as the 'I' and its acts, is the "knower" for them. Owing to this defect, though truth is admitted to be knowledge, whether all knowledge is truth is still a controversial matter. Further, so far as the western conception goes,

(continued from the previous page) whatever meaning be given to truth, "copy" "correspondence", "co-existence", "coherence" "harmony", "pragmatic import" or any other, in all cases two factors are implied. The two are not the knower (awareness) and the known, but mind (as a whole) and matter. And if matter (the object) be considered mental, both the factors are mental. Whatever the nature of the factors their relation is still a subject of doubt, to remove which the Indian philosopher proceeds to his "truth of truth" which takes him to awareness itself. The relation between awareness and the known, i.e. mind and matter, is also one of non-difference in their essence; for as "ideas" both mind and matter disappear into the distinctionlessness of deep-sleep and then reappear.

According to any Indian analysis of knowledge is not truth. Knowledge may be true or erroneous. And there are two stages in the interpretation of truth: first, the ordinary (empirical) in which the knower and the known are un-analysed, and secondly, the critical, in which the two are fully enquired into. In both, truth is a bridge sought to be thrown across the two factors to bring them together: the closer they come the less is the room for doubt or error.

Truth, as has been already indicated, like two plus two are equal to four, admits of no difference of view. Man therefore at every stage of making sure that his knowledge is true seeks agreement either by quoting authorities, ancient and modern, or by repeating his observations, or, as in religious proselytisation, by compelling others to

(continued from the previous page) his own view, so that he may have the satisfaction derived from non-difference, which is the essential characteristic of truth. But as it is not possible to find out what all men,—past, present and future—think of any item of experience, the first necessary condition to be fulfilled in this quest is that the item of experience, knowledge of which is sought, in itself excludes all possibility of difference. This condition can be fulfilled only in “Non-duality.”

Next, ordinarily (in the waking state) we find two sources of doubt or error: (a) the knowing mind and (b) the object sought to be known. The knowing mind has various capacities at different times. And there are many minds. The matter to be known appears to present various aspects and that at different times. Each mind sees some one aspect at a time, and hence arise doubts. To be free from all possibility of doubt, one's mind should comprehend at a given moment all minds and all their capacities, and the matter to be known should likewise comprehend all its aspects of all times and should represent them at once. The existence of two such factors, the one knowing the other absolutely, is impossible, unless they be non-different.

Again, even when there are only two minds, one cannot know the other truly (beyond all doubt) unless the two be non-different. Similarly, no one can say that one knows God (who is not a material being) truly, unless one is nondifferent from Him. Similar is the difficulty of comprehending totality, whether the knowing mind be included in the

(continued from the previous page) total or excluded from it. Non-difference is a necessity in attaining truth beyond doubt. Absolute non-difference in thought or knowledge is the same as non-duality in existence or being. It must be absolute, for there may be two entities, non-different in all respects excepting in regard to their location in time and space.

It is sometimes said that if the ultimate truth be nonduality what is there to prevent the knower from undergoing change and knowing it himself? But how can change have a meaning unless distinguished from changelessness, and unless change be known to something unchanging? The impossible feat of conceiving an entity remaining unchanged and at the same time undergoing change is attempted by some. But the problem disappears on deeper enquiry, which leads one to the second stage in the knower which is unchanging awareness only. The final problem therefore, is how can the unchanging and indivisible awareness know the changing as non-different, so that truth may be attained. The appeal is made to life. All changes disappear in deep-sleep which is non-duality. Change, therefore, is unreal being an idea appearing and disappearing. Change appears with the waking and ceases with it. And what constitutes the essence of ideas is non-duality, which is beyond change and changelessness. In non-duality all distinctions of knowledge (thought) and existence (being) cease to exist. There is no proof that the known – which is idea – exists or can exist apart from awareness. It is needless to consider the unprovable hypothesis that a third unknown entity produces all ideas.

Some philosophers make no distinction between "Monism" and "non-dualism" but say that "Unity" is what they also seek in philosophy. But Monism and Non-dualism are poles asunder. They do not see this because they ignore the uniqueness of the knower. When one is conscious of the idea (concept) of Unity, the knower is one and the known (concept) is another: there are two. Unity here really implies duality. Non-duality only means that what is beyond duality cannot be characterised either as "Unity" or as "Non-existence" for unity has no meaning unless distinguished from multiplicity; nor can non-existence have a meaning apart from the notion of existence. They refer, therefore, to the world of duality where no term can have a meaning without reference to any other. The Ultimate truth negates all duality. But truth is no truth unless verified.

VERIFICATION. Is non-duality a mere word or sound like the "Barren woman's son", or a mere concept? No. It is actually realised in this life. In deep-sleep there is no known, no second, no duality. Nor is it absolute non-existence. But this is only an instance of non-duality in one state, which is enough to prove its possibility in actual life. What philosophy seeks is the non-duality in all the three states. Now, into the distinctionless non-duality of deep-sleep disappears the entire known (universe). Then nothing else is known to exist to which could be traced the origin of the universe of ideas—the known, of the waking and dream states, in which (states) the universe reappears. It may be likened to the water of the sea which remains the same whether the sea is waveless or

(continued from the previous page) full of waves. The waves, when they arise, cannot be said to be different from water in their substance. Whatever that non-dual distinctionless entity of deep-sleep be, that is what constitutes the substance of the waking and the dream states. Again, the existence of the waking or the dream worlds is unthinkable unless distinguished from their non-existence which is deep sleep. Further, there is no memory either in deep-sleep; for memory implies something known, which is then absent. When, therefore, non-duality is said to be known, it only means that there is no distinction of knowing and being. There, to know is to be. When some men think that they grasp non-duality, they only form a concept, a sort of dummy, and delude themselves by mistaking the imaginary dummy, and delude themselves by mistaking the imaginary dummy for what they vainly attempt to grasp. Similarly, when others say that non-duality is something attained in mystic ecstasy or vision, they only think of it from the standpoint of intellect, not from that of "Reason." For we have non-duality for instance in deepsleep which is common to all men and even to lower animals (and plants) which no one takes to be mystic realisation or intuition. For attaining the truth, i.e. the non-duality verified in the three states, which philosophy seeks, Reason is needed—not intellect. To one confined to intellect, Reason appears mystical.

Were Non-duality not the truth beyond doubt, philosophy would be, as it is to so many men, mere chaff, mere words. It is so to those who talk the grandest conceptual philosophy, living at the same time the most unethical lives. With the absolute non-difference

(continued from the previous page) reached in knowledge, perfection is reached in life. They are non-different. In philosophy Non-duality is not only the Ultimate truth, but also the ultimate reality.

CAUSALITY. The importance of this subject to the philosopher in India may be measured by the fact that there it is the knowledge of its meaning that marks the qualification needed for one to enter the gates of philosophy.

The notion of cause and effect is found associated with all that is known, i.e. with the waking and dream states. Nothing in the world of science, religion, and even art in some aspects, has meaning apart from the idea of "cause". But as the entire universe is only an idea or mental phenomenon, cause also is of this nature. That stories of creation found in all the scriptures are but fairy tales or myths meant for children, and have a value only as such, was known thousands of years ago, in India. Even the modern scientific theory of evolution is no more than a concept, useful for scientific or practical purposes. Nevertheless, causal relation even in the waking state itself is an enigma. Everyone knows that what at one stage is a seed, is a shoot at another and a plant or tree with fruits, flowers and foliage at a third stage. But who knows how a seed transforms itself, or other materials, into all these? What kind of continuity or connection is there? Various explanations have been attempted in the West. But in India three are offered to suit different stages of thinkers. (1) The effect fully exists in the cause, though it manifests itself as effect subsequently, both being in essence the same,

(continued from the previous page) (2) the effect has new forms which did not exist in the cause but which spring out of nothing (3) the effect remains unaffected by effect. All these fail to satisfy Reason because of the contradictions in them and because the phenomena of the world of "cause and effect" disappears in deep sleep. "Cause and effect" in the world of duality convey sense. But to talk of them with reference to what is beyond duality is meaningless. That God (the Absolute, Unmanifest, Unconditioned or Infinite) created, produced, manifested or in any manner became the universe, is from the standpoint of truth meaningless. From the waking standpoint, that is, of duality, mind cannot but think in terms of cause and effect. The mind when it posits a cause for this world, imagines it to be antecedent to the world as effect. Causal relation is the only characteristic of the thinking process, which enables the mind to know the world of experience. This is well known to Europe also. The urge to seek a cause for the world is an urge to transcend the effect because the known universe is unreal, or as it is sometimes said, "not-self-subsistent." Considered from the standpoint of substance, cause cannot be different from the effect, even in the waking state. But what appears significant now is that even modern science in its quantum theory is approaching the same truth. Seeing that all ideas and concepts are wiped out in deep-sleep, they are, as such, unreal. This Universe, when viewed as unassociated with the concept of causal relation, is neither produced nor destroyed.

Space and time which causality implies,

(continued from the previous page) share the same fate. Modern science has seen the old truth that the former two are inseparable. It will also see in the future that even "cause" is inseparable. It is not "space-time" but "space-time-cause" that really forms the fourth dimension of matter. Perhaps the meaning of cause will then be extended.

MEANING OF EXPLANATION The greatest value of "causal relation" lies in the fact that it gives a meaning to the term "explanation" When an explanation of any fact is sought, it is the cause that is usually sought. But the need for the "cause" arises because the "effect" by itself is meaningless without its correlative. The two form a whole. In other words, it is the whole and its relation to the part, that "explains." The true explanation of life or existence, therefore, lies in the knowledge of the relation of awareness to the three states, that is the whole of life to each of them.

SCIENCE, RELIGION, ETHICS AND ART. There being no field of experience that science does not study, even Religion and Art cannot be beyond its reach. As already indicated, all these do, but only in certain degrees, contribute to the attainment of the ultimate truth. They also satisfy wants and remove fears in a measure. In indicating their trend or outlook, nothing more than a bird's eye view, and that from the standpoint of philosophy alone, is attempted under this head. Science, as knowledge, is concerned with the known only, not the knower (simple awareness) which can never be an object and cannot, as such, be studied. Psychology,

(continued from the previous page) physical and natural science, social and sociological sciences, which deal with "objects" mental and material, are all of unquestionable value in the waking states. What interests the philosopher ultimately is not so much the conclusions or the applications of science, as its method and outlook. The conclusions of the scientists of to-day may be scrapped to-morrow, but their method and outlook continue. The features of science that philosophy values are: first, science aims at generalisation, which is a measure of differencelessness. Next, science has the great virtue of not accepting anything as truth till that is verified as far as possible, though the test be confined to the waking state alone. It makes the meaning of the term "explanation" clearer. Turning next to its conclusions, physical and natural sciences have now reached the stage in which it is recognized that all phenomena of the material world or the mental world imply not merely change but also exchange. It is a truism to say that the constituents of one form of existence become in part, or in entirety, the constituents of another, and vice versa. Loss in or of one is gain to another, elsewhere. There is no absolute destruction of anything. This is the meaning of what are known as growth, decay and death, or transformation and whatever constitutes life. The food I now eat formed part of something different from me, and has now, after my eating it, become my body. Even so, what I give up from my body becomes part of the world outside. This goes on continuously. No line can be drawn between my body and the rest of the world so far as the constituents

(continued from the previous page) go. The lesson of philosophical significance learnt is that ultimately non-difference characterises the highest truths of the world of matter and energy. What the world considers the most wonderful achievements of practical scientists is based upon the transmutability of one kind of matter or energy into another, which in turn points to Non-duality.

The case is not different with the objects or contents of the mental world with which psychology deals. As already indicated, all the contents of the mind, namely thoughts, volitions, feelings, including visions, intuitions and ecstasies, are only transformations of the stuff (if the may be used) of the mind. No line can be drawn between the stuff of the mind and the stuff of the volitions or feelings and other phenomena. So psychology also points to the same direction.

Thirdly, the latest science is the most emphatic on the inference that mind and matter are not two different entities in their stuff. The entire universe is resolvable into mind or a third common entity. Non-duality again meets us here.

Fourthly, science doubts the existence of causal relation as it does in its theory of indeterminacy and approaches philosophy in holding this relation to be a concept only.

Next, we turn to the science that answers the question of what practical use is science to the growth of society or of mankind as a whole? Men die, but man or society lives. What promotes its growth and life? This is what sociology is concerned with. The whole urge in the world of sociology is towards

(continued from the previous page) the gradual realisation of the unity of interests, negating differences, so that society may live. To take only a few instances, in politics, whatever the form of Government, the struggle is to overcome the painful consequences of the failure to realise one's self as the all... The elimination of difference so as to lead to unity in interests is the goal, but not merely the changing of forms such as monarchy into democracy and so forth. Any political organisation or institution can give satisfaction only to the extent to which this truth is recognised. Political disturbances arise when difference is accentuated in any form. They are least where the feeling of difference is least. It is even so with all other sociological concerns. Social progress and stability are promoted to the extent to which the negation of differences is achieved.

It is the same with forms of Religion, whose number is legion. It is ever multiplying, and developing differences and distinctions. But this urge to seek spiritual satisfaction does not cease till in the mystic the individual is merged in the Absolute or God.

In the lower stages he seeks to approach God or realise God in his thoughts and acts. But merging into Him is the goal. Even then the urge might continue for knowing or realising the whole of God. All doubts can cease only when man identifies himself with God. Though the science of religion teaches that religion in general seeks an Ultimate Unity called God, yet the Unity cannot be reached except by negating differences. Man comes nearer to God by eliminating differences and

(continued from the previous page) realising that both are of the same stuff called "spirit" whatever significance that term may have. But so long as something known as satisfaction, hitherto unattained, is sought and for this purpose one has to depend upon another, absolute non-difference cannot be said to be contemplated in religion or mysticism.

The conception of God as a perfectly good Being is contradicted by the presence of evil in the world created by Him. He is saved from this inconsistency by the Hindus with the help of their doctrine of Karma. Philosophy indicates that one's body and personality (self), are, like the universe, only ideas or creations of the mind. Man is, therefore, said to be the architect of his misfortunes also. And the continuity characterising that into which all ideas are refunded, gives to the Hindu the closely allied doctrine of re-incarnation. These two are of great value, not only in religion, but also in ethics. They serve to check the impulse towards hatred, the curse of life, which only means the accentuation of difference. And what is more valuable still, is that they are powerful stimulants in making men seek an ethical life, which grows in strength as differences disappear.

In ethics the first rule of right conduct starts from the urge in the mother to identify herself with her child in pain or pleasure and to seek common good. It proceeds in ever-widening circles of such identification, till it includes the whole of humanity. The various ethical ideals find their final explanation in the Hindu doctrine that another is non-different from one. The goal is to see one's self as all and all as one's self. The all here comprehends

(continued from the previous page) even animals and plants. Hindu ethics enjoins not only the seeking of the common good but also the scrupulous avoidance of injury to anyone because by inflicting injury one not only ignores non-difference but also perpetuates the error of the conception that one's self or ego is a reality and that separate from the self the injured. The ideal in ethical conduct is to realise not merely the "non-difference" of the ego and non-ego, but the fact that the ego or the individual self, as "idea" is unreal. The more one repressed the ego till it is a separate entity the greater the value. This is not done by suicide or chloroform. For, beginning with self-restraint, ethics leads one up to self-sacrifices in life, which means the dissolution of the ego in others or in all. And this is the same as saying that the realisation of the all as the ego is the ideal or goal.

In art and Aesthetics, which deal with the urge to derive pleasure from what is considered beautiful, two facts are noticeable. Art consists first in conceiving ideas and then in projecting them into the world of senses. The artist finds in the world of ideas whatever pleasure the layman or he himself would find in the world of senses. The artist often forgets his body and the material surroundings when he is engrossed in the ideas, which for him constitute everything. And when he expressed himself in sounds, words, stone, wood, on the canvas and so forth, he seeks only the realisation of his ideas there, emphasising the non-difference of mind and the sense world. The other aspects of art

(continued from the previous page) which point to the realisation of time, space and cause as ideas cannot be discussed here.

Aesthetic enjoyment comes from what is considered beautiful, in the material or the mental world. The externally beautiful first produces in the enjoyer ideas, which have truth enough to give pleasure, and enable him to enter into the substance or life of the sense world and to realise the common mental character, indicating his essential non-difference from it. This is most evident from the feelings of sympathy evoked at the sight of forests, mountains, rivers, sky and the like; and especially when men feel impelled to address them as living beings.

When the artist seeks expression in the sense world, so that it may evoke similar mental states in other men, he realises himself in others. In all the processes of conceiving, expressing and communing there is a forgetting of one's self. This forgetting gives pleasure because the truth is then realised that individuality is unreal. The source of pleasure, the beautiful, is found everywhere to the extent to which one is able to look beyond the unreal limitations of appearances to negate the sense of difference and duality.

Those whose feelings of reality is based most on external objects derive pleasure most from the sense world. Those whose real interest is greater in the mental² world derive it most from the conceptual or intellectual constructions. Those whose notion of the real rests on neither of these two, find satisfaction in ignoring them both as some mystics do. Those, however, who seek to rest

² The original editor inserted "mental" by hand

(continued from the previous page) on that which is the stuff of all existence find delight in feeling themselves to be one with the all. But they have first to know the meaning of the all, which is the philosopher's aim.

In religion, ethics and aesthetics, not to say sociology in particular, the highest significance is attached to what is known as "love" which only means the realisation, though in different degrees, of "non-difference."

ULTIMATE TRUTH: HOW ATTAINED. A bird's eye view of religion, art and science points to the fact that while they imply truth-values they do not aim at Ultimate truth. They stop at the stages where they find the satisfactions they seek, which are no criteria of philosophic truth.

The very fact that philosophy seeks the truth common to all is proof that it can be no construction of any human mind or minds. Truth is there already and it has only to be discovered or as the Indian thinker says uncovered. Philosophic effort only aims at removing the cover of ignorance, the cause of error and doubt.

Some men reach it quickly and others slowly, often with considerable effort. This labour is needed only to remove mental or material obstacles, such as are implied in personal predilections, temperaments and limitations of the power of observation or of intellectual capacity. When the mind is not strong enough to remove all obstructions, it seeks satisfaction by imagining the ultimate truth (as in Religion), or the immediately next higher degree of truth (as in Science).

(continued from the previous page) But philosophy does not stop till the end is actually attained and therefore it strictly pursues the path of science to the end in freeing the mind of all its errors. In it, as in science, only verified facts count. For eliminating error, Indian philosophy lays down certain conditions as indicated below, which, excepting the last, are common to both philosophy and science.

1. To know that there is something more than appearance for one to seek.
2. To eliminate all personal predilections or preconceptions regarding the object of enquiry.
3. To possess calmness, self-restraint, patience, concentration, and an absence of religious bias.
4. To possess the supreme determination to eradicate all doubts and their possibilities and all causes of error as well as all ignorance.

The scientist does not admit the last (No.4) for, he does not seek ultimate truth, which he presumes to be unattainable.

The most important of the conditions common to both philosophers and scientists is "Depersonalisation" of "Self-elimination" leading to the detachment of awareness, which is a sine qua non. But scientists admit it only to a limited extent. This item and a few others, however, show to what extent moral discipline is needed for removing the cause of error and for sharpening the mind. Philosophy insists upon an unqualified fulfilment of moral condition. Egoism within limits does not seriously obstruct the pursuit of truth in the intellectual field; but attachment to the ego, which is unreal, is a positive hindrance of the

(continued from the previous page) greatest magnitude in the world of Reason. Religion lays emphasis on moral discipline, and Science on intellectual, but Philosophy upon both, in the highest degree.

Doubt and possibilities of error can never cease so long as one confines oneself to waking experience. And there can be no end to philosophies springing up so long as men build solely upon waking experience ignoring the rest. Reason alone leads to truth beyond all doubts. Philosophy based on Reason, therefore, is, and can be, only one.

Theology, Scholasticism and the like do make use of logical or intellectual arguments in interpreting authorities, scriptures and so forth. They are no doubt valuable as disciplines. But as they do not appeal to Reason in its universal character, they can never lead directly to truth beyond all possibility of doubt. Nor can authority and scripture or their interpretation constitute philosophy. LIFE. The touchstone of philosophy is life. As shown above, all life's activities comprehended under science, religion and art tend towards the realisation that not only the universe is an idea but that there ultimately exists no difference between thought and being, knowledge and existence or life. The past years that one has lived enjoying or suffering, achieving or failing, waking or sleeping and the past world of one's childhood and youth, all so real then, are now no more than ideas or knowledge. Such also is the past history of man and his past world, so real while they lasted. Everything known resolves itself into knowledge or idea. The man of knowledge, feeling, thought or intellect, be he scientist, artist, theologian or

(continued from the previous page) whatever else, to the extent to which he rises above the gross world of the senses is, and is held, superior to others. Every man, whether he likes it or not, converts according to his capacity all experience of life into knowledge, something known in the mind, that he may value it.

Philosophy rises above all distinctions of creed, caste, colour, race, calling age, or school of thought. Its most distinguishing feature is that the philosopher seeks the supreme realisation of himself as the all the all as himself. This perfection is either for all or for none; for to the philosopher individually there is no perfection inasmuch as the universe as an idea is in him and of him. Till one realises this existence by eradicating ignorance one thinks life, world or God to be difference from "knowledge" and one will not have realised "Non-duality."

But for the man who has not attained perfection, who has not realised himself as the all, the many with differences exist; and for him, no one has attained the truth of non-difference. Absolute non-difference or non-duality has no meaning when the thinker excludes or differentiates himself from another or the rest. To the imperfect, therefore, the so called perfect man is imperfect or less imperfect than others. Perfection looks most like mysticism to the man of mere intellect. But to the man of perfect reason nothing is more real, more universal.

Philosophers do not seek to distinguish themselves from the rest of mankind in any manner, for all distinctions are but ideas and therefore unreal. Philosophers discharge, like their fellow-men, all duties, pleasant or

(continued from the previous page) unpleasant, and all functions in society as well as they can. Whatever the circumstances in which they are placed, prosperity or adversity, on the battlefield or in the parlour with a crown of diamonds or of thorns, in the mountain caves or in market places, whether praised or condemned, they remain ever balanced, resting on the Ultimate Truth. They only strive to help others to reach the goal that they themselves have reached. Their sole object in life is to make others reach this perfection. The philosopher is he who in various ways seeks to realise himself in the all and the all in himself, their joy being his joy and their sorrow his sorrow. When all ignorance is dispelled, when everything is found to be of the same stuff that which is labelled knowledge when there is no second or other, and when there remains nothing unattained, then there can be no room for "want" or "fear" of any change or even of death which is unmasked by truth.

Why do men not reach this goal easily? The failure is due to the inability to see that the external world including the body and individuality are mental, that the body and the universe are not outside the mind but all is idea. The inherited and almost ineffaceable prejudice or preconception that these are what they appear, in spite of the everyday experience of deep sleep, is erroneous knowledge which mankind is most reluctant to give up. Even the thought of death fails to teach this lesson. Men with preconceptions cannot hope to obtain, as Indian philosophers say, even scientific truth, much less philosophic truth. Divesting the

(continued from the previous page) mind of its preconceptions is a gradual process, which takes the mind through the disciplines of religion, art and science.

The supreme test of Philosophy or supreme verification of Ultimate Truth lies in life, i.e. life of the three states, but not in any intellectual solution of the problems, nor in weaving conceptual webs called "systems" of thought, which must be interminable. Philosophical enquiry based on Reason, therefore leads one beyond vision, intuition—however unique—intellect and concept. Reason which with a view to removing the intellectual misgiving that such a goal may be non-existent or unattainable, names it Non-duality. It is nothing but awareness together with the three-states, in which, like the water of the sea, with the waves (as in waking and dream states) or without them (as in deep-sleep) the distinctionless Non-duality is never non-existence, to which has been given the name Atman.

In India, Philosophy is sought for the sake of the one and only lesson it teaches man: how to attain and live the life in which realised the all as himself and himself in the all. It is sought by him who pursues the truth that admits of no doubt of possibility of doubt, which reveals the absolute non-difference of complete knowledge and perfect life. Such a man (dhira) will not stop, come what may, till he reaches the end, in which Reason makes absolutely sure that there exists nothing unknown and unattained.

To what extent mankind attains to this truth, to that extent does it approach perfection, known as Brahman, and to that extent, it is philosophic. When perfection is reached

(continued from the previous page) there is none imperfect, no imperfection anywhere. When perfect knowledge is attained perfection of life in all its aspects is attained, which is "the highest good comprising all possible good in itself.

VEDANTA AND MODERN THOUGHT.[§]

"Truth loses its force for us when it disagrees with what one loves, or even when it agrees with what one hates." – Eastern Proverb.

That thoughtful minds of the West as well as of the East still think it worth their while not only to make a study, however laborious, of Vedanta, but also vigorously to attack it, is proof that it is not grown effete yet, though it is among the oldest of human speculations. Nor does it appear that its influence on the actual life of its adherents of even the twentieth century has suffered in the slightest degree. This age-long vitality seems to lie in its characteristic solution of the problem of existence. And it has been steadily gaining support from some of the profoundest thinkers not only of the old Greek world such as those of the Parmenidean or the Platonic School, but also of the Modern Western world, from Spinoza to Gentile, who hold views tending more and more towards the Vedantic goal of Atman as the sole ultimate reality.

Vedanta, as it is evident, signifies the end of the Vedas. It comes after the portion dealing with religion or matters concerning various beliefs in respect of God and concerning practices or rituals pertaining to

[§] Pamphlet reprinted from Mysore University Journal.

(continued from the previous page) them. This "end" has grown out of religious thought as the tree out of the seed and the seedling. But the tree is not the seed. Vedanta is nevertheless often mistaken for religion, mysticism or theology. To put it briefly, Vedanta is a study of the significance of man's experience and life; in other words, it is an enquiry into the meaning of all existence. It seeks an explanation of the phenomena of religion, as it does of all other phenomena in and around us, such as psychological, aesthetical, ethical, social and physical. With regard to religion, for instance, it enquires why man is impelled to believe in an invisible Being and to propitiate it by worship, whether there is any Reality attaching to such Being, why men fight for creeds or seek to establish the superiority of one's faith to those of others, or why men sacrifice their very lives on the altar of their pet beliefs. Such being the scope and aim of Vedanta in general, we shall, in the following paras, try to indicate what it is in so far as it bears on the contents of one of the latest and most thoughtful works on Vedanta, from the learned pen of Dr Urquhart of the Calcutta University. It is an invaluable contribution to Vedantic literature of Sankara's school, from an opponent worthy of the highest esteem. All seekers after truth must be deeply indebted to him. "Truth (be it Vedantic, be it Christian) is like a torch, the more it is shook, it shines."

VEDANTA AS RELIGION. If in "The Vedanta and Modern thought" our author's object was to compare the religion of the Vedantin with Christianity or from that matter any other religion, it would have been fairer if he had

(continued from the previous page) taken into account that stage of it that has been indicated above as the seed or the seedling. This volume appears as one of the publications of the series entitled "The Religious Quest of India" whose editorial preface says that these books "seek to set each form of Indian Religion by the side of Christianity." And at the end of the book the author declares that the Vedanta is "A definite preparation for Christianity—and further acceptance of Christ himself—who will sanctify and make complete the religious thought of India." In thus comparing "Religious" values it is not clear why Dr Urquhart, who is so eager to be fair to his opponent, overlooked the fact that while Christianity holds that it alone is in sole possession of the final key to Heaven, in that it believes that Christianity is the completion of the "Religious Quest" and that "whosoever drinketh of the water that I (Christ) shall give him shall never thirst. The Vedantin's God is not susceptible either to "favouritism" or the "Jealousy" or to "anger." His God says "Howsoever men approach me, even so do I welcome them. It is the path leading to me that men follow on every side." (Gita) "The same am I to all beings." (Gita). And Sankara to whom the learned author refers is not the founder or reviver of any single faith, like other founders, but a reviver of all the six faiths that believed in a moral God and that were known to the India of his days. He was therefore called "Shanmatasthapanacharya". Accordingly the followers of Sankara pray every day thus: "May all be happy; may all enjoy

(continued from the previous page) perfect health; may all attain the highest good." Do others, may we ask, believe and pray that all non-believers such as infidels, mlechas and pagans may also attain to Heaven straight without the intervention of their own prophets and Messengers. The Vedantin esteems all religious paths alike; there is none higher, none lower: the keys of Heaven are with all alike. Nor has Vedantic religion ever waged aggressive wars to make converts. Above all, the Advaita Vedantin cannot enter Heaven till every other creature in this Universe has attained it. Whereas other religions hold that their followers can reach this goal, even though the rest of their fellow beings may be wallowing in misery. Individual or self-seeking salvation is an abomination to Shankara's religion. The Vedantin of Sankara's school has therefore patiently to wait and see that all others enter the kingdom of God before he can.

The learned professor, however, seems to have a higher ambition. He wishes to beat philosophy with a big stick of religion. And he contends at great length that the former must occupy a lower place than the latter. He observes: "When thought devoted to abstract procedure sets out upon its search for the "Mythical" Absolute, for some unknowable substance hidden behind the qualities of the world, or some mysterious soul lurking beneath all the processes of the mind, and failing in the quest, it is disposed to deny the reality of all the products of its exploring experiences, it may reach the conception of identity, between that which has not been found in either direction of the search. But as a result which is so closely and consciously

(continued from the previous page) associated with scepticism, yet this is surely one of the functions we naturally assign to religion. We expect it to give us at least some rock to which, we may cling in the midst of our sea of doubt."

Let us now turn to this "rock" of religion for is while. Religions are legion. And they have not ceased to multiply even after God sent so many of his Prophets, Avatars and Sons down to us to reveal the truth. Evidently God multiplies them perhaps only to confound his children the more. And there is such a dreadful struggle among religions for survival and supremacy that we find that more human blood has been shed and more harm done in the name of God than in any other cause. May we ask, if religions revealed truth, why should there be such bitter fights. No one makes use of such vituperative or deadly weapons to prove that 2 plus 2 is 4. And why should God, the Arbiter of all religious differences delight in causing so much hatred among those that seek Him?

Dr Urquhart is most particular in the matter of ethical tests. What shall we say of the ethical standard of God who insidiously inflicts terrible sufferings on mere babies and children, the most innocent of his own creatures, who know not good from bad? Let us recall to our mind in this connection, the offerings to God Moloch and God Jagannath. Who created the human mind and put these thoughts into the mothers and fathers? Were these tragedies beyond God's control?

Be this as it may, God is Omniscient. He knew the future when he created the mind of

(continued from the previous page) man and put into the world the multitude of temptations. He knew that his weak children whom he deliberately made weak, would succumb to them. And yet, when they fall victims, He springs untold miseries on them here. Further, as though He were not satisfied, He has, it is said created a Hell in the next world that he may feast his eyes (for he is omnipresent) by looking on the sufferings of his own "weak" children. Even the virtuous are not spared; for, their sufferings are said to delight God (and Gods) in a special degree. But the unkindest cut of all is that He has deliberately blessed His children, not only with weakness, but also with ignorance. What kind of Fatherhood (or Motherhood) of God is this!

Before creating this world of sins and the sinful minds in it, he was planning them in His heart. When He nurtured these sinful thoughts in His breast, was He vicious or not? Or shall we say, as some Hindu theologians hold, that God found himself placed suddenly in this world for which He is not responsible? Then, where is the proof that He is able to free us from our sins or from the "Karma" of the Hindu theologians?

Perhaps, Dr Urquhart will tell us, that the very sense of the "Over-powering Presence of God" which a Christian actually experiences is the real "Heaven" or "Salvation", in the midst of the intense suffering and sorrow around him. If, then, Heaven, or Salvation be a purely personal and private affair, why should we not admit that the Jain Sanyasi attains the Highest Heaven, when, on certain days each hair on his head is individually pulled out that he feels "Parama Sukham" (Supreme bliss)? And how can we believe that

(continued from the previous page) any religion will bring mankind to the highest good, when we see before us that two thousands years of spiritual discipline of one of the most ethical of religions, viz. Christianity, has not been able to tame the tiger and the wolf in its believers as revealed by the Great War of Europe, when the good God begged on His most faithful devotees to tear each other, and to prostitute the knowledge of science that He gave them for the achievement of an unparalleled homicidal glory?

It is not to be understood here that the consolation and the stimulus to good life that religious faith offers are undervalued. It is the strongest stay of men in sorrow. But all this comes from what one conceives religion to be, whether the conception be true or false. And there are those on whom fortune has not smiled, whose lot has been cast in suffering and poverty, whose most fervent prayers to God have not had any response till the very last day of their life, and who therefore most seriously doubt whether religious conceptions are not after all delusions. Says a Christian Poet in his disappointment: I fight alone and win or sink, I need none to make me free; I want no Jesus Christ to think, That He can die for me.

Evidently, Dr Urquhart's "rock" of religion is no more than the whale's back on which Sindbad the Sailor sought refuge. The moment the fire of reason is lit, this "rock" disappears in the ocean of doubt, as did the leviathan of the Arabian Nights!

The point, however, is this. The learned Doctor seems to be conscious that his "rock"

(continued from the previous page) may prove a veritable illusion. He therefore cautions his readers against the use of intellect or reason. He says "We must use our knowledge giving faculties in a normal way, and in religion this means that we must regard God as an object distinct from ourselves" What is normal? And who else has seen his God described by him and verified it as truth? His nervousness in this respect is best seen in his frequent use of such expressions as "excessively intellectual", "Its hampering influence", "the danger of purely intellectual attitude." Now, if in assigning to religion a higher rank than philosophy, he holds, as he says, that "feeling" or "sense" is the "supreme criterion" why has he appealed at such enormous length to the Vedantin's reason in this work on religion? "Feeling" as a part of experience is recognised both by philosophy and by religion. But its value and significance are tested by reason. When Dr Urquhart tries to place the feeling of the Christian above that of the Vedantin, he but appeals to reason.

Mysticism in Vedanta no doubt occupies a rank next to that of philosophy. It is recognised as the next best course for the majority seeking the goal. If the mystic could only prove that his "feeling" or "realisation" of God is the ultimate truth, he would be a Vedantin.

So to test the value of "feeling" and the truth of religious belief, we need Philosophy. It is the inexorable urge to appeal to Reason as the highest judge, that marks Philosophy or Vedanta from Religion, Mysticism and Theology.

Though religion can never allay the increasing doubts of such enquiring minds as are not

(continued from the previous page) stagnant, yet to the Vedantin religion is indispensable, for the reason that every human mind has to pass in its search after truth through this stage. Religion is that child that grows into manhood of philosophy or Vedanta. He sees that Religion “resisting yet yielding” – acquiesces more and more in the supremacy of reason as man advances in knowledge.

VEDANTA AS PHILOSOPHY. The starting point of the philosophy of Sankara’s Vedanta to which the book confines its attention may be put in his own words thus: “The followers of Kapila, Kanada, Buddha, Jaina and many others are obstinately firm in their individual conviction, so as to hold that truth in its entirety must be of this form and this alone” What then, is truth? And here, for instance, how shall we know what Dr Urquhart says is truth? That is the fundamental question with which the Vedanta starts. And yet, not a word not a syllable, about it in the whole of Dr Urquhart’s book on the Vedanta of Sankara!

Those that seek to enter the gates of Vedanta are called “Dhira” (the fearless wise). They must be men – not children as Dr Urquhart would wish all the believers in his religion to be. These “Dhiras” must have put away all the baubles and toys of religious, mystical, or theological concepts, which delight “child” minds. That religion brings satisfaction just as toys to children, is no proof of its truth, for these concepts are ever in conflict with each other; and each religion thinks the other false. Should the God of religion Himself appear before the Vedantin, he will say unto Him “Art Thou truth, if so, pray, tell me, how shall I know

(continued from the previous page) thee as truth? Such an attitude is incompatible with a nerveless or an unnerved mentality that quails before an "Overpowering Presence" or a "Mysterious Tremendum." That something exists beyond our intellectual ken is admitted by the Vedantin. But whether that something is God as religion conceives it, whether there is nothing beyond that something and whether that something is Reality, requires proof. Vedanta does not disbelieve in an Ultimate Reality, called God or by any other name, but it totally refuses to be led into the shares of religion, mysticism and theology, which cannot stand the test of truth, truth which alone is the means of securing all that is of permanent value.

Sankara's Vedanta says that the highest Truth is one after knowing which there remains nothing else unknown, there can be no possibility of any further doubt arising and no possibility of one desiring anything higher. This is not the truth of religion, which also says that when one attains to God one knows everything and has nothing further to desire. If everything includes God, to know Him and His mind perfectly one ought to be God Himself. But religion according to our author demands the separate existence of God. Slave mentalities may rejoice in being slaves of God, but there are others whose ambition soars to Godhead itself. "What care I how great that God be, If his greatness be not for me?"

Thirdly the most characteristic feature of Vedanta is what is called "Avastatraya". It consists upon a consideration of the totality of experience, in arriving at truth unlike the usual course of taking into account only a fraction of experience, as other schools do. All non-Vedantic philosophers confine themselves

(continued from the previous page) to the data of the waking state only; whereas Vedanta demands that the data of the three states of Dream, Sleep and Waking should be taken into account. This is the key-stone of this system. And yet not a word of discussion about the metaphysical and epistemological implications of this all important subject is to be found here, beyond a passing reference to it, obviously of its vital importance in ascertaining the meaning of Reality.

While the very basic features of Sankara's Vedanta are thus ignored, the book is filled with subsidiary or secondary topics, such as the place of Authority and Works, the distinctions between Avidya and Maya, the two orders of knowledge, the Kosas and so forth.

A word about "Authority" in Sankara, before we proceed further. No one that studies with care, in the original, his commentary on the first four sutras or in the translations, his commentaries on the Upanishads and the sutras in general can fail to notice that nothing is farther from his philosophy than to base his doctrine of Advaita on any authority, be it of the Vedas or of the teachers, Sankara does not accept any piece of knowledge, even that which is called "traditional" without testing it in the fire of reason. Those "child" minds that are still in the swadling clothes of theology and dogma which such mentalities on their own ground Sankara makes use of similar weapons. But Dr Urquhart imagines that Sankara's philosophy is dependent on the authority of the Vedas and extends his sympathies to him, probably because the Doctor's religion cannot stand unless supported by his own scriptures. Sankara's method in philosophical enquiry is to

(continued from the previous page) prove his points rationally and then to quote others that agree with him. This does not mean that he bases his doctrines on the authorities of the vedas or of the Gurus.

But we admit that the Ethics of Vedanta is rightly assigned its proper place, as a subject of the highest importance. First the charges of "quietism", "inactivity" and "indifference" are laid at the door of "Vedanta". One however, need not go far to point out the futility of such a criticism. In regard to a philosopher's ethics the best interpretation is that afforded by his own life. Here is a life of the whole of which was spent in touring most probably on foot, from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas and from Guzerat to Orissa, preaching, teaching and organising, and in writing commentaries on, or orally expounding the Upanisads, the Gita, and the Sutras, besides producing a number of minor works. All this was done within the space of about 20 years, i.e. between the 12th and 32nd year of Shankara, at which age he is said to have died. It is said he never rested for more than three nights under a roof. Is this inertia or indolence? In fact, the Gita, the gospel of the Vedantin is specially meant for the purpose of condemning "Quietism" or "indifference" and inducing Arjuna to fight. We shall not discuss the charge of "pessimism" though is equally untenable, lest we should exceed the limits of this paper.

To cull a few more instances, of the Doctor's powerful indictment of Vedantic ethics, Vedanta is said to be "peculiarly disastrous", "absolutely fatal", "almost a mockery of intelligence"; nothing (in it) that has importance for ethics; "Evil cannot be overcome by denying its reality"

(continued from the previous page) "We are bereft of the responsibility for even the evil we do." "The most serious consequence of Sankara's position is connected with his depreciation of social service and self-sacrifice." "The ethical life is robbed of the necessary energy for dealing with it."

Now in regard to the Vedantin's attitude to "social service" we shall refer but to one verse of the Gita (XXII. 4) "Those who contemplate on the Imperishable delight in actually seeking the welfare of all beings." "That the only mark of the knower of Brahman is his seeking the good of all beings." says Sankara himself in Madukya Karika. As for the other points of attack, we have to invite attention to the fact that while Christianity teaches love of human beings, Vedanta teaches love of all beings. In fact Sankara asks every one to look upon the entire universe as one's own self and to do unto it as he would do unto himself. Why I love my neighbour is that he is myself. The "ought" in Vedanta is the manifestation of the "is". Vedanta is evidently found fault with merely because it goes to the root to find an explanation for what is called "ethical" action.

Throughout this discussion, Dr Urquhart appears to have confused the moral conditions necessary for the attainment of truth and the logical conditions required for the same end. He therefore, repeatedly appeals to "satisfaction" or "satisfactoriness" as the supreme test. But is the satisfaction of a pig in the sty the same as that of the artist conceiving his work or the scientist in making a successful experiment? Or, is the pig satisfied superior to a Plato dissatisfied? What makes the

(continued from the previous page) difference? Is it not the intellect?

We must note, however, before closing this review that the best part of the book is that on Maya. It contains the learned criticism of this doctrine, that we have read in English during the past fifty years and more, though we disagree with him on many points. The author begins by defining it as "Mysterious power" and points out how it acquired, in his view, the significance of "illusion." Its adoption by Sankara is stated thus: "The dominating idea (of the quality-less ultimate) not only make his (Sankara's) search a hopeless one, but prevented him from finding in the unity for which he was searching any key to the baffling problems of the world...He could not bridge the gulf, except by the conception of Maya (A could-enveloped concept)—in itself a recognition of the inexplicability of world and a depreciation of its value." Here we have unfortunately a travesty of this doctrine. The cart has been put before the horse. It is not the idea of a quality-less unity that has forced Sankara to adopt "Maya" but it is the existence of an indisputable fact of experience which he calls Maya, and which fact of experience gives him the quality-less unity as ultimate. This is quite evident to one relying on the totality of experience, but not to one depending upon the fractional, as is the vogue of modern philosophy.

Next Sankara's Maya presents four aspects for a student:- 1. That indicating the character of the world before us, 2. That indicating the cause of this world when the world is viewed as effect; and 3. that indicating power when the cause is thought of as related to something beyond and 4. That indicating

(continued from the previous page) its "non-existence" in Atman. Again when analysis of the characteristics of the world is made, "Maya" is found by Sankara to comprehend 1. change, 2. form, 3. sense of reality. But Dr Urquhart, though he has covered vast ground has not discussed these vital issues, as to how far they are facts of experience. The question of questions therefore is: Is Maya a fact or not?

It take, for instance, a piece of ice in my hand and ask: What is this? By the time I get an answer, it turns into water. Now where have the hardness, the whiteness and the geometrical forms gone? Do they exist or no? If they do exist, where and how? This inexplicability is called Maya in the first aspect. Is this fact of fiction? And yet Dr Urquhart remarks. "We can prove illusion (maya) only theoretically or on paper. In our activity we are brought into contact with a real world and become growingly conscious of its reality as we deal with its problems." Is the disappearance of hardness, whiteness, and geometrical form, which were so evident to the senses, and amenable even to mathematical measurement, real or no. It is not a full solution to say as Kant, Hegel and their followers do, that they are ideas or mental forms.

For the Vedantin, the question still remains: Where are the ideas after their disappearance? Is the inexplicability of their existence after disappearance real or no?

Even granting that this is only theoretical may we ask whether the doctrines of any religion, even of Christianity in support of which he has written this entire work, are not mostly on paper? "Unto him that smiteth thee

(continued from the previous page) on one cheek offer also the other, him that take the away they cloak, forbid not to take they coat also." Pray, tell us, how many christian nations have thus offered their cheeks and coats, in similar circumstances? Doctrines and ideals should be compared with doctrines and ideas, and practices with practices if such discussions are meant to be fruitful.

The other points in regard to Maya cannot be discussed without enquiry into the meaning of the "causal" relation, a most difficult topic (in Sankara's Vedanta) as he himself holds. And without understanding this, no rational interpretation is possible of the teaching "That thou Art" or that the quality-less or Nirguna Atman is ever changeless, untouched by Maya. Dr Urquhart has therefore naturally passed over these knotty problems. And we shall not presume to cover them in a review, limited as this is, but shall refer to one or two instances to show why he cannot depend on mere translations and epitomes. Do translators make a distinction between "truth" and "reality"? Do the authors summaries point out where Sankara uses Brahman and where Atman, for metaphysical purposes? We shall not pursue this further.

To Dr Urquhart, Christianity is truth because it agrees with what he loves: and Vedanta is not truth, because it agrees with what he dislikes.

"So let us say – not, 'since we know we love but rather "since we love we know enough" – R. Browning.

Has Dr Urquhart anything higher to offer? Does he love religious or philosophic thought because it is true? If so, what is his definition

(continued from the previous page) In the absence of such a basis in reason the Indian Vedanta will be, to the world at large, but the pinchbeck, and not the find gold, of philosophy.

Theology, philosophy (particularly Metaphysics) and Religion are so closely associated that criticisms of points in any one of them often lead to misconceptions regarding allied positions in the other two. It is, therefore necessary to state at the very outset that this essay keeps the subject of religion outside the pale of its discussions and confines itself only to Theology and Philosophy. These two subjects differ in many respects, but, it is proposed to consider here only those aspects that have a bearing on Vedanta.

Now, while Philosophy institutes enquiries regarding the idea of God, and the value of this concept in the world of reason and reality, Theology starts with a postulate regarding the existence of God and regarding some of His attributes, from which others are derived by ratiocinative processes. Theology is the science of the God so assumed. It bases its assumptions on the authority of what are known as revelations of Scripture or of Nature. It seeks the help of reason to the extent to which it finds it necessary to make its assumptions appear plausible or rational. It invades the domain of Philosophy when it avers that the God assumed by it is the ultimate truth or the reality of Philosophy. It is there that dogma usurps the throne of reason, and allows it no choice but unconditional subjection. Scriptural Theology tolerates reason only so long as it is subservient to the Scriptures and Natural Theology, only so long as the

(continued from the previous page) validity of its fundamental assumptions are not questioned by reason. What appears to have so encouraged Theology in general to persevere in such a course is the school of philosophic thought which holds that intellect or reason is too impotent an instrument to penetrate into the regions of the highest truth and that it is necessary for this purpose to fall back upon intuition in some form, whose support Revelation finds it easy to seek in as much as it can substitute Revelation for intuition. Theology, therefore believes that it has the support of Philosophy also. Now let us briefly enquire into the nature of the pretensions of Theology to rational bases.

To give here only a few illustrative instances from Indian polemical writings. Everything in this world is seen to have a cause. Hence this world must be presumed to have a cause and that is the First Cause or God. Should it, however, be asked whether that cause God has not another cause in its turn or whether the concept of a First Cause is possible to the Intellect, the theologian summarily rules this question out of order, because it undermines his assumptions. If the law of causality rigorously governs the world and if God is something different in nature from the world, how can we presume that causal relation must subsist between the world and God or between unperceived entities unless we know that they also are of the nature of entities perceived? Again, if God be merciful and good, how could He have been the Creator of all the evil, the sorrows and sufferings in this world? If the evil is all man's doing, who gave man the power to be wicked? And why are innocent children and animals

(continued from the previous page) made susceptible to pain and suffering? If suffering and evil are to be attributed to Karma, as the Indian theologian holds, was the good God justified in laying down the Karmic law, which entails so much pain even on helpless babies, who are incapable of realizing the significance of the great law? Or, is He powerless over the law? Such questions Theology considers impertinent because they are inconvenient; or it freely offers, for them the one characteristic solution, "Divine Mystery or Divine Sport." Besides, whenever in the course of discussions, the Indian theologian is brought to bay, he presses into his service the ready formula of "Anadi" (beginninglessness) to escape the humiliating confession of inability to meet the arguments of the opponent. Such verbal ruses are too common in theological warfare. Unfortunately they do not help to hide one's ignorance as to expose it.

Again, the most elaborate and subtle arguments are advanced to show, as in some of the modern schools of European thought, that reason is not a safe guide to ascertaining the nature of truth. But nothing is more ridiculous, if not childish, than the attempts of some Theologians to disavow the claims of reason altogether. For, in doing so they only appeal to reason and cannot but do it as rational beings. In the Commentaries on the famous Vedanta Sutra II, 1.11 want of uniformity, etc. is put forward as an argument against reason: but it is reason that is invoked to point out these defects.

It is said that reason is required only for purposes of interpreting the scriptural

(continued from the previous page) texts. But when the interpretations differ, as for instance those of the Dualists and the Monists, what is the highest court of appeal sought? It is none other than that of reason, again. The sorriest plight, however in which we find the theologian is when he attempts to argue that in the absence of Scriptural revelation, there would be no finality in our knowledge of truth. Has any finality been arrived at in India? The highest truth, says the theologian, is that contained in the Scriptures but these have to be interpreted in the light of reason: such is the logical see-saw. In the days of Sankara his interpretation was probably thought final. Then came Ramanuja's interpretation which was considered by him and his followers as final. After his came Madhva's. Now which is the final and which the true interpretation? Who knows the true interpretation? If reason has no finality in itself and if interpretations depend upon reason, how can there be finality in interpretations? This transparent fallacy, so patent to every one, the Indian theologian just blinks.

Nor is there a universally accepted science of Theology, as of Physics or Chemistry. The contradictions and inconsistencies of Scriptural and Natural Theology, of the Christian, Islamic, Hindu and other Theologies, and of many sectarian schools under each of these heads, are too numerous to mention and have been even more productive of class hatred than differences in Politics. What is more important still, Theology which started with the avowed object of furnishing a rational support to Religion, a most vital factor in

(continued from the previous page) human life, has made it so vulnerable to the attacks of reason that Religion is how become a contemptible weakling which is more tolerated than admired by the intellectual classes in general, naturally with exceptions.

Is Theology then of no use? Theology has no doubt a value of its own, much in the same was as pinchbeck has, which stills the craving for gold by serving as a plausible substitute for it. Similarly Theological dogmas satisfy the great majority who cannot wing to the highest reaches of reason, but who want something that they could readily believe as the final truth and that could be a solace to them not merely in life but in death.

Philosophy, on the other hand, being a systematized and rational summing up, of man's knowledge of what exists, rests entirely upon man's reason and his actual experience. It recognizes, without any equivocation, the supremacy of reason as the ultimate and sole judge. Even when certain philosophers try to point out the incompetency of reason to penetrate into the mysteries of ultimate reality, they do so only relying upon reason. The theologian that disputes this position, unwittingly pays tribute to reason, as the latter alone enable him to admit or oppose it. Philosophy does not ignore Theology, but works into its own fabric whatever is rational in it. Philosophy guides Theology in its struggles to arrive at truth as it does every other department of human thought. Philosophy honestly encourages the spirit of enquiry to puch forward, as far as it can, and without any let or hindrance, into the whole field of possible

(continued from the previous page) knowledge. Theology is jealous and keeps the questioning spirit immured within the walls of dogmatic assertions; it does not tolerate investigation leading to anything that is opposed to its fundamental assumptions. Philosophy, on the contrary, is prepared to accept as the result of its investigations either a God or a Satan, a heaven or a hell, a something or a nothing (a void) matter or energy, in short, whatever honest enquiry leads to. And the very first person to whom the term philosopher has been applied in Europe is Thales of Greece, who held "water" not God, to be the cause of the world. While philosophy is free to range where it wills, Theology is ever imprisoned in the coils of the octopus of anthropomorphism. But the search after truth cannot be hedged in by such conditions or made dependent on results however gratifying to fancy or imagination.

True philosophy has always carried the banner of peace wherever it has gone. It sows no seeds of discord. It only seeks to harmonize and unify.

Now, is Vedanta Theology or Philosophy? It must be admitted that the Vedanta Sutras, which form the first efforts made at a systematic presentation of this school of thought is unquestionably theological in tone as is evident from its fundamental Sutras like "Sutra Yonitvat" etc. It starts with dogmatic assumptions based on the Vedas and Sastras. So far, the estimates of the European and Indian scholars agree. But what about the pure system of thought that it has led to and that has been elaborated and developed by the later thinkers and writers? To Sankaracharya and his great master Goudapadacharya

(continued from the previous page) belong the credit of having first perceived the untenability of theological arguments in Vedanta, and of having carefully filtered out of the dogmatic mass a purely rational system. Many subsequent thinkers in India amongst the followers not only of Sankaracharya, but also of Ramanujacharya have, I learn, adopted philosophical methods in establishing Vedantic truths. None of them, however, discarded the Theological Vedanta, for, it alone would appeal best to the less intellectual or more emotional majority.

Sankara having been the first to give Vedanta as systematized in the Sutras, a philosophic share I shall confine myself to his work in this field. What constitute Sankaracharya's developments? His Holiness Sri MahaBhagavath of Kolhapur, (in the July 1917 issue of the Indian Philosophic Review,) an accredited Vedantic Scholar, in his learned article "Sankaracharya's Criterion of Truth" says that writers like Dr Thibaut, Prof. J. Eggeling and Prof. A.B. Keith hold Sankara to be a 'Theologian' and a 'Dogmatist'. And His Holiness, one of the highest of Indian authorities also says, "From these and all similar statements it should be evident that Sankara does not attach any value to inferences opposed to the Vedas." "On the contrary, he (Sankara) expressly says that Revelation is the one source of correct knowledge in this case...A sure proof of his (Sankara's) predilection for spiritual authority." Now, merely because Sankara wrote a commentary on a Theological work to infer that he is a "Theologian in his convictions" is a fallacy too palpable to need refutation, especially when there is positive evidence to show his uncompromising adherence

(continued from the previous page) to pure reason and his absolute reliance on it as the highest criterion of truth, independent of any authority other than Experience. The theological doctrines on which he has commented with apparent approval have been taken to indicate his own views. Sankara's words are often quoted as though they supported this contention. But such passages occur in particular contexts, where they have a perfectly relevant bearing on the theological doctrines discussed. They indicate absolutely nothing about Sankara's one philosophic views. Many Western thinkers and theologians have made mighty and gigantic (attempts) to prove the existence and the attributes of God from Cosmological and Teleological arguments, but in vain. And Sankara a thousands years ago said that such arguments are all trifles, light as air, to the philosopher. He said that they were to be used only for theological purposes and as such they should be based upon Scriptural authority alone. The Vedanta Sutras start with the dogma that God is the cause of this world. (Brahman is that from which the origination of this world etc.). And if it be asked how we know that He is the cause of the world, the reply, says Sankara, should be "from the Scriptures Sruti) only, no reasoning can prove the causal relation between God and the world." Theologian's efforts to establish this relation are altogether futile. Nay, it can never be proved that such a relation as "cause and effect" really exist. Let me now quote Sankara's own words. At the very threshold of his great work, his commentary on the Vedanta Sutras, where

(continued from the previous page) for the first time the relation of reasoning to Revelation is discussed, (Sutra I, 2), Sankara says "(some of) those who maintain a Lord to be the cause of the world think that the existence...can be inferred by means of the argument stated just now (without recourse being had to Scripture at all...). By no means, we (Sankara) reply. For the comprehension of Brahman as the author of the world is effected by...the Vedanta texts not either by inference or by other means of right knowledge...If Brahman were an object of the senses, we might perceive that the world is connected with Brahman as its effect but as the effect (world) only is perceived it is impossible to decide whether it is connected with Brahman or something else as its cause." "Through Scripture only as a means of knowledge Brahman is known to be the cause of the origination of the world." (Sutra 3) "The cause of this world is not to be known even by divine beings of extraordinary power and wisdom..." (Sutra II, 16). Above all, in that famous Sutra on the futility of reasoning (II, 1, II) Sankara sums up the position in the words "Our final position, therefore, is that on the ground of scripture and of reasoning subordinate to scripture the intelligent Brahman is to be considered the cause and substance of the world."

Now, of this causal relation what is Sankara's estimate? Does he consider "Causality" a real or philosophic fact? He says in the Sutra on causal relation (II.1.14) that "In reality there is no such thing as a modification...So long as a person has not reached the true knowledge...So long it does not enter his mind that the world of effects with

(continued from the previous page) its means and objects of right knowledge...is untrue." Again in his commentary on the Karikas "Nothing born (produced) of anything for the reason that whatever is supposed to be born (produced) is not born of itself, or of another...In truth the being (produced) of something it is impossible to establish in any manner." "More plainly still, "Those who have received the light do not see any truth in causality..." The possibility of Causation countenanced at times by the wise...is meant only for the ignorant." This Indian philosopher thus anticipated a thousand years ago what Hume vaguely guessed and Kant definitely proved in comparatively recent times."

Here it may be noted in passing that the one key to the entire system of Vedanta, the philosophy of Sankara, lies in the meaning of 'causality.' Unless one clearly understands that no such relation as 'cause and effect' exists as a reality one cannot according to Sankara understand the philosophy of Vedanta.

Now, according to Sankara the causal relation is not true and even if it were true it would be illogical to connect God with the world as its cause. If such an untrue and illogical relation is to be attributed to God, it must be on the authority of the scriptures. And this is what is so often quoted to prove that Sankara is a Theologian and a Dogmatist.

But what has all this to do with Sankaracharya, as a philosopher and his philosophy which he calls the Advaita, which alone is truth to him? Not only of the critics, European or Indian, has till now enquired how far Sankara's philosophy proper requires the support of Sruti (scripture). His system

(continued from the previous page) establishes, as its very name Advaita implies – the non-existence of duality – i.e. Ego and the Non-ego, Knower and the known, the I and the you. Like Descartes, but on a line of reasoning different from his, Sankara arrives at the doctrine that the existence of one's own consciousness or self, or the knower, does not and cannot admit of any doubt. The self, as objectless consciousness being self-established all proofs are needed by the self with reference to the non-self and the very desire for proof does itself pre-suppose the self. It is only that of which one is conscious, i.e. the known or the knowable and the relation between the knower and the known that can be objects of doubt and that need investigation. This enquiry constitutes the entire purpose of philosophy. Sankara's system, therefore, consists of the proof of the relative unreality of what is perceived or known and consequently also of its relation to the knower or consciousness. This he achieves without any appeal to the Scripture. He bases it entirely upon reason. Not that the Scriptures do not contain the same truth. On the contrary, the unique distinction of having first given out to the world these truths belongs to the Vedas alone. But the credit of having first woven them into a philosophical system belongs to the genius of Sankara and his master Gaudapada. They, however, repeatedly acknowledge that they owe the suggestion, the basic idea of these truths and of their methods of reasoning to the Vedas, and that is the reason why they call their system Vedanta. History shows that at the time of Sankara and his master Gaudapada other rationalistic

(continued from the previous page) schools of Indian thought, like those of the Charvakas, Buddhists, Syadvadins, Hirisvara, Sankhyavadins had sprung up and Vedanta could not hold its own unless it took its stand on reason. And it was these two philosophers who realized a need for, and actually chalked out, a rational and systematic path to these truths independently of the Scriptures, so that to-day, the Vedas may disappear, yet will Vedanta stand as a system of philosophy. Of the so called truths of Vedantic Theology, such for instance as God being the cause for the world, scripture alone is the basis. But of the real truths of Vedantic philosophy of which Sankara and Gaudapada are the first builders reason alone is the basis and can be the basis, for the Vedas themselves, as though by passing a self-denying ordinances, declare in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad: "There, Vedas are no Vedas, and Gods on Gods." Sankara's ultimate criterion of philosophic truth, therefore, is reason.

It was Gaudapada who first drew a line between Vedantic theology and Vedantic Philosophy in his famous Karikas. It was Sankara who developed on these lines and built up a system. Here are Sankara's own words. In his commentary on Gaudapada's Karika he says "It has already been said that knowledge having arisen, duality does not exist and this has been borne out by the Srutis. This however, is established only on the authority of the holy writ. But it is possible also to prove the unsubstantiality of the objective (the known) even from pure reasoning. And this second chapter is undertaken for that purpose. Again "It is asked whether the

(continued from the previous page) the Advaita is to be taken as proved only on the evidence of the Sruti and whether reason cannot possibly demonstrate it? This chapter, therefore, shows how the Advaita can be demonstrated by reason." (Com. Karika III.1)

Now, Sankara and Gaudapada have not only said so, but have actually established their doctrine solely by reasoning, without relying upon a single syllable of the Scriptures. That I have not misread Sankara's views of Vedanta is further corroborated by testimony of great value. Sures-Varacharya, Sankara's immediate disciple, who ought to know his master's mind better than others, writes in his celebrated Nyshkarma Siddhi as follows:- "The subject matter of Vedanta is thus reasoned out. Although this (knowledge) is attained through the grace of the Vedas and the preceptor, yet it does not depend upon such grace. For, it is of the nature of truth established independently of all these. For a more detailed exposition of the rational basis of Vedanta, the English Commentary on Vidyaranya's Panchadeshi by Dr Srinivasa Rao and Mr Krishnaswami Iyer and the article by the latter on the Fundamental of Vedanta published in the Journal of the Mythic Society, Bangalore may be consulted.

Lastly, if Vedanta as developed by Sankara and others is philosophy, what is its value to the philosophic world? It has brought in an entirely new conception of reason and its range, a conception of which neither Europe nor America, nor any other part of the world appears to have had any inkling. Vedantic reason is based entirely upon experience (anubhava) which includes intuition and realisation. Vedantic reason is not the same as the

(continued from the previous page) reason of the Logician or Tharkika, which is the European idea of reason. Vedantic reason is wider than the European conception of it. To distinguish this Eastern notion from the Western, we may use tentatively two new terms. Vedantic Reason is tribasic while the European is monobasic. It is the narrowness of this European conception that has compelled a large number of its philosophers to question the adequacy of reason as a source of the highest knowledge and to fall back upon intuition in some one of its various forms and on mystic or ecstatic visions of truth as the Indian Tharkika (logician) and the Indian Yogi (Mystic) have, whose systems are different from Advaita. After Kant, who first scientifically determined the limitations of reason as understood in Europe, Schelling and his school hovered between intellect and intuition, and Bergson relies upon intuition to a greater extent still. And pure empiricists of the type of the new realists and pragmatists, the modern Western representatives of the old Hindu 'Artha Kriya Kari Satya Vadins' altogether despair of ever knowing absolute truth or a non-dynamic reality. The characteristic breadth, however, of the premises from which the Indian thinkers draw their inferences have exactly reversed the situation in as much as they show that philosophy is not, as a student in one of the Western Universities is said to have written upon his professor's door "A road leading nowhere", that it is not a speculative science as the Europeans hold, but the most real and the most indubitable of sciences, while the physical sciences upon which Western people so largely build, are at

(continued from the previous page) are at bottom speculative in the highest degree. This accounts for the Indian's remarkable attachment to his metaphysics. As the conception of what I have called the tribasic reason is, therefore, one of the most original and valuable of India's contribution to the world's treasury of philosophic wisdom, I should be doing it a positive injustice if I disposed of it in a few sentences or paragraphs. Besides, every student of philosophy knows the magnitude of the confusion arising from an absence of accurate definition of the terms used. Reserving therefore, this subject of reason for another occasion, I may state here that reason as understood by Sankara and Gaudapada is the most powerful searchlight yet turned on any philosophic enquiry in the world, of which even the latest and the most advanced thinkers outside India appear, to me, to be so far altogether unaware.

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THE ESSENTIALS OF VEDANTA.
(In the Cultural Heritage of India).

What does Vedanta mean? Vedanta is knowledge that has for its aim the solution of the mystery of all existence. In a sense every man has an explanation of the universe known to him, though it cannot be said that he has solved all the doubts that have presented themselves. What the Vedantist, however, does is to make a systematic, nay, the most comprehensive enquiry possible. From time immemorial Indian thinkers fully recognized the fact, so often overlooked, that a man can grasp only what he has the capacity to think about or perceive, and that the same truths are viewed in a variety of ways

(continued from the previous page) according to different stages of intellectual development or different mental attitudes or tastes. The Indian or Vedantic philosophers have in view of this fact when they present their solutions in a number of ways. This feature causes not a little confusion in the minds of those that approach Vedantic literature from the modern Western or Westernised standpoint. Some have taken it to be religion and some, mysticism. Others have thought that it is theology or scholasticism. And yet others have considered it to be the rudiments of scientific thinking. A few, however, believe that it is a philosophic interpretation of the universe. All these views are both correct and incorrect; for Vedanta is all these. Vedanta attempts to sum up the whole of human knowledge or experience to be a step in the ladder. At one stage it is religion, at another it is mysticism, and so forth. It recognises even atheism or agnosticism as a step. It takes a bird's eye view of all sciences and arts also. It ignores or discards nothing of human experience. At its highest stage Vedanta is pure philosophy. It seeks not an imaginary or hypothetical but a verifiable or true explanation of the whole of existence.

That Vedantic thought made great progress in the past is generally acknowledged. But whether it has kept itself abreast of the recent advances in science and philosophy is doubted by many. For latterly it only helped to produce a colossal literature in theology and scholasticism or to drive men to mysticism. It was left to Sri Ramakrishna Paramahansa to present Vedanta in a manner

(continued from the previous page) suited to modern mind. He has shown that Vedanta includes and implies all stages and varieties of human experience and knowledge, and that it is not opposed to the latest developments of science and philosophy.

Of what use or value is Vedanta? Vedanta is a treasure of which no conqueror can deprive India and make her poor, but she can freely give to all mankind, and make not only the receiver but also the giver equally rich. It actually and truly blesses him that gives and him that takes, inasmuch as it seeks, as the goal of all existence, universal or supreme good (paramapurushartha). While every religion and every school of mysticism vouchsafes its joys or satisfactions only to the individual or individuals entering its fold, Vedanta seeks, without inflicting the humiliation of proselytization, the good of all men, nay, of all beings, and that in the highest degree, though at first sight such an object appears too ambitious to be within actual human reach. Further, every religion, no doubt, promises the highest good or bliss after death, whereas Vedanta aims at realizing such good in this world. In this respect, its object conforms itself in the strictest sense to the laws of verification known to the most modern scientist.

Vedanta naturally starts with an enquiry into the nature and means of satisfying human cravings or desires, which, when not satisfied, beget sorrow or suffering. Many a Western critic has misunderstood this feature of Vedantic enquiry and characterises it as a pessimistic philosophy. But it only starts with such universal facts as stimulate best the spirit of enquiry. What distinguishes Vedanta from all other human pursuits is that it does

(continued from the previous page) not rest till it attains the goal of universal good, by eradicating all sorrows of life. This it seeks to reach by probing the mystery of existence. It may not be possible for every one to reach what is called the Ultimate Truth or bring about the highest good. To the extent men approach this truth, do they achieve and promote universal good. Therefore great souls seek to help humanity in attaining what is called Supreme Knowledge (Brahmajnana), which is inseparable from universal good, the goal of Vedanta. This truth sought by Vedanta is beyond the reach of religions and sciences.

Who is qualified to make Vedantic Enquiry? The first condition to be satisfied by a seeker after the highest truth is for him to possess the requisite competency. Now there are different degrees, or, as it is sometimes thought, different views of the same truth. There are, as already said, truths of religion, mysticism, science and different philosophic schools, marking the steps so far reached. But the peculiarity of Vedanta lies in that it comprehends all of them and aims at the highest or all-unifying truth. He who is satisfied with any particular kind or degree of truth other than the highest, and is not eager to get at the latter, is not qualified for Vedantic philosophy. The seeker after this end should possess the strength and determination needed to continue till the goal is reached. He must be able to command perfect concentration or one-pointedness (ekagrata) of mind. Such concentration means the complete elimination of all personal preconceptions (ahamkara and raga). These disciplines are made possible in

(continued from the previous page) the modern world of science, provided the determination to reach the very end is persistent, which unfortunately is absent in most of the scientists. The scientist often lacks this determination, because he fears he may have to forego some of those things that he is most attached to in the world. To give an instance, some eminent scientists, though they see at times that the causal relation is no more than one's own intellectual conception or an idea, cannot yet rise above, or free themselves from the coils of "causal" complex that they can get at the vedantic point of view. Not is the scientist able to rise to that pitch of complete detachment which demands greater sacrifices (vairagya) than are commonly made. The old Indian discipline which combined yoga (mental control) and vichara (enquiry) has fallen into disfavour. The modern Hindu student of philosophy is prepared for vichara alone without the necessary yoga, which demands the fulfilment of many ethical disciplines. The Indian philosophic preparation for the pursuit of truth is known as sadhana. As this course of preparation is slow and gradual, men are made to pass through the stages called religion, theology, scholasticism and mysticism, including a taste for art before they attempt sastra-vichara or what is known as enquiry on scientific lines, in these days. At each stage men are made to think that they are near the goal, lest they should feel discouraged. They are, therefore, made to discard doubt, and rely solely upon faith. The pursuit known as philosophic enquiry (tattvaartha-vichara) marks the last step. Vedanta is often interpreted as signifying only this last stage, though in reality it covers the

(continued from the previous page) whole field of human knowledge including the last step, which is its most distinguishing feature.

Philosophy commences when one sees the fallacy of relying upon authority or tradition, including scriptures or the testimony of others, however extraordinary. Philosophy, further repudiates all mystic attitudes or ecstatic visions which manifest themselves in such expressions as "I know," "have seen" or "I have felt", and cannot rely upon them as absolute truth, without testing them.

After one has thus qualified oneself, that is, after one is able to eliminate all personal preconceptions either by rigorously applying the scientific method or by fully undergoing yogic discipline, one may embark upon the rational interpretation of existence, i.e. philosophic enquiry. Men at the helpless or child stage have to rely upon the help of others, and have therefore to begin with some kind of belief suited to their own temperaments, in an unseen or more powerful Being, or some existence after the death of the body, or in the reality of the objective world. At this stage the mind finds satisfaction in what it attains to, and clings to it. But when it grows in vigour, it begins to doubt and asks for proofs. Doubt is dangerous, as the Bhagavad-Gita points out, inasmuch as it tends to unsettle the mind. It must be got rid of at least by dogmatic faith. Faith is the sheet anchor of such minds. But to those that possess the strength and capacity to think acutely, doubt is stimulant to further enquiry. As the Nasadiya Sukta or the UddhavaGita indicates, doubt is

(continued from the previous page) the mother of knowledge. Philosophy first develops the thirst for emancipating oneself from the slave mentality of relying upon tradition or authority or upon one's unverified knowledge. Since this emancipation is a gradual process, every man is in one sense a philosopher to the extent to which he is able to pursue truth. Religion and mysticism seek to live in a world of faith and vision, whereas science and philosophy try to live in a world of verified facts.

The Nature of the truth in Vedanta. All systems of philosophy, wherever found or developed, are but approaches to the common end or summit of Vedanta, which is the end of all knowledge. This end or goal of Vedanta is thus described: It is that which being known, everything becomes known, and which being attained nothing else remains to be attained. The urge or impulse to attain to this goal manifests itself in the earliest stages as efforts to satisfy one's cravings or wants and to overcome fears, all of a physical character. In the higher stages it seeks to satisfy all intellectual as well as spiritual wants and overcome fears of all kinds. To attain the former men make use of religion and science, and to attain the latter they pursue philosophy, especially Vedanta. Vedanta, therefore, does not despise religion or science but seeks their co-ordination. All disciplines from religion upwards tend to 'purify', 'sharpen' or make 'one-pointed' the buddhi or reason, not the intellect as so many writers on Vedanta say. But it should not be misunderstood that one can straightaway start the study of philosophy before this capacity to 'depersonalize' (effacement of the ego) is attained.

Such a seeker has to be warned against a

(continued from the previous page) serious error, into which men often fall in the attempt to recognize truth. All men naturally love truth and seek it. And satisfaction is thought to be the index of truth. But a Plato dissatisfied knows more of truth than an unthinking person satisfied. It is this satisfaction that determines the truths of religions, mysticism, theology and often of the scientists also. A Max Planck or a Bertrand Russel prefers to stick to the causal relation merely because it has given them satisfaction. The theologians and scholastics, who wrangle about logical or grammatical interpretations, rely finally upon personal satisfaction which evidently varies. The test of the highest truth in Vedanta consists in the inconceivability, and consequently the impossibility, of difference in it. Mere satisfaction, joy or bliss experienced by one is no criterion of truth in Vedanta. The two must go together, though truth is independently sought.

What is existence? Vedanta studies all experience by first analysing it, as is more commonly done, into two factors, the knowing agency (kshetrajna) and the known or knowable world (kshetra), which are, roughly speaking, similar to the 'mind' and 'matter' of European thought. The correspondence, however, is but a rough one. For, in the West, philosophers do not seem to have as yet analyzed 'mind' and 'matter' or 'subject' and 'object' so completely as the Vedantists have done. The knowing factor does not include in Vedanta, the contents of 'mind' such as thoughts, feelings, ideas, which are treated as 'mind' in Europe and America. They are treated as the 'known' or the object in India,

(continued from the previous page) and are put in the same category as percepts. Vedanta recognizes two classes of objects, mental and physical, i.e. internal and external. The witness (knower) is thus separated from what is witnessed (known) i.e. the entire panorama of the physical and mental worlds. The reason for such analysis is that the two factors belong to distinct categories. The seen or know is inconstant, whereas the witness only sees the change and is as such non-varying.

The practical significance of this division Such men as are struck by the impermanence of the objective world, and particularly of this physical body, seek the comfort and support of religion, theology, mysticism and the like. Such others as cling to the objective world, believing it or at least the changes to be real, because of the pleasure they yield, are realists, most of whom are scientists also. They do not ignore the 'objects' known as mental. Only they rely most upon the 'seen' or known, internally or externally. Those few, on the other hand, that investigate both mind and matter, i.e. the 'witness' and the 'witnessed' the subject (knower) and the object (known), and seek the absolutely real, are philosophers. They do not fall back upon mere intuition or imagination, as do the first group of men; nor do they ignore any part of the mental factor, as do the second group or take the known world to be real because it is a source of pleasure to them. What the philosopher, according to Vedanta, seeks is not comfort or joy, but truth. He who knows the truth of all existence is said to attain Supreme knowledge, which is seen to comprehend the universal good.

What do we mean by the whole of life, or experience? This is in fact the central problem of the philosophy of Vedanta. European and American philosophy is based upon the data of the waking state, in other words, of a fraction of experience, while Vedanta takes all the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep, or the whole of experience, into consideration. Western philosophy, again, takes the waking data as the standard of Reality, and with this standard evaluates the experience of dream and deep sleep; whereas Vedanta places all the three states on the same level and enquires into their worth as 'reality'. The philosophic conclusions of the West cannot, therefore, attain a view of the whole truth. Vedanta is the only road leading to it, for it considers the whole of experience.

Without going into detail, it will suffice here to say that the study of the three states leads one, first, to the fact that the entire world of the waking state is as much a creation of the mind as the world of dreams, and as both the worlds disappear in deep sleep into the mind, the entire objective world of the waking and dream states is unreal or illusory. They appear to be real for the time being. Vedanta is neither realism nor idealism, but unrealism so far as the object world goes, and Atmanism so far as the substance in itself is concerned; for the whole world of mental creation emanates from and returns to the mind substance. The knowledge that everything is Atman cannot be attained unless one rises above the thought or concept of Atman, i.e. lives or has his being identified with everything, the all.

The goal of Vedanta. The true test of the worth of Vedanta lies in its bearing on life now and here, not in any speculative hypothesis or any intellectually constructed system. The only question is: Does Vedanta explain the whole of life, and at the same time help the realization of universal good, in actual life? These are not two separate questions but are the obverse and the reverse, so to say, of the same question. Generally men view the highest good as one's own supreme bliss in this or in some future life, taking the individual standpoint, and rest satisfied with it. This is religion or mysticism. Though, as religion, Vedanta starts with the welfare of the individual yet it does not stop till the whole of mankind, nay, the whole of the world of life, is embraced in its conception of the highest good. Man is not happy unless he has the satisfaction of possessing as much as possible of what is outside of him. At first he seeks wealth and all the means of happiness which are outside of him. He wants wife, friends and neighbours, or society; and he feels that their joy or sorrow is his joy or sorrow. In a word, he feels that their well-being constitutes the good of man. In fact, Vedanta points out that what constitutes the body of man also constitutes in different combinations the material world. What constituted the human body a minute ago is now part of the body of entities outside and vice versa. His body is food for others, as other objects are food for him. In fact, this exchange is so continuous that it is impossible to say whether there is anything that can be called one's own at any

(continued from the previous page) time. It is a vain belief or delusion to think that there permanently exists anything separate as one's own body. Similarly, the individual mind is made up of the thoughts or ideas of his parents, neighbours and ancestors, nay, of the world known to him. Nowhere in the mental world of the individual can a line be drawn to indicate what is exclusively his own. His passions and feelings and cravings came to him with his body from his parents, i.e. inherited from his ancestors. Next, as regards what is called the self: Everyone refers to his self as "I". What is the characteristic of this I? What is its general mark? It must be the common factor or feature of all the "Is" with all their differences. Eliminating the latter, which change with every man and every moment, the common feature "I" is the only permanent factor known. In a word individuality, cannot be defined as a permanent feature. Whatever exists permanently is the universal only. "The One remains, the many change. "Individuality is a notion which, when enquired into, lands us in the universal, the all. The firm conviction that the one is the all, attained by constant and deep enquiry into the meaning of life, in all its aspects is the goal of Vedanta. This attainment is impossible unless one constantly looks into one's own life and actually sees in it the all.

Why is philosophy considered so difficult? The fact that there exist so many schools and systems, each differing from the others, and sometimes even hostile to each other, and the most disheartening fact that the number is multiplying every day, make one seriously

(continued from the previous page) doubt whether there can be any philosophy that will be universally or absolutely true. It may be asked whether after all it is not wiser to avoid this wild-goose chase, if some kind of mysticism or religion will not give one peace of mind or joy that one needs in life. This great maze of thought regarding Ultimate Reality is, says Vedanta, due to the circumstance that men confine themselves to the experiences of the waking state only, in which man's valuation of truth depends upon his intellect. So long as he is guided by the intellect, philosophies will only multiply and be more a hindrance than a help in attaining a final solution. All philosophical wranglings so often met with in the world are of intellect. To such intellect-ridden minds, religion or at best yoga or mysticism is the best antidote. In fact, the best philosophers of modern and ancient Europe, who have soared to some of the highest peaks of the intellect and have written the most admirable works, have lost themselves finally in some kind of mysticism. But Vedanta teaches that the real solution is to be sought not in the intellect, nor in mere intuition or ecstasy, but in reason which takes the all of life into consideration. It is therefore said, "In reason seek thou shelter." It is the whole of life with which reason is concerned. In other words, it is this knowledge of Kshetra and Kshetrajna that is the subject-matter of reason, and not the knowledge of matter alone, nor of the mind, or of spirit alone, to which the intellect addresses itself and multiplies systems, perhaps, to the weariness of mankind.

The best guide to philosophy. There is a time-honoured conviction of the Hindu mind that the

(continued from the previous page) best exposition of the philosophy of a man is the life lived by him. It is, therefore, insisted that 'association' (sanga) with holy men is indispensable. Where, however, this is not possible, a study of their life is the next best course. Now it is evident from what we know of the greatest Vedantins, from Sri Rama, Janaka and Sri Krishna down to Sankaracharya and Ramakrishna Paramahansa, that they did not, after their philosophy ripened, hide themselves in mystic contemplation in caves and forests or sit statue-like on river banks or mountain tops, but wore themselves out working at all their might for the world around them, wherever the call came from. Such was the way in which they sought the fulfilment of the object of their existence. Before realizing the highest truth, they did have recourse to all the disciplines known as religion, mysticism, (yoga) and studies of various kinds even enquiries along different lines: but all these were dropped away when they reached the world of philosophic truth.

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ANUBHAVA: THE CRITERION OF TRUTH IN SANKARA.

(Indian Philosophical Review).

In recent years few Western critics of Eastern philosophy have brought to bear upon the subjects dealt with by them greater originality of thought than Father Zimmerman of Bombay has in his article in the last April number of this journal, on "Truth and its criterion in Sankara's Vedanta." His criticism, howsoever adverse, is most welcome in that it helps more effectively than eulogistic appreciations, to bring into

(continued from the previous page) relief the merits, if any, of Vedanta. I should therefore have naturally preferred the reply being undertaken by hands abler than mine and refrained from making the attempt had it not been for the references that the article makes to me and to some of my statements. And in venturing to make this defence, I shall, as I may be expected to, devote greater attention to that part of the essay, that deals specifically with Sankara's system. After I read through the searching examination to which Sankara's position has been subjected, and through the impressive peroration with which the weighty thesis is wound up in the words: "The Theory gains little by the support of the Westerners[@] whose philosophy if weighed would be found too light though they have written voluminous tones and spoken with the tones and in the pose of prophets," the first thought that flashed on me was that of a passage I had read thirty years ago, in connection with the then famous duel between Frederic Harrison and Herbert Spencer. I could not but exclaim, almost in the language of the evolutionist philosopher: "Even the acute Father Zimmerman could not avoid the course so frequent with critics, of demolishing a simulacrum and like veritable victors, walking off in triumph as though the reality has been demolished:" The Reverend critic has no doubt passed his poniard through and through Sankara. But, which Sankara? Not he to whom the millions of his followers have been looking up for centuries, as an accredited expounder of the Vedanta, but

[@] Perhaps such as Schopenhauer and Deussen who explicitly support Vedanta; and Plato Plotinus, Kant and others who hold characteristic views in common with Sankara.

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(continued from the previous page) that modern namesake of his, that Father Zimmerman has so kindly created for the delectation of the readers of this magazine.

The learned professor divides his article into two sections and devotes the first to an enunciation and exposition of the general principles on which he bases his examination of Sankara and the second to the actual application of those principles. Accordingly in the former he discusses the following points:- "Whether different cannons of Truth leading to contradictory results can be applied in one and the same system?" "What is truth?" and "What does Certitude imply?" What are the determining features of a "Criterion?"

And in the section following applies the principles deduced from those enquiries to Sankara's doctrines and arrives at the conclusion: "That by putting ANUBHAVA not only above but against other sources of knowledge, a double standard of truth is introduced into one and the same system of thought," and "That it is a flat contradiction, the splitting of the notion of truth, and Yes and No about one and the same thing that makes the theory of the esoteric and exoteric knowledge philosophically so unpalatable and its source ANUBHAVA so suspicious." "An unbiassed mind might" therefore "Consider itself entitled not to accept ANUBHAVA as an ultimate criterion of Truth." Evidently, then, it is the subject of "Anubhava as criterion" that forms the main issue and round it ranges the most serious part of the discussion. Now, the question before us is whether these inferences of Father Zimmerman are valid. Clearly, the validity here depends upon three factors:

1. The soundness of the general principles enunciated by him.
2. The correctness of the premises with which he starts, and
3. the correctness with which he applies to them the laws of reasoning.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES. Turning to the first of his 'general principles' we have to observe that his view that different cannons of truth should not be applied in the SAME SYSTEM, is not universally admitted. In the province of Mathematics for instance, we employ different standards of truth in ascertaining the measure of the circumference of a circle in terms of the diameter. At one stage, for all practical purposes we proceed upon the formula that the circumference is $3 \frac{1}{7}$ times the diameter. At another stage we employ the measure 3.14159. And at a further stage we find that they are incommensurable. That last is the very opposite of the first two. And we have here a "Flat contradiction", a declaration of 'yes' and 'no' about one and the same thing. Is the Science of Mathematics, then irrational? Even if it be so to Father Zimmerman, we should have no quarrel with him. Every man has a right to hold his own views. We should however, agree with him, if he said that different cannons of truth leading to contradictory results cannot be applied AT THE SAME STAGE OF THOUGHT, i.e. when things are viewed FROM ONE AND THE SAME STANDPOINT. In fact, a rational system demands that every thing be viewed from as many points as are current in the world or, as are possible. For its worth as a system depends upon the way in which it co-ordinates or reconciles the difference in views.

Next, his theory of Truth, which he bases upon the notions of repudiated by competent

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(continued from the previous page) philosophical authorities in Europe, not to say by the Advaitins also in India. The Advaitin would admit such theories of truth as those of 'copy' 'correspondence' 'conformity' 'coherence', 'cosmic unity', 'workability', 'Utility and others to be true, when viewed from particular standpoints or stages of thought, in the world of VYAVAHARA, but NOT as absolutely true. Father Zimmerman believes "Truth to consist in the correct mental representation of the outside world, so that it could lead to an understanding of how the world of thought corresponds to the world of Reality." But Sankara holds that Reality is never an object of thought and there is no possibility of a correspondence or representation in regard to reality. Or, if by reality the learned Professor means the "Outside world" the Vedantin is not aware of two distinct experiences, a "Representation" APART from the knowledge of the outside world, to compare with the other. It is, however, needless to enter into a discussion of this subject here. Suffice it to point out that this assumption of the incontestableness of the correspondence or conformity theory, stultifies the eloquent statement with which the learned critic ushers to the world his examination of Sankara, thus: "The notion of truth must coincide with UNIVERSALLY acknowledged principles." May we know which of these principles are universally acknowledged? Should he give us, even now, a universally acknowledged definition or meaning of truth the Advaitin would most implicitly submit to this test. Nor is his definition of "criterion

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(continued from the previous page) such as would be universally accepted. Which school of European idealists admit the 'objectivity' of the criterion, i.e., employs an independent 'objective' standard for testing the absolute truth of his 'subjective' knowledge? And in India an absolutist of Sankara's school would be the last to recognize a dualistic theory of this kind.

It is not contended here that Father Zimmerman's views are erroneous. Only it is sought to point out that, if father Zimmerman's object in discussing the general principles be to find a common ground, we should say that these principles of his do not furnish such a basis.

Premises. Let us, next, proceed to the premites. He starts with Sankara's division of knowledge into *apara Vidya* and *para Vidya* which in English would more nearly correspond to 'empirical' and 'rational' knowledge than to 'Exoteric' and 'Esoteric' knowledge as he and some others have assumed. He then observes that "The Criteria valid for *apara Vidya* are sense perception, inference analogy, and especially sacred authority" and that in *para Vidya* "The solution has been made to depend upon the *Pramanani* of the esoteric knowledge, the *Samyagdarsanam*." He adds, further, that when this doctrine is to be applied to the individual, "the application is done by *Anubhava*" and that "*Anubhava* in Sankara's view, is the main proof." The learned critic has little fault to find with the criteria of *apara Vidya*, whereas with regard to the criterion of *para Vidya*, he says, "It is on this point that opinions are divided" and that "it constitutes the essence of Sankara's system."

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(continued from the previous page) We see, therefore, why he has concentrated the fire of his artillery on the one point, anubhava.

What, then, is anubhava? According to Father Zimmerman "it is the conviction from the immediate consciousness that Jivatma is identical with Paramatma, the Nirguna Brahma." Having thus defined it, he proceeds to analyse it after his own heart, in a manner that would make it perfectly easy for him to refute it, and to crow victory over the system of Advaita, which he fears has been allowed to go unchallenged rather too long. "It could be" he says, "hardly called a sound method to accept a system with all or a part of its tenets because it has a long history or a large following", and because it has been, as he observes at the end of his essay, gaining the support of "Westerners who have written voluminous tomes."

Now the first disillusionment that Father Zimmerman appears to need, if he cares for truth, is that his interpretation of anubhava is the same as the Vedantin's. For, "anubhava" the criterion, in para Vidya, never meant for Sankara, as his words testify, and never meant for his followers, the CONSCIOUSNESS that Jivatma is identical with Paramatma. In that anubhava, there do not exist the three factors, Jivatma, paramatma, and knowledge of identity, as well as perhaps a fourth, the consciousness which is said to be aware of these three factors. "Where the self alone has become all this, how should he see another?" (Brih. up.) "Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, known nothing else, that is the highest or the infinite (Brahman): (Chand. Up.).

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This is the first of the false stones that Father Zimmerman has placed at the foundation of his elaborate structure of criticism. The second is the incorrect statement that Sankara “puts anubhava not only above but against other sources of knowledge of the *apara Vidya*.” The fact is that anubhava is a VALID *pramana* or source of knowledge not only in *para* but also in *apara vidya*; for, we know, we have every day our anubhava of joys and sorrow in this world of duality and nescience. Even in the *apara Vidya* of nescience, anubhava is not only a source of knowledge but also our highest criterion. We rely upon *Pratyaksha* etc., i.e. perception, inference and others, ultimately only on the ground of anubhava. The Advaitin says that we have not only anubhava of the familiar dual existences, which is invariably accompanied by doubts, or a sense of limit beyond which everything is unknown but also Anubhava of non-dual existence, in which there exist no doubts and no possibilities of doubts of any kind, no sense of not-knowingness and no sense of limitation, which is free from sorrows and sufferings. Those persons who know not what an anubhava of the latter sort is must necessarily rely upon anubhava of the former kind alone. And whatever is their anubhava, will also be the basis of their criterion of Truth.

Then, can anubhava lead to two contradictory experiences or cognitions? Yes, it can reveal not two but twenty thousand conflicting experiences. And the business of the wise, is to sift the ultimate truth from out of all these. The Advaitin’s world of anubhava does not, though Father Zimmerman

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(continued from the previous page) declares that it does, discard mystic experiences and intuitional knowledge. In fact, the Advaitin rejects nothing. All human experiences are his data. He tests all by means of reason and holds fast to that which he considers Absolutely true. Sankara's 'anubhava' is therefore not confined to para Vidya alone: it covers apara Vidya also.

If any man says that he does not believe in the possibility of anubhava of Nirguna Brahman the advaitin has no quarrel with him, anymore than he has a quarrel with those that say they refuse to believe that the circle and the diameter are incommensurable, because, they have worked hundreds of sums, correctly, relying on the truth of the formula of $3\frac{1}{7}$, and seen hundreds of circular, or cylindrical structures built by engineers basing their calculations upon the formula of 3.14159. An Advaitin can, likewise have no quarrel with the Reverend Father Zimmerman, if his anubhava does not lead him to the truth that there is but one God the God of all, and therefore looks down upon the Vedantain's God, (Brahman) which he deliberately spells with a small b, while he honours the Christian God, with a big G. Called by any name, the rose smells as sweet, to the Advaitin. And Sankara, it may be remarked in passing, as a religious revivalist possesses the unique distinction of having equally honoured all the six theistic creeds including his own, that existed in India of his day, he being accordingly called Sanmathasthanacharya.

The third false stone in the argument that the Sruti is Pramana for Nirguna Brahman. He says "the tenet of Nirguna Brahman is adopted

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(continued from the previous page) by Sankara, because it is true, and it is true because it is taught by the Sruti. This particular tenet is true for Sankara not because it is taught by the Sruti, but because it is based on anubhava though it is also supported by Sruti. "The knowledge of Brahman depends altogether upon the thing, i.e. Brahman itself" says Sankara. Father Zimmerman himself says in the same article that "It should not be forgotten that anubhava in Sankara's view is the main proof to which even Sruti, though it points unmistakingly the same way, is in the relation of Angatva (subordination)". The Advaitin knows that a legitimate doubt may here arise. The Rishi may have truly spoken; but they may have been deluded themselves. How are we certain that what the Rishis cognized is the Reality or Truth? This can be proved according to the Advaitin only by anubhava.

Again, in the absence of this anubhava 'Nirguna Brahman' as an object of thought is mere sound without sense. To one who has not seen a penguin, for instance, the word has no meaning. If he be told, at least, that it resembles something that he has seen, say a bird, he could have some idea. But if it be unlike everything that is seen, it cannot even be imagined by him. Of what use, then, is such Sruti to him? Similarly common sense tells the Advaitin that the meaning of the Sruti and especially when there are conflicting interpretations, is made out by means of reasoning based upon the authority of anubhava, the supreme court. Only those that do not follow Sankara's Advaita talk of the Sruti being a criterion of Truth or Pramana (authority) for Nirguna Brahman.

That the Sruti is an authority for other purposes is admitted by the Advaitin. To refer to one such purpose as an illustration: Any one who has gone through the first two of the Brahma Sutras will have seen that Saguna Brahma Sruti is made the final or exclusive authority in Para Vidya and that for supporting the tenet of Causal relation or creator-ship of Brahman, i.e. of Saguna or apara Brahma. It need hardly be said that it is only he who has actually seen and caught God in the very act of forging the world, that can with absolute certainty and honesty say that God did create. And in the absence of such knowledge the efforts of the theologians not only of India and Europe, but of all theologians all over the world to establish the creatorship of God, are only an indication of the child-like simplicity of their mind though not of the self-decision they are labouring under. The support of Scriptural Revelation is, therefore, absolutely necessary for this hypothesis of Cosmology, this Saguna or apara Brahma, but not for the absolute truth of Nirguna Brahman.[@] The Sruti itself says "This Atma is NOT to be attained by a study of the Vedas" (Katha Up.)" There (in Nirguna Brahma) the Veda is no Veda." (Brih. Up.)

Fourthly, our critic says that Nirguna Brahma is attained by Brahma Jignasa. But Bhavopnishad has in the most unequivocal and unambiguous language, declared, that such Brahma can be taught by no words or acts. Absolute 'silence' is the only means

[@] The same mistake is repeated by many writers on Vedanta. The latest is Dr Sidney Cave (Vide his "Redemption". p. 81).

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(continued from the previous page) of inculcating this knowledge. "From which all speech, the mind turns away unable to reach it." (Tait. Up). No one has to go beyond the first Sutra to understand that "the object of the Sastra (Jignasa) is only to discard the distinctions fictitiously created by nescience. It has nothing whatever to do with Brahma which is ever existing, which has never been subject to ignorance. The Brahma proved by such Jignasa is the Saguna Brahman, the hypothetical author of the work; the theological Brahma, but Not the philosophical.

A fifth false item is the statement that 'Paramatma is internal.' When everything, everywhere, is Paramatman, how can He be internal or external? The Vedantin says, "He is without and within, unproduced."

A sixth is the statement "Nirguna Brahma is an altogether supersensual object." That he is neither a sensual nor a supersensual object, is too well known to students of Advaita to need any refutation. "Brahman, or the eternal subject is NEVER an object" (S. Bhashya). "By whom it is thought, he does not know it." (Kena Up.).

A seventh and an eighth misapprehension is to be found in his assumption that there is a "change of the one Atma from the apara Vidyavan to para Vidyavan" or from agnanin to a jnanin" and that there is "a Production of the intuition that one is Brahma." In reply, I shall content myself with quoting from Sankara Bhashya the sentence: "This (moksha or Jnana) is eternal in the true sense. It is not produced by anything." In a jnanin there does not arise any such knowledge as that of the Atma having ever existed as a being enveloped in apara Vidya or a jnana.

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Processes of Reasoning. Having thus obtained an idea of the character of the learned Professor's premises, we shall consider a few samples of his processes of reasoning. According to his own definition "truth" implies two factors: (1) a representation, (2) either a "reality" or an outside world, and (3) a relation between them. Now, Nirguna Brahman, hypothetically, negates all duality. The very name of Sankara's system Advaita, means the non-existence of two. How, then, can there arise a question of Truth in the Anubhava of Nirguna Brahman the Absolute?

Again, the question of a criterion is possible only where a doubt exists. But, hypothetically, the anubhava of Nirguna Brahman is one in which there exist no doubts and where no doubts are possible.

Thirdly, the anubhava of Nirguna Brahman can mean nothing else than actually being Nirguna Brahman; for, as has already been pointed out there is said to be then no other entity or knowledge and it is declared that "He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman." There is then no 'other' by which its truth could be measured. When, therefore, it is said that anubhava is the sole criterion for the truth of Nirguna Brahman, we only mean that It is the sole Criterion for itself, or that no criterion apart from Itself exists.

Fourthly, when absolute unity is thus reached as the ultimate elemental existence, the Reverend theologian proceeds to make a discovery of a trinity of attributes or factors into which the ultimate unitary elemental

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(continued from the previous page) anubhava is analysed by him. How elemental homogenous 'one' can, at the same time, be a compound 'three' of attributes Father Zimmerman's logic alone must prove. This description may be true of a criterion in *apara vidya*. But is it true of the criterion in *para Vidya*? That is the question. The three, therefore, that the critic sees, are not to be found in Sankara's not-even-two.

The main process of the reasoning here employed only illustrates the commonplace fallacy underlying questions like "did you give up beating your mother?" addressed to one who never did such an act. A negative reply is as damaging as an affirmative. It is only the irrational that venture to answer. A little thought would show any one such a question has no answer. For, it gratuitously assumes what has not been given or proved. Nirguna Brahman is first supposed to stand in relation to something else, such for instance as the world or the thinker or a criterion and then questions are put. This fallacy is so common in Vedantic discussion that I think it would not be considered out of place to give another well known example.

The opponents of Sankara ask: How did the Absolute Brahman become the relative Jivatma? How did the ever effulgent light of knowledge become subject to the darkness of the illusion of Maya? The reply to these questions is NOT that there is a Sakti or power in Brahman but that there WAS and there IS NO illusion, no maya and no Sakti in Brahman. The absolute never because the relative Jiva. The Advaitin's Brahman is, EX HYPOTHESI, that which has in it no changes, no divisions, no attributes of

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(continued from the previous page) any kind. It is absolute non-duality. All questions therefore relative to its attributes are irrational. For each of these questions assumes either that the absolute has become the relative Jiva or that the light has become darkness and then demands an answer. It is, however, perfectly logical to ask what the cause of this illusion of the phenomenal Universe is; or, whether the Absolute exists? But to assume that Brahman is connected with Maya and to base questions upon the assumption is to set reason at naught.

Not long ago, His Excellency Lord Ronaldshay, Governor of Bengal, put to a learned audience of Calcutta Professors and Pandits the question: "How, if the sole reality is Brahman, did the illusion of the universe arise? Probably, as his speech indicates the noble Lord thought, like the Reverend Father Zimmerman, that he had nicely caught the Advaitin between the horns of a dilemma. For, any answer describing the 'how' would commit the Advaitin to an admission that Sankara's Brahman is no Brahman. Lord Ronaldshay adds "This surely involves a contradiction in terms since it imposes a limitation upon the Absolute." Those that do not follow Sankara, however, do admit a Sakti, called Maya in Brahman. But with that school, we have nothing to do. A little thought would be enough to show that logically the question is fallacious. For, it assumes what it has no right to do, that Brahman or the absolute is related to the illusion of the phenomenal universe. His Lordship would have been within the province of correct logic, had he only asked: How did the illusion of the phenomenal arise? Or, does the Advaitic Brahman exist?

(continued from the previous page) each separately.

What has been said above, will show that one of the most fruitful sources of confusion to students of sankara is the failure to draw the line clearly between the facts given and the facts assumed.

The attempt, therefore, of professor Zimmerman to get at a criterion of truth for Nirguna Brahman (apart from Nirguna Brahman itself) is only a search for a mare's next. The trinity that he has been at so much pains to evolve out of the Anubhava of the unity of Nirguna Brahman are, to the Advaitin, no more than Castles-in-the-air. And the learned critic has devoted no fewer than thirty-five printed pages of logic to demolish what, after all, has no existence in and cannot find a place in, Sankara's tenet of Advaita!

Now the object aimed at by Father Zimmerman in this article is, as he says, "To find out 'sine ira et studio'* sankara's attitude towards the generally acknowledged Laws of Reasoning." It is, in other words, a logical examination of Sankara's methods of Reasoning that he has set about. To test the worth of the working capacity of a system of Reasoning the requisite data have to be furnished to it. It is anubhava that furnishes such materials. Partial anubhava gives partial data, which necessarily lead to defective inferences. Sankara's system seeks, therefore, for purposes of ascertaining ultimate Truth, data which are of a universal character and which are drawn from the whole of the area of life. Unlike all other philosophical systems of the world Sankara's Vedanta, takes into account the experiences of 'dream' and 'sleep', in

* without ire and partisanship. The original editor inserted "*" by hand

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(continued from the previous page) addition to those of waking. No European system of logic has looked beyond the four corners of the waking state for its data. The West has just embarked on its enquiry into the meaning of dreams and it has not yet thought of the logical significance of "sleep." Nor has it set about the quest of universally common and uniform experiences. It has still to open its eyes fully to such logical inconsistencies, as those underlying the use of terms like Unity, Individuality, Causality and Truth itself which have a direct bearing on this subject. Above all, it has not been able to tell us till now what exactly it means by the term 'meaning' and what its relation is to logic. Is it not then too premature, if not too presumptuous, for a student who pins his faith to the European science of ratiocination to profess to judge whether Sankara's Laws of Reasoning are rational or irrational?

It is only such as have not taken or are unable to take so wide a survey of life, that fail to understand him. So universal and comprehensive a grasp is possible only thro' the highest anubhava. And this Anubhava, the Advaitin says, is ever within the reach of every man, woman and child. Only, they all know not it is so. To those that seek to know what an immense possibility lies hidden in themselves is here commended the Persian Verse:

"So long as THOU art, God is in sleep,
When Thou art not, He awakes."

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TRUTH IN MODERN EUROPE.

During my recent visit to Europe in 1937 I have had the inestimable privilege of meeting not only at the International Congress of Philosophy in Paris, but also at other places, eminent professors as well as highly cultured men and women. Besides philosophers, I came into contact with scientists, such as physicists, chemists, biologists, mathematicians, astronomers, physicians, psychologists, psycho-analysts and sociologists as also with authorities on ancient civilizations and cultures, on history, politics, economics, law, military science, commerce and industry, religion and theology, ethics, aesthetics and especially metaphysics, over seventy in number. Their talks left on me the impression that they all possessed an intense love of Truth and that all were supremely eager to pursue it. But this love and this pursuit were and are confined chiefly to the spheres of their respective fields of activity or thought. Excepting a few, the question of Truth in regard to the whole of experience of life seemed to make little appeal. Some of them relegated such an enquiry to the world of the mentally defective, if not of the insane. No doubt there exist in Europe Colleges and professors of philosophy whose object is to interpret the whole of life or experience. But even they are still unable to free themselves from the influence of their environment which emphasises some particular aspect of experience, such as the social, political, or economic. Even scientists often preferred to keep away from philosophy as much as possible. The majority appeared to hold an 'ultimate' or "All-comprehending"

(continued from the previous page) Truth to be a chimera, if not meaningless. When it was pointed out that 'Compartmental' Truths change and are modified from time to time and that they as such are conflicting or contradictory even in their own spheres the reply came that an unchanging truth was an impossibility, at the present stage of human knowledge and that the Hegelian Absolute or the Marxian Unity was only a theoretical concept but not a practical or stable goal that could be attained in life. Not a few still believed that Truth was best understood by those who possessed power and prosperity.

When it was next urged by me that such 'compartmental' conceptions of Truth led to 'good' only of a partial and temporary character and that a view of it based on experience covering longer periods or wide areas could yield better results, more beneficial to man, they admitted the reasonableness of the argument but stuck to their conviction of the practical impossibility of attaining an "All-comprehending" truth. They acknowledged that such Truth as has a bearing on the whole of life or evidence does not press on the mind of every one, sometime or other. But this is disposed of in either of two ways. The great majority find the easiest solution in some religious faith, which gives hopes of its realization after death. The rest ignore the problem altogether, as unattainable in life, not meaningless.

Criterion of Truth. Setting aside the question of an "All-comprehending" or 'Ultimate' Truth whenever I put the question: "How do you know that in any field of enquiry leads you

(continued from the previous page) to truth? and the invariable reply was that the results in actual or practical life were the strongest proof. And where no practical results could be attained at all, or could be attained immediately, one's own 'belief' or 'faith' even in matters of science was, they said, the sole criterion. Here, when I pointed out that 'belief' and 'faith' lead to differences so serious as to invite conflict, nay, even wars; and that religious 'beliefs' lead to more bloodshed than political or other beliefs, they said that as a criterion of Truth, nothing higher than 'belief' or 'faith' was yet known to man and that for the rest we must submit to Nature's laws, whether we like them or not.

Almost every thoughtful person I met, I asked what was meant by Europe by Truth. A number of interpretations of Truth were given, each of which differed from others though each was found satisfactory from the standpoint of the particular sphere to which one's thought was confined, for the time being. Further, thinkers refer to "absolute", "relative" "subjective" "objective" "impersonal" "theoretical", "practical" and various other kinds of Truth, in which the qualifying words can have no meaning unless that of Truth by itself were known. So, when the question was raised by me as to the meaning of Truth independently of any 'compartmental' limitations, in other words, as to the common feature of all the 'compartmental' truths, I was told that it was useless to pursue such an enquiry and that the question was as old as the world. There has thus been no advance on the exclamation of

(continued from the previous page) Pontius Pilate made nearly twenty centuries ago which is thus recorded: "And Pilate said, What is truth? but would not wait for an answer." The inconclusiveness of the several attempts made by philosophers in this matter was also referred to by many.

Best index of present European attitude. The highest prize awarded by the most thoughtful men in Europe is known as the 'Nobel' prize. It encourages best the pursuit of 'compartmental' Truth in several important fields of knowledge. The impetus given by it to science in particular has been two-fold. While modern science has done immense good to the world so far as the individual is concerned it has done incalculable harm so far as communities or nationalities are affected. It has encouraged war and slaughter more than anything else. It has further increased the struggle for existence inside Europe as well as outside in several ways. Had the Nobel Prize only kept in view the pursuit of not merely Truth 'compartmental' but also Truth 'Universal' regarding the whole of experience; the highest Truth, it would have contributed to the well-being of mankind in general also. For, Truth that covers the whole of life belongs to the province of philosophy, which alone can help us to evaluate human action, individual or collective, from the standpoint of common well-being of humanity.

Excepting in those universities where philosophy is studied as a part of a course, the number pursuing this subject alone is fast dwindling. The Truth of science, not of philosophy is what attracts the great majority, though it is evident that science

(continued from the previous page) is productive of as much evil as good. Even religious truth which is thought to be an antidote to the evils of science, is found to be powerless in checking national or communal animosities though it is so valuable as affording individual satisfaction.

Some thinkers realising the difficulty of solving the problem of Truth, have thought it necessary to assign a subordinate place to Truth and to set up other standards of values. But this point was nowhere brought up for discussion.

India's Attempt. At last, I placed before them for their consideration and examination the effort made by India to attain to a clearer and more consistent meaning of Truth and to test it in life. But in as much as Ultimate Truth was for most of them a chimera, they thought that India was labouring under a delusion. They further held that a nation that has been proverbially passive so long, whose greatness has always been in the past and which is ever enamoured of mysticism, cannot be expected to have the capacity to think vigorously on matters rational. In India, they added, even the most cultured – let alone the masses – were still in the stage of “revelling in poetry”, “quoting Scriptures” for everything and finding delight in blindly copying others. These preconceptions, I could overcome in some cases. But the difficulty far more formidable in the natural inability of the majority in Europe to concentrate their mind. Restlessness and impatience have been among the most noticeable features in their daily life. So, the attitude of some reminded me of the well-known saying, “He that speaketh

(continued from the previous page) the Truth to the unprepared (may I add: to concentrate) is a liar in his own despite" –for, I could not get some of them to understand the meaning of what is known as 'sleep'. And I had to divert the talk to less serious topics such as would not tax the mind so much.

I should, however, be not only failing in my duty but even be highly ungrateful if I did not state here that a number of the most distinguished and thoughtful men whom I had the good fortune to meet did readily see my point of view and did express their whole-hearted appreciation of the Indian conception of the 'Ultimate' Truth must be what is beyond contradiction and beyond all possibility of doubt. Further, they acknowledged its value in practical life also.

Among those that evinced such interest, were persons who not merely possessed the highest order of intelligence but also combined with it the longest experience of life. To mention some of the names: In France, Prof. Henri Bergson and Prof. Lalande; in Germany, Prof. Max Planck and Prof. Jung; in Austria, Prof. Giegar; and especially in England Sir James Jeans, Sir Arthus Eddington, Prof. Julian Huxley, Prof. MacMurray and Prof. Muirhead. Among the political personages deeply interested in philosophic Truth, I cannot refrain from referring to the Marquis of Zetland and Viscount Samuel in England, and H.H. the Archduke Eugen in Austria. Many of them were so good as to observe that in seeking and pursuing philosophic Truth, India would certainly lay greater claim to the benefit of longer experience combined with deep and concentrated thought than modern Europe.

I am now leaving this continent with the feeling that if leaders of thought in Europe—Europe with its superior knowledge of science, its admirable skill in matters of organization and its great ability in diverting energy of every kind into the more practical and useful channels, and above all its power to influence other nations in a smaller or greater degree—could only make up their minds seriously to grapple with the problem of Truth of the whole of experience, in addition to pursuing ‘compartmental’ Truth, and what is more, could ascertain its basis and bearing on actual or practical life beginning with a complete analysis of the meaning of the term ‘I’ and of the word ‘whole’ when applied to experience, Europe would be doing the greatest good of a permanent character not merely to herself but to all mankind. For, the Ultimate or Highest Truth eliminates contradictions, and thus makes for harmony and peace, internal as well as external, by the elimination of harmful conflict with every kind, not after death, as in religion, but in this life, this mundane life of ours, as in science.

May Europe as well as the rest of the world have the determination to seek Truth unqualified, will always be the prayer of one who, however feebly, seeks to represent those that have made the pursuit of Truth, Truth in its totality, their aim and end of existence.

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PURE PHILOSOPHY IN INDIA.
(Congress of philosophy)

Summary. Indian philosophy rests on 'Truth uncontradictable' beyond all possibilities of 'doubt and dispute' on knowledge of all existence, attaining which everything becomes attained. It seeks identity of one's self with All.

Its uniqueness: Relies on 'totality' of experience by co-ordinating the three states – waking, dream, deep sleep – not on waking alone like other Philosophies, Arts, Sciences and religions. Appeals to neither intuition or intellect but Reason absolutely.

Its test: Not satisfaction of human individuals or groups, but happiness of all beings.

On this auspicious occasion when so many distinguished representatives of the cultures of the most enlightened nations of the world have met here under the aegis of the Great Spirit of Truth, it is an inestimable privilege for a humble inheritor of the ancient thought of India to join them in paying homage to that Spirit which holds undisputed sway over the whole world of Philosophy. It is further a source of supreme gratification to find here an opportunity to do honour to "The Father of Modern Philosophy." Descartes was the first to kindle in Europe the fire of what is pure philosophy in India, where it is held that no such knowledge is possible unless it be based on absolutely rational certainty. Though Socrates had anticipated in great measure, yet he relied upon his Daimon also. Among the later thinkers in France, the nearest kindred of Indian philosopher,

(continued from the previous page) are Voltaire, Comte and Bergson. The difference apart, he holds that religion theology, scholasticism and mysticism fail to attain actional certainty and with Bergson in particular that the world perceived is characterised by continuous change. To France, therefore, the philosophic India conveys her warmest greetings.

We have philosophies of religion or individual religions; similarly of science and sciences. There are ethical, social and aesthetic philosophies. Nay, we find philosophies of even magic or murders and so forth. By pure philosophy, however, India understands "That knowledge on which is based all knowledge" or "That knowledge that makes everything known." In other words, is an interpretation of the whole of life or experience. This knowledge is further described as being "Free from all disputes", "not opposed to any school of thought or religion" and "productive of good equally to all beings", "in this life" not after death.

In India, knowledge is either private (Matam), i.e. individual, or public (Tatwam) i.e. universal. It is the latter that is known as pure Philosophy. As this is pursued with the object of overcoming sorrow and suffering, not of individuals but of all beings, it is not mere speculation, abstraction or theorisation nor intellectual gymnastics or verbal disquisitions but what directly concerns the hardest realities of life. In her own words, it is "The knowledge attaining which everything in existence becomes attained and nothing remains unattained." In short, philosophy in India aims at Perfection in life. It finds that error and

(continued from the previous page) ignorance bring suffering and sorrow. To erradicate ignorance Truth is sought.

Men do seek Truth in religion including mysticism, art and science, and in various systems of philosophy, and all of which are only degrees of approach to Truth Universal. That they are not such Truth is evident from the patent fact that while they are mere palliatives more or less limited in scope, they increase or multiply differences, intolerance, hatred, greed, pain, bloodshed, nay, all the ills of life. India, therefore, seeks refuge in pure Philosophy, whose sole objective is Truth Universal. When the various steps or degrees of approach to Truth are termed truths, the truth of pure philosophy is named "Truth of Truths", the supreme Highest or Ultimate Truth. The former are also characterised as pragmatic truths for practical purposes. In India, philosophy being the interpretation of the whole of life, everything from the effort to solve abstruse mathematical astronomical or other scientific problems down to eating, drinking, dreaming and sleeping is considered a single process of attaining this Truth. So, while some hold that philosophy is the goal of knowledge, India takes that to be the goal of all existence. The enquiry into the Nature and Tests of truth is, therefore, the first business of Indian Philosophy. And it is to this single topic that this paper is chiefly devoted.

To attempt to study pure philosophy, without setting before oneself the objective of the ultimate Truth is like embarking on a sea voyage without a compass or without knowing what or where the pole star is. Since

(continued from the previous page) with this compass the Indian tries to explore every nook and corner of experience, he rejects nothing, unlike others who turn their backs upon whatever is alien to their special fields of study. In this pursuit of Truth when one feels exhausted, one naturally seeks refuge in religion, art or science and succumbs to the delusion that what gives him satisfaction is Ultimate Truth, or that Truth Perfect is unattainable. Indian Philosophy repudiates both these activities, for the reason, that all other truths bring satisfaction only to individuals or groups of them, but not to the world at large. The few may be happy while the millions are left steeped in misery. That satisfaction is no criterion of Truth was known long ago. "A Plato dissatisfied is more estimable than a pig satisfied." Therefore, says India, the mind must be heroic to pursue pure philosophy.

What then is the nature of Ultimate Truth which aims at perfection all round and what are its tests? The Philosopher in India is no slave to authority – be it that of man, revelation or scripture. Reason universal – not intellect or intuition – is his highest court of appeal. And such Truth, when reached, removes not only all doubts but also all possibilities of doubt.

At the first or religious stage, man relies upon intuition as a test or criterion of the highest Truth. When experience teaches him that it often fails, he relies upon the authority of someone else or of revelation or scripture which is the stage of theology. When even that lands him in doubt, he rises to scholasticism and appeals to the rules of interpretation and logic. When that does

(continued from the previous page) not satisfy either, he seeks consolation in mysticism relying upon vision, ecstasy or intuition of even an intellectual order. When even this is found to cause disappointment on a comparison with the experiences of other mystics, he rises to science and tests his knowledge by intellectual methods which aim at, but do not attain to universality. Lastly coming to the various schools of Philosophy, the attempt is made to get at universality in Science, but they are most often only opinions but not Truth. Indian Philosophy has the unique distinction of accepting nothing as ultimate, that is not absolutely universal and necessary. In all these stages, it is Reason that grows by degrees and attains maturity, when it becomes universal. Life in all its aspects is the highest test. And Truth is what makes for Perfect Life.

What is perfection? It is the life in which none feels any pain, none has suffering or sorrow of any kind, in which everything is known, everything is attained. The chief obstacle to attaining such Truth is that the world is unwilling to enquire into the simplest of matter. It cannot see that the Totality of data alone can give Truth but not fractions thereof. Even Europe and America, the most enlightened countries, take into consideration only a portion of such data. They think that the experience of waking state alone is of value, and ignore that of the dream and the deep sleep states. It is actual life that corrects man's conception of Truth. The first step is to study all the three states not merely for psychological or physiological but also for

(continued from the previous page) philosophical purposes, that is with a view to ascertaining the highest Truth. When men confine their enquiry into what they know in the one state of waking, they find themselves involved in contradictions. Let us look at a few instances.

When men see the progress of science bringing in its train the horrors of war, to which it gives such great impetus, they seek refuge in religion. And when the impotency of the evil of religion is felt, they go to science for comfort; they keep repeating this process endlessly. Next, we see persons discussing realism and idealism, matter and mind, intuition and intellect, monism and dualism, theism and aethism, the absolute and the relative, the one and the many or any other subject such as monarchy and republic, autocracy and democracy, communism and socialism, and so forth. Such disputations have gone on for ages, and we do not see anything like the end of them. Again, turning to some of the greatest minds, we do not find that they are any nearer to the goal. Kant proves time space and causality to be no more than mental creations, but it is logically disputed by others. Some hold that there can be no justification for believing in his Things-in-themselves. Nor could he avoid contradictions by his descent to his Practical Reason. Further "Thought" by itself does not evolve his Universality and necessity which are forced on us by life or experience. Hegel, does not appear to have seen that his dialectic does not solve the problem of Ultimate Truth, for, synthesis comprehends within itself disparate factors whose harmony it is impossible to establish. Synthesis has to be transcended to attain to perfection. Nor can we ignore

(continued from the previous page) the European genius Spinoza so near the thought of India. But how can we know that exists such a thing as his substance-in-itself, different from attributes?

Coming to some of the great scientists of our own times, we find professors Jeans, Eddington, Max Planck and Einstein holding scientific views which have philosophic implications of the utmost importance. The two former find the known external universe to consist of ideas or mental constructions. The third finds causal relation, determinacy unsupported at some stages of enquiry. The last holds that time and space are inseparable and that they vary with individuals. Some biologists also like Julian Huxley and others seem to hold that one fundamental entity undergoes changes and appear as mind, matter and the universe. But they do not tell us how to get at that one as a fact? Not one of these great minds could say whether any of their conclusions indicate the Ultimate Truth. Science might reveal at the next turn what may contradict their present faith. Where is absolute certainty in all these? Everyone thinks that what he knows must be or is truth. The question invariably arises, how shall we say which is the Truth? India says that such contradictions and differences can never end if we confine ourselves to the waking state. If these great minds could only take into consideration the three states, the totality of the data of experience, they could give to the world some higher truth, or "truth uncontradictable." Not that the discoveries of these great geniuses are of no value. They are invaluable assets to the seeker after the highest truth. Only they point to

(continued from the previous page) something higher which has yet to be sought. Indian philosophy shows that when one set of data only is taken into account realism is perfectly valid, when another set is considered idealism is valid, similarly when only one group of data is kept in view, causality, determinacy is found to be an irrefutable fact, but when the totality is taken into account, neither realism nor causality is found to have a basis for Ultimate truth. Truth has been variously interpreted in the West as well as in the East. But every interpretation is found to involve contradictions. Indian philosophy sees in reason alone the key to solve this mystery. For, Reason alone points out the way to rise above duality and multiplicity, which can in no way free themselves from this basic defect. The highest truth cannot be even synthesis which implies contradictions internal, if not external. A thesis alone can give absolute non-contradiction. This is termed in India "Non-duality – not unity.

How this truth governs the entire field of experience is a subject of supreme interest. But space and time forbid our going into it. All the difficulties in regard to the problem of truth arise from the fact that the totality of data is not enquired into. Without this investigation, truth which eliminates all doubts and all possibility of doubts, cannot be attained. Till that is reached, contradictions will always force on us the fact of the inadequacy of the waking state by which alone men usually swear. It is the attachment to this one state that vitiates Truth as known to them. To judge the three states impartially requires great effort

(continued from the previous page) which can only come from a determination to pursue truth at any cost. And this implies a thorough purging of one's mind of all preconceptions and prejudices, which is not merely a scientific but an ethical process. The Indian student of pure philosophy invariably prepares himself for it, as does the scientist of the West.

Even a casual study of the states of waking and dream shows that though they are different, the experiences gained in them have a similarity. In both we find existences termed real and ideal, or external and internal, which when they pass away never return. Does this fact in Nature so universal, serve any useful purpose? Again, when we consider deep sleep we find that space, time, and cause and ego have no existence apart from the mind. This necessarily leads us to the great question "What is mind or consciousness?", into which we cannot enter here. Those interested in the pursuit of Truth may look into the works of Gaudapada and Sankara, translations of which in English are available.

In what way, then has the Philosopher been useful to India till now? If he had sought truth in individual or groups satisfactions, the course of Indian History would have been different. But he has been all along striving to make the world at large happy; which Truth demands. To what extent mankind sees such truth, to that extent is it philosophic and to that extent does it enjoy the blessings of such Truth. Perfection can be reached only when the world at large realizes it. The philosopher has therefore bid the time needed for

(continued from the previous page) awakening if not all the minds, at least those of the thoughtful and of the leading that guide the destinies of the rest to a sense of the value of this Truth, as Plato rightly held. But the world which mistakes individual satisfaction for Truth is slow to move or to give up belief.

The greatest drawback of the present day civilization is its want of adequate enthusiasm to pursue Truth to the end. The best among us think that what they know is Truth or Truth enough for all practical purposes. It does not seem, however, to strike even the intelligent that what they know is not Truth enough. The thought of the well-being of all humanity and all well-being hardly strikes them.

It may be asked, how Truth could prove the 'non-duality of all that exists or the identity of All with One, and what is of still greater interest, how all sorrow and suffering could be eradicated? Is such Truth a self-delusion? The reply is that the very enquiry into the meaning of Truth as revealed by the three states, not only lays bare the mystery of 'the one and the many' but also the means to this great end of existence. Lectures or even volumes of writings cannot reveal these quickly. Only dispassionate talks in person can hasten progress.

It is not India's religion, or theology, her scholasticism or mysticism, it is not her fine arts or her sciences despite their special features that could be a special contribution to the culture of the world. The west has all these admirably developed and in abundance. It is India's Meaning of Truth, and her method of approach through

(continued from the previous page) the three states still unknown to the rest of the world that could be thought worthy of the world's consideration.

Let us not lay to our souls the flattering unction that we shall attain to the Permanent Good of the world at large, by seeking refuge in religion, mysticism, changes of government or organization of society, or even in the researches or application of sciences and arts to life, or anything else that man may devise, without knowledge of Truth, the Supreme Truth. Individuals and large groups of men may find satisfaction and that of a temporary character even in knowledge devoid of the Supreme Truth. But nothing else than that Truth can lead to Perfection, to the good of the whole world. It is not the ineffectual theory of the "Brotherhood of man" but the irrefutable theory of fact of unqualified oneness of all existence that it establishes. Truth leads to knowledge: that the individual is ALL and the ALL is the individual.

This is Indian philosophy pure. May the world grow in the determination to "stop not till the goal of truth is reached.

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RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY.
(Parliament of Religions, Calcutta.1937)

This is a parliament of religionists. Is it also a Parliament of philosophers? That is the question I am here making an attempt to answer.

In the minds of the immense majority of men philosophy is invariably associated with religion. They speak of Christian Philosophy Muslim Philosophy, Hindu Philosophy, Jain or Buddhist philosophy and so forth. Even competent and cultured scholars generally put religion and philosophy together. There is undoubtedly a justification for it. Every religion has its own interpretation of life or existence, which is philosophy. But if enquiry should proceed a little further, it would be found truer to say that every man has his own view of life as a whole, and has therefore a philosophy of his own. But does this indicate all that is meant by philosophy?

In the history of religion no event is more remarkable than the recent volcanic eruption in Russia which has nearly levelled to the ground the edifice of religion. No doubt, at all times, there have been individuals more or less indifferent to one or more aspects of religious life. But a wholesale rejection of it by an entire society has been witnessed only in this age. Posterity will perhaps see its significance better than we do. For it is a phenomena that has already influenced and is bound to influence further the social, political and economic life, not only of the Russians but of civilized nations

(continued from the previous page) generally. This event will perhaps be characterised as the most outstanding feature of the history of the 20th century. The question is often asked by the thoughtful men nowadays: "Are we still in a fool's paradise? Even if we have been in it in the past, is it desirable that we should do so any longer, after seeing the revolution in Russia?" So the time evidently appears to have come for re-valuation of the religious factor in human life.

Uses of Religion. Generally people believe that religion implies a God or Gods on whom man's life, present and future depends. But we actually find that there are religions without any belief in God, or Gods, not even in an "other" to which some of the latest thinkers attach much importance. Whatever may be the implications of religion, for it has been defined variously, no one seriously doubts that in the past it has guided and shaped the entire life not only of individuals but also of communities. It has been the greatest source of consolation to millions of sorrowing and suffering people. It has brought peace and prosperity to communities by effectively binding together myriads of separate individuals for beneficial purposes. It has to a remarkable degree developed fine arts. It has often promoted social good of the highest value. And for that reason self-sacrifice, voluntary or forced, made in the cause of religion has won the greatest admiration everywhere. Further, the most effective of sanctions for moral life among the great majority is religion. Even from

(continued from the previous page) a political point of view it is religion that has served as one of the best means of wielding the mass mind.

Nevertheless, history equally truly points to the dark side of religion. There is no crime or vice known to man that has not been committed in the name of religion. The bloodiest of wars, the cruellest of murders, the most inhuman tortures, by methods infinitely worse than those invented by science are traceable to religion. Let alone the past: think for a moment of what happened and is happening particularly in this land of ours. What has transpired all the world over in this respect is too well known. This is not all. There is no kind of vice or immorality that has not been perpetuated in the name of religion. And for such practices the most elaborate justifications have been invented. Even those religions that are said to possess the highest ethical codes are not exempt. Such undesirable aspects of religion furnish incontestable evidence for the theories of those psychologists that trace the religious sense in man to sex complexes. Further, in some countries it has tended to the disruption of society and social solidarity, of which political intriguers have taken considerable advantage. Would we then be not nearer the truth if we substituted "religion" for "liberty" in that famous utterance of Madame Roland who exclaimed: "O Religion, what horrors have been committed in thy name?"

Theology and Scholasticism. Those looking at the bright side praise religion, whereas those that see more of the dark side condemn

(continued from the previous page) it outright. But now we could get glimpses of both the sides, does it not behove us to make an unbiased enquiry though we be undoubtedly attached to our own religious beliefs. There is a South Indian Proverb: Even Ambrosia when indulged in beyond measure acts as poison." Could not the same be said of religion? Even "good customs" are believed by Tennyson to corrupt the world.

Whether there exists a God; whether He is the Creator of the World; whether He is still creating; whether He is the Governor and the Judge that punished the wicked and rewards the virtuous; whether there are Heaven and Hell; what they are like; What God's nature is; what attitudes of man pleases Him; what forms of worship are welcomed by Him; what connection there is between Him and the Bibles, Korans, Vedas and other scriptures; whether they are eternal and superhuman; above all how evil came into this world; whether God could be good when He created a Hell; these and others, such as if God should be absolved from evil, and the Karma doctrines should be adopted, what are the proofs of its validity? A thousand such questions form the subject matter of theology. And the answers given vary with man's inclinations, tastes and culture.

Taking for granted that such dogmas as the above of traditional beliefs and scriptures to be true, men set out to interpret them finding arguments for and against with the help of science, logic, and grammar. Since these dogmas have been viewed from a variety of standpoints, the literature that

(continued from the previous page) has grown up is enormous. The great majority of men usually mistake these discussions for philosophy, though in truth they form the subject of scholasticism. The upshot of the theology and scholasticisms is that there is no unanimity³ of views on any point. Every topic has its pros and cons. Conflict and contradiction characterise them all, and are and will be endless as some Indian philosophers have pointed out, on perfectly rational grounds. Lest such natural differences should produce in men's minds doubts, zealous religionists have not hesitated to suppress them by declaring that the doubter is doomed to perdition.

Most men, either because they are too absorbed in earning their livelihood to think of such matters, or because they are too lazy to exercise their minds, or because they have a slave mentality, meekly submit to the judgment of the theological or scholastic heroes in their midst. Even atheistic religions have their dogmas and scholastic literature. But with the march of human civilization, we find that the thoughtful set to enquire before they judge. Neither the dogmas of the theists nor those of the atheists can be accepted as truth without enquiry which is the province of science and philosophy. These conflicting aspects were noticed thousands of years ago.

MYSTICISM. Those that fail, however, to derive any satisfaction from theological or scholastic disputations reject them wholesale and seek refuge in what are known as mystic experiences, ecstasies, visions

³ This symbol not found in Book Antiqua font so we have inserted from Microsoft Sans Serif

(continued from the previous page) and above all, what they term intuitions. They believe they have found here the bed-rock on which religion stands and consider it impregnable. For, it is seen that even some of the acutest scientists fear to approach this domain of the mystic. They hold religious experience or intuition to be beyond the reach of science. But this hesitancy or weakness of the scientist is no proof of the strength of mysticism. Whatever the opinion of the scientist, the fact remains, as has been observed for thousands of years in India, that the views of the greatest mystics regarding their own experiences and their knowledge of the World are⁴ contradictory and⁵ in conflict with each other.

Again, as an effect of it on society, we find that for every immaculate and irreproachable Ramana Maharishi, there are hundreds of frauds and fakes whose spiritual haven is the company of such women and men as have met with great sexual or other disappointments in life, not to say anything about the free use of wine offered, as in some of their cults, to the deity, in the selves. Nay, mysticism also lends itself easily, as an Indian philosopher says, to be used for attaining worldly comforts of other kinds. This is not all. When mystics seek their satisfaction in this manner and they or their activities in life do not interfere with those of the others, they are most welcome to rejoice in their "intuitions." But when their lives or actions influence the societies in which they move, and when we find harm resulting there from, we are compelled to enquire into the truth value of mysticism. If the 'divine' intuitions of the historical murderers, or of the famous

⁴ "their own experiences and their knowledge of the World are" was typed above the line and inserted with an arrow.

⁵ The original editor changed "matters a" to "and" by hand

(continued from the previous page) parents that roasted their praying children alive, or of the perverts that seduced innocent women by the score has only confined themselves to their cells or chambers rejoicing in their divine intuitions, or ecstasies, we should have had nothing but praise for them.

This essential weakness of mysticism was noticed by thinkers of the days of the Brahadaranyaka Upanisad thousands of years ago, and by Sankara, the critic, who says that even a "fool" says "I know, I experience, I have an intuition of the highest reality." Where is the proof that what he sees or knows is Truth? This is the question of questions that has exercised the minds of the thoughtful men of India.

When seriously asked, the believers in mysticism betake to flouting reason and declare to the world that religious experience is above reason, and "Truth Values" are inferior to what they call the values of satisfaction, which are spiritual as they term it. Now it does not need much argument to show that such defences have unfortunately fallen flat on enquiring minds because of the patent contradictions which have shaken the confidence of many observers. In a word, even mysticism, like the rest of religion, has its good as well as bad features.

Few are the men that care to weigh both sides; for, the number of those that can detach themselves from their religious bias which have been flowing in their veins for age and fewer are they that are able to subject their own experiences and thoughts to dispassionate scrutiny. Emotion often gets the

(continued from the previous page) upper hand in the generality of mankind and subordinates reason.

Nature of Religion. In life men invariably seek enjoyment, peace or satisfaction of some kind. They pursue religion with God or without God, to the extent to which it helps them to attain this object. And men are of different tastes. There are religions of different kinds, from the most virtuous to the most vicious of patterns, suited to their temperament, culture and capacity. On the other hand such as have found religion to be an obstacle to seeking their pleasures have rejected it, or modified it so as to keep religion out of their way. Hence though numberless are the religions already in existence, new varieties spring up each day. And each one of them is backed up by the most elaborate arguments, metaphysical intuitions, physiological, psychological, with their various theories of intuitions, sublimations, sub-conscious celebrations, cataleptic states, and the like. Religion is the manifestation of a craving. It is thus a universal as well as natural phenomena. Continuous differentiation is one of its most essential characteristics. Like every thing else in nature it is seen to obey the law "from unity or uniformity to multiplicity and variety, and variety in spite of all that men do to the contrary to suppress or check its growth.

Truth and Religion. Every follower of a religion thinks that what he believes is truth. What does truth then signify? If what we understand by truth be something like the meaning given to it in Mathematics, i.e. as two plus two are equal to four, we

(continued from the previous page) we see that such is and must be its most universal import. It is only such truth that holds good for a Christian or a Muhammadan, as Hindu or a Hebrew, an Asiatic or European, an American, an African, a man or a woman, the aged or the young. Its chief characteristic is non-contradictability.

But like everything else religion also is changing. Change implies difference. What was believed to be true a hundred years ago is modified considerably to-day. Can truth be subject to such changes? Again, no persons however much they may differ in all other respects are seen to fight in respect of the truth that two plus two are four. But the endless disputes, quarrels, nay, wars of religions are proof positive that religion is not based on Truth. And consistently do the mystics reject truth or reason as a test of the worth of their experience. Whatever they perceive feel or think, or imagine, is of supreme value to them, provided it brings them "satisfaction."

Now, if the highest stage of religion, that of the mystic in which he declares that he is above "reason" and "truth" satisfies one there is nothing more for such an one to do. But if the feeling be that this matter demands or justifies investigation, one should proceed a few more steps. "The easiest person to deceive" says Lord Chesterfield, "is one's own self." Shall we not then rely upon our "intuitions" only after we make sure that what we know is truth. Now, to attain to truth by removing all contradictions, could we prevent these growing differences among men of religion? Could we check the wars of the

(continued from the previous page) disputants? Could we, in a word, check Nature's process of multiplication? Since the last great Parliament was held in Chicago, some forty-three years ago religions have increased without number. Multiplication brings with it differences, and differences we cannot do away with. The primitive way of making religion by means of conversions, or by wiping out of existence the weaker followers of other religions, is still prevalent. For this aboriginal methods have proved futile; for, the converts have only developed new variants. Differences, conflicts and contradictions are again seen to spring forth endlessly.

The problem, How to prove any religion to be "true" or how to make it true, has yet to be solved. For, religionists want satisfaction before truth.

The Value and Signification of Religions.

It is not, however to be thought that religion, as at the present time, whatever it may have been in the past, no useful purpose to serve. It is still of the highest value as means though, very slow, of leading men step by step, to think of the value of truth. The very multiplicity and variety and necessary conflicts of the bloody, sometimes verbal, goad and force men to think of the need for knowing the truth in religion. Religions in the plural are a necessity that each may see the defects of the other and expose the fact that religion as such is not based on truth but on mere satisfaction, varying with imaginations, which is the cause of a great deal of human suffering. But

(continued from the previous page) adversity yields the sweet milk of philosophy. Next, proselytisation and propagandism for a universal religion are mere attempts of child-like minds, for they run directly counter to the natural craving that can never be eradicated by any means, do what we will.

The common features of all cravings is to possess something found or believed to be outside of it, and that as permanently as possible. But what is specially characteristic of the religious craving is its stronger emphasis on the Permanent. In this world of continuous changes and of joys of a most fleeting character the human heart thirsts for "permanence." Religion seeks to attain it by certain acts of propitiation or of renunciation or by both. But it does not worry itself as to whether the "permanence" has been actually attained or not. Religious men only imagine that "Permanence" is realisable after they are dead, and while can only believe in it. But where is the proof that any kind of permanence is attained and is secured after death? Again, the aim of art and science also is the attainment of the "permanent." All anti-religionists may ignore or even try to suppress religion; but they can never suppress the craving for the Permanent. If diverted from the channels called religions, this urge flows into other channels such as those of science and art. For the same reason, if same form of religion is suppressed, other forms spring up.

Wisdom, therefore, consists in working with Nature and taking advantage of religion to attain the object of life or existence.

Religion and Philosophy. We now see that the real worth of religion lies in its being an effort at seeking the Permanent. But what is

(continued from the previous page) permanent? Religion cannot answer because of the contradictions in man's views of it. If it were based on truth, there could be no contradiction or conflict, and no religion would have attempted to make converts. For, no mathematician proselytises another to bring home to others the truths that two plus two are equal to four. Truth is the objective of philosophy—not religion. The Permanent is sought by every one in existence, individually or collectively, in all actions and thoughts. Whether what is Permanent is manifold or single is ascertainable only when man possesses all knowledge comprehending arts and truth. The artist seeks it, the scientist also seeks it. It is philosophy that co-ordinates all efforts and seeks to get at the Permanent as it actually is. Religion by itself cannot attain the truth. Here let me quote a few words from a philosopher of India:

1. "The realisation of truth is brought about by enquiry and not in the least by the observance of ten millions of religious rituals."
2. "Knowledge of truth is seen to proceed from reasoning and not by pilgrimages to sacred rivers, etc."
3. "Let men quote scriptures and make sacrifices to the Gods and let them perform religious acts and worship the Gods. There is no attainment of Truth...not even in the life of a hundred Brahmas...."
4. "Neither by Yoga (mystic practice) nor by Sankhya nor by religious acts nor by erudition (scholarship) is the attainment of truth possible."
5. "Loud talks consisting of showers of words

(continued from the previous page) the skill in expounding scriptures and likewise great learning bring on a little personal enjoyment to the scholar but are not good for realising truth."

6. "The scriptures consisting of many words are dense forests which only make one ramble and get lost."

7. "For one who has been bitten by the serpents of ignorance the only remedy is the knowledge of ultimate truth (Brahman). Of what avail are the Vedas, Scriptures, Mantras and Medicine to such a one?"

We learn from philosophical enquiry that all urges, all cravings, all processes in life are but efforts for attaining the Permanent. From eating and drinking, playing and enjoying, up to governing and ruling and acquiring knowledge, all endeavours to attain self-preservation are but the pathways to the Permanent. Neither Russian nor any other power on earth can root out this urge towards self-preservation. Religion is but an aspect of this urge. Till from a knowledge of the changes, general conflicts and contradictions of faiths, there arises in one's mind and doubts remains in the stage of religion and art. When one feels the need for devising other tests of Permanence than satisfaction, to ascertain whether what is conceived as such is the Permanent one rises to the stage of science. But one remains in the scientific stage till one realises that all that is known is fleeting and that all knowledge of the world is coloured by imagination or conception, and above all, till a doubt again arises as to whether the permanent that is beyond all changes, and all contradictions is felt. One enters the gates of philosophy

(continued from the previous page) with a view to get beyond the reach of even possible doubts, which alone characterises truth. Thus the seeking for the Permanent proceeds from religion to philosophy through art and science. Religion interests the largest numbers; for, it is the simplest and easiest thing to find satisfaction by imagining whatever pleases one to be permanent. Whereas Philosophy interests the fewest; for, there, it is not imagination nor conception that counts, but truth that is independent of them and that is unchanging. So, what could be "Universal" is only Truth, i.e. the world of Philosophy, but not that of religion. And philosophy is as already indicated impossible without a knowledge of Science also.

The urge towards the permanent being universal known no distinctions of creed, colour, caste, age, race or sex though the form it takes, called religion, varies with men's minds. It is a knowledge of the nature of the urge, and its goal called truth, that takes one beyond religion to the enquiry known as Philosophy. (Paramartha Tatva Viechara).

What is characterised as sectarian such as Christian, Hindu, Muslim, or Jain philosophy is till it reaches the goal of truth, no philosophy proper but theology or scholasticism or mysticism. Truth is one and the same for all. There is no secrecy about it, no cell or screen is needed for it; no exceptional intuitive experience, no vision, no individual or scriptural superiority monopolises it. Truth is as wide as the world, and open to all alike, as the knowledge that one added to one make more than one.

Truth and the Parliament of Religions. Religionists most undoubtedly feel the urge to seek Truth, but feel at the same time that they are not called upon to ascertain the nature of 'truth' which is the province of philosophy. The foremost question for consideration for a Parliament of Religions therefore appears to be this: should we do anything to check this multiplicity and conflict? The primitive or aboriginal effort at unifying all religious views and of seeking a universal religion, which is in itself a contradiction in thought is found to be puerile and futile because it seeks to run directly counter to nature. And variety which nature produces with its contradictions is the best means of directing man's thoughts to the fact that religion is but a preparation for attaining the permanent, which is reached only through a knowledge which leads to Truth is based as much on science and art as upon religion, nay on the whole of life. Religion with the knowledge of science and art is beneficial in that it makes for truth. The common term philosophy used by all faiths and sciences, shows that the common factor truth, indicates that in itself it has no distinctions.

Lastly, the highest authority on religion, may tell us that he is in God or is in touch with God or that he is himself God. Let alone the question how he knows that his God is the same as what all others understand by God. If we ask him how he knows that what he refers to as God is the Permanent, the ever lasting in the future and without a beginning in the past, then he must play the well known trick of saying "You will know it when you become like me capable of having intuitions like mine.

(continued from the previous page) This trick, as has been pointed out already, any one can play. A Parliament of religious thinkers will therefore be as much a Parliament of philosophic thinkers, if the former will only see the proper place to give to the object of satisfaction as compared with that of 'truth'. The urge towards the goal of the Permanent is inexorable; it will not cease till truth is attained. Hence the pure philosophers of old said "Awake, Arise, and stop not till the goal is reached."

Conclusion. A Parliament like this has therefore not only to take stock of the differences and contradictions of faiths but also inculcate the best course of making the way easy for attaining the Permanent, which depends upon a knowledge, of truth, the goal of Philosophy, that is, Truth uncontradictable. The attainment of truth, however, demands an ethical discipline of a most rigorous character, which is⁶ sometimes under the name of religion as some Indian philosophers have pointed out. And this discipline, the Parliament will, I presume, unanimously uphold and actively encourage in every denomination. The Parliament, it is presumed, accepts the variety in religious experiences as a necessity and will discountenance the vanity of proselytisation, exposing the absurdity of the idea of a single universal religion. Though, as a special feature, religion has been at times more harmful, its value as a factor in individual life is unquestionable. Let every individual man or woman seek his or her own religious satisfaction without being induced or forced by another and without inducing or forcing another to the same course. To fulfil the object of the religious

⁶ The original editor inserted "is" by typed

(continued from the previous page) craving, nothing is more necessary than the acquisition of knowledge not confined to religion alone, though it is within the reach of the largest number but of knowledge of all fields of life or existence, knowledge as deep and as wide as is possible for man, for such knowledge alone is the path to the attainment, not in the next world—but “in the world” and “in this life” of the Permanent.

ON DEATH.

(Vedanta Kesari, '38)

The sorrow that death brings is as universal as it is intense. There is no house that has not experienced this pain sometime and that most bitterly. When it comes, most men succumb to it for the time, and some continue to be unhappy for years. But a few feel provoked to enquiry and thought. It is these few that tell us that pain and sorrow could be overcome and that the chief means to it lies in knowing the meaning of sorrow, suffering and death.

Change, when perceived naturally, provokes thought which leads one ultimately to knowledge. Striking changes rouse deep thought. And one of the most striking changes or phenomena is death, especially because it causes pain, which sets the human mind a-thinking deeply. The thought is directed primarily towards seeking the means, if that be possible, to overcome pain or sorrow. This enquiry naturally takes one to the question of the meaning of pain and death.

The answers to the questions put, have varied with men's temperaments and intellects. The several solutions may be broadly grouped under two heads: (1) Religious, and (2) Philosophical.

Religion finds satisfaction in the belief that after death, that is, after death of the body, there is another existence, which continues to eternity. Then will the soul of man realise its immortality and that in a spiritual or ethereal body. The soul will then find its compensations for all its sufferings or losses in this world. And it will also be duly punished for its wicked acts in this life. Lastly, will come God's grace and his blessings in a variety of ways. These compensations, punishments, graces and blessings vary with the hopes, actions, and wishes that the believer cherished in this world.

Some religions tell us of an eternal future life with our dead kith and kin, others tell of a life with charming women and friends, or of a life lost in admiration of God's throne and glory. In short such is the immortality vouchsafed by Religion that one finds after death all that one wishes for. This belief is strengthened by a variety of impressive funeral ceremonies after death.

Such religious views imply a certain unreasoned autocracy on the part of God, the Creator; for, it is not clear why men should be prompted to do wicked deeds, why temptations should be placed before them, why they should be punished for the weaknesses. To avoid difficulties, the Hindus believe in rebirth, according to the law of re-incarnation, on earth, which makes man reap as he has sown in his past. But the religious solutions,

(continued from the previous page) though they have satisfied and do satisfy immense majority of mankind, do not carry conviction to some minds which do not feel assured of an immortality which is promised after death. And they do not find consolation in future immortality in spite of all the charms of existence after death; it is no solution of the real problem. What man is not pained at his death here in this world and death of this earthly body? Of what use is it to him to be told that there is no remedy against this mortality and that there is a future immortality of a something other than this body? The solution that Religion offers is therefore felt by some to be far from giving the satisfaction sought. Those that feel the futility of the religious immortality and set about studying the nature and significance of death, are called philosophers. Their first step is a scientific study of this striking phenomenon.

Plato, the philosopher, put into the mouth of Socrates the statement that all philosophy springs from the phenomenon of death: "Philosophy is the study of death." In fact the highest philosophy in India starts with the subject of death. For instance it is so in the Bhagavad Gita, the Kathakopanishad and the Chandogyopanishad. The aim of philosophy is to ascertain the meaning and the truth of all experiences including death. This enquiry has been carried to its farthest boundary only in India, where they have come to the conclusion that it is possible to overcome pain and death of this body, nay, all sorrow. It does not seek consolation in the deathlessness of a future body as in Religion.

(continued from the previous page) It wishes to make sure whether in this body, here on this earth and now, any remedy could be found against death. Vedanta has an answer in the affirmative. It says that even this body is found to be Brahman, that is immortal, by one that knows the Truth. Once upon a time even the Lord Buddha, when asked by a sorrow-stricken person to revive her dead child, said that the only remedy lay in knowing the truth about death and there was no other way of freeing oneself from death or sorrow.

In pursuing Truth, science demands proof in the absence of which it relegates all beliefs to the world of unproven hypothesis, guess or imagination. The evidence for spiritual existence after death, advanced by the great scientist Oliver Lodge, leads at best only to hypothesis, but not to a certainty. He seems to be still under the influence of his old religious beliefs. For Hindu scientists and philosophers rely upon public or universal reason, and not upon private or individual experiences such as those relied upon by Oliver Lodge. According to Indian philosophers, to think that to be truth which pleases or satisfies one, is the religious mentality, whereas to seek satisfaction in what is proved to be true is the philosophical attitude. Indian philosophy, like European science, studies first the material body as part of the material universe. It holds that death is a kind of change not different from the changes observed in the world around us. In fact the body is undergoing change constantly, in other words, dying constantly. It looks strange, Vedanta observes, that one should always be dying and yet be

(continued from the previous page) afraid of death.

Philosophy in India begins by analysing experience or knowledge. It analyses all existence into two factors—mind and matter—mind including all that is called in Religion as soul or spirit, and whatever is said to be 'internal', and matter including one's own body and the 'external' world of space.

These two factors are named Drik and Drisyam, the seer and the seen, or the knower and the known, each of which is in turn analysed still further till what is called ultimate Truth is reached. The most determined pursuit of truth along the lines indicated above results in the philosophic solution, that all is Brahman the Eternal, and that nothing really dies. One who wishes to be convinced of this fact has to study Vedanta. Death is but a powerful call to think, to ponder, and to seek the goal of Truth, with a determination not to stop till the goal is reached.

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SANKARA: REASON OR REVELATION.
(In Sanksrit Research).

Of that Indian thinker who has been described as "one of the greatest philosophers of all times and countries" by a leading scholar and philosopher of Europe of the 20th century, the modern world of thought does not appear to know much. In Europe and America there are no doubt a few who are acquainted with this Indian Philosopher's writings; but their impression appears to be that he is only a theologian or at best a clever dialectician. For, no recognized

(continued from the previous page) history of philosophy yet published in those countries, excepting perhaps that of Prof. Paul Deussen of Kiel University, even so much as alludes to the school of thought with which Sankara's name is associated. Even authoritative works of reference like the Encyclopaedia Britannica treat of his writings on theology rather than of his works on philosophy. Dr Thibaut, translator of one of the most important works of Sankara, confines himself solely to the discussions of the dogmas in it. As a rational philosopher, Sankara has yet to be studied by the modern seeker after truth, though a great impetus has been in recent years given to a study of the philosophical systems of India by her Universities. An attempt is therefore made in the following paragraphs to present, from a modern point of view, a few salient features of this philosopher's thoughts and of his school which goes by the unique name of "Non-dualism", a name so often incorrectly rendered as "Monism" in Europe and America where no philosopher appears to have as yet had any conception of a "Non-dualistic" system of thought.

Seeing that to the Western and the Westernized world Sankara has been introduced by Sanskrit scholars as a theologian, the first point for consideration is whether he is a dogmatist or a rationalist, a theologian or a philosopher. Theology, as the science of God (of whose nature and existence, of whose creation of the universe, and above all, of whose introduction of sorrow, suffering and all the evils into the world it is unable to give a rational explanation) has not much in common with the philosophy

(continued from the previous page) whose business is the ascertainment of truth, whatever its form, and whose path of reason – unlike that of theology which cannot but adopt a course of dogmatic assumptions at every stage. It is not, however, unusual to find great thinkers holding that, in as much as reason has its limitations, all thinking on ultimate facts must abandon reason and fall back upon dogma in some form. But such men forget that they are only arguing in a circle. For it is to reason as supreme judge that they themselves appeal in satisfying themselves as to whether their ultimate facts are such as could be held by sensible or rational beings. Be this as it may, theologians, in as much as their aim is not to get at truth, whatever its form or nature, but to make their God the ultimate truth, are obliged to find the strongest support for their arguments in what they call revelation, natural and scriptural to the interpretation of which they devote so much of their intelligence, skill and labour. Philosophers on the other hand, build upon the facts ascertained by scientific thought, irrespective of what the Scriptures may reveal. Diametrically opposed as theology and philosophy are in these respects, there is yet a common point at which they meet. Both have their origin in a desire to get at the ultimate truth and to interpret the mystery of the universe or of life. Both the former starts with certain assumptions fashioned to suit human fancies; for, each school of theology has its own ideas of God and of His relation with man; whereas, philosophy starts with just the facts of experience within the knowledge of all men and viewed

(continued from the previous page) from this common stand-point. The theologian is but the child of whom the philosopher is the grown up man. And it is but reasonable that at that early stage of intellectual growth man should depend upon external supports, such as the Scriptures, though at the philosophic stage he is able to stand on his own legs, and reason for himself independently of Scriptures and the like.

Now, let us turn to Sankara who lived at least a thousand years before Descartes, the father of the modern, or as it is also known, the scientific school of thought. We find in Sankara's commentary on the Mandukya-Upanishad-Karika the following:- "It is asked whether the Advaita (Sankara's philosophical goad of non-dualism) is to be taken as proved only on the authority of the Sruti (Scriptural revelation) whether reason cannot possibly demonstrate it. This chapter, therefore, shows how the Advaita can be demonstrated by reason." Again:- "This (the unreality of duality) is borne out by the Srutis. It, however, is only established on the authority of the word Scripture. But it is possible also to show the unreality of the object world even from pure reasoning; and this second chapter is undertaken for that purpose." (Vaitathya Prakarana, Stanza 1.)

And in the chapters referred to above is shown in detail how Sankara's system of Advaita is based upon pure reason. Here let me consider a few possible objections:

First: it may be argued that this is not Sankara's real position, in as much as he elsewhere holds a diametrically opposite

(continued from the previous page) view. In reply, I have to point out that Sankara was fully aware that there were, and would always be, in this world men that would not recognise the authority of the Vedas; such, for instance, as the Buddhists. To refute their criticisms of the Vedanta, it was (and is) absolutely necessary not to appeal to Vedic authority. So he deliberately says in his Sutra Bhashya (chap.2, padai): "Now however, we are going to refute their arguments, in an independent manner, without any reference to Vedanta texts."

Secondly: it may again be argued that it was only for controverting the arguments of the opponents that he made use of pure reason, but not constructing his own system. For we find in his greatest work already referred to, the Sutra-Bhasya, the following statements:-

"Transcendant Brahma can be fathomed by means of Scriptures only, not by mere reasoning. Mere reasoning is not to be relied upon."

In passing, I may observe that these statements regarding the futility of reasoning were referred to even by the late Prof. Max Muller, as characterising this philosopher's views. But all such students of Sankara base their views solely upon these passages entirely ignore the context in which these words occur.

The greatest of all dogmas is the fiction that God is a or the cause of the world. If this fiction is to be maintained, it must be not by reasoning, but by authority only. For Sankara, anticipating Hume, proves the untenability of the argument from causality: "Having known the absolute non-existence of causal relation as the truth." Some minds, however, which have a dislike to "reasoning"

(continued from the previous page) find satisfaction in fancying God to be the cause. They can never see the fallacy of the cosmological theory. It is the "reasoning" of such men that Sankara thinks should be subordinated to authority. But to others who are intelligent enough to see through this fallacy, the fiction of causality is unnecessary. By the philosopher who is called by Sankara the "Vedantin" this dogma is completely ignored.

Thirdly: it may be held that the foregoing argument only shows that Sankara places the method of reason on a level with that of dogma or authority (Sruti), and that this cannot give him a title to being a scientific or a modern philosopher. Does he anywhere prove or admit that the method of authority is inferior? Here is what the Indian Philosopher says: "srotriyas (followers of Sruti or authority) who stick to forms, being of dull intellect (sthula-Buddhi), are afraid of the negation (or cessation) of causation. All such things (as causation) are meant only as a help to such persons." Again, "the possibility of causation is countenanced at times by the wise—only for the sake of the ignorant. But the Vedantins must be able to realize the futility of the rest (i.e. of causation etc.) —Mandukya Bhashya. The Vedantin or the philosopher, it must also be remembered is characterised by Sankara, in the same work, as possessing 'mahabuddhi' or high intellect.

Sankara thus divides seekers after knowledge into two classes: 1. the 'dull intellects' and 2. the 'high intellects'; in other words, the 'non-philosophers' and the 'philosophers' and he draws a line between them at their ability to understand the meaning of the causal relation."

Fourthly: if Sankara really thought the scientific or the rational method superior to that of the dogmatic, why then does he waste almost the whole of his energy on those works that adopt the srottriya or the theological method?

Some of the Western philosophers hold that as the world advances, it must gradually wean itself from the method of authority and adopt that of reason once for all. But Sankara seems to think that however much the world may advance, there will ever be in it children along with adults, I mean intellectual children and intellectual adults. And the method of reason will be of little avail with those in the child stage, who generally form the majority; for them Sruti is of the utmost importance. And it is for this reason that he expounds the scriptural texts bearing on the search after truth on the old or dogmatic lines.

This curious fact that Sankara has a two-fold aspect, has been a source of confusion and misunderstanding. On the one hand, no European or American critic has yet seen his purely rational side. Everyone has considered him a theologian. Even Prof. Deussen positively asserts that Sankara builds his system upon Sruti as the ultimate basis, which injustice to Sankara I have pointed out to the learned professor. And Dr George Thibaut does not appear to have taken any notice of the two-fold method adopted by Sankara. The other European and American critics have not shown any deep acquaintance with his works I shall not, therefore say anything here about them.

On the other hand, it is not a little strange that the Indian opponents of Sankara see more of his rational side and call him a

(continued from the previous page) Prachanna Buddha, or a distinguished Buddhist, that is to say, an atheist.

Fifthly, and lastly, my critic may yet make another attempt to dislodge me. He may make use of the time-honoured weapon of interpretation and declare that I have misconstrued this philosopher's words. And once it did actually happen that a highly respected friend of mine, a Professor of Sanskrit in Mysore, said that an orthodox authority he was inclined to give a different meaning. But seeing that, in this circumstance, he would not accept my interpretation, however accurate, as final, and also seeing that I had to meet him on his own ground, I quoted for him the highest orthodox scholar and philosopher of the time, who had distinctly and definitely said that Sankara based his Advaita Vedanta either on reason, independently of Sruti, or on Sruti supported by reason. That high authority was no other than the great Sri Sachchidananda Sivabhinava Narasimha Bharati Swami, the late head of the Sringeri Matha.

It will thus be seen that Sankara's system of Advaita does not need the support of any Scripture or Revelation like the Veda. The Srutis may all disappear, yet will his school stand. For it is based, not upon the varying theological fancies, which are as numerous as the sands of the sea, but upon reason, the common heritage of all mankind irrespective of colour, or creed or clime. Nor is it even a philosophical dish cooked to suit exclusively the palate of the Hindu. It is like air and the water, the common food of all men in all countries. It is, as will be shown, in the sequel, an attempt, not merely at attaining

(continued from the previous page) Truth but as constructing a “Science of Truth”, nay – prior to Descartes and Kant – it is in fact the only attempt made at such a science.

SANKARA’S PHILOSOPHY.
(In the New Era & German Logos Mags.)

“Thus engaged in supporting conflicting theories...they have been drawn away from truth.” Shankara’s Commentary on Prashnopanishad.

Shankara, religious teacher, mystic, theologian, philosopher, and above all, man of action, has been variously interpreted and estimated by scholars both eastern and western. Apart from the natural tendency in interpreters, unconsciously to read, at times their own thoughts into other’s words, the differences in the presentations of the philosophy of Shankara, to a bird’s eye view of which this article is confined, are due not only to the difficulty of understanding the abstruse mind of one who lived over a thousand years ago, but also to the circumstance that has given to this world no work containing what might be called a systematic exposition of his own thought, as a modern Kant or Hegel has done. His most authoritative works are but the commentaries on those of others, mainly theological or mystical in character, which necessitates our sifting his philosophy proper from the rest of his thoughts.

A study of Advaita (Non-dualism), as Shankara’s system is called, may start from either of the two standpoints of physics

(continued from the previous page) or metaphysics and proceed to the other. This Indian thinker, like his ancient predecessors, the Vedic Rishis, held that a philosophy should explain in the light of its fundamental doctrine the whole of life or existence. (Mundaka Up.I.1.i.& iii: Brihadaranyaka IV. 5,6: Chandogya VI.1.3 & VI.4,5: Shankara's Sutrabhasya II.1.14). That Advaita aims at such an explanation will be evident from its most characteristic feature, the keystone of the system, the method of "Avasthatraya" which will be adverted to in the sequel.

The mental world as well as the material of which we are aware, appears to be as few would dispute, one of continuous change. The appearance and disappearance of physical or spiritual phenomena as well as all physical including the natural and the social, indicate movement of one kind or other. So the basic philosophical question with which this school also like many an other, may be said to grapple, is: what does the urge (for an explanation of it as impulse vide Shankara's commentary Bhagavadgita VII.4-6 and XIII, 19-20. Specially Shankara's com. Brih.Up.I.4-7 and II,7. Reference to Pravriti and Nivritti etc), which manifests these several activities and changes in mind and matter, point to and imply?

The two central topics round which all his disquisitions may be said to range themselves in this connection are: (1) the problem of Truth, and (2) the problem of Reality, which are necessarily inter-related and therefore inseparable. In the course of his treatment of these two problems he states his views on many others which are usually

(continued from the previous page) considered under philosophy.

What distinguishes him from other thinkers of the past is his approach to the subject. A thousand years ago he appears to have held that the battles of philosophy (not religion or mysticism) have been fought and won on the field of epistemological problem of truth but not on that of ontology. This is evident from the introductory remarks in his great commentary on Badarayana's Sutras and the commentaries on the most important Upanisads, such as the Brhadaranyaka and Mandukya (with Gaudapada's Karikas.) While as theologian he is content to start, like Badarayana, with the assumption that Brahman or God is the first cause or creator, as a philosopher he begins with an enquiry into the meaning of Truth. Here he relies on no theoretical hypotheses (as many a modern philosopher does) or ecstatic visions; no scriptural authority or theological dogma, upon nothing beyond the common experience of mankind. Great thinkers have no doubt enquired into logical truth; but what Shankara seeks is philosophical or ultimate truth, — truth which comprehends all other truths, i.e, the truth-process which explains all other truth-processes.

Falling into error is among the commonest occurrences in life, which man learns to be due to ignorance. Error brings on sufferings, which prompt enquiry. An enquiry into the causes and their implications means search after truth. The moment at which one knows that one has fallen into error marks the awakening of the sense of truth. The first point (for this distinction between theological dogma and philosophical enquiry vide his Commentary Bhagavatgita XIII 25: Sutra Bhashya

(continued from the previous page) Introduction) therefore that Shankara considered is: What constitutes error? Then comes the questions: How does it arise and how is it removed? These lead to the elucidation of the meaning of truth, which naturally involves the discussion of the problem of reality. It is not unusual to find persons proceeding to the study of 'reality' straight, in Shankara. It is preferable, however, to follow Shankara's own course. Further some writers have ignored his distinction between 'Truth' and 'reality' which has led to some misunderstanding of his system. This is probably due in a measure to the use at times of the same word "Satyam" in Vedanta in both the senses. The confusion is further attributable to the fact that in the philosophy of non-dualism (Advaita), absolute or ultimate Truth and Reality are identical. That he, however, does make this distinction, till the ultimate (paramarthika) point is reached, is evident from what he says in various places in regard to "Existing or real things" and our "knowledge of them" as distinct conceptions. In other words, truth here is one's knowledge, thought or conception of something denoted as fact or reality, or, more accurately speaking, truth is a mental effort to get at fact or reality. And it must be said that without a clear grasp of Shankara's views in regard to truth it is impossible to understand his philosophy, though one may get at his religion and mysticism without such knowledge.

He holds that not only religious feeling, mystic experiences, theological dogmas but also laws of science rest upon truth and

(continued from the previous page) and that they all reveal but different degrees of it, through which the human mind passes before it attains to the highest or ultimate truth. All these realms of knowledge receive their stamp or imprimatur of truth, or more accurately, of the degree of truth that they contain only from a philosophical enquiry (Tatvavicara: Bg.XIII 25). There are any number of doctrines of schools (matas) of religion, theology, mysticism, scientific theory, every one of which without exception seeks a justification of its attitude in the language of truth (Tatva or Paramartha). Even when some of them urge the existence of non-rational facts, beyond the reach of the intellect they do so relying on their sense of truth for establishing the validity (In Western philosophy 'validity' is held to be more comprehensive than 'truth', but in Indian thought such a distinction does not seem to obtain) of their convictions. If an adherent of any school or doctrine felt his non-intellectual beliefs to be false or foolish, he would not stick to them for a moment, whatever others may think of them. What, however, directly led Shankara to tackle the problem of truth may be best indicated in his own words thus: "The followers of Kapila, Kanada, Buddha, Jina and many others are obstinately firm, each in their individual conviction...So as to hold that truth (paramartha) in its entirety must be of this form and this alone....And they are in endless conflict with one another."

Since every one possesses an instinct of truth with which one tests the validity of one's experience and knowledge, the question arises: Does this sense of truth signify that what is called truth is different for different

(continued from the previous page) men or that it is one and the same for all, though there may be various degrees of it. Is there a basic universal standard? Shankara's enquiry leads him to the conclusion that there exists a common standard which is the same for all men which "does not conflict with any" (Avivada) and is free from dispute and which is non-antithetical (Aviruddha). In the absence of such a touchstone no discussion will help us to estimate the value of any piece of human knowledge and particularly of philosophical knowledge, nay, even of any human action, not to say anything of the conflict and discord naturally resulting from want of a correct estimate of this kind.

Before proceeding to the enquiry proper, Shankara lays down that a seeker after the standard truth should keep out whatever might disturb the mental equilibrium and clearness necessary to perceive it. And he accordingly says that: 1. the seeker must not be actuated by any motive—such as of gain or of pleasure, temporal or celestial—other than that of the pursuit of truth (Ihamutra Phalabhogaviraga). 2. He must possess such control over himself as to secure perfect calmness, patience, attentiveness and concentration (Shama, dama titiksa etc). 3. He must be free from all predilections or prejudices even those of a religious or theological character. (Uparati) besides possessing a resolution to accept 'truth' be it agreeable or disagreeable to his preconceived notions.

Now what does this urge of thought called truth aim at? When I say that I am seeking truth, I expect that my thought will correspond

(continued from the previous page) to something material or mental that 'exists' but not what does not exist. Since my expectation implies also a comprehension of what exists, intelligence or consciousness is a necessary concomitant. Lastly, when consciousness or intelligence has grasped the existent without any doubt a satisfaction must be felt which marks the grasping; for, in the absence of such satisfaction there is no knowing whether what I know is true. Or, if a man were asked why he considers a piece of knowledge or a belief true he would say that he does so because he feels that it tells him of something which is a fact, positive or negative, that actually exists, because he has intellectually comprehended it, and because he feels a satisfaction in having grasped it. Existence, comprehension or intellection and satisfaction are the trio of characteristics that mark the objective of all truth-seeking—a view which is of upanishadic origin, as we shall see (This trio is known as Sat, Chit, Anandam. It has been further elaborated by later Vedantins into asti, bhati, priam, nama and rupam with which we are not connected here: vide Drig Drisya Viveka). And these three are indissolubly united though they may according to circumstances be of different degrees of intensity. When the 'urge' attains its maximum limit and the three characteristics are also at their highest degree of effectiveness, we reach the conceivable 'goal' of truth-seeking.

In the practical world, this 'urge' which varies with temperaments and intellecta, sometimes overemphasises one or two of the three characteristics, which leads to different

(continued from the previous page) levels or varieties of truth and to fallacies of various kinds. In mixed philosophy which does not wean itself from religious, theological, mystical scientific and other bias, there is infinite scope for differences and grades of truth. On the other hand in pure philosophy, which seeks Absolute Truth, the standard common to all, there can be no room for gradation or differentiation. And those who have not the patience to get at the ultimate balance of emphasis do not attain to the standard of Absolute truth though they do get at some aspect of truth, which they very often believe to be ultimate, but which is not such, as is evident, and as Shankara says, from the 'conflicts' we see.

Fallacies of mysticism arise out of an over-emphasis of the 'satisfaction' (Anandam) and 'existence' (sat) aspects subordinating 'intelligence' (chit) or reason, to use a western word. Those of religion owe their origin to the stressing of 'satisfaction' more than even the 'existence' feature. Prominence given to the 'intelligence' character sub-ordinating 'existence' and 'satisfaction' leads to inconsistencies of intellectualism and Idealism and of some of the theories of Science. Attachment of undue importance to the 'existence' character involves us in the contradictions of Realism and Materialism. (Atheism also). The more balanced and the greater the degrees of emphasis, the nearer one is to absolute or standard truth. It is, however, Intelligence that is aware of and that determines the degrees of the emphasis on the three aspects. The utmost limit of the emphasis is reached when intelligence sees that it is not possible for the 'urge' to reach a higher

(continued from the previous page) level in any of the factors. Hence the supreme importance of intelligence. And it happens that owing to want of intellectual acuteness one is not able to see when this maximum level is reached. And intelligence does not develop as rapidly as one often wishes. Science, however quickens its pace. Truth being the effect of thought or knowledge to get at something which is considered real, the 'urge' of truth-seeking has no further function to perform when reality is reached. Next, what reality is has to be considered.

Truth-efforts being thus subject to various modifications, their objectives which also likewise vary, are classified by Shankara under three heads. The highest or the Absolute is called "paramarthika" which admits of no degrees or conditions. Next comes the Relative, or 'Vyavaharika', the most familiar one, which contains an infinite number or grades and varieties such as not only the basic or logical, but also the mathematical, the scientific, the historical, the legal and many others each determined by the character of the date or facts dealt with, and each governed by subsidiary laws of its own. His last order is the illusory or 'Pratibhasika' in which what is taken for truth at first turns out subsequently on enquiry to be untrue as is a dream. Vyavaharika and Pratibhasika truths resemble each other so largely that they are often bracketed and placed under the head Relative by some writers. "Paramarthika" truth being absolute and beyond all characterisation, the "Existence, consciousness and satisfaction" formula indicates in varying degrees the objective of the truths of the 'Relative' class only. Many thinkers seem to hold that there is no limit or finality

(continued from the previous page) in regard to truth and that ultimate truth is unattainable. They are perfectly correct so far, in as much as their point of view is only the relative. "Paramarthika" or absolute truth being beyond characterisation is to them necessarily meaningless. Hence they have no idea of a standard common to all men. Even Shankara quotes one of the Rishis who when asked to put into language the absolute truth, answers by maintaining silence.

How then, do we in practice speak of it, in such terms as "Absolute" or "Ultimate"? So long as we use language to indicate it, we have to by diverting our attention from, i.e. by negating the relative, we cannot help having recourse to the language. Using such language, Sankara declares that 'Perfect knowledge has the characteristic mark of uniformity,' (Ekarupam) which implies, as he himself says, 'permanence' (Avasthita) and 'Universality' or an absence of mutual conflict of men's opinions, or rather an impossibility of such conflict regarding it. (Vipratipattiranupapanna). Such knowledge, however, he adds, it is impossible to attain actually within the limits of the relative And he also says that the greater the degree of such uniformity, the nearer is one to absolute truth. Absolute truth as distinguished from relative truths, which are dynamic, is static. But in itself it is neither.

Corresponding to these varieties of truth, tests have been adopted. The Advaitic system recognises, for instance, in the world of relative knowledge, the test of correspondence where the "existence" and "intelligence" aspects of the objective are emphasised, the test of non-contradictability or consistency

(continued from the previous page) where the intelligence factor predominates; the pragmatic test where the existence and satisfaction features are stressed. The test of the inconceivability of the opposite is applied to what is known as the subject or self, where there is a consciousness of subject as related to object. As for absolute truth viewed from the world of relativity a three-fold test is provided which is essentially one. When this truth is attained (1) there remains no existence unknown, for, "every thing becomes known; (2) there is not merely no room for, but no possibility of room for, any doubt (of intellect) arising; (3) there is no higher 'satisfaction' to seek; for there is and can be no desire for anything beyond. This correspondence to the three-fold objective, "Existence, intelligence and satisfaction (satchidanandam)' of the relative world which is here negated by saying that of these three characteristics there remains nothing that is distinguishable in absolute truth. Perfect agreement or perfect consistency is possible only when truth is Reality i.e. when both are the same when the urge naturally ceases. This is the oldest three-fold Vedic-test which only 'unity' or better still 'non-duality' can stand. When we look at it from the point of view of negation we call it non-duality. The 'non-duality' is denoted by Shankara by the unique expression "Antyam Pramanam" (ultimate measure of truth).

The absolute reality is beyond even 'unity' (Brhahadaranyaka Up. II 3-1). Hence nonduality is not the same as unity or 'monistic reality' as applied to truth process. Even unity may imply duality. When we have the idea of unity there is not only the idea but also a thinking or consciousness of that idea i.e. two entities

(continued from the previous page) or existents. Shankara therefore used the negative 'non-duality' advisedly.

Now, it might be urged that "paramarthika" or absolute truth is only a theoretical or intellectual conception with an equally theoretical 'ultimate measure' corresponding to it. Strictly speaking, what it is, is inconceivable. Can it then be actual? Or is it attainable? In answering this question, Shankara has recourse to what has been referred to as the "keystone of Advaita Vedanta." The highest court of appeal is common experience. The business of truth is to read it aright. Europe and other parts of the world which have no knowledge of 'non-dualism' – which is not monism as has been pointed out – rely upon experience of a fragmentary character for the data of their knowledge, whereas the Advaitic philosopher takes account of the totality of experience. Those thinkers of East and West who are not non-dualists base their inference on the experience furnished by the 'waking' state only, while the adherents of the Shankara doctrine cover the entire ground of the three states of waking, the dream and the deep sleep. This is known as the Avasthatraya. Scientists of the West have no doubt studied dream and sleep physiologically and psychologically, but not for epistemological or noetic purpose. Avasthatraya is the core of Shankara's philosophy. Some critics of Sankara have ignored this in the belief that it involves the fallacy of solipsism. Without however going into its details, it may be stated that Avasthatraya shows that non-dual experience is no hypothesis, but a fact and reality beyond all doubt, and within the reach of one and all.

Truth seeking as has been said is a process of thinking. Thought is a movement at bottom. And thinking implies a 'being' (vide Sankara's Sutrabhasya III.2.21) that thinks; which being need not be, as some men suppose a material or tangible entity. Being and thinking cannot be different in essence or stuff. Only the one is static while the other is dynamic. Sometimes the word 'spirit' is used to denote 'being.' In as much as thinking implies 'being', so long as we think we are 'thinking beings.' To get at 'pure being' (Shankara's pure being is beyond thought and therefore beyond Hegel's distinction of "Being" and 'non-being'. Shankara's 'pure being' (Sadeva) is beyond being 'sat' as ordinarily known. It is even 'asat' non-being from another aspect) thinking has to cease. Hegel thought 'pure being' to be nothing because of his intellectual attitude, which while it corrected the fallacious reasoning of those that relied too much on feeling, subordinated the factor of existence. It is not nothing however for Shankara, for, to him, it is 'non-duality.'" (Sat implies Asat: therefore pure sat is what is beyond this duality. vide. Sankara's commentary: Gaudapada Karika 2).

But it will be said that with the cessation of thinking the idea of 'being' also is lost to thought. But this 'being' is the beyond not only affirmation but also negation. It cannot be said that it does not exist merely because thinking ceases. Further 'being' is not non-existent because of the awareness of the fact of the cessation of thinking as in the intervals of thinking, when it is said that one has had a blank mind; or, generally speaking as illustrated by deep sleep. In the

(continued from the previous page) reality revealed by non-duality, there is no annihilation, as some nihilists hold, but it is indescribable;—indescribable because, 'being' is all that is and is not and could possibly be. In fact there is nothing different from it to think of. Paramarthika truth is such that in it 'knowing' and 'being' are not two; are not different.

The argument of "unconscious cerebration" and 'sub-conscious thinking' of certain critics is not to the point. We are never aware of such thinking at the time. We only infer such processes from what appears to us when we become conscious of them. But such phenomena or experience is accounted for differently and more practically by Advaitism into which we cannot go here.

How then do we know that this Paramarthika, 'non-dual' standard is ever present, functioning even in the Vyavaharika or Pratibhasika truths as the universal and permanent sense of truth? In the first place, so long as the 'urge' is felt for attaining truth, i.e. the equilibrated, non-conflicting standard, so long is it said to be present in the waking and in the dream states. (There can be no urge towards or no seeking for an object of which we have not some knowledge, implicit or explicit). Next, 'Being' is present in all thinking (including feeling) and Being which is unrelated, is the non-dual reality or absolute truth. Shankara's 'pure-being' abhors all attempts at reaching it by thinking which only hides pure being from view, though it is ever present. No amount of thinking will ever help us to get at 'being' pure and simple, which alone determines the validity of all the thinking whose object is

(continued from the previous page) to get at 'being'. Some philosophers attach no value to 'pure-being' inasmuch as they are so attached to the ego, that is disappearance alarms them. They seem to have no idea of the totality of experience, which shows that the ego is only an 'idea' (kalpana). The ultimate truth or existence is 'Pure-Being' which is called Atman.

Further, what perceived the various degrees and kinds of truth is what comprehends them all. What is ordinarily called truth is the truth of the waking and the dream states, that is, of the relative world. Shankara's analysis of the knowledge of the Relative world gives him an "awareness" or "Witness" as subject and a two-fold object, one internal and the other external. All thoughts or ideas including those of time and space and causality, feelings, volitions, soul or ego, intellect, in a word, what one is mentally aware of constitutes the internal object. And whatever is perceived through the senses including the body is external object. Both these appear and disappear and are subject to change. And our knowledge of them is neither 'uniform' in all men nor 'permanent'. They are therefore considered to be unlike the constant witness 'awareness' or 'subject' whose non-existence cannot even be conceived of. Even when you think of the absence of awareness you are somehow aware of the unawareness. If awareness whose non-existence cannot even be thought of be called, 'real' what is off and on presented to it and is changing may be denoted by the term 'unreal'. Now if a person says that he feels or sees or conceives, or in any other manner becomes aware of God, he only knows God as an object, which is unreal being subject to changes of appearance and disappearance

(continued from the previous page) being not known to be 'uniform' or the same to all. Shankara, is therefore in one sense in agreement with 'Terteegen' who says "A God comprehended is no God." (Quoted from Dr Otto's "The Idea of the Holy"). Sankara goes a step further. If any one feels that God is external, subject to no change or conditions, is truth, or that He exists but cannot be thought of or described or comprehended, God must be one with Pure-Being. In no other sense can there exist God.

Sankara holds that the characteristics of the Vyaharika and Partibhasika, i.e. of the waking and the dream worlds, are time space and causality, (In this Sankara anticipated Kant about a thousand years before Kant. His proof is however different) which are unreal beings but creations of thought is proved by 'Avasthatraya'. Therefore those that talk of a first cause, a ruler, a director, or a saviour, belong to the theological stage. As Sankara declares, they alone who can see the truth value of the causal relation are qualified to enter upon a study of pure philosophy whose object is the pursuit of the absolute or the ultimate 'non-conflicting' truth.

Now, the truth-seeking effort is a thought process, passing through the Vyavaharika and the Pratibhasika grades of experience, which leaves each step as it rises higher, as soon as it is felt that reality is yet to be reached. But to have the satisfaction that it moves in the direction of reality, it keeps the idea of reality, constantly before it, which forces it to take at first sight anything as real. This reality which is a tentative superimposition

(continued from the previous page) (aropita) is also called apparent reality; or shortly, apperance. This is apparent because it is removed (apavada) afterwards. Experience itself shows the character of this superimposed reality by means of the changes and by the contradictions arising in one's knowledge of it. There is thus a combined process of affirmation and negation. The aim of the combined process is the attainment of the unimposed reality, which is 'being' itself, which is always implied in thinking, as the nondual Paramarthika truth. It is by this process of the dialectic of thought, that non-duality is reached. The modern tendency in European Philosophy is more towards construction (aropa) based on hypotheses. But the 'apavada' is left to mysticism, because Europe or the West has as yet no idea of the standard truth as revealed by Avastatraya.

Taking it for granted that causality is a real relation, men often ask, How does the 'dual' spring out of the 'non-dual'? The dual may be unreal, even then the question arises: How does the unreal come into existence while the real is held to be unchanging? The usual reply is well known that causality is a characteristic only of the relative or the dual world, that no relation can be predicated of the non-dual and that therefore the question is inadmissible. But this does not satisfy: for, it is said that it is only an intellectual reply. Now, if we turn to experience and ask how the dual is produced by the non-dual we get the answer that if it has been produced we could say it has been produced. Experience has nowhere given us such production from the non-dual. We only assume or imagine that it has been produced by the non-dual and ask for the cause.

(continued from the previous page) To make this clearer, if we hold a piece of ice in our hand, we feel its solidity and hardness. We also perceive its shining surface and its defined shape. But it soon turns into water, when it loses the above features. Water then turns into vapour, vapour may be turned into gases. But at each step the characteristics that we once found disappeared. Where have they gone? Do solidity, hardness, shining surface, shape, etc. exist or no? If they do exist where is the proof of their existence? When one asks what is ice one is told that ice is water. And when one asks what is water, one is told that it is vapour a compound of gases and so on. At each step of seeking the cause, certain features which were so actual as to be perceived by the senses disappear. In other words when we ask an explanation by analysing and enquiring into causes and rising to higher generalisations, if anything ceases to be, this disappearance of characters and this inexplicability is said to be Maya (Shankara's com. & Vidyananya's gloss. – Taittiriya Upanishad: Anandavall ChVII) which is assumed to be the cause of the dual existence. (That is, so long as we view from the Vyavaharik or relative world. When there is no causal or any other relation to think of as in the Paramarthika world, there is no maya in it.)

Maya is only a statement of a fact, the most stubborn of facts. It is no theory. And there is no philosopher of the past or present who is more opposed than Shankara to imaginary, hypothetical and mythical assumptions or inference in the search of the absolute truth. Maya which is beyond dispute explains this duality to be of the nature of ideas or

(continued from the previous page) thoughts which disappear when you seek their cause; i.e. when you seek to know the stuff of which they are made; for ideas or thoughts disappear in beings when you seek their cause. This we learn from "Avastatraya", which tells us that we have before us duality consisting of the witness (subject) or Being, and the object (internal and external). When we seek for the cause of the whole of the object we are obliged to fall back upon the subject; for nothing else exists. (vide Shankara's commentary on Gaudapada Karika II 16). The object is treated as effect and its cause is sought. The thought world of the waking and the dream states disappear in deep sleep.

Shankara, however, holds that the causal relation is only an idea (kalpana) and says (vide Shankara's commentary –Gaudapadakarika IV 78 et. seq) that the seeking for a cause is only the urge or craving for the 'real' the 'being', the 'non-dual' which is never an object of thought. And when there is pure being there can be no thinking, for, when there is thinking we have a 'thinking being.' If one knows how one's own being and one's own 'thinking' are related one knows how duality appears or disappears.

The internal object, i.e. the mental world may disappear in sleep, as it is only a world of ideas. What about the external object or the mental universe? How can we dispose it off so summarily? That the external world is also of the same stuff as ideas and are like the world of dreams is made clear by Avastatraya. The modern Gentile is a good approach to this part of Sankara here. This subject, however, must be reserved for a future occasion. (To

(continued from the previous page) avoid misunderstanding it must be added that Shankara is neither an 'idealist' nor a 'realist' nor a 'monist' in the European sense of these terms. He is a 'non-dualist: He admits an internal or mental world and an external or material world like all other men. But those these are of the same stuff as the Atman. They appear to be distinct. Duality or manifoldness is an error of thought. He is the opponent of Gentile in this that while for Gentile 'thinking' is reality, for Shankara 'pure being' alone is reality, for Shankara relies solely upon his definition of truth. Thinking is chimera. While idealisms fails to explain whence comes the feeling or sense of reality of external entities, Sankara's Advaita alone gives a rational explanation of the fact of such a feeling. In this sense Shankara is a realist.)

We may now turn to other provinces of knowledge, to get an insight into the truths they teach. We can only take a birds-eye view by noting the highest generalizations without going into details. In as much as logic furnishes the general groundwork of all rational enquiry, we may ask what does the 'urge' which manifests itself as logical processes, imply? Logic seeks truth in the 'objective' (internal and external) world only, but not the truth of entire existence, which is the province of philosophy. Logical processes are primarily based upon what is known as 'Induction' which points to a universal, starting from one or more particulars. What does this 'urge' or movement of thought indicate? It is the effort to realise the ultimate character of thought by abolishing in mind, the distinctions of duality and multiplicity. Perfect Induction

(continued from the previous page) seeks to attain a universal, i.e. non-dual principle of thought underlying the manifold which is constantly abolishing itself by its changes. Deduction gives us no new information but only indicates how manifoldness is comprehended in unified knowledge. The way this is done by steps in the two processes, in the various departments of knowledge of the 'objective' (internal and external) world is a matter of detail.

In Ethics only such conduct is held to be good or right as seeks to negate the idea of the Ego and of the objective world as something other than 'being.' The effort at self-sacrifice selflessness or self-restraint or at renouncing worldly gains would not be thought of and would not be made, nor justified if the ego and the world were real. The desire for self-purification is a desire to divest 'being' of all the accretions which 'thinking' has covered it with, by negating dualistic ideas. If a person utters a lie, his conduct is disapproved because, he has one thing at heart and another on his lips. He is affirming 'duality' in thought which is abhorred by the 'urge' towards non-dualism. To take another illustration, if one seeks to identify one's self with all by making another's sorrows and joys his own, by widening the circle step by step, by expanding his being till the idea of the duality of the ego and the non-ego disappears, one is said to do what is right. (All the affirmation of the unreal by taking it to be real, which is duality is evil and the seeking of delight in such affirmation is a sinful act.) Do unto the world as though all the world was your own self is the highest

(continued from the previous page) Advaitic doctrine of Ethics taught by Shankara. In fact it is the course recommended by him for practice by everyone who wishes to realise the highest truth or reality.

Shankara certainly could not have known the modern developments of knowledge. But the truth of his philosophy may be tested by applications of it to modern knowledge.

In Aesthetics, (the Aesthetic urge according to Shankara's views emphasises or seeks the Anandam aspect of the objective; i.e. realises the Paramarthik truth, or reality by transcending finally this 'anandam') the 'urge' of creativeness is the effort of self-expansion by imitating the Creator (Iswara) of the Universe which leads to a negation in thought, by steps of the distinction between an external creation and one's own ego. When the ego seeks thus to expand and to realise its own 'greatness' as Being, the process makes one forget one's individual self which is being expanded and which gives us the bliss of expansion which is but a step towards self realisation (the index of creative expansion of Being is naturally 'expression' which is said by modern western philosophers to be the essence of art, which fact also is clearly indicated by Sankara). When the thought of self is lost in thought of the infinite, it is the way of realisation of Being or 'non-duality'. The production and the enjoyment of all that is beautiful is a process of expansion which implies effort at effacement of ego and gradual negation of duality in thought. How it does this in poetry, music, drama, sculpture, etc. is a question that will take us far outside the scope of this paper to answer.

No school of philosophy would be considered

(continued from the previous page) a system in modern times (as in the Vedic times also) unless it explained the facts of life in all its aspects. Turn we therefore to the field of physical and social phenomena. Here we must first distinguish between a scientific enquiry and a philosophic one. The latter seeks to generalise the generalisations which are called truths of several sciences and to interpret them in terms of some fundamental principle or principles. Science is a handmaid to philosophy as a means of arriving at from the objective side, at the highest truth of non-dualism. For, the phenomena of all science form part of the waking experience.

The assertion of individual interests leads invariably to discord in society, while the merging of the same interests in those of the family in the interests of the community and those of the community in those of human society, makes for harmony in increasing degrees. And that is what the social 'urge' points to. It means the negation of the individual interests for realising the common and the universal, which is the same as realising the oneness or non-duality of Being; which is common to all. Similarly, uniting for the purpose of common good is the aim of political life. In other words, the effort at gradual abolition of differences and inequalities in their practical aspect so as to ensure undivided action, is the meaning of the urge as it is studied by sociology in all its phenomena. Even here the realisation of the idea and the ideal of non-duality is the goal sought to be obtained, though by degrees, in different social groups. All expansion is negation of limitations. All division and disunion is suffering and is, at every state, sought to be avoided.

In the world of natural and physical sciences the movement or the urge of forces which manifest themselves as evolution, involution or retrogression as integration and disintegration, attraction and repulsion, whatever new forms they may create, point to changes not only from homogeneous unity to heterogeneous variety and multiplicity but also vice versa. The phenomena of assimilation during what is called progress and growth are followed by those of dissolution during what are known as decay and death. But this dissolution only means reunion in some other way, of the released elements with their own kind or with others to form fresh combination pointing to unity. There are also processes which make one part of the nature co-operate a basic oneness of matter or energy beneath the manifested phenomenal duality or diversity, which is ceaselessly abolishing itself by constant changes, proclaiming that the objective world as it appears is not permanent, while the whole of the physical and natural world is found to be an interrelated unity.

The urge in man to conquer nature so as to make it subservient to his purposes is an attempt at bridging the apparent gulf between the world of man and that of nature. It also shows that the entire existence is a connected or concrete unity. Thus much modern science has taught us. But the question is what is the process by which this lesson of unity is taught? It is not by affirming multiplicity but by negating it. In this sense philosophy is a summing up of all sciences. (There are disruptive or multiplying forces in nature. And in the Ethical World men are seen impelled to do evil deeds. What do such urges indicate?)

(continued from the previous page) In all these cases the impulsive process is incomplete; for, all these are but struggles towards a goal of equilibrium or complete satisfaction which points to negation of diversity—a goal never reached in the 'objective' world but only aimed at.)

It may be asked what bearing has the physical world upon the metaphysical beyond enabling us to learn the truths underlying them? Of what significance are the storms and earthquakes to thoughts and feelings? "Avastatraya" reveals to every one the great fact that the materiality of the external or sense world and the mental character of the internal or thought world are not different from the same basic entity the 'being' called Brahman or Atman. "Avastatraya" points out how "By knowing the one everything becomes known." All that exists and all that is felt, thought or perceived is Brahman or Atman (Vide Shankara's commentary. Aitareya Up. V 2-3). The 'urge' seems to point to Atman trying to reveal itself as something non-dual: The 'urge' itself is but the ceaseless effort of the objective world to deny itself by change. The subject-not the ego, but—the witness of all, is beyond all changes. (Self-realisation of the Hegelian school is different from the Advaitic. It is not by multiplying ideas, and making existence richer, but by negating and dissolving ideas, that the Advaita gets at self or reality, though all ideas appear in the self). And using the same language of relativity, or subject-object relation, the universal 'urge' which manifests all processes including those of thought, the urge which in practical life makes for the good and the beautiful and which moves nature in all its

(continued from the previous page) aspects towards the universal goal is but the effort to unfold reality or Atman, (Vide S's com. Brih.Up. I.4-7) by negating duality (S's com. Bg.Gita XVIII 50: Com. Taittiriya II.1, last para). But in absolute truth which is marked by the cessation of the 'urge' which is technically known as 'maya' or 'sakti' there is nothing moving, causing or thinking. (This appears to be a perfect contrast to European or Western thought which seeks to pile thought upon thought aiming at affirmation, construction, synthesis and activism in an ever increasing measure. But in reality it is not such. There has not probably been and there cannot be another human being more active as a man of the world, than Shankara. His philosophy is only an interpretation of all experience. He shows how 'activity' from one point of view is 'inactivity' from another. It opposes nothing that nature and reason make out as the goal of existence). What is beyond thought, that is what thought implies.

Whether or not one has understood Sankara is best known by the truth-test. When the non-duality implied in the universal urge is seen, Sankara's philosophy has been understood. Or to what extent that truth is seen to that extent Sankara is understood. (Advaita seeks universal happiness, sarvabhutahitartha, which implies most directly individual happiness also. In fact they coincide in Advaita. This system aims not only for human but also for all sorrow and suffering) – when all differences speakable and thinkable such as 'It is' 'it is not' are merged into one 'existence'. (S's Com. Aitareya Up. IV.).

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AVASTHATRAYA.

So much has already been written in Europe and America about the Indian system of thought called "Vedanta" that many a modern student of philosophy even in those countries appears to be familiar with its main features. But the characteristics that distinguish it from the other systems do not seem to be so generally known. From the days of Parmenides (fifth century B.C.) there have been in the West philosophers who have held very similar doctrines. The question, therefore, is sometimes asked: Has Vedanta anything of value to offer, which may be considered new to the West or peculiar to the genius of the Hindu mind? In attempting to answer it, the student of Vedanta when he eliminates its mystical and theological developments, which have their parallels in Europe, is naturally led first to think of what is known as "Avasthatraya."

Any attempt at placing this subject before the Western world a few decades ago would have been characterised as nothing short of madness. The present change of attitude may be traced chiefly to the fact that thoughtful minds there consider the phenomena of "dream" and "sleep" worthy of serious enquiry.

What does it mean? What does life, as a whole, signify to us? In other words, has the mystery of life or existence in all its aspects, in its entirety, an explanation? One's life is known to cover the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep. Nevertheless, men rely solely upon the knowledge gathered from the waking state, believing that alone to be characterised by certainty or reality. But knowledge based on a fraction of the date of life

(continued from the previous page) can only attain to partial views of truth. Therefore, however advanced, accurate or scientific one's knowledge of the waking state be, it is, according to the Vedantin defective for purposes of philosophic or the highest truth, inasmuch as that knowledge ignores the other two states. One may study each of the three states separately or any portion or aspect of any one of them. Take, for instance, the waking experience. It may be divided into several departments or fields of inquiry such as the various sciences and arts, and invaluable truths gleaned from each. All the same they can but contribute to generalisations valid only so far as the waking state is concerned. Similarly the other two states may be studied. We may inquire how sleep and dreams are caused, how dreams come true and so on. But to know what life in its totality means, the experience gained in the three states should be co-ordinated. And "Avasthatraya" aims at it and literally means "The three states."

Such being the import of "Avasthatraya", it cannot and does not ignore even an iota of the data of life. It covers all phenomena, be they the domain of religion or spirit, or of that of science or matter. It is neither dogmatic intellectualism, nor dogmatic religion, mysticism or theology, which relies upon "sense", "feeling" or "intuition." It ascertains how far one can allow oneself to be guided by intellect, intuition, inspiration, sense, feeling or emotion. Its highest court of appeal is "Reason", but not intellect or feeling and the like which are confined only to the waking or the dream states and which consequently are vitiated by contradictions.

(continued from the previous page) What comprehends and co-ordinates the experiences of the three states is the Reason of the Vedantin.

It need hardly be said that this does not expose Vedanta to the charge of solipsism though it may, at first sight appear to be liable to it. The data of the waking state include whatever may be contributed by our fellow-beings to the common fund of human knowledge.

Lastly, it is not that Europe or America has not studied these states. In fact some of the great thinkers of those countries have gone far more deeply into each of them individually than the Vedantin. But the former have approached each of them from the physical, physiological or psychological side, which confines them to the standpoint of the waking state only. The metaphysical—not the mystic—aspect as based on Avasthatraya or the three states co-ordinated has scarcely been touched upon by them.

How Vedantins approach this study: The teachers of Vedanta lay down various qualifications for entering upon an enquiry into its several aspects. Those seeking Vedantic, that is, ultimate philosophical knowledge (Tattva) are expected to possess the capacity to undergo the disciplines, mental and moral, needed for a determined pursuit of “pure” truth, be what it may, and the acuteness of intellect required for a correct understanding of the meaning of the “causal relation.” Intense concentration of thought, without which it is impossible to understand “Avasthatraya” is the most important of disciplines. And the subject of “causality” is

(continued from the previous page) the main key to Vedantic enquiry in its final stages.

What does it teach? Avasthatraya according to Vedanta being the sole rational means of reaching Reality (Turiya), the Vedantin approaches this problem of Reality, from three aspects. One's knowledge of Reality implies (1) something existing (2) the awareness of such existence and (3) a satisfaction accompanying such awareness. It is, so to speak, a trio (Sat Chit Ananda). Next, all that one is aware of as existing is either (a) Sense-objects or (b) Ideas (including thoughts feelings, etc.) which manifest themselves directly within one-self.

(a) Reality of Sense-objects: It is a matter of common knowledge that objects perceived in dreams are unreal and objects seen in the waking state are real. But it is also felt that "things are not what they seem." In the first place, dream objects are felt to be as real as those of the waking state, while the dream lasts. And there exists at the same time a sense of distinction between the "real" and the "unreal" in the one state as in the other. For, while the dream lasts, to the dreamer not only are dream objects real but also is the dream state a waking one. He feels that it is waking because he somehow distinguishes it from other states. Else he could not have felt it as waking or real even for the time being. Further, we sometimes see illusory objects in dream and feel surprised when the first impression wears off, which impression we consider unreal in the dream itself.

Secondly, dream objects are held to be subjective while the waking ones are objective and cognizable by means of the senses. What marks the difference is said to be the instrumentality

(continued from the previous page) of the sense-organs, which, as we know, are active in the waking state. But close observation shows that such a distinction obtains as fully in the one state as in the other. The corresponding sense-organs and physical bodies of the dream world are seen to be as active there as in the waking. And there we not only think but touch, smell or see objects though they be only dream creations. Thus there exist both material and mental worlds in the dream state as well as in the waking. But the sense-organs, though as objects they appear real, in each state by itself, are stultified in the other.

Again, dream experience is said to be private, its objects and actions being cognised by the dreamer and none else. This is no so. The dream universe has not only its suns, moons and stars but also its human denizens who perceive them as our fellow-beings of the waking universe do in the waking world. The distinction of private and public to mark the objects of the one state from those of the other is futile.

Thirdly whatever endures for an appreciable period of time, which is measurable, is held to be characteristic of the percepts of the waking world. But such duration extending over years is found to be a feature of the objects seen in dreams also though a dream may not last even for a second as measured by the time concepts of the wakeful mind. The sense of time is present in both the states. Only each has its own independent standard of measurement. Each is false in the other though both appear real.

Fourthly, it is observed that the pounds shillings and pence of the dream land cannot purchase the bread of the waking man. And it

(continued from the previous page) is replied that neither can the gold of the wakeful world purchase the clothes needed by one met with in dreams. In other words, the test of reality is thought by some to be "What works" (as the Arthakriyakaryavadins hold). The Vedantin says that dream objects are means to dream ends as the waking ones are to waking ends. A sense of causal relation is thus present in the dream mind like that of time. But what is considered logical sequence in the waking state is not the same in the dream. Each has its own notion of propriety and each is stultified by the other in spite of its appearing to be real.

Fifthly, dream percepts being most often queer and fantastic, the like of them do not find a place in the world of wakeful man. But such percepts, however grotesque or abnormal, appear perfectly normal to the dreamer. He evidently has his own notion of space, distance and form. But his standards of the latter in regard to space etc., have no place in the dreamer's world, though for each everything is normal and real.

Sixthly, dream experiences are refuted by waking ones. And when we are awake, we judge of the merits of dream experiences. Whereas the waking world objects are not thus proved unreal in another state. Neither do we sit likewise in judgment over waking experiences in dreams. How, then, could the objects of both the world be placed on the same level? The Vedantin's reply is that to the dreamer the dream is a waking state. In fact one sees a succession of waking states only or one group of real objects coming after another. And it is the objects of one waking state that are judged in another waking state. And when they are discovered to be unreal (ideal), the entire waking state which contained them is called a dream. What characterises

(continued from the previous page) the waking is that the objects seen in that state are felt to be real. And it is these very real objects that turn out unreal (ideal) and are then classed as dreams. So it is only the waking experience that is refuted by another waking experience. The dream continually suggests that the waking world though different, has no higher value than the dream world. One has not even to wait for dreams to learn this lesson. In the same waking state past experiences are judged as dreams are and sometimes proved false by the present. A snake seen and felt as real is proved to be false when subsequently a rope is perceived instead of the snake, which was only a mistaken impression. And both the dream and the past waking state are no more than memories or ideas. The difference between a dream and an illusion is only that the former refers to an entire state whereas the latter covers only a part of a state.

Seventhly, what is said to give its indisputable stamp of reality to the waking world is the return to the very same objects such as one's body, father, son, house and so forth, every time the waking state appears. Whereas we do not see the same persons or other objects when we go into successive dream states. The Vedantin explains by appealing again to experience. The dream state is the waking state for the dreamer as has already been pointed out. And one feels a state to be waking only when there is the feeling that the objects seen are real and that as such they remain the same in all waking states. This feeling is present even while one is dreaming. Else, the dream would not be felt as waking, nor the objects then seen felt real. Whether we actually return to the same

(continued from the previous page) objects in every waking state is a matter for investigation confined to that state. But the fact is unquestionable that we have the feeling that real objects are unchanging and that all waking states have the characteristic of presenting real or unchanging objects.

Eightly, if the objects of the waking state be exactly like those of the dream, our dearest possessions on earth, our kith and kin, would be no more than ideas which our dream-world friends are. Such an attitude is most repugnant to our feelings. The Vedantin's reply is that they are as real as the 'I' or the ego which has dealings with them in each state is. Their physical bodies are also as real as my body of each state is. It is when men think that their own egos or bodies are real and that the egos of bodies of their fellow-beings are ideas that an absurdity confronts them.

Ninthly, it may be urged that it is only in dreams that ideas look real, whereas, in the world of the wakeful, the real looks real, and the unreal, unreal (ideal). Further in the waking state man has a clearer and more logical mind than when he is dreaming. Now in spite of this superiority of the waking vision it is the fully awake person that sometimes perceives a snake as real, which after enquiry he finds to be no more than a rope. Till the truth is known the snake is real though in fact it is only an idea, (If a person has never seen a snake but has seen something else, say a stick, resembling a rope, he would, in the dusk, see a stick, i.e. what his memory produces) projected by the mind. Illusions of this kind are common enough to establish the truth that ideas, though only subjective or mental, do appear real and objective, being

(continued from the previous page) actually perceived by the sense-organs.

One may however remark that illusions are only exceptions. There are in the waking experience realities which are not illusions and which are truly real. The Vedantin offers his explanation. Nothing is more real to one than one's own body. One had a body at six and has it also at sixty. Evidently it is not the same body. What one thought most real at six is no longer there at sixty, at which age, the former body is only a memory, an idea. Similarly, what is there in the world which one sees, and which is not found to be an idea, though appearing real? This example, it may be objected, implies lapse of time. But the same object is sometimes found to present at the same moment different forms to different persons. And the appearances are severally real to each. What one sees are only the forms. Where do they come from and go?

Such questions of reality are discussed at great length by Vedantins. But we cannot pursue them further in view of the limitations of this article. Our object, further, is not to study the phenomena of waking experience by itself, but to co-ordinate waking and dream experiences, which, so far as we have been able to do so here, leads to the following general view.

This inquiry has two distinct but closely connected issues:- (1) What is the nature of Reality as found in the objects perceived? (2) When or under what circumstances do we become aware of the nature of such reality?

(1) What a man feels that he is in the waking state he cannot argue (as the Buddhistic idealist does) that the waking state is the same as the dream or that he is dreaming. The states are different. The subjects seen in the former are real while those of the latter are ideas.

(continued from the previous page) The dream is always in the past and a memory, while the waking is ever present and actual. But though differing in appearance, yet that they are in their essence ideas, is realised only when one detaches oneself from both the states and then views them.

In the waking state we know that the idea of a snake is different from an actual snake, the latter being distinguished as real because it is perceived through sense-organs. But we are also aware that an illusory snake seen in place of a rope is real till the truth is known. And this snake is only an idea, which is nevertheless perceived through sense-organs which mark it as a real object. Though this experience does not enable us to see which of the realities before us are not ideas, yet the Vedantin's inference that all the real things of the waking world are ideas in essence appears unconvincing.

But turning to the dream state we find all perceived objects to be real and the state itself to be waking, while the dream lasts. On inquiry we realise that all the real objects of this waking state are only ideas.

Now suppose we are in the waking state once again. Its objects appear to us perfectly real. Can they all be ideas? The Vedantin from his detached standpoint replies by asking: How could there be any room for doubt? Where have we seen any objective reality which has not passed away into the region of memory or ideas, of which has always remained real? We have no knowledge of any objective reality which is not on enquiry or subsequently found to be an idea. And what

(continued from the previous page) grounds have we now to think that this world is not an idea at bottom? Only those that confine themselves to one state, the waking, fail to see this "truth of truths."

(2) As regards the circumstances under which we become aware of the truth, the Vedantin says that it is only enquiry that leads one to it. The truth may dawn sometimes of itself, some times after conscious effort. Realization comes at times as when after a dream, a waking state comes naturally and disillusion one of one's sense of reality of the dream objects, or when a person who mistakes a rope for a snake but gets near it without any thought of enquiry at all, and learns the truth. Voluntary and conscious search may also be made as and one when on seeing a snake tries to ascertain what it is. To one who has accumulated enough knowledge and wisdom about the world, which the Vedantins hold may need several lives or generations of experience and observation, the true knowledge may come of itself, as the waking does after a dream, that the world is only idea. Or, one may set about enquiring into the nature of objects seen and reach the truth. Such a pursuit of truth is familiar even to modern thinkers though they may confine themselves to the data of the waking state only.

It must now be evident to the reader that Avasthatraya does not recognize the unnatural divorce that is so illogically effected by many a philosopher, between thoughts and things. Things or objects are never known to exist apart from thought. The objects seen as well as the ideas we have of them are equally thoughts, though they appear different as in dreams.

(b) Reality of ideas. Have the ideas themselves

(continued from the previous page) any reality which they seem to possess? Even from the times of the predecessors of Plato up to the present many philosophers of Europe, as well as of India, have held that ideas possess reality, or at least a degree of reality. This view they base upon the data of the waking state only. But Vedantin's solution is based on the third state of deep sleep which has to be investigated next. While making this enquiry it will be well to bear in one's mind some of the results of the study of the two states of waking and dream.

(1) Unsophisticated minds like those of very young children often make no distinction between the waking and the dream-world objects. They consider both of them real. Minds weak or primitive in character believe that they actually see real ghosts, spirits, and God or Gods in dreams. But enquiring and developed minds find both experiences to yield only unreal i.e. mental (ideal, Manasa) objects. And those who are midway who rely only upon appearances but not upon essence, take the waking objects to be differently constituted from those of the dream ones.

(2) In each state the objects, they only ideas, are as real as the I or the ego.

(3) Time, space and causation which always accompany objective reality, both in the waking and in the dream world are no more than ideas which vary with individuals. And these notions of each state contradict those of the other. They are 'relative' to use a modern term.

(4) Dream experiences help us to evaluate waking experience and vice versa.

Let us now turn to deep sleep. I find that I was not conscious of anything in it. I perceived then no objects as in the waking or the

(continued from the previous page) dream state. Nor was I aware of thoughts or feelings or of any kind of activity in my mind. When I am conscious of any of these, I know either that I am in the waking or that I was in the dream state. Where then do the ideas (including thoughts, feelings, etc) go or disappear during sleep? Reserving for consideration at a later state, the guesses or the hypotheses of modern philosophers and scientists in regard to this question, in as much as they confine themselves to their standpoint of the waking state, we may forthwith state the Vedantin's view. He holds that all suppositions or inference as to the whereabouts of ideas in deep sleep are futile. The indisputable fact is that the mind is not aware of their existence anywhere. There is, then, for the sleeper, not even his ego or 'I', which appears with the world of ideas and disappears with it. And it cannot be said that the world goes into the 'I' or the ego or 'my' mind. For none of these is known as existing then. Further, the 'I' belongs to the cognized world and therefore cannot create or wipe out the world of which it is a part, a feat that some philosophers in India and Europe have vainly sought to perform. If everything disappears, wherefrom do ideas or the world come, when we again wake up? Ideas cannot be conceived as existing without a basis or support, which is generally called mind. Whatever kind of existence ideas may have, so long as they are known to exist they cannot be the effects of non-existence. To argue analogically, the absence of objects cannot prove the absence of the light that illumines them. Similarly, the absence of percept or cognitions cannot establish the absence of the perceiver or the cognizer. Above all, to say that nothing exists,

(continued from the previous page) one must be aware of non-existence, which necessarily implies the existence of what becomes aware of such thinking. Above all, the inconceivability of the opposite of non-existence of one's own awareness which bears witness to all, proves the untenability of Nihilism, (Sunnyavada) or absolute non-existence. What then, exists cannot be 'I' or 'my' mind but that into which these merge. It may be called pure mind or the mind in itself or spirit. Vedanta denotes it by the word "Prajna." What is the nature of ideas? 'Idea' as distinguished from "reality" means that which is mental, unsubstantial, that which appears and disappears in less than a second, without any trace of its whereabouts. If then they appear they are known to exist in the mind, and if they are known to disappear there the only inference is that they resolve themselves into the substance or the stuff of mind, i.e. as Vedanta puts it, they become indistinguishable as do the waves when they sink back into the calm sea. In deep sleep, therefore, the mind is said to be in its undifferentiated state, which Vedanta denotes by the word Avyakrta.

Other schools of thought hold that ideas are created and hold by God, or that they are eternally lodged in other spiritual entities, like the absolute, or that ideas have permanence and reality, thought not known to us. Some others assert that they lie dormant in a potential (seed) form in the mind itself. Such schools have their parallels in modern Europe also. But their reasoning is in every case vitiated by the defects due to its being confined solely to the waking standpoint. They, however, raise an objection against Vedantin. If to be aware of its contents or at least its

(continued from the previous page) activities is the chief characteristic of the mind and if ideas appear and disappear in it, why is it not aware of their creation and dissolution? The Vedantin's reply is that this is due to want of enquiry, which is called Nescience, Ajnana or Avidya. With this concept we shall deal under Causality, with which it is directly connected.

Various Indian as well as European thinkers have attempted to explain the origin of the "many" from the "one" but they have all ended in mysticism or theology. And the scientists have given us their tentative or agnostic hypotheses. All these views are found to be inconclusive because they ignore the totality of life's data. The Vedantin's explanation needs an elucidation of his view of the causal relation, which subject has been deferred. One point may, however, be noted at this stage in this connection. In as much as the universe is a universe of ideas and ideas are in the mind, the universe is in the mind. And as I and my body are a part of the universe, I and my body are in the mind. But the mind cannot be said to be within my body or within my ego, as unphilosophical men think, for, the mind has no limitations of space.

(c) Reality of awareness: Deep sleep points to the existence of "Awareness", or, as some prefer to call it, "contentless consciousness." The use of these terms is misleading; for, they cannot free from ambiguity and they all imply something of which one is aware or conscious. Further, awareness or consciousness by itself looks like pure abstraction. But from it is said to spring this universe which we see and which has a substantial existence and a reality for us. A mere abstraction cannot produce anything

(continued from the previous page) substantial or real. Therefore, the words "Soul" "Spirit" and "Substance" have been substituted by some to avoid this difficulty. But even they connote some kind of personality or materiality which has been found to be unreal. Vedanta, however, says that this awareness can only be of the nature of what is called mind, of the reality of which alone we have the most immediate knowledge.

Awareness or as Vedanta calls it Saksin (Witness) is never an object of thought. It is not the 'I' or the ego which disappears in deep sleep, though when ideas are cognised the mind or Saksin functions as the 'I' and the 'my' for the time being. Reality is the sense in which it is applied to objects or ideas is not a characteristic of the Saksin, for it is never an object of thought. In this sense it is neither real nor unreal but supra-real. Time and space which condition the objects as in dream and waking experiences do not bind it. It is the only entity of whose non-existence it is impossible to conceive, and, therefore, of whose existence we have the highest or absolute certainty.

We have been all along thinking of this awareness or mind or Saksin as the source of all ideas and consequently of this universe. As such cause it is only a relative conception. But when we ourselves are the sole entity that exists in deep sleep, and we have no thought of the universe, which is indistinguishably dissolved in it, it cannot be, and is not, related to anything. The question, however, arises: How can we say or think that it alone exists, when we have thoughts of it or while we talk of it as a conceivable

(continued from the previous page) entity? This question demands an investigation into the meaning of relation, particularly the basic relation of cause and effect a subject which, on account of its great importance in Vedanta must be reserved for separate treatment. It will however suffice here to point out that while we speak of the entity, "Saksin" from the waking standpoint we cannot help using the language of Causality, which characterises the whole of the waking world, especially the objects or thoughts.

A Few Doubts: The philosophy of Avasthatraya looks most absurd when it teaches that this actual universe of such huge suns and planets, mighty mountains and rivers, solid bodies, objects and men, things so near and true, disappear in deep sleep as though they were nothing. No science teaches the destructibility, and that every day, all that is cognized be it matter or energy. And no theology holds that human souls cease to exist at any time, nay, even after death. The Vedantin admits all these impressions to be true, perfectly true, so long as we confine ourselves to waking experience alone. When we open our eyes wider, we see, not the partial or fractional, but the entire truth and realize that the world is only an idea, and none of the objects seen, such as suns and planets or our kith and kin and friends, nay, not even the minutest atom, though they all disappear in deep sleep, ceases to exist leaving a vacuum as it were behind. Owing to a wrong interpretation of Vedanta, many are led to think that in its view the world is a "Fata morgana." But there is no non-existence anywhere of anything according to Vedanta. Everything seen, felt or thought is the "one" entity,

(continued from the previous page) of whose non-existence it is impossible even to conceive.

Another doubt may arise. When every one every day passes through the three states, how could so many ignore the lessons taught by the states, pinning their faith on the waking state alone, if the waking were not the real or the most real? Vedanta says that the effects of Avasthatraya are never lost. They remain accumulated in the mind and manifest themselves from time to time as intuitions, though mixed up with sense, feeling emotions intellect or other mental attitudes till Reason i.e. the wisdom of Avasthatraya asserts itself completely. These intuitions vary with men's enlightenment. Those in whom the results of the waking experience predominate are of a realistic or materialistic attitude. Those others in whom dream experiences play a dominant part are of idealistic, mystic or spiritualistic tendencies. Those others in whom deep-sleep experiences are most effective have a nihilistic or an indifferent turn of mind. But such men as have all the three experiences more or less balanced and co-ordinated possess like Parmenides, Vedantic intuitions.

The criticism that is most common comes from the side of religion, which Avasthatraya seems to throw overboard. But as has already been indicated, no part of a man's experience is ignored in Avasthatraya. It fully recognises the indisputable fact that there exists what is known as religious experience. But it holds that this experience only points to the existence of the rock of that Super-reality, higher than the 'I' the ego and the world, all of which appear and disappear in

(continued from the previous page) it and that religion can do nothing more than point to it as from a distance till the Reason of Avasthatraya enables us to reach that Reality.

What counts most in religion is not “intellect” but “feeling”, “sense” “inspiration” or “intuition” on which is made to depend the nature and existence of God. And it is these latter that appear most real—so real indeed that men have been seen from the dawn of human history to rely upon them absolutely and to prove the truth of their religion, either by taking the life of those that differ from them or by giving up their own. With the advance of reason, however, these blood-stained proofs of truth are being replaced by “wars of words” each religion claiming superiority over others, forgetting all the while the lesson of Avasthatraya that thought, feeling, sense or intuition and even intellect are all inadequate and defective as guides to the Ultimate existence, the Super-Reality, though they are steps leading to it. For, they not only contradict and stultify each other in the different states, but disappear altogether in deep sleep. What the reason of Avasthatraya recognised is religion in so far as it leads to the realisation of the rock of the universal and, therefore, non-controversial truth. What it repudiates is the reality of the differences in Religion which multiply every day like black berries on account of the variations of men’s emotions and intellects, which have no more than an apparent or fictitious reality, though such differences are necessary as adaptations of the essence of Religion to different minds. Further Religion raises its structure upon at least two beliefs or intuitions or inspirations: (1) One’s own

(continued from the previous page) conception of God and (2) One's own hopes of achieving some object, such as, for instance, salvation by propitiating Him. In as much as these conceptions make men of different religions quarrel among themselves, each claiming to itself absolute infallibility or a higher degree of infallibility than others their very contradictions and differences prove their unreal character. For, no two sane men have been seen to disagree and that so violently, in regard to anything true or real, such as that fire burns. The world has grown old enough to realize that belief (i.e. belief unchecked by reason) is no proof of truth.

This Vedantic principle of the states recognizes mysticism also but in a higher degree. Mysticism sees the futility of the distinctions of religions. And what is more, while religion argues most from the data of waking experience, mysticism goes a step higher and co-ordinates with its dream experience, in that it perceives the fact that in dreams we see that the one mind manifests itself as the many of the dream universe. It subsequently realises that the one existing entity of the waking world likewise manifests itself as the many of that state. But this experience is not the whole truth which, as has been shown, comprehends the three states.

If the contents of the dreams and the waking states be ideas only, why should the states themselves be considered different? They are not the same in as much as each has its own time, space and cause orders. There is no continuity or uniformity in this respect. Then, could the states themselves be real while the contents are only ideas, when we

(continued from the previous page) speak of the three states, and see them coming and going, like ideas.? The states themselves are, therefore, no better than their contents, all appearing real only for the time being.

The question may be asked, "If what we are aware of are only ideas and if ideas disappear in the undifferentiated mind or Super-Reality, how does it happen that these unreal existences are felt to be real and why should they appear at all?" The Vedantin's answer is that it is due to Avidya or Maya than which no word in any human language appears to have been more misunderstood. What it means will be ascertained, as has been indicated already, under Causality. Under the same head it has to be considered the question whether the states are related to each other as cause and effect.

Lastly, awareness is directly realized only as it exists in me and not as it exists in others or elsewhere. This Awareness functions as 'I' or 'Me' distinguishes itself from the rest of this world. And it is this same Awareness that knows the 'I' or 'Me' and the three states as ideas or objects to itself when it contemplates their appearance and disappearance. This Awareness then called Atman, is said to be realised only as "I am Atman" or "Thou art Atman" and in no other way. Now is this awareness or Atman the same as God or Brahman, the cause, the creator, or the preserver of the universe? The answer to this question is also to be found in the explanation of the relation of cause and effect.

Since Avasthatraya covers the whole of life, it aims at explaining the meaning or goal of all experience, i.e. of all

(continued from the previous page) phenomena of this universe, such for instance, as those dealt with not only under religion or mysticism but also under ethics, aesthetics, politics, psychology, physiology, biology, physics and so forth. It attempts to answer the question: What is the significance as a whole, of all the infinite processes of mind and matter?

Above all, the Vedantin himself advances the most powerful criticism against himself, on his own behalf and that of all his opponents. He asks: "How am I sure that this method of reasoning based on Avasthatraya has not misled me, that under it does not lurk a fallacy, which superior minds, now or in future, may detect; nay, how am I sure that this leads me to the final or absolute truth?" The Vedantin accordingly enquires into the nature and meaning of Truth, which forms a separate subject, not only discussing the third aspect of reality, that of the satisfaction, joy, bliss or blessedness termed the dialectic of Avasthatraya—not that of the movement of the individual thoughts or ideas, as in Hegel and other European thinkers, which do not escape contradictions and which form but parts of a state: this is the dialectic of the movement of the states themselves, which, in fact, is the higher dialectic of the movement of life itself.

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M. SRINIVASA RAU'S "OUTLINES OF VEDANTA."

It must be a source of no little satisfaction to the Vedantin that a man of science like Dr M. Srinivasa Rau should have given so many years of the best part of his life to the study of Vedanta and have found it to be of practical interest to every human being. By giving us in this little book of 88 pages a modern exposition of Shankara's thought, he has rendered a great service to the cause of Indian philosophy. The real value of his labours lies not so much in his explanation of the originals as in the thoughtful comparisons he institutes between Shankara's views and those of the eminent thinkers of the West of our own times, and in his very suggestive criticisms. His endeavours to bring Advaita Vedanta into line with modern metaphysical thought, especially that which is cast in a scientific mould, are highly praiseworthy, not to say instructive.

Advaita Vedanta has been compressed into a single line of a quatrain, into half-verse, a single stanza, a poem of eight stanzas, into ten or a hundred verses, besides innumerable other compositions. Our author has, however, selected a celebrated piece of Shankara's, which originally consisted of eight verses, to which two are said to have been subsequently added. It is called Dakshinamoorti Stotra which has the great distinction of having been commented on by Suresvaracharya one of Sankara's direct and immediate pupils. Dr Srinivasa Rau does not follow this commentary, Manasollasa, which adopts the orthodox method. But he lets in a flood of modern light from the eminent thinkers of the West of our own times.

The book begins with the question: What is this Universe? In answer it deals with the

(continued from the previous page) meaning of such concepts as Existence, Realism, Idealism, Maya and so forth. The next topic dealt with is that regarding the origin of the Universe. In the course of the discussion the author refers to Kant, Hegel, Leibnitz, Mc.Taggart, Croce, Gentile, Ruggeiro and others. Then comes an enquiry into the nature of the contents of the Universe, Atman, and Avidya. Here Bertrand Russell, T.H. Green, Prof. Hopkins and others are quoted. The subject considered is Emancipation or Moksha.

In matters relating to philosophy there is naturally great room for difference of opinion. One may not agree with all that the learned author says, though he possesses first-hand knowledge of the Sanskrit originals. He says, for instance that "the aim of the Vedanta is to prove the identity of Brahman and Atman." This can never be proved. The identity is a mere dogma which can only be blindly accepted on the sole authority of the Veda, interpreted so as to suit the Advaitin. There are others who repudiate such interpretations. And interpretations are no proof. Again, the question how 'real unity can generate either a real or apparent diversity,' remains unanswered rationally. The author says that in Yoga "the union of the subject and the object is secured." May we ask how many times has the world been destroyed by Yogic meditations? It is with such a mystic solution that the book ends. Could a modern student of philosophy accept this as a rational explanation? If Shankara's vedanta cannot rise to the level of modern rational thought, it must be relegated to the province of theology or mysticism, like other schools of

(continued from the previous page) Indian thought.

Such differences do not blind us to the merits of this excellent work. The author cannot bring all the thoughts of Shankara into this book which has necessarily limitations. There is however, enough in it to make us eagerly look forward to longer works from him, which we dare say, will enrich the growing literature on Indian philosophy, particularly Vedanta. We, therefore, most heartily welcome this addition and commend it to the philosophically inclined public, and especially to university students who will naturally seek for an easy introduction from the modern standpoint, to the study of this important subject.

THE VERNACULAR AS AN EDUCATIONAL MEDIUM.

(In Mysore University Magazine)

The arena of Indian educational controversies never witnessed a more interesting spectacle than the animated passage of arms with which the discussion of educational subjects commenced at the last session of the Mysore Economic Conference. On either side were arrayed some of the leading persons in Mysore. Rao Bahadur Mr M.Shama Rao, Mr C.R.Reddy, Mr C.S.Balasundram Iyer, Mr Mir Mumza Hussain and others held that the vernacular should be the medium of instruction in the higher schools and colleges for girls; while Mrs Rukminiamma, Kr.K.Chandy, Mr M. Venkatakrishtnayya and others contended that whichever language was the medium of instruction for boys should likewise be the medium of instruction for girls. "Man and Woman" Mrs Rukminiamma said "should

(continued from the previous page) stand or fall together." The judgment of the Conference was in favour of the former.

I shall not attempt to weigh the merits of this decision, but shall only point out that the main issue in this particular controversy was whether woman should be treated differently from man, the question whether the vernacular should be the medium of instruction in the higher stages being subordinate to it. The main issue, however, was almost lost sight of, the fight having raged round the subsidiary point. How far the arguments the several speakers advanced were convincing it is not my object here to discuss, however interesting it might be to know whether, and if so, how far, in matters intellectual "Unto the man (should) woman (be) as unto the bow the cord is—useless each without the other."

What I propose to consider is the side issue of the vernacular medium, which is of supreme interest at this moment. As I have dealt with some aspects of this subject in another journal, I shall here confine myself mainly to the educational. No rational being would in these days think of disputing the plain logic of the truth that the mother-tongue is the best medium of instruction, by the mother-tongue being meant the first language learnt under those that bring up the child, but not necessarily the language of the mother or even that of the father. In fact, the mother-tongue is made the medium of instruction in the primary and partly in the secondary stages everywhere. Nevertheless in the matter of the application of this doctrine to the higher stages of education patriotic sentiment and dispassionate reason

(continued from the previous page) do not seem to agree. For there are some stubborn facts which it is not possible for reasons to ignore.

In matters educational no part of India is more enthusiastic than Baroda, which has further the advantage of having its own vernacular for its official language. That state has been especially endeavouring to encourage the spread of the vernacular by making it the medium of instruction, not only in classes of the high school standard, but even in the college department in the teaching of certain important subjects. Yet, under English education, the number of pupils is showing a steady increase, while the number under vernacular education has been showing a steady decrease. Under the former the number rose from 9,036 to 10,026, while under the latter it fell from about 2,49,000 to about 2,39,000 (vide report 1915-1916). As many as 181 vernacular schools have had to be closed.

The latest report, that of 1916-17 shows that while under English education the pupils increased from 10,123 to 10,825, their number decreased under Vernacular Education from 2,2,39,000 to 2,31,248.

Among the political divisions of India, the one whose vernacular has attained in recent years the most marked development, in that it has not merely made translations of some of the best books of other languages, but has also produced some original works of great excellence, is Bengal. It has a very large homogeneous population, so far as language is concerned, and the citizens are second to none in point of patriotism. Yet in the Quinquennial Review for 1912-17, the Director of Public Instruction says, under the significant heading, "the doom of the

(continued from the previous page) Secondary Vernacular School": "While the number of institutions in which English is taught has risen considerably, viz. high schools by 201 and the middle English schools by 165, the number of schools working on a vernacular basis has decreased by 165. The secondary vernacular school is no longer in demand. A knowledge of English is nowadays regarded as the first necessity of life."

In Bombay the people are not less patriotic or less earnest than the people of Bengal in regard to the vernacular, and yet we read in the Quinquennial Report (1912-1917): "The question of introducing the teaching in the three upper standards of Primary schools has been mooted during the later part of the quinquennium."

Now what does this preference for English or recedence from the vernacular mean?

Again, it is often exclaimed, What is there in a language? What really matters is thought, not words; If a vernacular literature contains knowledge of value, it is bound to tell as effectively in life as any other language. But does this mean that language does not count? If so, what is the advocacy of the vernacular for?

Thought now doubt counts, but language also counts. Evidently language also has a value. And what is this value?

As on the answers to these preliminary questions largely depend the results of the enquiry whether the Indian vernacular can be the medium of instruction in the higher stages of education we shall deal with those questions first and then consider the main issue.

Now in the discussions in connection with this subject, the terms "Mother-tongue", "Vernacular" and "Language of efficiency" are so indiscriminately employed that they have led to

(continued from the previous page) much confusion. The word vernacular though it originally meant mother-tongue, is now often used to indicate "the common mode of expression in a particular locality or trade." But the mother-tongue of the majority is generally the vernacular of a locality. In Mysore, for instance, Urdu is the mother-tongue of most Muhammadans, but the Vernacular is Kannada.

Nor is the vernacular of a country necessarily the same as "The language of political, and economic efficiency," or briefly, the language of efficiency, which varies with the calling or profession to which one belongs. To the merchant not his mother-tongue nor the local vernacular, but the language of his customers and of his agents or constituents in other lands are among the most efficient business instruments. To the litigant and the lawyer the language of the court is of supreme importance. For a scientist a knowledge of the language which contains treatises on the latest researches or discoveries in his subject is more valuable than his mother-tongue or vernacular devoid of such. And it need hardly be said that for those who seek Government service the language of their government is a more efficient instrument than other tongues.

In some cases the language of efficiency coincides with the mother-tongue or with the local vernacular, or with both. But the value of a language of efficiency is different from that of the vernacular, when they are not identical. The Madrassah, the Bengalee or the Bombayite, not to say anything of the European, without a knowledge of the local vernacular sometimes flourishes in Burma or Hongkong, in Berar or Mysore. This is due to their knowledge of the

(continued from the previous page) language of efficiency. The Japanese and the Chinese with a knowledge of English have been able to compete successfully in the Indian markets by the side of the English. And the German's success in trade, not only in India but even in England and in all English-speaking countries, is traceable in a large measure to his knowledge of English, the commercial "language of efficiency" in these localities. There are in Mysore lakhs of Urdu-speaking Muhammadans, Mahrati-speaking Hindus, Telegu-speaking agriculturists, who possess a knowledge not only of their mother-tongue but also of the vernacular Kannada. But they are nevertheless in the background. The reason is not far to seek. They know not the "language of efficiency", viz. English.

These functions of language are performed either by three different languages or by one or two only. All the same each of them has, as is evident, an important part to play in modern life. And in India, as in all civilized countries, nowadays one language cannot and does not discharge all these functions. Now, turning to Education we learn from facts such as those referred to in the above extracts from educational reports, that, do what the educational experts may, other forms than merely educational determine the people's choice of a language. Their selection, however, only establishes the truth that the purpose of education is not to get whatever knowledge is acquired with the greatest ease; but to acquire that knowledge which is needed most, however difficult the acquisition. The end is more important than the means, though it is of the highest importance that the best of the means should be chosen. Evidently the vernacular

(continued from the previous page) does not bring to these people the knowledge that is required. Let us therefore consider the "end" or the "objects" of education first, and the "means" or the "medium" next.

Whatever the old ideal of education, its modern aim is not merely to develop the capacity to store the mind with information, but also to fit one for life's duties and struggles under modern conditions. The latter part of the object evidently implies that education must have a direct bearing on the social, political and economic environment in which one lives, and such an environment is the same at all times and in all places.

1. Can a single language help the attainment of these objects of modern education?
2. If not, in what respects is the vernacular superior to the other tongues as a means of acquiring that knowledge that is sought for in modern education.

The kind of knowledge, or the end sought, varies with one's vocation, or calling, or interests in life. Almost all the knowledge that the ryot in the village needs he can get through the mother-tongue; for him a single language is enough. To the merchant or the lawyer or the politician of the town, or of the city, whose spheres of action bring them in contact with peoples of different tongues, the common vernacular and the language of efficiency are a necessity.

Further, the more it is realised that the modern struggle for existence is at bottom an international one, the less is any nation or community prepared to wait till translations of advanced works bearing on science, commerce, politics, and the like are made available in its own vernacular. For if it did wait it would

(continued from the previous page) soon be left behind in the race, and other nations would steal so many rapid marches that to keep abreast of them would be an impossibility.

Again, these are days of rapid growth of democratic ideals, when knowledge has to be spread in the shortest space of time along with the largest number. For this purpose neither a mother-tongue nor a foreign language of efficiency can serve so well as a vernacular. And the wider the range of the vernacular and the greater the capacity for absorbing as quickly as possible foreign or new ideas, the more useful will it be for this purpose. Therefore, the vernacular as such, that is, in so far as it is neither a mother tongue nor a language of efficiency, has a special value. Its importance lies in its being the very best means for spreading information. To a local journalist, or a local politician, or a religious propagandist, such as a missionary, the vernacular is of the utmost value.

It may be, and sometimes is, argued that even grafting that more languages than one are needed to attain the objects of modern education, is it not desirable, if possible, to make one language serve the purposes of all the three, or even two? And why not make an attempt at attaining this object of linguistic unification? Now, every living language is a mother-tongue but every mother-tongue cannot become a common vernacular. Every vernacular brings together people of different tongues. Nevertheless every Vernacular cannot become a language of international or economic efficiency.

It is because the most enlightened and thoughtful peoples of the world have realized the impracticability, though not the impossibility, of developing all such functions in languages and that within measurable periods of time while the need for these functions remains undiminished, that they have one and all adopted the course of choosing the most suitable of efficient languages for the time being, and learning them as well as having them taught in their "modern" schools. All the same, they actively encourage the rendering of works of value into their own vernaculars, with a view to spreading knowledge among those who cannot march as quickly as the times demand. The masses may follow. But the leaders must keep pace with the rest of the world, else the community will go to the wall. And it is the aim of higher education to prepare the leaders.

Here we can learn a most valuable lesson from modern China. The peoples are most eager to get modern scientific knowledge. But they have not set about it by making and waiting for translations. This is what we find in one of the latest and authoritative publications:- "Schools spring up daily, the study of Japanese and European languages naturally assuming a peculiar importance in view of the lack of scientific text books in the Vernacular."

The possession of a knowledge of more languages than one is becoming so common a feature that, it is said, in Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and Austria, one can hardly meet a gentleman who cannot speak at least three languages. In Japan, English is made compulsory in schools and a large majority of educated women are conversant with English. The modern conditions

(continued from the previous page) such that a knowledge of a single language is not enough to meet all its requirements, at least two languages are absolutely necessary. What is called "modern" education therefore invariably provides for the study of a second "modern" language. Again, these objects of modern education cannot be attained all at once. They have to be reached by stages, according as the pupil grows in years. The predominant feature of the child's mind is its acquisitiveness. In the primary stages, therefore, the language best suited for instruction is the mother-tongue. Next, in the secondary stage, when the mind becomes "orthocentric", as they say, the pupil is more interested in a world outside than in that of one's own self, and when he seeks the company of friends and playmates of different tongues a common vernacular comes to be pressed into service most. In the highest or the university stage, as well as in the technical fields of applied science and business, the aim being the acquisition of advanced knowledge, scientific, professional, technical or political, wherever it be found in the world of thought, not only for keeping the community abreast of the most forward nations, but also for acquiring power and wealth, the languages of efficiency must necessarily take the lead if the community is not to be left behind in the world's race.

Now, though in the primary and in the secondary stages a single language is adequate for educational purposes, yet in the higher stages the objects of modern education cannot be attained without the help of at least two languages. But where neither of these two is the vernacular, as it may be in the case of

(continued from the previous page) Muhammadans, the vernacular has also to be acquired. In fact, every civilized system of education, even of a pre-modern type, has made use of at least two languages for seeking knowledge in the higher stages. In the earlier systems, what are generally termed "classical" languages have been made compulsory besides the mother-tongue. The classical or second language in these cases was the language of economic efficiency for the time being in the past, and is such for specific purposes even in the present.

So much for the possibilities of the unilinguistic principle. We have now to ascertain what advantages the vernacular has over the others as a medium of instruction.

Dr Sadler, who was quoted in the discussion, does not appear to contemplate the cases in which the vernacular differs from the mother-tongue. Even in Great Britain the mother-tongue, such as Welsh, or Gaelic, is often made the medium of instruction for children of the respective communities, but not the common vernacular, which is English. In Indian countries like Baroda, for instance, there exist for those whose mother-tongue is Gujarati, Gujarati schools, for Mahratti children, Mahratti schools, and for Urdu boys and girls, Urdu schools, though the state vernacular is Gujarati. In many other enlightened countries of the world the same principle is adopted. And to those whose mother-tongue is different from the vernacular and the language of efficiency, a language of efficiency is as good or as bad as the vernacular as a medium. Rather, the latter will be preferred because of its other advantages.

Again, if it should be admitted that under

(continued from the previous page) a knowledge of two modern languages is an absolute necessity for pupils of higher stages, one might ask when a pupil has reached a stage in which at least a working knowledge of a language of efficiency has been acquired, whether it is practical wisdom to learn either through the mother tongue or through a third language, viz. the vernacular, by means of translations, what could be beat learnt through the language of efficiency direct.?

If not, what is the object of making the vernacular the medium of instruction in the higher stages of education? This important problem of the medium is thus coming to wear nowadays an aspect altogether different from the one it seemed to present hitherto. The question will no longer be one of "translations" but one of "subjects." Till now it was believed that the vernacular could not be utilized for this purpose in the higher classes, because of a want of text-books suited to the "standards" or "stages" and men set about the production of translations. But it is now being realized that certain scientific and technical subjects are best learnt in particular languages, and at a stage in which at least two languages have to be learnt as a matter of absolute necessity, to get at these subjects through translations from one of them to the other is, to say the least, a meaningless process. The "direct" method, not only in the kindergarten, but also in an extended sense, even in the university, is the order of the day. More and more foreign languages are being taught in every modern collegiate institution, all the world over, that the students may go directly to the very fountain head. Modern languages are also more largely taught in the high school

(continued from the previous page) stages with a view to preparing pupils for collegiate work as well as for life's duties. In the case of the college classes, the question which language should be principal and which secondary, is, therefore, losing its significance in modern education. In the higher stages each subject tends to determine its own language, i.e. its own medium of instruction. The modern international struggle establishes, more firmly than ever before, that all knowledge is the common inheritance of mankind. If so, all the languages through which knowledge is given to the world are also their common inheritance of mankind. Let each man choose the language or languages he likes or he can learn, according to his needs and capacity. The ambition of the vernacular may be to usurp the offices of the mother-tongue and the language of efficiency. But we cannot ignore the claims of the other two. We have to encourage all, the vernacular, the mother-tongue and the language of efficiency so as to fulfil the particular objects for which nature has intended them.

The case of the Urdu University of Hyderabad is often cited as an example to follow. But it is forgotten that there are some unique features about it which satisfy three conditions better than the other Indian languages. Not only as a mother-tongue, but also as a vernacular, it is spoken or understood all over India. As a language of efficiency it has a triple one for State purposes within Hyderabad, and another for commercial purposes all over India, and even beyond: in Africa, in Burma, and elsewhere. And further, it is also a religious force. Every Muhammadan throughout India is likely to look up to the

(continued from the previous page) Usmania University of Hyderabad for light and guidance. Urdu gives a coherence to the entire Muhammadan population of India, which numbers over 66 millions. The influence of this language is felt in every nook and corner of the peninsula. And an Urdu graduate of the Usmania University has a wide field for his work as the Urdu-speaking Muhammadan world is. Now what are Tamil, Telegu and Kanarese by the side of Urdu?

All the same, in the international world Urdu has as yet to find a place. Mere translations will not save its adherents, who will soon discover how far they lag behind in the world's race. The time is not far distant when the Urdu university will be compelled to seek scientific and political knowledge first hand and to drink at the very sources, when its policy will be modified. Nevertheless, the valuable translations it may produce will help to raise, and that is a most marked manner, the intellectual level of those middle classes whose vernacular is Urdu. But modern history has shown that such an achievement is not enough for national progress. It can not develop leaders of the first rank as quickly as the time requires.

What has the vernacular proved or disproved? His argument for making the vernacular the medium of instruction is sound—

1. So far as it applied to Primary and Secondary stages.
2. So far as it applies to those whose mother-tongue is the same as the common vernacular.
3. So far as it concerns those whose outlook in life does not extend beyond local subordinate

(continued from the previous page) State service, local religious and political propagandists are concerned.

His arguments have not proved its soundness —

1. So far as it applies to those whose mother-tongue is not the common vernacular
2. So far as it affects those who seek advanced knowledge which may be found in any language.
3. So far as it concerns those whose duties in life are affected by matters of an international or inter-state character, and which necessitates a world-wide outlook.
4. So far as it concerns those who are interested in political commerce and industry, which are now determining the fitness of nations to survive the great struggle.

In other words, he has only made out a case for developing the vernacular further, but has not proved that instruction through the medium of the vernacular will equip pupils of the higher stages for the battle of life better than the language of efficiency for the time being.

We started with an enquiry into the nature of language values and we find that till the stage is reached in which knowledge is sought for acquiring wealth or political power, the languages employed for acquiring such knowledge have only an educational value. When, however, the motive for earning money or gaining influence determines one's efforts, knowledge is sought for economic reasons, the languages employed likewise acquire an economic value in addition. In the age in which we live economic values are mostly international at bottom, and the struggle for existence is equally international. Does it not then behove

(continued from the previous page) us to take account of both thought and values and language values in acquiring knowledge? Does it not behove us to use in what may here be called the economic stages of languages that have the highest economic, i.e. international value? When it is absolutely necessary to learn two languages is it wisdom to learn by means of translations into one and that which has a lower economic value, what could be directly learnt from the other which especially has a higher economic value? Now this exactly is what the world, unconsciously under the stress of the struggle for existence is doing; and what India is also tending towards in seeking higher knowledge through English, leaving the vernaculars to help in bringing the rear in her onward march.

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SANSKRIT EDUCATION AND MODERN LIFE.

(In Mysore University Magazine).

Our difficulties: When I see before me so many young men eagerly seeking to slake their thirst at this fountain of Sanskrit learning, the first question that occurs to me is, what is the future that we, grown-up citizens, have been preparing these students for? Do we make them go through the courses with an eye to spiritual benefit alone or with a view to both temporal and spiritual ends? Some there will be, whose aim is solely spiritual, to whom worldly advantages have little interest. And theirs will be a career of glory, who love knowledge for its own sake. About them I have nothing to say. As regards however, those others, who form the majority and who belong to the latter category I venture to enquire how far this system of Sanskrit

(continued from the previous page) education conduces to their earthly well-being, in the first instance? For, as the old Sanskrit saying has it, no Dharma, spiritual or temporal, no achievement or artha, is possible for one who does not begin by making sure of a living body. Experience of the last fifty years amply testifies to the results of the existing system. Now-a-days nothing appears to be more precarious and unenviable than the lot of the great majority of the Pandits and Vidwans. Some feel that had they but devoted to English half the energy that they have expended on Sanskrit, they, with their high order of intelligence, would have had a far larger share of the world's goods. Sometimes, a merely mechanical workman earns more than a Pundit of four sastras. Turning to the institutions, though this College in Mysore has had a very successful career, other Sanskrit institutions in the State have shown signs of marked decline. Though the number of students in schools teaching English or Kannada and Sanskrit has not decreased, the strength of those schools that teach only Sanskrit has fallen while other educational institutions have grown five or ten times their original size in much shorter time. The strength in the lower stages has not decreased, as they are stepping stones to English schools. But what counts for real progress in Sanskrit Education is the numbers in the higher classes, which, I fear, is very discouraging. If pupils seek in large numbers the Mysore College, they do so especially because of the liberal support given it by the Royal Family of Mysore, the renowned and generous patrons of Sanskrit learning. And it is needless for me to add that it is to His Highness the Maharaja's interest in particular that persons seeking the blessings of a knowledge

(continued from the previous page) of Sanskrit owe their deepest debt of gratitude for a special encouragement so graciously extended to the study of this All-India language. Nevertheless, the feeling seems to be growing that this kind of education does not help men to keep even body and soul together. For, no one is more conscious of the inestimable worth of Sanskrit learning than our Pandits, who have devoted their whole life to it. And yet, we see that it is they that are most eager to divert their sons and relations to the English school, especially if they happen to be intelligent. I do not, in the least, blame them. The preservation of the body is a fundamental need and cannot be ignored.

This is not all. The latest verdict of some of the most thoughtful men in Mysore is that Sanskrit is of little value in the modern struggle for existence and should therefore cease to be taught in the University as it used to be till now, that is as a second language. This is a natural consummation of the movement started a few years ago, that Sanskrit as a second language should find no place in the curricula of Secondary Schools. And as the net result is that even the few openings that our poor Pandits and Vidwans had in the Colleges and Schools in Mysore will ere long disappear. In future, perhaps only such as have been blessed with adequate ancestral or other means to live upon, and as are devoid of the thirst for acquiring more wealth will seek pure Sanskrit instruction. And how many such will there be?

As though these difficulties were not in themselves enough, we find that we are attracting fewer and fewer talented youths for purely Sanskrit courses. Students with brilliant parts somehow prefer to enter the English or the

(continued from the previous page) Anglo-Sanskrit institutions. As a consequence, the labours of the ablest Pandits often fail to produce the best fruit. It is therefore feared that such men, not the most brilliant will have to be our guides and philosophers in the world of the Vedas and the Sastras. I am not forgetting that there may be noteworthy exceptions.

Remedies already suggested: One of the remedial measures proposed is that or⁷ the "Veda Sastra Poshini Sabha" which aims at securing a large number of pupils early in life for the college. As a first step of reform this is highly laudable. But it does not go to the root of the matter. Free boarding and lodging for a few years at an early age, is no guarantee of bread throughout life and that for growing families with several souls. How many will take to this course regardless of the future? What are the means that the Sabha proposes for securing talented and promising youths? All the same, in as much as this is the first organised effort made at seriously tackling a momentous problem, it deserves to be heartily welcomed.

The other effective remedy, that of combining some study of English with that of Sanskrit needs no further reference just now, than that even a step of that kind will not save Sanskrit from being gradually elbowed out under the stress of modern life, on other grounds. I do not mean that Sanskrit will ever disappear altogether. Individuals may and perhaps will always cling to it. But, it will cease to be a factor, in the life of the people in general. For, the crux of the problem lies deeper in the inseparable connection that exists between the language and literature of a community and its life.

A dying language and a dying race: Why do

⁷ The original editor inserted "or" by typed

(continued from the previous page) we study a language and its literature? For the sake of the thoughts they contain. Of what use are thoughts? First, they are the means of securing the pleasures of the intellect and of gratifying its endless curiosity. Next, thoughts provide invaluable spiritual comfort for the soul, especially in view of its life after death. Thoughts, further, equip every man and woman for the daily struggle by telling them how to seek the health, the strength and the means needed for winning their bread. Fourthly and lastly, it is the power of thought that enables us to protect the race; for the individual cannot but wither. Even if the individual disappears, the community may survive. But if the community is wiped out, where will the individual be? It is therefore of paramount importance that "thoughts" should help the preservation of society.

Now, turning to Sanskrit, we all admit that it furnishes us with thoughts of the very highest value, in respect of God, soul and the future. As regards gratifying intellectual curiosity or craving, though Sanskrit cannot give us any modern scientific knowledge, it can satisfy many of our wants in the world of Arts. And we have already seen how little pure Sanskrit learning without the help of English is a passport even to modest livelihood. The purohiths themselves who are indispensable to every Hindu find it hard to make both ends meet. Coming last to the preservation of the community or the race, I shall devote this paper to this aspect of Sanskrit Culture to-day.

As you are aware, an enormous change has come over our country and society with the

(continued from the previous page) advent of the other civilizations and the Western sciences. It is now impossible for our community to live in the same way as our ancestors did though a few individuals may do so if they so choose. Now, do the Sanskrit language and literature provide us with all the ideas or thoughts necessary for the preservation of our race under these altered conditions?

Those that are most devoted to the study of Sanskrit because of the influence that the ideas embodied in its language and literature have on their daily life, are chiefly the Hindus. How have these people fared as a race or a community? In India during the last fifty years, while every 100 Christians have increased to 258 in number, while every 100 Muhammedans have increased to 138, every 100 Hindus have increased only to 115. As for the guides and teachers of the Hindu community, the Brahmins, we find that every 100 Brahmins have not only not increased, but positively decreased to 94. Now, if the increase in the total population be considered, it will be seen that the Hindus have fallen by 10% and the Brahmins by 32% below the average. The very champions of the Sanskrit language and culture, the Brahmins, are dwindling in numbers every year. There are about ten lakhs of Brahmins fewer now than fifty years ago. Not only is the Brahmin class dying out, the Hindu race itself is proceeding, though slowly, towards the same end. For, as I have just pointed out, a small percentage of increase in one community is of no avail against large increase in others. To give you a concrete illustration: Fifty years ago one of the provinces of India had a population of over 60% of Hindus,

(continued from the previous page) and now that strength is reduced to about 45% and that too, in spite of the increase. And in another hundred years, the Hindus there will become negligible, or they may even lose their individuality so much as to disappear altogether, as in Afghanistan, the ancient Gandhara, and Java which were once Hindu countries.

Such then, is the fate of the Hindu race in spite of the far-seeing religious injunction of the Rishis that every man must leave behind him a son to perform his father's Shraddha. Is there not here something tragical in this our inability to thrive under changed conditions of thought and life? Let no man deceive himself into thinking that because a few here and a few there are flourishing, the race is prosperous. When the race disappears where will the few or their children be? It may be asked why should the Hindu care for the race or their children after they leave this world. But without children how can any true Hindu, even if he leave this world hope to escape the series of hells of which Puth is perhaps the first? By neglecting the race he ensures for himself an everlasting hell.

Some will say that my reasoning is fallacious and that I have failed to take into account the supreme factor, God. If it is His will that we Hindus should be wiped out, and that Sanskrit language should disappear, how can we prevent it? But I ask them, is it our own action, our Karma or God's ill-will that has been working our misfortune? When. He has endowed us with a mind that can think and judge, are we justified in throwing the blame on Him? The law seems to be that God helps those that help themselves. He having given us power to think and act seems to say, Purushayata first and Deivasahaya next. Or, as

(continued from the previous page) as it is sometimes put, to six parts of man's effort, God adds the seventh. What social or intellectual efforts then have we Hindus, the devotees of Sanskrit culture made to save ourselves from this slow racial death? Does this matter not deserve the earnest consideration of every Hindu? These facts and figures may be interpreted in a vicious or in a virtuous light. If they evoke only passion in us we shall, as the Bhagavatgita says, grow blinder still to our defects and hasten our ruin. If, on the other hand, they make us see how ignorant we are in certain matters and how God in His infinite wisdom has been seeking to teach by revealing to us in the civilizations of our brethren of other communities, what we have still to learn and if accordingly we let more light shine into our mind we shall assuredly grow and prosper. Our great misfortune appears to be not so much the pessimism which some critics see in our culture, as the mentality which makes us often think that there is little worth learning from others elsewhere.

In placing before you such matters let me not be understood to belittle the worth of Sanskrit learning and culture. Nothing is farther from my mind. I only seek to emphasize the fact that had we rightly interpreted the ancient rishis, those most far-seeing of men, we should never have been in this plight of being slowly wiped out of existence.

What then do we mean when we speak of following in the wake of the Rishis? In answering this question I shall confine myself to language, literature and culture only.

Language, Culture: & Life: There was a time, covering a long period of

(continued from the previous page) our past history during which, as the Literature and Arts of ancient India show, the Hindus made steady progress and showed developments in various directions. They withstood the vicissitudes of fortune more successfully than at present under the influence of the self same Sanskrit culture. How did this come about then?

Let us not forget the two aspects: language and thought including Culture, with which we started.

Taking the language by itself first, Sanskrit, as it is known to us now appears to have ceased to be a spoken tongue thousands of years ago and to have been all this time the language of culture only. And wherever Sanskrit was used, there was by its side another language for the current use of vyavahara. Such a second or subsidiary language was sometimes a colloquial derivative or dialect of it, sometimes an altogether different tongue. It was in some places Prakrit, Pali, Magadhi or Bengali, in others Persian, Tamil, Telugu, or Kanada and so forth. It may be English to-day, French or Urdu to-morrow. Wherever Sanskrit went, it appears to have sought the co-operation of another language for purposes of temporal life. These might change or vary. But Sanskrit seems to have remained through ages, wherever it went, a common and permanent factor, imparting its culture to and moulding the other language in a variety of ways. The two appear to have grown to be complementary to each other. A mere vernacular in India could never develop to its full stature and be equal to the task of spreading higher thoughts among the people at large, without the inspiration of Sanskrit. It is

(continued from the previous page) said that Bengali has shown remarkable development in recent years. And that is due not a little to the circumstance that for nearly 50 years Sanskrit was a compulsory subject of study at the Calcutta University. It is Sanskrit that revived Bengali. If Kannada has made no similar progress it is because of unconscionable divorce effected between Sanskrit and Kannada in recent years. Sanskrit has fed and blessed every vernacular and has killed none of them.

This is not all. In those provinces of India in which Sanskrit has been studied by the people in general, the ill-will between communities of Hindus is less marked. This has made them sink most of their differences in view of the common source of the highest thoughts. Sanskrit language has helped more to cement than to separate.

One of the burning topics of the day in India is that of its unification. It is said that we have just become conscious of this serious defect of the Hindu Society. In reality, however, this is a question thousands of years old. The welding operation was started and is being carried on by Sanskrit for millenniums past. Its influence was brought to bear on hundred of languages. Out of a population of about 2,800 lakhs of Hindus as many as 2,600 lakhs speak languages, either of Sanskritic origin or of Sanskritic moulding. If this be not a unifying process, I wonder what else could be. If men now wish to hasten the consummation, would they be wise in throwing away the advantages won for us by Sanskrit, during thousands of years? And yet the vernaculars which owe their prosperity to Sanskrit, now cry aloud "Down with Sanskrit. Let us divide the

(continued from the previous page) country and set up as quickly as we can, walls as high as possible, so that the masses may all feel again as perfect strangers." The motto for the future will probably be: "United we shall be miserable; divided, we shall be happy." Remember for a minute how even the Parsis, whose mother tongue was Persian, came within the Sanskritic fold and how they exchanged their mother-tongue Persian for Gujarati of Sanskritic origin. It is true that the vernacular is of the highest value to each separate community and makes for its unity. But it is also true that Sanskrit is of equal importance to Indian Life as a whole, for whose unity in one aspect of it seeks to pave the way. The separation of Sanskrit and Vernacular will be a misfortune and their co-operation a blessing.

Now, turning to Sanskrit culture, we ask how it succeeded in manifesting a continuity of life through ages, in the past.

Sanskrit Culture: What are the signs of life in a language and literature or culture? A tree or an animal is said to possess life when it grows or multiplies. Life is further indicated by the taking in of nourishment and the assimilating of it. When these functions cease, signs of death are said to be present. Now, nourishment consists of some suitable matter external and different from the tree or animal, and assimilation means the conversion of such matter into its own substance. Likewise, a language, literature or culture has life so long as it grows; or so long as it is able to take in nourishment in the shape of new ideas, different from what already is there, and to make them part of itself, which action calls to play what is called its vital powers.

One of the most distinguishing features of Sanskrit Culture in ancient times was its continuous growth, a sign of life. The Hindu mind then found nourishment in the world outside and in the thoughts of those that differed from it. Neither a Kapila nor a Gautama neither a Sankara nor a Ramajuna could have had matter to write their great works upon, if they had not had new ideas and if they had not attacked those that differed from them. The old views were often dropped and new ones developed, to overthrow new critics. If the Hindus of old did not find food for thought in their own country they hesitated not to acquire knowledge from foreign sources. Varahamihira, for instance, took ideas from the Greeks and the Romans. Some scholars say that Sri Madhwa acquired a knowledge of the philosophies of even the Arabs. As you find in the Mahabharata and other works, the Hindus did actually travel far and wide outside their country and acquired new knowledge. It is this continued acquisition of thoughts, which demanded a constant exercise of the mind that called forth manifestations of growth of life in our culture in the past.

Coming to modern times, let us enquire what indication Sanskrit culture has given of its vitality? What are the new ideas that it has given to the world to indicate its growth? Or what new thoughts has it acquired from the modern world to show that it is capable of taking in nourishment and of assimilating it? Turn where you will, you will only hear the usual justification of stagnation, in the shape of a common place variation of the argument of Calif Omar. "There is nothing new to be said, all that is worth saying has been said." Now, is

(continued from the previous page) there no scope for further progress in the very fields in which the Hindus are said to have excelled other ancient nations? Modern men, under the influence of other cultures, feel perplexed by doubts for a solution of which they eagerly look around. And as this is a Sanskrit College, I shall, just for a sample mention a few of such doubts.

It is asserted that the “Anthahkarana Chetana” goes out through the eyes and takes the form of the object it sees and returns to the self, in an act of perception. Now, where is the proof for this going out and returning after assuming the size and shape of the object? On the contrary, there is every evidence to show that rays proceeding from an external object fall upon the retina when the object is said to be perceived. But what exactly is it that happens when we say we perceive an object?

Again, in Anumana, we proceed from individual cases of smoke accompanying fire, to the universal that wherever there is smoke there is fire. How do we know that this universal is true, unless we see all the cases of fire and smoke in the past, present and future, from the beginning to end of creation? There may be or may have been cases of fire without smoke. The Indian logician tells us that the knowledge of the universal comes along with that of the particular. It is granted. But the question is how do we know that this knowledge of the universal is valid or true? If it cannot be valid or true, Anumana cannot be an instrument of truth. So say some critics.

I shall not go into any of the interesting criticisms on the doctrines of Purva Mimamsa, to-day, but shall turn to matters

(continued from the previous page) connected with social life. The Hindu's daily domestic programme is governed so largely by the movements of the planets and the stars which the Hindus learn from the Panchanga. And there are half a dozen systems of astronomical calculations, no two of these completely agreeing. So far as the calculations go our Pandits may be absolutely correct. But how are we sure which calculation is in conformity with the actual positions of the heavenly bodies so that we may derive the advantages, whatever they be, of our religious observances?

Our capacity to observe has also been questioned. For instance does a worm become a wasp by being stung? There is no proof of this theory of Bhramara Kita Nyaya. On the other hand, there is every evidence to show that the worm carried by the wasp is used as food for the grub. If it is asked: Is Vyasa, then wrong? I reply by asking a counter question, have we understood him aright?

The Hindu race, which has given to the world valuable historical compositions in the past, does not appear to have produced during the last 500 years a single work of that kind. Of course, there have been translations of others' works. I ask how many original historians have recorded actual events during this period? Some say we have lost our sense of time and fact. Fancy is what our mind loves to feed on. Have we ascertained the steps by which other nations achieved greatness and what our own national defects are? There were in the past great works on Hindu Polity. But it is said by competent authorities that, while the Hindus have developed a very high sense of duty as individuals, they have no conception of Civic, Social and National duties

(continued from the previous page) or interests of our times and that, in fact, Sanskrit has no single word connecting all that the word National or Social or Civic signifies to the modern world. Is this true?

One more instance and I shall stop. Our progressive ancestors were so alive to the changes around them, that quite unlike other old nations of the world, they gave to their people successively a series of DharmaSastras or codes of law so that their children might be able to grapple successfully with new situations. They held that interpretations of smritis must vary with time, place and circumstance. Whenever there were changes, they revised the smritis that the race might not die owing to any inability to adapt itself to altered circumstances. Where then are the laws suited to our present needs? Have we yet taken the trouble to revise or formulate any? Need I say, that we are drifting, not knowing wither, each interpreting the social laws as he likes and each condemning the other, and all bewildered by the inexorable situations created by the modern conditions.

Such are some of the doubts that trouble us. And if Sanskrit Culture cannot solve these and if the Hindus are forced to look elsewhere for solutions, how can we reasonably expect Sanskrit Culture to continue to have the same hold on our mind, that it had in the past?

We see every day that we are obliged to borrow words from other languages to carry on the affairs of life, which would be impossible without such borrowing. And yet can we say that our culture and society can live without the nourishment of new thoughts?

I am not saying that every one should study

(continued from the previous page) English or German. But every one should be in touch with the world of modern thought. In this, I am not suggesting anything new or novel but am only pleading that we should follow in the foot-steps of the Rishis and the ancient Hindus in making Sanskrit live by growing.

Sanskrit culture, especially that obtained through Sanskrit language has great potentiality, not only as a mighty spiritual force, but also as a great social power, helping the unification and preservation of the race. It has, above all, some valuable spiritual lessons for the entire world. But this potentiality cannot manifest itself unless we make efforts to keep it alive.

To attain this object, within the narrow limits of educational organisations with which we are concerned to-day, we have to secure first the best talents for the study of Sanskrit. Then we have to make it worth their while to devote their life to it. I do not see why the Pandits should not aspire to be as well off as the Professors of English Colleges in course of time. Next we must make it possible for the latest knowledge of the world being brought into touch with Sanskrit culture by means of frequent personal exchanges of thought between Professors of English Colleges and Pandits. Lastly, History as a compulsory subject should be taught throughout the course. Then will Sanskrit culture manifest once again the life and vigour it had in the past, and prove a blessing to the Hindu race of the future.

The best means of making Sanskrit Culture live and grow and of making it helpful to the life of the Hindu race is by constant enquiry in regard to which Sage Vasishta says:

(continued from the previous page) "A Sastra even if it be of human origin should be accepted, if it be in accordance with reason. But if it be otherwise it would be rejected though it be of Vedic origin, by one who follows the dictates of reason. Even the words of a child are worthy of acceptance if they be rational; but the words of Brahma Himself should be rejected like straw if they lack in reason."

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RADHAKRISHNAN'S "AN IDEALIST VIEW OF LIFE."

It is a source of supreme gratification to all believers in or admirers of, Hinduism that so eminent scholar and authority as Sir. S. Radhakrishnan was invited to deliver the well-known Hibbert Lectures in 1929. Whatever impression his English readers and audience may have formed of his lectures his own countrymen and co-religionists, much as they differ from him on particular points of faith, will not hesitate to acclaim this literary performance of his as a remarkable achievement. It is remarkable in the sense that, till now, few Hindus and fewer Europeans or Americans have succeeded so well as he has in turning on man's religious experiences in general, and one some of the deepest religious convictions of the Hindus in particular, the powerful searchlight of MODERN criticism. Among his predecessors, there was none greater than Prof. Max Muller as an exponent of the Philosophy of Religion as also Hindu religious thought. But Sir Radhakrishnan has outshone him in depth as well as in width of vision; not to say anything of his knowledge of the later researches made in this subject. In fact, our author covers so extensive a field and so ably too that one cannot help agreeing with the learned

(continued from the previous page) reviewer of his book in EVERYMAN when he says that it is "the most complete statement of religion in the language of the present that I have read...I know of no book that presents so well the ultimate truths of religion in the psychological idiom of this age."

The lectures do not aim at a defence of any specific religion but at making a tentative attempt to discover truth and to discuss its bearing on the general religious attitude. They seek to interpret life with a view to pointing out that it has a 'meaning' or 'purpose' and that "man has a destiny not limited to the sensible world." In other words, he uses the word 'idealist' in the sense that he is a seeker of 'value' but not in the sense of a believer in 'subjectivism.' He prepares the ground for the central topic of religion by examining the attitude of science towards it. Modern physics, Astronomy, Biology, Psychology, Sociology, Comparative Religion, Politics, are passed in rapid review to show how far they still are from the true religious spirit, which believes in God and the spiritual world. The values of modern substitutes for religion, such as Theosophy, Anthropology, Christian Science, New Thought are estimated. The general tendency in our day towards Atheism, Agnosticism, Scepticism, Humanism, Pragmatism and Modernism are next discussed. They are all found to be lacking in the spiritual element without which man's life is felt 'incomplete.'" And he, therefore, believes that the present world is "waiting for a vital religion which it can follow with self-respect and joy!"

Now comes the main these which begins with the important chapter on "Religious Experience and its affirmations" in which the

(continued from the previous page) author grapples with the fundamentals of the problem of religion, a problem which, he says, "exists DIRECTLY ONLY for the religious man who has the spiritual intuition or experience and INDIRECTLY for all those who, while they have no personal share in the experience, have yet sufficient belief that the experience does not occur and is not illusory."

Next the question is asked whether his 'experience' of the saints and 'the belief' of ordinary men, can stand the test of truth which is really the most interesting issue. After rejecting dogmatic and speculative theology and showing how religious consciousness differs from philosophy or metaphysics, moral consciousness and mere consciousness of value, he describes religion as "the reaction of the WHOLE man, the WHOLE reality. "Such functioning may be called spiritual life as distinguished from the merely intellectual, moral or aesthetic activity, or a combination of these." He says, further, that there is in it "a mystical element or apprehension of the real and an enjoyment of it for its own sake." There is in it an attempt to discover the ideal possibilities of human life, a quest for emancipation from the immediate compulsion of vain and petty moods....The spiritual sense, the instinct for the real is not satisfied with anything less than the absolute and the eternal." This, is, no doubt, one of the best interpretations of the religious sense in man, one that could be accepted by the followers of all faiths extant. It is free from the defects of most of the definitions till now given.

Turning to the subject of the validity of such consciousness, he, first of all adduces the evidence of the experience of great men of all countries the Rishis of the Vedas, Sankara, the Buddha, Moses, Jesus, St. James, St. Paul, Muhammad, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Porphyry, Augustine, Eckhart, Dante, Spinoza, Bunyan, Wesley who all testify to the FELT reality of God.

In other words, if we understand him aright, he relies in the first place upon private, individual or mystic experience. This evidence, he says, "is too massive to run away from."

In dealing with the 'truth value' of such experience, he says that its validity is 'self-established' (svatasiddha), 'self-evidencing' (Svasamvedya) and 'self-luminous' (Svayamprakasa). "It is its own cause and explanation. It is the sovereign in its own rights and carries its own credentials. The 'yogic' (mystic) insight is 'truth-filled' or 'truth-bearing'. In short, what it knows is truth. Doubt and disbelief are no more possible."

The learned author here presses the claims of Hinduism on the attention of the thoughtful reader. Its ideas of harmony, self-discovery or divine nature of the individual, ethical universalism, and tolerance, re-birth and degrees of salvation leading to the final liberation of ALL, the glorious consummation of all spiritual aspirations, are brought out in great relief.

All the same, the question remains, if authority, tradition and mystic experience form the base of religion, in other words, the conviction of seers and saints are the sole grounds of the 'religious beliefs' of

(continued from the previous page) mankind, whether these intuitive apprehensions could be taken to be absolute and ultimate truths. Here come two of the most ably written chapters. One of them discusses the relative parts played by intuition and intellect, which is more philosophical than religious in its outlook, though the author places religious consciousness on a higher pedestal than philosophic thinking. Here he makes a critical examination of the views in this matter, not only of ancient Indian Philosophers like the Buddha and Sankara but also of the greatest thinkers of the West, ancient and modern, from Pythagoras to Croce, including Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Pascal, Kant, Hegel, Bergson, Bosanquet and Russell. He thinks that some of the most advanced minds of the West agree with Sankara.

"Intuition" he says, "is the direct perception or a simple steady looking upon an object. It lies beyond the intellect. It is the wisdom gained by the whole spirit." As such, intuitive truths are not liable to the doubts cast upon them by the intellect. Nevertheless, the intellect serves a useful purpose, in preparing the soul for apprehending intuitive truths. This however takes us to debatable regions.

Closely connected with this discussion is that bearing on the 'creativity' of intuitive knowledge, the most characteristic feature of 'the spirit in man.' This part of the book is perhaps the most brilliant. Though one may admit that the roots of all great thinking and noble living lie in deep life itself, yet, one may not subscribe to the view that they do "not lie in the dry light of reasoning." Similarly in regard to his observation: all

(continued from the previous page) creative work in science and philosophy, in outward life is inspired by intuitive experience... "not by the plodding process of the intellect." In these and similar statements he argues for the supreme value of intuitive knowledge and makes reason play the second fiddle. Though Bergson the greatest of its modern protagonists, is not fully accepted by our author, yet Bergson's mystic intuition seems to have cast a spell on him. But in as much as the main theme of these Hibbert Lectures is RELIGION, I respect the author's prepossessions in regard to religion; for I believe on matters religious or mystical that every man is equally entitled to hold his own convictions to be absolutely true, though one's beliefs may be in direct conflict with another's.

The author says that religious intuition is "vivid, warm, joyous, hearty and dynamic." The thoughts of God are not known by the means of REASON...Spiritual insight differs from religious intellectualism. Religion revels in unverifiable hypothesis.. The intuitive seers shrink from precise statements and clear-cut definitions." All the same, Sir Radhakrishnan seems to believe in religious EVOLUTION for, he says, that to reach "true religion which has nothing in common with the spirit of negation, religion as practised to-day has a long distance to travel." The reader again may feel that the author has not told us what we should do when religious affirmations contradict each other and how we should find out which his TRUE religion of the future may be. I am of opinion that all religions must be either equally true or equally false, if REASON be not the ultimate court of appeal. Invariably the religious Bias of one man makes

(continued from the previous page) him assert the inferiority of others' institutions. The best Christians and Mahomedans hold that the doctrine of KARMA and rebirth are untrue. They sometimes ridicule them as marks of primitivity of beliefs. Again, great authorities like Doctor Otto and Bishop Gore hold that their intuition tells them that Hindu ethics is lower than Christian morality, that there is "no ideal of good life in Hinduism." But even the best intuitions appear to be helpless, if they cannot appeal to reason. If an attempt be made to transcend contradictions and inconsistencies that we may know which religious intuition is finally 'true', the attempt must ignore the finality of the truths till now revealed by any of the intuitions of the Seers and the Saints.

Inasmuch as these lectures aim at an interpretation of 'life', the scientific accounts of Matter, Life and Mind cannot be overlooked. They are considered at length and then the un-satisfactoriness of their explanations is pointed out after an examination of the latest theories. The next chapter on "Human Personality and its Destiny" is however of supreme value, to Religion, for, it deals with what is known as "personality", "soul" or "self" and "consciousness" from the psychological and spiritual standpoints. The author here expounds the doctrines of KARMA, freedom, immortality, rebirth and salvation, which are not merely learned but most thoughtful. Though men of other religions may trifle with some of his views owing to prejudices, yet they appear to me to be very ably argued. This only proves the fact that in religion based upon INTUITION, we can never get at any consensus. But taking one's stand on intuition or mystic experience, I do

(continued from the previous page) do not see why Hinduism should not be considered to be far ahead of other religions. Europe and America, though undoubtedly enlightened, have yet to reach a higher level wherefrom they could realise the validity of KARMA and re-birth. Turning to salvation we find the author describing it as 'spiritualised harmony' "coherence within the individual" and 'harmony with the environments' as its ESSENTIALS, though, from the point of view of different religions, some are asserted to be truths and some, other than truths. His arguments in regard to Karma, particularly "Rebirth" appear to me to be exceptionally good; for, no explanation of the existence of 'evil' yet offered by Western thinkers, however, eminent, is so satisfactory. Man's survival, in some form, and his inheritance of many characteristics of a spiritual nature, are being more and more recognized even by such men as adhere to "reason." Here Sir Radhakrishnan has given some good food for modern seekers after truth to think about at leisure.

In the concluding chapter 'Ultimate Reality' the author tries to reconcile the religious with the philosophical interpretations of the goal of existence. He examines the modern doctrines of Naturalism, Holism, Emergent Evolution, Ingressive Evolution, and offers many thoughtful criticisms. But we may pass on the coping stone, the question of the reconciliation of the 'God' religion and the 'Absolute' of philosophy. If he considers the Absolute also to be something intuited like the God of religion I must plead inability to get a view of the Absolute as OBJECT which is implied in his definition of Intuition as quoted above. If it be a matter of reason and if the Absolute must itself be

(continued from the previous page) changing—for, he speaks of it as being the 'pre-cosmic' nature of God, who is also subject to time,—he must be in agreement with the Hegellian, Bradleyan and Bergsonian Ultimates which like Sir Radhakrishnan's Absolute are characterised by "never ending activity." What is the relation of this Absolute to its ever changing appearances? Are they both READ in any sense? And what does REALITY mean in the phrase "Ultimate Reality?" Religion, however, ignores such subtleties of thought. But Sir Radhakrishnan supports the ADVAITA view of God and the Absolute, as generally understood in the Pandit world. His object, however, in these lectures, is not a philosophical determination of the 'Ultimate Truth' but only a religious attempt to get at it. And I admit that in regard to RELIGIOUS issues, men must not push reason beyond the limits of their choice.

These differences, however, cannot in the least blind me to the outstanding worth of his spiritual views as presented in this volume. The author has rendered no small service to those whose object in life is to seek religious truth. If one could venture to take a peep into the future one would not hesitate to say that Sir Radhakrishnan's singularly wide outlook is the nearest approach to a religion that would be most welcome to cultured humanity in general in the years to come. No student of the philosophy of religion can, I presume, lay down this book without the feeling that he has come in contact with one of the most gifted and thoughtful minds of our day. In this short review it is not possible to refer to all the invaluable topics of interest dealt with by him. Considered from the points of view of

RADHAKRISHNAN'S "AN IDEALIST VIEW OF LIFE."

(continued from the previous page) comprehensiveness, depth and modernness, I must say that there are very few books on the subject of the religious value of life, to compare with it. No Indian has, during the last half-a-century, given to the world a view of religion so strikingly independent and original.

RADHAKRISHNAN'S "THE HINDU VIEW OF LIFE."

The meaning and value that the Hindu attaches to life has been a subject of criticism, for a long time. But it appears to have roused some fresh interest of late, perhaps on account of the new phase of evolution through which India is passing. Both Western and Eastern writers on this subject, naturally seek for a key to the Hindu's attitude towards life, in his Religion and Philosophy, or as one of them, an eminent English authority puts it, in the "Thought-structure" of the Hindu mind. The same critic, after searching scrutiny finds, what he considers, a fallacy in this "thought-structure", which in opinion has led the Hindu mind into a course of "false reasoning" or into "a certain curious course of inconsistency, or something which is better described, perhaps, as an immense capacity for remaining unaffected by inconsistency of thought or action, a characteristic which.. has proved a constant source of bewilderment and embarrassment to those engaged in the task of administration in India." This observation is further supported by a quotation from an Indian gentleman who admitted that "Hindus are not, in the least, troubled by contradictions, where the teaching of the Vedanta is concerned. Many others, Europeans

(continued from the previous page) as well as Indians, have animadverted in strong terms, upon the evils of such institutions and doctrines as caste, karma, sanyasa and so forth. And now, the well-known Prof. Radhakrishnan of the University of Calcutta has attempted a clearer presentation of Hindu thought and an original examination of some of the criticisms, of this kind, in the four lectures which he delivered at Manchester College, Oxford, last year, and which have just been published. They cover what he describes as the "central motives of Hindu faith and its way of approach to some of the pressing problems of the day."

The profundity and the eloquence that characterised the lectures are reported by the Manchester College authorities to have greatly impressed the audiences. The lectures do not aim at a discussion of philosophical or metaphysical issues, but at a consideration of certain practical aspects of life, as determined by the religious beliefs and philosophical speculations of the Hindus which are said, as pointed out, to involve fallacious reasoning. In dealing with such topics as caste, karma, marriage, renunciation and others, while he is not oblivious of their undesirable developments, he has presented their basic principles in a rational light. This valuable publication deserved to be heartily welcomed especially because, it sets forth in the right perspective important Indian questions, so that not only European critics but also educated Hindus may pause and think before condemning outright what is old, in their eagerness to make India move forwards, as quickly as possible. True⁸

⁸ The original editor deleted "Pre" by hand

(continued from the previous page) progress demands a rejection, not of what is effete and irrational. His discussion of the comparative merits of the old eastern and modern western standpoints are well as his refutation of the alleged inconsistency of the Hindu mind really deserve thoughtful consideration.

The lecturer starts with the old Vedic view that religion is not a mere belief but an "experience" which, he thinks, "is not an emotional thrill or a subjective fancy" whose certitude is based upon "trust." He seeks an explanation for the conflict of different beliefs in the universality of mystic experience. Strange as it may seem, it is nevertheless true that this ancient Vedic view is what has been in other parts of the world, bringing conviction to the minds of the most modern thinkers. He quotes Dean Inge, who says that "the centre of gravity in religion has shifted from authority to experience...that fundamental principles of mystical religion are now very widely accepted and are, especially with educated people avowedly the main ground of belief." While we repudiate the argument not infrequently met with in modern writers, which seeks to make mysticism the end of philosophical enquiry, we quite agree that it is the natural consummation of all religious quests.

After referring to the extent, vitality, unity, significance and revealed character of Hindu religion, as well as the place of reason in it, he deals with some of the most distinguishing features, of which the first is its cosmopolitanism or universalism. "The Hindu thinker readily admits other points of view than his own and considers them equally worthy

(continued from the previous page) of attention... Hindu thought accepts the obvious fact that mankind seeks its goal of God at various levels and in various directions and feels sympathy with every stage of the search. The same God expresses itself at one stage as power, at another as personality and at a third as all-comprehensive spirit, just as the same forces which put forth green leaves also cause the crimson flowers to grow."

The next outstanding characteristic is its anti-proselytising attitude. While Hinduism has even been ready to absorb or to comprehend within its vast folds any alien faith, it sees no meaning in formal conversion; for, "what counts is conduct, not belief...It is not fair to God or to men to assume that one people are the chosen of God, their religion occupies a central place in the religious development of mankind and that all others should borrow from them or suffer spiritual destitution." The Hindu attitude is made clear in the words, "When a pupil approaches his religious teacher for guidance, the teacher asks his pupil about his favourite God, ishta-devata; for, every man has a right to choose that form or belief and worship which most appeals to him. Suppose a Christian approaches a Hindu teacher for spiritual guidance, he would not ask his Christian pupil to discard his allegiance to Christ."

It is often remarked that eastern culture has not been so effective as the western, as a civilizing agency, in as much as many barbarous practices are still to be found among some of the peoples of India. But a reply is found, as the lecturer points out, in what a great western authority, Sir James Frazer says: "Among the ignorant and superstitious

(continued from the previous page) classes of modern Europe, it is very much what it was thousands of years ago in Egypt and India and what it now is among the lowest savages surviving in the remotest corners of the world. Now and then, the polite world is startled by a paragraph in a newspaper which tells how in Scotland an image has been found stuck full of gems for the purpose of killing an obnoxious laird or minister, how a woman has been slowly roasted to death as witch in Ireland, or how a girl has been murdered and chopped up in Russia to make those candles of human tallow by whose light the thieves hope to pursue their midnight trade unseen." It must however be regretted as stated by the Professor that owing to historical vicissitudes of fortune Hinduism has had to neglect for some centuries past its task of uplifting the depressed communities.

A third characteristic of Hinduism is its unique idea of toleration. "The intolerance," says the lecturer, "of narrow monotheism is written in letters of blood across the history of man...The worshippers of the one jealous God are egged on to aggressive wars against peoples of alien cults." Contrast this with Asoka's edicts enjoining that every form of religious faith should be honoured, or King Harsha's dedication of temples to gods of other faiths or the spirit with which sympathetic support was extended to Christians by the Hindu rulers of Cochin and Mysore.

The evil of sectarianism finds a most striking description in the following remark of the Professor: "Those who love their sects more than truth end by loving themselves more than their sects. We start by claiming that Christianity is the only true religion and then

(continued from the previous page) affirm that protestantism is the only true sect of Christianity, episcopalianism is the only true protestantism, the high Church the only true episcopal protestant Christian religion and our particular standpoint, the only true representation of the high Church view." This part of the lectures bearing on Religion, is wound up with the observation: "To obliterate every other religion than one's own is a sort of bolshevism in religion, which we must try to prevent. We can do so only if we accept something like the Hindu solution, which seeks the Unity of religion, not in a common creed but in a common quest."

Turning to the Hindu view of "right action" or "law" which is termed Dharma, he deals first with the criticism that there can be no rational foundation for ethics in the doctrines of pantheism and maya (illusion). The lecturer contends that neither maya, in the sense of illusion, nor pantheism is a part of Vedantic thought, including that of Sankara. As the aim of the lectures is not a philosophical pursuit of ultimate truth, we shall pass on to the several practical issues considered here.

The synthetic frame of mind that underlies the Hindu's religion is to be seen again in his laws or rules of Dharma. For, "the Hindu legislators accepted the bewildering variety of customs professed by the tribes in India, as civilization spread from the Indus to the Cape" and did not seek to suppress others' customs for the sake of uniformity.

Turning to the doctrines of Karma, he says, that it has unfortunately been taken to mean "fatality", and turned into a message of despair

(continued from the previous page) instead of hope. In fact, as he observes, "it does not conflict with freedom which is the basis of all ethical values...It displaces belief in magic or the theory that we can manipulate the forces of the world at our pleasure." This doctrine holds that "every act, every thought, is weighed in the invisible but universal balance scales of justice, and that there is room for repentance and consequent forgiveness, fresh opportunities being open to us until we reach the end of our journey." Above all, "it encourages the sinner that it is never too late to mend." According to it man's freedom of action lies in this: "The cards in the game of life are given to us.. They are traced to our past Karma, but we can call as we please, lead what suit we will, and as we play we gain or lose."

In discussing next the four stages of Hindu life the lecturer points out the spiritual ideal aimed at and lays special stress upon "marriage" and "Sanyasa" (renunciation). He points out the importance and the advantages of a married life both for men and for women. Even the Hindu Gods set an example by marrying goddesses. He does not approve of the practice of divorce. He has not got much sympathy for the modern woman, who, he says "is losing her self-respect." But we do not know whether all women-folk would accept his judgment that "the stricter code of morality applied to women is really a compliment to them." The author, however, recognises woman's claim to be equal of man as a householder, and as a spiritual being, man and wife being each half of one entity, as held by ancient Hindus.

Sanyasa or renunciation, he interprets, as Medhatiti does, as "a surrendering of the notions of I and mine, and not the giving up of

(continued from the previous page) the work enjoined by the scriptures." Man is thereafter said to be perfectly free in this life, and "the liberated soul is not indifferent to the welfare of the world.

Freedom on the highest level of existence expresses itself as courage to suffer, sacrifice and die.. Mahadeva, the prince of ascetics, drank poison for the sake of the world."

We come last to the most formidable of all Hindu institutions, caste, which may be viewed from a variety of standpoints. And even here we find the same basic principles of comprehensive synthesis. To-day every thoughtful mind is apprehensive of a world-conflict of races. Has Hindu culture any suggestion to make in this matter? Professor Radhakrishnan says: "Regarding the solution of the problem of racial conflicts, the different alternatives which present themselves are those of extermination, subordination, identification, or harmonization." Where the first alternative is not practicable, the powerful races have recourse to the second and act on the maxim "Spare the slave and smash the rebel," which also evidently means slow decimation of the weaker races. The next alternative of identification or fusion on a large scale is "an impossibility of it is to be achieved in a short period of time." Nor is it desirable to suppress Nature's attempt to evolve various types of humanity. The last, and the only safe course is that "each racial group should be allowed to develop best upon it, without impeding the progress of others." This is the process of "harmonized multiplicity," that of "the many in the one," every group being considered a limb of the great self, as the Hindu views the caste divisions.

From the economic standpoint, "caste insists that the law of social life should not be cold

(continued from the previous page) and cruel competition but harmony and co-operation." The rules of caste assign different functions to several groups, so that all may contribute to the common weal. "The caste idea never encouraged the notion of work as a degrading servitude to be done grudgingly." In a word, "we are a co-operative concern or brotherhood, where we give according to our capacity and take according to our needs."

Caste is not a democracy of wealth or of pleasure, but a spiritual democracy in which every individual of every caste or group is assured of the highest perfection, where there is absolutely no distinction or difference. For, caste recognises "that every soul has in it something transcendent and incapable of degradation."

Referring to the present day conflict of communities in India, the Prof. says that it is due to the absence, in all castes, of a proper sense of the underlying unity of existence. It cannot be ignored that caste has wrought much evil, though its original or basic principle is rational. People have forgotten that in the work of uplift of the backward classes, the determining principle is character and that "the higher the man the fewer are his rights and the more numerous his duties." The caste system has to be reject all that has been preventing the realisation of the truth of its philosophy which aims at seeing "the whole in each part, while each part is indispensable to the whole."

The present situation which calls for the observations made in the lectures is best indicated in the author's own words, "We are to-day drifting, not advancing, waiting for the future to turn up. There is a lack of

(continued from the previous page) vitality, a spiritual flagging...We are clinging to the shell of our religion for self-preservation. The envelope by which we try to protect life checks its expansion." Further, for a long time religious life in India was manifesting the best signs of growth. Buddha, Krishna, Sankara, Ramanuja, Madhva, Chaitanya, Basava, Ramananda, Kabir and Nanak contributed not a little to this growth, so that "there was no such thing as a uniform or stationary, unalterable Hinduism, whether in point of belief or practice. Hinduism is a movement, not a position. of growing tradition, not a fixed revelation.. We are, therefore, now beginning to look upon our ancient faith with fresh eyes. Such an attempt will only be a repetition of a process which has occurred a number of times in the history of Hinduism."

In his presentation of an eastern type of culture Prof. Radhakrishnan has rendered a most valuable service to India. His arguments in every case may not convince all his readers. For instance, we ourselves, are not able to see eye to eye with him in his philosophical attitude towards the world. All the same, it must be said that he has truly interpreted the Hindu mind, for which, life is a "spiritual" existence, or which every thought and every action, has a "spiritual value" or significance. Modern Europe is now beginning to understand what India means by "spiritual" existence. Further, life according to the Hindu is not an end in itself or even the only chance given to man to make or mar his future. Many times he is born; many an error does he commit: many a time is he corrected: and innumerable are the lessons he learns till he attains perfection, with a live sense of the absolute equality of all man-kind,

(continued from the previous page) which blessing, according to Sankara as the author points out, is assured to each and every soul. What, then, is the characteristic of the life of a perfect being on earth? His mind is thus described in the Bhagavata: "I desire not the supreme state of bliss, with its either perfections, nor the cessation of re-birth. May I take up the sorrow of all creatures, who suffer and enter into them so that they may be made free from grief." In fact, so far as our present knowledge goes, the Hindu appears to have among the earliest of men to enunciate the principle that the aim of life is to seek the well-being, not of this or that individual or community, or even nation, but of all beings.

These illuminating lectures are a most praiseworthy vindication of the basic virtues of Hindu life and thought, without ignoring faults of modern Hindu practices. Its study is exceedingly stimulating. It gives us therefore very great pleasure to commend this admirable book strongly to every one who is interested in a spiritual view of existence.

RADHAKRISHNAN'S "INDIAN PHILOSOPHY." VOL I.

Though several treatises of great merit have been written, from time to time, on sections of select topics of Indian philosophy, by eminent scholars of the West, yet no detailed account of the entire field has been given till now by any of them, excepting the late Professor Max Muller, to whom undoubtedly belongs the credit of having made a first attempt in this direction. And it is now generally agreed that his Six Systems neither goes sufficiently deep into details nor includes all the phases of Indian thought,

(continued from the previous page) not to say anything of its other similar defects. Nor has any Indian till recently ventured to present his critical estimate of the achieve-of his countrymen in this field, comprehensively considered.

The last two years may, therefore, be said to mark the beginning of a new chapter in the modern history of Philosophical India. Three noteworthy publications, all by Indian authors, hails from the University of Cambridge, Dr Das Gupta, Prof. of Bengali, published the first volume of his History of Indian Philosophy about two years ago. Under the auspices of the Bombay University, Profs. Ranade and Belvalkar brought out a part of their History of Indian Philosophy. The third contribution comes from the pen of Prof. Radhakrishnan, of the Premier University of Calcutta. And his is a name still held in highest esteem by the students and professors of the University of Mysore which was the scene of his intellectual labours before he proceeded to Calcutta. And this fact makes it a matter of special interest to this magazine, in reviewing the learned Professor's magnificent work: magnificent because, it has won for Indian Philosophy a place in the hierarchy of speculative thought as recognised by the accredited thinkers of the modern world. It has been published as one of the famous series known as the "Library of Philosophy."

Though like the other two publications, only a part of the work has appeared, yet it is unlike them in its aim. It is no 'history' but an interpretation. "Nowhere is the difficulty of getting reliable historical evidence so extreme as in the case of Indian thought. The problem of determining the exact dates of early Indian systems has furnished a field for the wildest hypothesis, and bold romance.."

(continued from the previous page) His aim, has therefore, "been not so much to narrate Indian views, as to explain them so as to bring them within the focus of Western traditions of thought." Himself possessing a thorough and extensive knowledge of Western Philosophy he has succeeded in presenting his subject to the critical mind of Europe and America in a most admirable manner, as is evident from the authoritative opinions which have already appeared in the press.

In the introduction he has rightly drawn special attention to some of the distinguishing features of the culture of India. "Throughout its life it has been living with one purpose. It has fought for truth and against error..." Its great love of truth has made it intellectually and spiritually the most tolerant, whatever its defects socially. "That is why" says he, "the heretic, the sceptic, the unbeliever, the rationalist and the free-thinker, the materialist and the hedonist all flourish on the soil of India." Another important characteristic is the 'synthetic' vision, which it aims at taking in Philosophy, Religion and Science.

Prof. Radhakrishnan has, in our opinion, effectively shown how baseless are the commonplace charges of Pessimism, Dogmatism and Indifference to Ethics, levelled against Indian Philosophy. He, however, admits the charge of unprogressiveness, which he traces to India's political misfortunes, and not to any inherent defects of the Indian mind.

Though he adopts the results of Western research in regard to chronology and literary estimates and values, he maintains throughout the work his independence and individuality as a philosophic thinker and writer. What is more, we have often heard it said not only by European but even Indian Professors of Philosophy in the

(continued from the previous page) Universities of the East, that there is no philosophy worth the name in Indian culture. No psychology, no Epistemology, no Ethics, no Aesthetics; in short, no scientific study of those departments whose developments are generally comprehended under the term Philosophy in the West. Indian thought, they say, is all theology and mythology. And Professor Radhakrishnan has made a highly laudable attempt to refute such superficial views, though we wish very much he had gone further and shown that though the East has a great deal to learn from the West, yet the Hindu is in advance of the civilized races of the West in certain matters philosophical.

We also wish that he had devoted some more space to the repudiation of the untenable theory so often put forward by warped minds. Whenever similar thoughts of value are found in the East and in the West, they jump to the conclusion that the East must have borrowed from the West. We do not understand why it should have been impossible for the human mind in quest of truth, to pass through similar stages or to arrive at similar conclusions in different parts of the world independently. And it passes our comprehension why it should be impossible for a Sankara or a Ramanuja, or a Haribhadra or a Nagarjuna, to have lighted upon metaphysical concepts similar to those of a Spinoza, a Leibniz, a Kant or a Hegel though they could not have pursued the identical lines of enquiry. Prof. Radhakrishnan has been most judicious throughout the work in instituting comparisons of this kind. And he says that "There is no material evidence to prove any direct borrowings at any rate, by India, from the West."

In this first volume, he starts as scholars usually do, with the hymns of the Vedas and

(continued from the previous page) traces the growth of the religious and of the philosophic consciousness of the Indian mind, through the Brahmanas and Upanishads to the materialism as well as the Psychological Realism and Nihilism of the Buddhists. He devotes a chapter or two to the philosophy contained in the Epics of Ramayana, Mahabharata, especially, the Bhagavadgita. Then he considers some religious aspects of Buddhism. The next volume is expected to deal with the several Darsanas and the later developments of all the systems of Indian thought.

Prof. Radhakrishnan, does not always adopt the orthodox Indian view. He has his own stand-point and estimates. His Philosophy of the Upanishads, he says, is not favourable to the sacredness of the Vedas. Again, he holds that the Central Reality of the Upanishads is "Satchitananda." He attempts a reconciliation of Ramanujistic and Sankarite interpretations of the Upanishads by saying that "to the logical mind, the whole is real and within it falls the diversity of the World. The concrete anands is the Pramanika Satta or the real revealed to thought, and answers to the highest Brahman accepted by Ramanuja, the pure Brahman free from all predicates is the Nirupadhika Satta or the Nirguna Brahman of Sankara." Yet even according to Sankara it is the latter that shows itself as the former. But he does not seem to commit himself to any particular view, though when he says that Ananda is used as a synonym for final reality, he seems to incline towards Ramanuja. When he comes to the discussion of the part played by 'intellect' and 'intuition' in attaining reality, he says that by insisting on intuition (perhaps mystic experience) more than on thought, on "Ananda" more than on "Vignana"

(continued from the previous page) the Upanishads seem to support the non-dualism referred to in the introduction. In Ananda, "man is more and deepest in reality." Again the Upanishads believe in God and so believe in the world as well." "If we ignore differences, we reduce the absolute to a nonentity. Loyalty to the highest experience of man, religious and moral, philosophic and aesthetic, requires us to recognise the reality of the temporal as part of the eternal, of the finite as subsisting in the infinite...The Upanishads would not have seriously put forth doctrines about the relativity of the world if it was their view that the world was a mere illusion." By such arguments Prof. Radhakrishnan supports his own interpretation of Maya as energy and refutes the view put forward by Dr Deussen. But Deussen is an avowed follower of Sankara. and the Professor's leanings appear to be towards Ramanuja. However, though our object here is not to examine our author's position, yet we feel that he would have helped us to understand better had he made it clear to us what the two words "real" and 'illusion' mean for him.

His discussion of the Ethics of the Upanishads and Karma, appear to us to be really valuable contributions. "The whole Philosophy of the Upanishads tends towards the softening of the divisions and the undermining of class hatred and anticipates this.. The Upanishads insist on a life of spirit which combines both of Jnana and Karma." Moral activity is not an end in itself, it has to be taken over into the perfect life.. The moral struggle as preparing the way for it (the supreme) is not useless. But we ask: what place does Karma occupy in the world of Jnana? Is Virtue knowledge?

Our author sums up his interesting arguments in regard to Karma in these words: "There is no doctrine so valuable in life and conduct as the Karma theory. Whatever happens to us in this life we have to submit in meek resignation, for it is the result of our past doings. Yet the future is in our power and we can work with hope and confidence. Karma inspires hope for the future and resignation to the past. It makes us feel that the things of the world, its fortunes and failures do not touch the dignity of the soul. Virtue alone is good, not rank or riches, not race or nationality, nothing but goodness is good."

The Materialism of the Charvakas is said to be not without its redeeming features. It is a declaration of the spiritual independence of the individual and the rejection of the principle of authority. The removal of dogmatism, which it helped to effect was necessary to make room for the great constructive efforts of speculation. Its value lies in this, that it is the first answer to the question how far our unassisted reason helps us in the difficulties of philosophy.

Turning next to Jaina Philosophy, the central features, viz. its realistic classification of being, its theory of knowledge, its famous doctrines of Syadvada and Saptabhangi and its ascetic ethics with its great doctrine of Ahimsa are carefully weighed.. Its characteristic salvation or Moksha which is an eternal upward flying of the soul is also there, receiving its due measure of attention. The pluralistic basis of Jaina logic, and its fallacies naturally come in for much thoughtful criticism. "If Jainism

(continued from the previous page) stops with plurality which is at best a relative and partial truth...it throws overboard its own logic and exalts a relative truth into an absolute one." Again, "the distinction of subject and object is not a relation between two independent realities but a distinction made by knowledge itself within its own field. If Jaina logic does not recognise the need for this principle which includes within it the distinction of subject and object, it is because it takes a partial view for the whole truth." The metaphysical scheme of the Jainas has affinities with Leibniz's Monadism and Bergson's Creative Evolutionism. But that it is the product of an immature philosophising, is evident from the fact that it is not clearly aware of the exact distinction between jiva and atman and Ajiva and matter. It adduces no proof of the ultimate plurality of souls. It is only by stopping short at a half-way house that Jainism is able to set forth a pluralistic Realism.

Prof. Radhakrishnan's philosophical interpretation appears to be at its best in his chapters on Buddhism. For it is this system that in its fundamental ideas and essential spirit approximates remarkably to the advanced scientific thought of the 19th century. The modern pessimistic philosophy of Schopenhauer and Harman is, he thinks, only a revised version of ancient Buddhism and as far as the dynamic conception of reality is concerned Buddhism is a splendid prophesy of the Creative Evolution of Bergson. Early Buddhism suggests the outline of a philosophy suited to the practical wants of the present day and it is helpful in reconciling the conflict between faith and science.

At a time when anarchy is thought was leading to anarchy in morals, Buddha wished to steer clear of profitless metaphysical discussions. Buddhism is essentially Psychology, logic and ethics and not Metaphysics. Whatever metaphysics we have in it is not the original Dharma, but added to it (Abhi Dhamma). And the three marked Characteristics of Buddhism are ethical earnestness, absence of theological Dogma, and aversion to metaphysical speculation. Buddha, like Lucretius, felt that the world would be better for the triumph of natural law over supernaturalism by announcing a religion which proclaimed that each man could gain salvation for himself without the mediation of priests or reference to Gods. Buddha wished to increase the respect for human nature and raise the tone of morality. If Ethics is made to rest on the shifting sands of Metaphysics or Theology it has an uncertain tenure. Buddha wished to build it on the rock of facts. Ancient Buddhism resembles Positivism in its attempt to shift the centre from the worship of God to the service of man.

Buddha's pessimism is not a doctrine of despair. He asks man to revolt against evil, to conquer it and to attain an Arhat State.

All schools of Buddhism agree that there is nothing human or divine that is permanent. All things change. It is an artificial attitude that makes sections in the stream of change and calls them things. Identity of objects is an unreality. To account for the continuity of the world in the absence of a permanent substratum, Buddha announces his law of causation, which is perhaps his chief contribution to Indian thought. While the Upanishads say that things have no self-existence as such, but are products of a casual series which has no

(continued from the previous page) beginning or end, Buddha says that things are the products of conditions; that there is no being; but only changing. We cannot say, as in Nyaya, that one thing is the cause of something else. For a thing is what it is and it cannot be come something else. In the external world causation is uniform antecedence. After all the trouble of modern philosophy causation is not defined in more adequate terms. The aim of Buddhism is thus not philosophical explanation but scientific description.

The doctrine of impermanence held in common by the Upanishads and early Buddhism, is developed by later Buddhism into the view of momentariness. But to say, that things are anitya or impermanent is different from saying that they are momentary but not things. Our author after pointing out very clearly how all change involves a permanent entity that changes, and the human intellect compels us to admit an unconditional being as the condition of the empirical series winds up this section with the words "Buddha believed in an ontological reality that endures beneath the shifting appearances of the visible world," a statement the truth of which he has taken great pains to prove, but which will come as a surprise to not a few.

The ethics of Buddhism is based on its psychology. But Buddha did not recognize the reality of the Individual which is but an illusion. This Avidya or illusion of the sense of individuality ceases, when, with the wearying of the will, action ceases. Action ceases when delight of the senses in objects ceases. This delight ceases by the recognition of the transiency of life. Upon this groundwork is reared the structure of Buddhist Ethics,

(continued from the previous page) which may be noted in passing, avoids the extremes of self-indulgence and self-mortification. As there is no reference to grace in Buddhism, it is all a question of self-development. Though Buddha did not expect all men to become ascetics, yet he believed that the fulfilment of world's duties was not directly helpful to salvation.

It may be interesting to note here the Professor's view that Buddha does not oppose caste but adopts the Upanishad standpoint. The Brahmin is such, not so much by birth as by character. All men have the power to become perfect. So members of all castes were freely admitted to the monastic order so that they might attain the highest. But this is not foreign to the Brahminic theory, which also looked upon the highest status of the Sannyasin as above caste. The very prevalent notion that Buddhism and Jainism were reformatory movements and that more especially they represented the revolt against the tyranny of caste is quite erroneous. They were only a protest, says the author, against caste exclusiveness of the Brahmanical ascetics. Even birth in Brahmin family, Buddha allows to be a reward for merit. Caste as such and as existing outside their doors, was fully recognised by them. And Buddha did not interfere with the domestic rituals which continued to be performed according to Vedic rules.

The supreme importance of the Karma theory in Buddhist ethics is well-known. Buddhism, however, does not explain the mechanism by which the continuity of Karma is maintained between two lives separated by the phenomena of death. There is no soul to migrate. It is not the dead man who comes to rebirth but another. All

(continued from the previous page) the same, the law of Karma, requires us to reject all notions of favouritism, caprice and arbitrariness. The Majesty of God and the prestige of Providence pale before this principle. Buddha in thus relying upon Karma only abolished religion of the popular type which rests largely on craven fear or worship of power, which is fit for only savages or children, and strengthened religion in the sense of trust in righteousness. Dharma is the warp and woof of all that lives and moves.

Max Muller says "Many of the doctrines of the Upanishads are no doubt pure Buddhism or rather, Buddhism is only many points the consistent carrying out of the principle laid down in the Upanishads." So close indeed is the relation between Vedanta and Buddhism that the latter may be deemed a return of Brahminism to its fundamental principles. Buddhism helped to democratise the philosophy of the Upanishads which was still then confined to a select few. And it must be specially noted here that Prof. Radhakrishnan has with remarkable ability marshalled his arguments to prove that Buddha believed in an ultimate absolute existence and that one of the greatest of his followers, Nagarjuna, describes "Sunyata" almost in the very language in which Mirguna Brahman of the Upanishads is indicated.

Under the somewhat misleading title, Epic Philosophy, the philosophy of the cults of Durga Vishnu, Rudra and other Gods are described in the Ramayana and Mahabharata is considered. But the chapter on the Bhagavadgita constitutes an elaborate enquiry which goes into details, many of which might well be treated under the Upanishads or under the Vedanta as a system. There is no reference here to the question why a battle-field was chosen to teach the most recondite

(continued from the previous page) doctrines of philosophy. That the Gita attempts a synthesis is, however, ably pointed out.

The three paths of Jnana, Bhakti and Karma are expounded so as to indicate how they could lead to the goal of the Monistic Idealism which Prof. Radhakrishnan has in view. The interpretations of Sankara, Ramanuja and others are examined. The Ethics often of this poem is discussed at length. But the great lesson to be learnt is said to be "while the Gita insists much on social duties, it recognises a supra social state. It believes in the infinite destiny of the individual apart from human society. The Sannyasin is above all rules caste and society. It is not an ascetic ideal that the Sannyasin adopts. He may be aloof from society, yet he has compassion for all. Mahadeva, the ideal ascetic, seated in the Himalayan snows, readily drinks poison for the saving of humanity."

Next comes the subject of Buddhism after the death of Buddha. How the two schools of the Mahayana and Hinayana rose, how they were made to proximate to certain types of Hindu faith and how each of them gave birth to new speculations of various kinds, are described. At the end is stated the important reason for the disappearance of Buddhism from the land of its birth. India, has a more popular religion, which satisfied her imagination. Mahayanaism in the struggle for existence had to adapt itself to various strata of society and various tastes of men, the most superstitious and the most ignorant, so much so that it lost nearly the whole of its individuality. Mahayana was no better than Vaishnavism and Hinayana than Saivism, of old. Buddhism has nothing distinctive to teach. When the Brahmanical faith inculcated universal love and devotion to God and proclaimed Buddha to be an avatar of Vishnu, the death knell of

(continued from the previous page) Buddhism in India was sounded. The hand of the immeasurable past, with its congenial fancies and inherited beliefs again took hold of the country and Buddhism passed away, by becoming blended with Hinduism. It is an invention of the interested to say that fanatic priests fought Buddhism out of existence.

The history of Buddhism establishes the enormous difficulty of having a pure morality independent of spiritual sanctions. Thus far, one might agree with the author. But some will hesitate to subscribe to the observation that the "neglect of the mystical side of man's nature (is) the cause of its (Buddhism's) failure." For, Buddhism also has developed a mysticism of a most advanced type.

In the last chapter of the book the four well-known schools of the Vaibhashikas, the Sautrantikas, the Yogacharas, and the Madhyamikas, their characteristic tenets and their logical and metaphysical defects in particular are most lucidly stated. The author also points out that the Vedantic critics of Buddhism have not done adequate justice to Buddha.

The greatest service that Prof. Radhakrishnan has rendered in this work lies in his learned exposition of the work of Nagarjuna, the Madhyamika Philosopher. His theory of knowledge, his view of Time and Space, his criticisms of causal relation, above all his Metaphic of reality, are so acute, so original and so modern that they look as though they were the views of a first rate thinker of the 20th century. We fear we might be doing positive injustice if we attempted to summarise the views in a para or two. Such as are really interested in this subject cannot afford to ignore this brilliant thinker of ancient India, whom the Professor has introduced to the public here.

In this valuable work, Prof. Radhakrishnan has undertaken a task of tremendous difficulties. To present a historical survey, to give short but accurate summaries of ancient authors, is one thing and to interpret the most recondite thoughts of centuries ago is another. Each has its own responsibilities. But the latter is the more arduous. For, of what would any ancient thought be if it have no value, as judged by the men of our day? In trying to show, therefore, that there are in Indian philosophy, thoughts of the highest value to the philosopher of to-day, Prof. Radhakrishnan has succeeded so well, that we are compelled to say that he has laid the Indian world under very deep obligation to him. It will be not only a book indispensable to every student of Indian Philosophy but invaluable as a source of suggestions for making further progress in this field. Further research may lead to a different interpretation. But the line of work he has pursued will ever remain an enduring incentive to those that follow.

As a work of philosophical interpretation and criticism, it must be considered an epoch making publication, and we trust it will be warmly welcomed wherever people love truth and eagerly seek for it. howsoever far they may be from that universal goal of human thought.

VOLUME II. Not long ago a well-known Indian graduate, who now occupies an eminent academical position, gave it as his considered opinion that there was little or no philosophy worth the name in ancient Indian Literature, and that what went by that name was all an ingenious and fanciful elaboration of either theological myths or mystical sophistries which generally appeal most to emotional,

(continued from the previous page) unscientific or self-deluded minds. Perhaps the same view is shared by not a few of the graduates who have been passing out of our modern Universities, after going through the mill not only of European and but also of such Indian philosophy as was being presented to them, till recently, in the synopses published or prepared for examination purposes. But thanks to the invaluable labours not only of the distinguished oriental scholars of our own day but also of the eminent Hindu Professors of some of the Universities in this country, the time appears to have come for those belonging to the school of the graduates referred to above to revise their opinions. For these modern writers have thrown such a flood of light on Ancient India that one wonders whether there is not something in advance of the most rational and up-to-date metaphysical thought of the West, to be found in the literature of the Hindus of bygone times. Outside the narrow circle of such scholars, few seem to be aware of the vastness of the literature extant on the metaphysical speculations of the Hindus, and what is more, of the subtleness and acuteness of thought displayed in the discussions which were carried on in the numberless Indian schools that sprang up in the past. Often do we meet with writers who think that what they know of Indian philosophy is all that is worth knowing, and who have never dreamt of the actual difficulty that stares one in the face in the pursuit of such studies. And nothing is easier than for one to differ from or even to condemn another in the matter of interpreting the words and thoughts of those that lived centuries ago. Very often more energy appears, to be spent in fighting the battles of mere

(continued from the previous page) words. Such discussions may be most legitimate, nay, even most necessary for oriental scholars whose special interest lies in the dress that thoughts wear. But for students of philosophy the body of ideas behind the language, and their rational value in life, are of greater consequence, though these two aspects – the word and the content – cannot be divorced from each other. A still greater difficulty, not to refer here to others, is to find appropriate words in modern languages to bring out the ideas of the past ages correctly.

Among those who have in spite of such great obstacles, attempted not only a survey of the entire field of Indian thought but also a criticism of it from the modern stand-points the most distinguished is Prof. Radhakrishnan, of the University of Calcutta, the first volume of whose Indian Philosophy was reviewed some time ago in the pages of this Magazine.

The learned author holds, and rightly too, that in reality the Indian systems or schools including even Jainism, Buddhism, Nihilism or Materialism, are not altogether unconnected, but that they only mark the different stages or aspects of the evolution of thought, a fact which is so often ignored by those writers on Indian philosophy to whom the maze of words is of the greatest consequence and who delight in being lost in it. Volume I, as the reader perhaps knows, covers the Vedic Samhitas, the Upanishads, the Epic poems including the Bhagavadgita, and the un-orthodox systems of the Jains and the Buddhists and the Materialists and Sceptics, whereas Volume II deals with the later developments of the orthodox schools which have more or less directly grown out of

(continued from the previous page) the speculations of the Vedic Rishis, viz. the logical realism of Nyaya, the atomistic pluralism of Vaisheshika, the realistic pluralisms of the Sankhya and the yoga systems, the ritualistic metaphysics of the Purva Mimamsa, and the Non-dualistic, qualified non-dualistic and dualistic schools, with their subdivisions such as those of the Saivas, the Saktas and the Vaishnavas all of Vedanta. Under each head the author gives us a brief account of the standard works on the subject, his interpretation of each school of thought and lastly his critical estimate. The reference to originals and to well-known authorities are given as footnotes, and at the end of each chapter. Nothing more could be desired in respect of arrangement or method in a work of this kind. He has laid under contribution all the latest works of well-known oriental scholars of the West as well as the East. Some may not quite agree with him in regard to his exposition. But that is to be expected in all thoughtful and critical writings. He has developed the Western standpoint throughout, which makes his work so singularly attractive and so intelligible to those educated in the modern ways of thinking. It is the first complete work of this kind yet published by any Indian Scholar. Prof. Radhakrishnan's second volume of Indian Philosophy has far surpassed, in general execution, all his previous productions.

He makes an excellent beginning by analysing the common ideas of the different systems. The Veda is the common reservoir from which all the six systems, including the theisms of Saiva, Sakta and Vaishnava cults have drawn. But each school has, it is said, its own theory of knowledge, which is an integral part or a necessary

(continued from the previous page) consequence of its theology or metaphysics. Intuition and inference are also accepted by all. It is further noted that reason is subordinated to 'intuition'. Does intuition mean perception as Deussen puts it or ecstasy or trance as others interpret Anubhava? On what authority the author's views is based we are, however, not told, though that reason is subordinated to the Veda is a doctrine that we find in so many Sutras and Bhashyas. Next, he tells that intuition, revelation, cosmic consciousness and God-vision are synonymous, which evidently points to a mystic outlook. He adds that the philosophy of India takes its stand on the spirit which is above, and that "philosophy carries us to the gates of the promised land, but cannot let us in for which insight or realisation is necessary." Philosophy is, therefore impotent so far as the attainment of insight into the highest truth is concerned. Since the Professor believes that there is some definite entity called the highest truth, which philosophy does not reveal, he only means that philosophy is but a preparation for the mystical goal. As we have often pointed out in these pages we do not subscribe to such a view. Let us not forget here the still current practice and belief of many, that the goal of God-vision is reached by means of drugs, dances, fasts and magic, which only means that to such philosophy is a vain or idle pastime. Though the general tendency of all the theological systems is towards mysticism, yet there is ample evidence to show that the true philosopher in India has kept himself clear of such deluding marshes.

In the short space of this article, we shall not attempt the unnecessary and impossible task of summarising what is contained in the 800 closely printed pages, or of giving an account

(continued from the previous page) of the six systems, which are so well-known, but shall content ourselves with indicating what the Professor's own estimates of them are. "The greatest contribution of the Nyaya," he says, "to Hindu thought is in its organon of critical and scientific investigation." "Its methodology is accepted by the other systems though with slight modifications due to their metaphysical conceptions...The strength as well as the weakness of the Nyaya is in its faith that the method of ordinary common sense and experience can be applied to the problems of religion and philosophy." "But however convincing this may appear to the average mind, a metaphysical investigation of the nature and conditions of thought compels us to give up this view." "The continuity and coherence of our experience mans the reality of non-experienced entities. A deeper analysis of experience on the logical side was undertaken by the Samkhya and the Vedanta." "The atomic hypothesis of the Vaiseshikas" says the author, "only creates fresh difficulties and leads the Vaiseshika system into the dangers of subjectivism." "The chief defect of this system is that it does not piece together its results into a single coherently articulated structure. It is not a philosophy in the sense implied by the famous saying of the Republic that he who sees things together is the true dialectician or the philosopher.

Students of Indian philosophy are probably aware that Garbe holds that "the Samkhya is the most significant system of philosophy that India has produced." Winternitz believes that Pythagoras himself was influenced by it. And it is no doubt, as our author thinks, a notable attempt in the realm of pure philosophy, though every one may not be prepared to accept in

(continued from the previous page) entirety the verdict of Garbe. The chief peculiarities of the system are in its theories of Karma (Causality) Guna (Energy), Prakriti (Matter) and Purusha (Soul or mind) and the relation of Purusha and Prakriti (Mind and Matter, if one might say so). It does not believe in a God. As the author points out, Kapila's denial of Iswara (God) appears to be a regulative principle, which he insisted on to induce men to withdraw themselves from the excessive contemplation of an eternal God, which would impede the rise of true discriminative knowledge. In Prof. Radhakrishnan's view, throughout the Samkhya there is a confusion between Purusha and Jiva. As regards the co-operation of Purusha and Prakriti, the famous simili of the blind and the lame man is misleading, in as much as Prakriti and Purusha have no common purpose. "Failure" to recognise an ultimate unity co-ordinating these two factors is the fundamental mistake of the Samkhya theory. Again, "if Prakriti be completely mechanical, the freedom of the Will is an illusion, since the Will is the produce of Prakriti." The Professor winds up his criticism in these words "Samkhya is content to remain at the level of mere understanding, which insists upon the distinction between being and non-being and regards the opposition between the two as real and their identity as unreal. It was not able to realise all that was involved in the questions it raised – questions the difficulty and importance of which have been brought to light by ages of conflict and controversy – still less to reach a comprehensive view of the Universe in which no element of reality is suppressed or mutilated..The Samkhya analysis of experience only prepared the round for a more adequate philosophy."

Nothing else in India has evoked so much curiosity or interest as the yoga system. Some thinkers of the West are just beginning to believe that the brain is by no means indispensable for conscious activities. And as the Professor says, "The ancient thinkers of India tell us that we can acquire the power of seeing and knowing without the help of the outer senses...They assume that there is an outer world about us than we are normally able to apprehend..The Yoga helps us to reach a higher level of consciousness, through a transformation of the psychic organism, and a restraint of the senses and the mind." Patanjali systematised the conceptions of the yoga and set them forth on the back-ground of the metaphysics of the Samkhya, which he assumes with slight variations. The yoga accounts for creation, unlike the Samkhya, by the two agencies of God and Avidya. It is well observed that the goal in yoga, is not God but the absolute separation of Purusha (Mind or soul) from Prakriti (matter). God only facilitates the attainment of perfect freedom but does not grant it. To the modern mind, in the East or the West, says the Professor "The whole yoga scheme of attaining perfection appears to be only an elaborate process of self hypnotisation. But really the yoga discipline is nothing more than the purification of the body, mind and soul and preparing them for the beatific vision. Since the life of man depends on the nature of Chitta (mind) it is always within our reach to transform our nature by controlling our Chitta." Further it is believed that it enables one to plumb the depths of the subliminal or the unconscious mind, a feat which the most modern of psychological investigations has not succeeded in achieving yet.

(continued from the previous page) "In Purva Mimamsa, the central problem is ritual. The avowed aim of this system is to examine the nature of Dharma. The philosophical speculations found in it are subordinated to the ritualistic purpose. For the sake of the integrity of Dharma, it is obliged to affirm the reality of the soul and regard it as a permanent being possessing a body to whom the results of acts accrue. The Mimamsa is polytheistic though by implication atheistic. It accepts a realistic view of the world. Further the scriptures which govern the daily life of the Hindu require to be interpreted in accordance with Mimamsa rules. Modern Hindu law is considerably influenced by the Mimamsa system and its rules of interpretation. The ultimate reality of the world is looked upon as the constant principle of Karma. The Sastra called the Veda is Brahman in the form of Sounds." The author thinks that it is unnecessary to say much about the unsatisfactory character of the Purva Mimamsa as a system of philosophy. It did not concern itself with the problems of ultimate reality and its relation to the world of souls and matter. The performance of the sacrifices were regarded as the most essential thing. There is little in such a religion to touch the heart and make it glow.

The Vedanta philosophy has a higher philosophical value. It is closely bound up with the religions of India and is much more alive than any other system of thought. In one or the other of its various forms, the Vedanta determines the world-view of the Hindu thinkers of the present time.

The schools of Advaitism, Visishtadvaitism and Dwaitism as well as Saivism, Saktatism, and later Vaishnavism are necessarily considered here. While Advaitism appeals more to

(continued from the previous page) those whose minds are inclined to pure philosophy the rest have charm more to minds inclined to Theology, and are therefore treated under the head called "Theisms." In a work whose principal aim is philosophy, but not religion or theology, the author could not but devote more space to the former. He has gone more fully into details than any other writer on the subject in English, and has also compared Sankara with some of the Modern European philosophers. The Professor's general estimate may be briefly put thus. The Upanisads speak with the double voice of philosophy and religion. They represent the highest reality as Absolute and God. At the centre of Sankara's philosophy is the eternal mystery of creation. "His system is" says the author, "one of mystical indifference to fact." That human suffering will be healed, that the whole world will vanish like a pitiful mirage, that all our trouble is our own making and that in the world's finale all people will find that absolute oneness which will suffice for all hearts, compose all resentments and atone for all crimes, seem to many pious assumptions. Sankara knows all this and gives us a logical theism which does not slight the intellect, does not scorn the wisdom of ages and is at the same time the highest intellectual account of truth. The author discusses at length the interesting question whether Sankara does not believe in the reality of the external world. "Even those" he holds in winding this subject "who do not agree with the general attitude will not be reluctant to allow him a place among the immortals." "Ramanuja had the greatness of a religious genius. He tries to reconcile the demands of the religious feeling with the claims of logical thinking. Much more remarkable

(continued from the previous page) is the deep earnestness and hard logic with which he conceived the problem and laboured to bridge the yawning between the apparently conflicting claims of religion and philosophy..Ramanuja gives us the best type of monotheism conceivable." "Madhva stands out for unqualified dualism and insists on the five great distinctions of God and the individual soul, God and matter, the individual soul and matter, one soul and another, and one part of matter and another. The doctrines of exclusive mediatorship through Vayu, the son of Vishnu, eternal hell as well as the missionary fervour of Madhva's faith suggest the influence of Christianity though there is little evidence in support of it. Madhva makes a clever use of the Śamkhya and the Nyaya Vaisheshika theories."

Saivism is divided into two schools. The southern and the northern or the Kashmerian. In the former God Siva is the soul of which the universe of nature and man is the body. He is not identical with them though he dwells in them and they in him here. "Non-dualism does not mean oneness (Ekatva) but inseparability." Siva is not only the Absolute of Metaphysics but the God of religion. This system does not support the illusory conception of the world. On the other hand, the Kashmerian Saivism is more akin to Advaitism. While Siva is the only changeless reality underlying the entire universe, his energy or sakti has an infinity of aspects. As the soul is of the nature of consciousness dwells in each of us, though it is obscured by unreal Upadhis. The only reality is the unlimited pure self, the one and only substratum of the universe, whose activity (Spanda, Vibration) is the cause of all distinctions. Saktism has its roots in the Veda. Sakti is the supreme power by which

(continued from the previous page) the universe is upheld. She next became the great mother of the universe. The Vaishnavites make her the sister of Krishna and the Saivites the wife of Siva. The literature relating to this cult is called Tantra. It is famous for its reverence for women who are regarded as forms of divine motherhood. It holds that "Man is liberated by the knowledge that he is himself Brahman." The mystic side of the yoga system plays a large part throughout.

The Vaishnava schools of Nimbaraka, Vallabha Jiva Goswami are adaptation, in different degrees, of Sankara's and Ramanuja's doctrines, so as to suit different theological or mystical temperaments.

Reviewing the entire field, the Professor says "The faith that the Gods who can be persuaded by prayer or compelled by rites to grant our requests are only the forms of the supreme: the firm conviction that the pure stainless spirit to know whom is life eternal, is one with the innermost soul of man; the rise of materialism, Scepticism, and Fatalism, and their suppression by the ethical systems of Buddhism and Jainism, with their central doctrine that one can free one-self from all ills only by refraining from all evil, in thought, word, and deed—God or no God, the liberal theism of the Bhagavad-Gita, which endows the all-soul with ethical in addition to Metaphysical perfections, the logical science of the Nyaya, which furnishes the principal categories of the world of knowledge which are in use even to-day; the Vaiseshika interpretation of Nature, the Samkhya speculations in science and psychology; the yoga scheme of the pathway to perfection; the ethical and social regulations of the Mimamsa and the

(continued from the previous page) religious interpretations of the supreme Reality, as put forward by Sankara, Ramanuja, Madhva, Nimbaraka, Vallabha, and Jiva Gowsami form a remarkable record of philosophical development in the history of the human race...The long procession of thinkers struggled hard to add some small piece to the temple of human wisdom, some fresh fragment to the ever incomplete sum of human knowledge." But India is no longer playing her role as the vanguard of higher knowledge in Asia—and much less in the world outside, owing to various causes, political, historical and natural. The stagnation in her intellectual life is due most to the slave mentality engendered by the abnormally strong tendency to cling to the past. But the present day contact with other cultures as well as the Hindu's own sufferings has, as the learned author says, shaken the faith in the traditional solutions and has, in some degree tended to a larger freedom and flexibility of thought. We notice, as he says, the broadening of the range of experience, the growth of the critical temper and a distaste for mere speculation, which appears to augur well for the future of pure philosophy in this country.

Though one might at times feel, in looking through the pages of this work, that this or that particular feature of any system, to which one is attached or attracted, is not presented by the author with sufficient emphasis, one cannot but admire the magnitude of the labour that must have been expended in collecting the great mass of information found in this bulky volume and the remarkable ability with which this huge task has been accomplished, in spite of the innumerable

(continued from the previous page) difficulties attendant on such a literary undertaking. Few books on this subject have been so brilliantly written. Few have covered such a vast area not only of eastern but also of western thought. Fewer men have brought to bear upon such a work a critical mind with a philosophical grasp so cultured and comprehensive as his. And these two volumes will it is believed be admitted to contain the best historical and critical account yet published of India's great intellectual adventures and achievements of the past in its quest after Eternal Truth.

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SHANKARA AND HIS VIEW OF LIFE.

(In Vedanta Kesari – Vol.18).

You all know the oft-quoted lines:
 "Lives of great men all remind us
 We can make our lives sublime."

The truth contained in these words has a special significance to the admirers of Shankara. By contemplating on what Shankara did and taught we can make ourselves, as he himself holds, as great as he was. That is what we understand by sublimity when we refer to Shankara's greatness. Of the details of the life of this ancient teacher we find that we do not know much, if we ignore the contributions made by mythology and poetry to it. Historians and scholars have widely differed as to the age in which he lived. But the best authorities seem to assign to him the second century B.C. But these differences are in a sense a blessing in disguise. For, many thoughtful men who would otherwise have not cared to study Sankara, have been compelled to read his works and ponder deeply his words. There are, however, a few outstanding features which are

(continued from the previous page) not disputed. First, his active life was entirely dedicated to the cause of the promotion of India's welfare, in a unique manner. From so early an age as twelve when he seems to have left his home, till he was thirty-two when he departed from this life, he gave himself up to the service of his fellow-beings.

He did not marry, he having entered the ascetic order when he was twelve, a circumstance that helped him to devote his undivided attention for public work. For, he taught that the highest duty of man was 'Paranugraha' or doing good to others. Always on foot, now in the north, now in the south, now in the west and now in the east, he wandered from the Himalayas to Rameswaram, not merely teaching but organising. One of his greatest ambitions was to bring about a cultural, not religious, unification of India letting alone all religious, communal, caste, social and political differences, without interfering with them. His concern was solely to realise in life the central teaching of his philosophy: "Unity" of existence in the midst and in spite of its variety. He founded four colleges at the four cardinal borders, Badrinath, Jagannath, Sringeri and Dwaraka comprehending the whole country lying about and between them, as one. He did not seek to convert others to any particular religious faith; for he had none, which he could call his own. But he recognised all faiths to be pathways leading equally to the same God. He strove to effect a harmony by following to the letter, in this respect also, the doctrine taught by Sri Krishna, in the Gita. But he fought for Truth, which has been misunderstood and confounded with religion.

Turning to his teachings it is seen that he has varied his instruction to suit the intellectual

(continued from the previous page) capacities and moral temperaments of the men that he addressed. He appears to have divided such people into two classes. Into the first he put those that are cowed down by 'fear'; that is, the fear of the sorrows and the sufferings of this world. Under the second he brings the 'fearless', i.e. such men as set at naught weakness and strive to achieve something higher than escaping one's misery. The former, in as much as they dread pain and sorrow, look up to others for help. Their hopes are centred in others more powerful than they and are characterised by a craving for dependence. In fact, they are called 'Balaheena' to use the Upanishadic term. Their one cry is for being 'saved'. "May God save us" is ever on their lips. On the other hand, the latter class of men not merely make every effort to ignore their own sorrows but even welcome suffering in that it helps to develop the strength and the courage needed to overcome it, and to seek a remedy for others' woes. Far from praying for another's help for being 'saved' they fight their own battles. They seek for the cause of the sorrows and sufferings of others and endeavour to root it out. They do not succumb to fear. These men are called the 'fearless' or 'Dhira', in the sense of possessing not only the knowledge necessary for ascertaining the cause of all sorrow but also courage which is a product of such knowledge. They are said to possess 'Balam', of 'Balyam' in the sense of strength, mental and moral.

That Sankara had this twofold classification in his view is evident from his writings. In the introduction to his commentary on the Bhagavad Gita, his primary object is, as he says, to show to such men as fall a prey to 'Sokam' and 'Dukkham', a way out by making them seek

(continued from the previous page) help of the Lord. This feature is well illustrated throughout his commentary. On the other hand in his introduction to the "Sutra Bhashya" he sets forth as his chief object the removal of erroneous knowledge and the attainment of truth, which aims at many invaluable objects, among which one is the uprooting of the cause, not of one's own sorrows, but those of all beings. Such knowledge is not meant, he says, for the acquisition of one's individual happiness, here or hereafter. For, he says that the seeker after such knowledge should be free from thoughts of such gains for himself, in this world or in the next. To put the same in other words, he must, he says, possess "Ihamutra-phala-bhoga-viraga." This knowledge comprehends many things among which one is the removal of others' pain and misery. Men of this class are therefore specially known as 'seekers after knowledge'.

To the former division of men, who owing to their fear are temperamentally fitted for dependence upon others the lesson taught is 'reliance upon God.' These men naturally imbued with fear cannot shake it off even when they are blessed with the vision of God and even in His very presence. In the eleventh Adhyaya of the Gita, God reveals His real or Divine Nature to Arjuna, but he trembling with 'fear' begs the Lord to resume His veiled or assumed form. The Lord then grants his prayer and says the one thing that can save him is absolute reliance upon Himself, the Lord.

Contrariwise, in his Sutra Bhashya, Sankara says that one's aim in life ought to be to shake off all 'fear' (Bhayam) as inculcated in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad and as King Janaka actually did achieve, not by depending upon others as 'Balaheena' or weak men, but by attaining that knowledge, one of whose effects is that all fears resulting from sorrows,

(continued from the previous page) doubts or wants come to an end, as the Mandukya Karika declares.

In short, the former are those that do not rely upon themselves and the latter are such men as are self-reliant. And Sankara does not put them into two independent and closed compartments from either of which it is not possible to pass into the other. The class lacking in self-dependence can develop this virtue in due course. Then the 'fear' of this world can be cast off. Even cowards then become heroes.

Sankara's philosophy therefore teaches us that for those temperaments that need reliance upon others, 'Bhakti' is the path, i.e. Bhakti is of supreme value and knowledge is subsidiary. On the other hand, for other temperaments which do not make much of their own sufferings but seek the cause of those of others with a view to eradicating them and also aiming at other higher objects, 'Gnanam' or knowledge is the path, i.e. Gnanam is of the highest importance and Bhakti is subsidiary. Their thirst for knowledge can never be quenched till they reach the goal beyond which nothing remains to be attained or known, as the Upanishads say. For Sankara, therefore, the aim of life is not to save one's self from the sorrows of this world or the next. For him it is not manly for one to seek to enjoy the pleasures of life or even the pleasures of heaven. Nay, even the attainment of God by any individual is neither satisfying to him nor is felt the highest end by him. For, in the Gita story Sri Krishna showed himself to Arjuna, but he was not satisfied. His fears and doubts were not gone. Seven more chapters had to be added after the eleventh, to remove their cause, i.e. erroneous knowledge. The

(continued from the previous page) mere sight of God does not put an end to our ignorance regarding His own capacities and powers, nor our fears.

But the attainment of such a state of self-reliance, fearlessness and wantlessness is called in Vedanta, as in the Taittiriya Upanishad, for instance, Swarajya Siddhi. In that Swarajya everything is Brahman, as the Chandogya says—“Sarvam Khalvidam Brahma.” To attain it, is to become Brahman. This is the highest knowledge. And this is what Sankara wishes all of us to attain, as he himself did. That it may be possible for us to secure such knowledge let us cast out ‘Balaheenata’ and ‘Bhayam’, and develop ‘Balam’ and ‘Abhayam’ by walking in the footsteps of Sankara for whom life is a preparation for overcoming all that hinders us from realising our oneness.

“REASON AND INTUITION.”

(A Defence: In Prabuddha Bharata – June 1940).

1. “I believe in Reason and follow Reason.”
2. “We should follow Reason.”
3. “Whether we declare it boldly, clearly, or not, it is evident that here we appeal to Reason.”
4. “We need Reason to drive out all old superstitions....Be ever ready for new Truths. Fools are they who would drink brackish water from a well that their forefathers have digged and would not drink pure water from a well that others have digged!”
5. “It is better that mankind should become atheist by following Reason than blindly believe in two hundred millions of Gods on the authority of anybody.”
6. “Is it not tremendously blasphemous to believe against Reason?”

7. "On Reason we must have to lay our foundation."
8. "Inspiration (intuition?) always comes to fulfil Reason and is in harmony with it."
9. "Only those portions of them (The Vedas) which agree with Reason are to be accepted as authority."
10. "Personally I take as much of the Vedas as agrees with Reason. Many of our philosophers have taken this view."
11. "If a man wants to be a rationalist and satisfy his Reason it is here (in Vedanta) that he can find the most rational ideas...."
12. "What we want is Western Science coupled with Vedanta."

---Swami Vivekananda.

Prof. P.S. Naidu, M.A., has every right "To pull down", as he says in the last April number of Prabuddha Bharata, "The foundations...that support the bogey of the superiority of Reason....so that the superstructure will tumble down to dust of its own accord." Let him by all means pull down the foundations of Reason and also crush to dust poor mortals like me who seek shelter under it, humbly following our revered master Swami Vivekananda. Our consolation will be that we shall get crushed when our revered master is. If Swami Vivekananda had not known "English" I would not have attempted to make any defence against so powerful a professor as Mr Naidu. For he would have smashed me to smithereens by saying that Swami Vivekananda never relied on "Reason." And I have ventured to reply because the foolish cap of Reason fits me though my name is not mentioned by Prof. Naidu.

It is not our revered Swamiji alone whose support I seek here. Our greater guru Sri Ramakrishna also has definitely indicated the

(continued from the previous page) supremacy of Buddhi or Reason. But I shall quote from him only to those that seek "Truth" for "Truth's sake." But our greatest guru Lord Sri Krishna Himself is responsible for the Sin of having made Reason Supreme.

On the express authority of Prof. P.S. Naidu himself and also on that of the best Sanskrit and English authors known to me I have rendered in the following passages "Buddhi" into "Reason."

These references are to the Bhagavad Gita:-

1. What enables one to overcome all delusions or ignorance? Reason. 2-52.
2. What should a man finally seek refuge in? Reason. 2-49
3. What is it which if lost man is utterly ruined? Reason. 2-63
4. What in man should on no account be unsettled or confounded? Reason. 3-26
5. Which is supreme among man's faculties? Reason. 3-42
6. What is that which can grasp the Infinite Joy of the Ultimate Reality? Reason. 6-21
7. What is that in the absence of which the immutable nature of the Highest remains unknown? Reason. 7-24
8. What is the highest reward that God Himself gives to his most favourite devotees? Reason. 10-10.
9. What in man enables him to attain the most profound Knowledge, that of the Lord? Reason. 12-8 to 14.
10. What is that which if untrained and perverted one cannot see the Self (Reality or Truth)? Reason. 18-16.
11. What is that which enables one to know what is ignorance (bondage) and what is knowledge (liberation)? Reason. 18-30
12. What is it that one should finally resort to so that one may attain the Supreme Reality? Reason. 18-57.

Let me now turn to still higher authorities, the Upanishads.

What is it that enables one to see the Atman or Brahman? “He (Atman) is seen by subtle seers with the keenest (or superior) Reason. Katha Up. 3-12.

What is the highest help that we pray for in seeking the Ultimate Reality? Reason.

“May He endow us with clear Reason.” Svet. Up. 3-4 & 5-8.

It is needless to lengthen this list further. On the importance of “Reason” I could quote hundreds of references from standard works like the Mahabharata, Sree Bhagavata and other works literary and Vedantic. So let me wind up, by quoting a passage from the most authoritative English translation of a passage from one of the greatest of ancient philosophers of India. Whoever knows anything of Indian Philosophy can spot it at once.

“Some conceited philosophers hold that Reason cannot grasp the Self, as He is formless, and that therefore the Devotion of Right knowledge is impossible of attainment....Yes, it is unattainable to those....who have not been initiated by Gurus, who have not learnt and studied the Vedanta and whose reason is quite engrossed and....who have not been trained in the right source of Knowledge.”

Let it be remembered that I have quoted so many only because Reason—not intuition—makes me do so.

Here let me add if the learned and mighty professor had been taught by Vedantic gurus he would have seen what the essence of all Hindu prayers is. Or, if he had become a full-fledged Sannyasin of the type of Swami Vivekananda, —not an amateur—of the Sri Ramakrishna Order he would have at once spotted the same. Indian

(continued from the previous page) philosophy does not make its final appeal anywhere to anything but Reason (Buddhi) though Indian theology, Indian scholasticism, Indian mysticism (Yoga) finally rely upon Revelations, authorities, intuitions and ecstatic visions, which constitute the adamant rock on which Prof. Naidu takes his unshakeable seat, when he pulls down our weak "Foundations of Reason." Further he flinches not to attack even the Upanishads and Brahma Sutras with Commentaries when they refer to Reason. With reference to the description of "Reason as Charioteer" he says, "When this misleading conception is divested of all its glamorous poetry we find it riddled with many fallacies? There is not one word in his article to indicate the meaning of Reason, i.e. to show us what he understands by the term Reason. All that he says is "Reason which depends upon intelligence...and the intellect, thus becomes a slave to intuition." Is the meaning of Reason thus known? I 'depend' upon my salary. Am I known when my salary – the rupees, annas pies – I get is known? Is there one word in the whole article of Prof. Naidu to show what Reason means? Without any meaning for the word Reason of what use are such statements as the following?

"Reason has given a poor self-damaging account of herself..." "The champions of Reason will give up mere repetition of the word and dogmatic assertion about its omnipotence." "We have to transcend Reason." "Reason, the omnipotent – had its downfall." "Reason is self-contradictory." And he quotes some recent writers who do not define Reason.

But the most interesting feature of all his condemnations is with reference to the Aristotelian Logic and other Logics, the Laws of

(continued from the previous page) thought as known to Europe. He says not a word about Reason as known to Indian thinkers. But any student of Vedanta knows that Logic or Tarka or Nyaya Vaisesika is declared incompetent to get at the highest Truth or Reality, not only in the Brahma Sutras, but also in the Upanishads and other Vedantic works. No Vedantin seems to hold that Brahman is established by Tarka, though Tarka is of the greatest use in some other spheres of knowledge. And no Vedanta has condemned Reason or Buddhi! And no Rationalist or Scientist even in the West seems to say that the Ultimate Truth is known by logical Reasoning. No doubt, science marks only the first step in the search after truth. But to ignore even the first step is only to prepare for a fall or failure. Prof. Naidu has evidently confounded Philosophical Reason with Logical Reason, which is applied only to a part of existence or experience. It is this latter kind of Reason that the West is familiar with. Whereas Philosophical Reason comprehends the whole of existence or experience, which the West does not yet know fully and for which Western Reason and Science are certainly preparing the way.

As the Semanticists have pointed out such philosophical disquisitions without exact and precise meanings for words are "Blab-Blab-Blab."

Finally, let me again seek the protection of my master Swami Vivekananda. He says, "The Christian claims that his religion is the only true religion....The Muhammadan makes the same claim...How is this to be decided? Then we have to admit that there is something more universal. Something higher which can judge between the strength of the inspiration (Intuitions?) of different nations...Here we appeal to Reason."

Now, Prof. Naidu thinks that "he is right."

(continued from the previous page) I think "I am right." And various philosophers in Europe and India differ, each thinking himself to be right, even as to the meaning of Truth and Reality. How is this to be decided? Prof. Naidu, the Intuitionist, will declare what he intuits is Truth and that I am in error. I may say or anyone else may say that what I intuit or he intuits is truth. Many philosophers in the European Continent and in England told me personally, when I was there, that common Truth as such, cannot be reached much less defined, and that such Truth was not within the ken of Philosophy. Prof. Naidu is in good company in this respect. But if he wishes to decide once for all, he must follow the intuitionists, just as enthusiastic men of religion do, and as for such philosophers or scientists as rely more on intuitions than on truth verified, attempt to do, i.e. murder those that differ. So, the only course that Prof. Naidu could adopt is to murder me or to teach me to murder him. If this be not the course aimed at by him, he has but to seek the guidance of the Scientists at first, then the Upanishads and Swami Vivekananda, i.e. "Follow Reason." My dear Reader, pray, remember always the words "Be but contemptuous of Reason and Science, the highest gifts of man, and you have given yourself over to Satan and must perish!" Goethe. "Buddhi Nashat Pranashyati" – "When Reason is crushed, ruin seizes thee) Lord Krishna.

AN APPEAL TO PHILOSOPHIC THINKERS IN INDIA.

(Or HAS INDIA ANY "PHILOSOPHY" AS SUCH?)

(In Review of Philosophy & Religion – April 1940 – Allahabad).

(In this article the learned author shows by a number of representative quotations from various living and recent European Philosophers, that Philosophy in the West is a "living" study and closely connected with the growth of science. This leads him to make an appeal to the Indian philosophers to wake up and revitalise their philosophy.)

Before proceeding to make an attempt to answer this question, it is necessary to recall here, for a moment, the first condition that an Indian seeker after truth has to fulfil. As pointed out by one of the greatest of Indian philosophers, it is a universal weakness of the human mind to think "I know", "I know", ignoring the basic need that every seeker after "true knowledge" should make sure, that what one knows is truth or at least points to truth. And this implies that "true knowledge" demands that one should know exactly what the terms one uses signify.

To ask whether India has any "philosophy" would appear somewhat foolish inasmuch as India has been known, for centuries, as the home of, not one school, but several schools of religious mystical (yogic) and rational thought. Such Indian thought was held in the highest esteem by great Western thinkers like Schopenhauer, Cousin, Emerson, Thoreau, Duessen, Max Muller and others. Further, the culture of almost every country or race has passed through some one or more phases or stages of religion, theology, scholasticism, mysticism, metaphysical speculation,

(continued from the previous page) and scientific thought, every one of which phase or stage has been called philosophy for the reason that each of them has attempted some kind of general interpretation of life or existence. In fact, every man or woman has his or her view, or evaluation, of the world which has also been called philosophy. In this old sense, people of India have and had plenty of philosophic schools, perhaps more than any other race. But whether India has anything of the kind of knowledge called "Philosophy", at the present time, by the most thoughtful men in the West, that is, of the knowledge that that word signifies to those that speak at home the group of languages to which that word belongs, is seriously doubted.

Some Western thinkers hold that there is no 'philosophy' as such in India, though she is a rich treasure house of most of the other kinds of thought except science. To quote a few of them:-

"Many philosophies do not rise beyond the mythological stage. Even the theories of oriental peoples, the Hindus, the Egyptians, and the Chinese, consist, in the main, of mythological and ethical doctrines and are not thorough-going systems of thought; they are shot through with poetry and faith...Frank Thilly's History of Philosophy.

"It (the mystic's realisation of the Absolute) is the very antithesis of honest reasoning and a piece of presumptuous dogmatism. It is the theory that underlies theosophy, Hinduism, and most other forms of mysticism...It is designed to reconcile people to evils instead of to encourage them to combat them. It is the escape mechanism of the despairing, the helpless, and the lazy...The theoretical argument would seem to be more a rationalization of a convenient

(continued from the previous page) myth than a honest and irresistible train of reasoning." ..John Lewis's Introduction to Philosophy (1937).

"The system of Vedanta is rightly charged with immorality...What moral results could possibly be expected from a system so devoid of motives for a life of true purity." ..Jacob's Hindu Pantheism.

It is said that what is called Indian Philosophy is at least half a century behind the times. Hence a large number of colleges in India have already abolished this course of study!. And many others are abolishing it. The authorities of the Indian Civil Service Examination Board have dropped this subject altogether. The present Secretary of State for India, one who has studied Indian Culture on the spot, as a Governor of a great Indian province, doubts the existence of philosophy as such in this country. Some eminent and thoughtful scholars, as for instance, Professor Edgerton have declared Indian thought to be 'primitive' or "Magic" philosophy, or as something meant to make men seek caves and mountain tops or some mysterious powers. Some have even characterised it as a "Pig-trough philosophy." Is it a wonder then that so few of the Indian Journals of reputation take any serious notice of the work of the Philosophical Congresses and Conferences or lectures, though there are scores of such journals publishing accounts of the theological and sectarian transactions or mystic achievements in which the editors are personally interested.

This, however, does not mean that Religion, Theology, Scholasticism, Mysticism and Speculation whether in India or elsewhere, are devoid of value. These do give to the great majority of mankind the highest satisfaction

(continued from the previous page) or peace of mind. They are a natural and indispensable necessity for most men. What we, however, seek here is the meaning and implication of the term 'philosophy' as understood, at the present time, by the most thoughtful minds in Europe and America. And the first thing sought by a philosopher is "clarification." "To philosophise is to seek clear notions" as Plato held. Here are some of the latest statements of recognised authorities of those countries.

(1) All philosophers of any importance, now fully recognise their dependence of Science...J Moore.

(2) Philosophy is the attempt by use of "scientific methods" to understand the world in which we live.... G.T. Patrick.

(3) The day is gone by when Metaphysical systems can be constructed independently of the physical science. So intimate is the relation between science and philosophy that some knowledge of the special sciences such as Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology and Psychology is indispensable to the student of philosophy. Ready-made systems without due regard to the results of observation and experiment are held in less and less respect.....Do. (Patrick)⁹

(4) "Philosophy is like Science in seeking that which is certain, exact and well organised. They have—the same spirit and the same purpose—the honest and laborious search for truth,"....Do. (Patrick)¹⁰

(5) "Philosophy differs from science not in its method but in its subject matter." ...Do. See footnote¹¹

(6) "No progress in science or philosophy can be made if we common ourselves in advance to some fond theory. In daily life when some problem suddenly presents itself we are apt to fall back upon our habits or customs in deciding it. Most of us have some ready-made 'system', some favourite collection of ideas, which we

⁹ The original editor inserted "(Patrick)" by hand

¹⁰ The original editor inserted "(Patrick)" by hand

¹¹ The original editor inserted "See footnote" by hand

(continued from the previous page) have gotten from tradition or religion or social inheritance or from political party or even church, or perhaps some book which has impressed us deeply or from some new movement in poetry or fiction, or even possibly from an impressive picture on the screen, and solve the trouble some problem off-hand by reference to this system. And it is very probable that in our solution of the question we shall be strongly influenced by our personal feelings, our wishes and desires. Some exceptional complex will decide the question for us. But every problem, whether in philosophy or in science must be approached in the spirit of genuine scientific interest, whose motive is a keen desire to know, a real scientific curiosity."Do.

(7) "Philosophy is an unusually persistent effort to think clearly...weighing carefully and testing our conclusions—to do this is to extend the methods of science into the fields of human relations and human problems. Our social, economic, moral, philosophical and religious problems must now receive more of the attention of science and the tremendous intellectual power exhibited in scientific thought and research must be turned more into these directions." ..Adapted from Prof. James.

(8). "The method of philosophy is to see life steadily with neither prejudice, nor bias nor half knowledge. Now philosophy becomes the interpretation of life."...G.T. Patrick. (see footnote(2))¹²

(9). "Philosophy is the interpretation of knowledge through the synthesis of all the Sciences." – Durant Drake.

(10). "Philosophy is the survey of all the Sciences with the special object of their harmony and of their completion. It brings to this task not only the evidence of the separate sciences but also its own appeal to concrete experience." – A.N. Whitehead.

¹² The original editor inserted "(see footnote(2))" by hand

(11) “The results of science are both the starting point and the crucial test of the validity of its (philosophy’s) speculations..Philosophy must be scientific in the sense that it cannot but accept the proved results of science...Science aids and even controls philosophy, for, first of all it starts philosophy on the right road to truth and it calls back to this road whenever she strays into the bye paths of error and falsehood and what is worse into the blind alleys which lead nowhere.” – James H. Ryan. (see footnotes 3&4)¹³

(12) “It (the philosophical problem) is inseparably connected with the work of science and the estimate that is to be put upon its results.” – R.B. Perry. (see footnote (5))¹⁴

(13) “In philosophy we take the propositions we make in science and everyday life and try to exhibit them in a logical system.” E.P. Ramsay.

(14) “Whatever is not compatible with scientific facts must be eliminated in any sincere philosophising. This fact confers upon scientific facts an incalculably important office in philosophy...Only what has been scientifically verifiable supply the entire content of philosophy.” – John Dewey. (see footnote (6))¹⁵

(15) “Philosophy is not the same as metaphysics. In recent years this humanistic aspect of philosophy, this attempt to interpret life (as it is) and to see things in the large has been emphasised more than the other metaphysical problems such as the nature of Reality, of God etc.” – Patric.

(16) “The object of philosophy is to take over the results of the various sciences, to add to them the results of the various religions and ethical experiences of mankind and then to reflect upon the whole.” – C.D. Broad.

(17). “Philosophy is entirely dependent of the Sciences.” – Jared Moore.

(18) “The work of the philosophy of Nature and

¹³ The original editor inserted “(see footnotes 3&4)” by hand

¹⁴ The original editor inserted “(see footnote (5))’ by hand

¹⁵ The original editor inserted “(see footnote (6))” by hand

(continued from the previous page) Mind only begins where that of experimental science leaves off. " – A.E. Taylor.

(19) "Philosophy has never flourished except in alliance with the sciences, and also never flourished when it was prepared to plod humbly after them." – John Laird.

(20). "Philosophy has to take account of the general results of the investigations of all the sciences that are concerned with the most fundamental issues and on the basis of these results, it is its special task to endeavour to construct a general theory of the universe and especially of the place of human life in it. ..Philosophy is generally understood to mean certain kinds of more or less completely systematized knowledge of the Sciences." – J.S. Mackenzie.

(21) "Philosophy frankly accepts the conclusions of science, as its starting point." – Viscount Samuel.

(22) "Modern philosophy must take account of all the far reaching results of scientific enquiry. ...Philosophy has, of course, no right to call the tune which it wishes science to play, but its task is to correlate the conclusions of science, with those which may be reached in the course of practical, ethical, aesthetic or religious experience." – J.A. Sullivan.

(23) "The various sciences supply the partial pictures of the world, pictures taken from different points of view. It is for Metaphysics (philosophy) to combine these pictures, not as one makes a composite photograph by placing one print on top of another, but rather as one combines two views in the stereoscope. It reaches this or should reach this, not in an a priori fashion, but by taking into account the raw material which the sciences furnish." – J.A. Thomson. (Here metaphysics is considered as the equivalent of philosophy.)

(24). “One of the most interesting features of contemporary philosophy is the renewed co-operation between man of science and philosophers. – A. Wolfe. (see footnote (7))¹⁶

(25) “There is no more fatal enemy (to philosophy) than theories which are not also facts (ascertained)” – Bradley.

(26) “That the philosopher can some how spin his philosophy out of what he finds inside himself, that he has some internal source of information in virtue of which he can decide what the universe must be, without needing the trouble to look at it as a belief that dies hard.” Prof. Ritchie.

(27) “Modern science is its (of Modern philosophy) starting point and pre-condition....Whatever is not in accord with this thought lies outside the sphere of philosophy.” – F. Paulsen.

(28) “Philosophy is nothing more than the scientific knowledge of reality as distinguished from or opposed to the mythico-religious notion (poetic fancy) of the universe.” – Do.

(29) “The thorough study of the sciences is the road to this goal (Philosophy).” – DO

(30) “Philosophy cannot be separated from the sciences—we get philosophy by combining all the results of these sciences for the purpose of answering the question as to the nature of reality.” – Do.

(31) “Philosophy is the comprehensive sum total of all true knowledge. The sciences do not exist outside and by the side of it; they are parts of it.” – Do.

(32) “Kant has the merit of having procured a secure place for philosophy among the sciences.” – Do.

(33) “If science remains in isolation, that is, if there is no serious philosophy, obscurantism

¹⁶ The original editor inserted “(see footnote (7))” by hand

(continued from the previous page) together with specialism will reign supreme." – Do.

(34) "Two men are usually placed at the head of modern philosophy, as the originators or the first representatives of the two great 'modern' schools of thought. The Englishman Francis Bacon and the Frenchman Rene Descartes...In both schools the conception of the relation of philosophy to the sciences remains the same. Bacon's aim is to include all scientific knowledge in the notion of philosophy. Descartes embraces the whole of scientific knowledge under philosophy." – Do.

(35). "Science is partially unified knowledge; philosophy is completely unified knowledge." – Do

(36). "Natural science everywhere constitutes the principal part of philosophy; nay, for some of it forms the real essence of philosophy."-Do.

(37) "Philosophy is no science at all, it was said. In fact it is not to be taken seriously at all. It is the sophisticated practice of speaking of all things in general with a certain air of sense and reason. Its professors are jugglers who produce all sorts of obscure and profound oracles by the promiscuous use of general concepts, to the amazement of a lot of idlers." – Do.

(38). "We reject two errors...the error that philosophy can exist without science and the error that science can exist without philosophy." – Do.

(39) "All roads in science lead to philosophy, only not the road through the air." – Do

(40). "A purus puts metaphysicus (a pure metaphysician) is a chimera or an empty babbler. The sciences alone, natural and mental sciences, furnish the material by means of which to judge of existence in general and the world as a whole." – Do.

(41) "Philosophy is the general science, whose

(continued from the previous page) business is to unite the general truths furnished by the particular sciences into a consistent system." – Wundt. (Frechner, Lotze, and Lange hold more or less the same view.)

(42) "Fruitless end endeavours were made to spin philosophical systems out of a few general concepts...subject and object, nature and mind, being and becoming, we may find the remnants of it in the opinion which is occasionally advanced that a special study of philosophy is possible without a study of the sciences...It cannot fail to be barren and empty unless it is supplemented by scientific studies in other fields." – Do

RE. Living Philosophy.

(43) "It is the very essence of philosophy to examine thoroughly what lies at hand and around us." – Windleband.

(44) "If by philosophy we mean not systems of metaphysics or futile discussions about the Absolute but, rather the search for wisdom, the appraisal of values and the careful logical analysis of concepts, it seems to be just what the world needs now." Patrick.

(45) "Philosophy at the University has become a museum speciality, a display of lifeless systems and concepts." – Ginsberg.

(46) "Academic philosophy like academic Art is nearly always dead. It consists of either scholarly acquaintance with the philosophy of other people or of argument about traditional problems for the sake of argument full of very acute and learned subtlety of thought...But it has no vital significance. Its (philosophy's) problems are the living problems of the world in which it is born...The eternal questions (of philosophy) wear a different face in different generations." – Mac Murray.

Some Universal Characteristics:

(47) "The aim of philosophy is to see life as

(continued from the previous page) a whole." Plato onwards.

(48) "Philosophy like science knows no frontiers and no national boundaries." Aaron.

(49) Consciously or unconsciously every man frames for himself as theory of the relation of the individual to the universe and on his attitude to that question his whole life and conduct, public and private depend..E. Wallace & others.

50. Philosophy takes all knowledge for its province..Bacon etc.

51. The philosopher..should not be a respecter of persons but of things. Truth should be his primary object...Faraday.

To sum up:

Hundreds of similar references could be cited to prove that Philosophy as now understood by those that speak at home the language in which in one form or there the word appears, is impossible without a good knowledge of science. Philosophy without science is "empty babbling." Its "professors are jugglers with words, who utter them to the amazement of all idlers."

Those that do not care for science seek satisfaction in having recourse to 'spinning yarns' from within their mind, and that without any bearing on actual life in general. "Be but contemptuous of reason and science, the highest gifts of man, and you have given yourself over to Satan and must perish." ..Goethe.

Now, turn we to India. Certainly there are hundreds, nay, thousands of eminent Pandits, professors, scholars and yogis with attainment of the highest order, which are displayed in expounding and defending the doctrines of various religions, theologies, scholasticisms, mystic ecstasies, intuitions and speculations all of which undoubtedly furnish valuable material for philosophy. It is the

(continued from the previous page) business of philosophy to evaluate these and everything else in life. Many eminent authorities have produced admirable works on metaphysics also. Nay, they have shown that India has something to teach others in some of these subjects. But none of these subjects is considered at the present time to be the same as philosophy. For philosophy comprehends all these and much more, such as the sciences, in their up-to-date aspects.

Which Indian authority has attempted to survey “the whole of life, or knowledge, including its bearing on “modern” politics, ethics, psychology, or social sciences? Which school or Pandit possesses a sound knowledge of up-to-date physical and natural science and bases its or his philosophy on it? Which of them applies the “Scientific method” for verifying its or his conclusions, while every one loudly proclaims “I know, I know” without proving whether what he knows is verified fact” of truth? And which school of thought—not religion or speculation—can be said to be ‘living’? In a word, is there, at present, a single school of thought in all India that could be called ‘philosophy’ in the modern sense of the term? No wonder then that it is being thrown out by so many colleges and examination boards. Let it not be thought that I presume that no philosophic thinker in India at present is acquainted with Science.

As has been so often remarked by critics, the philosophers in India are expert “spinners of yarns” from within their own mind about the Absolute, God, and life after death, without a study of this world. Such philosophy has only driven the millions of India and that for thousands of years to the arms of callousness and led them to the worship of the idols of indifference to this world in which all of us

(continued from the previous page) live, and to the pleasure of dreaming dreams of life in a variety of other worlds – a fact pointed out to me during my tours in the West by thoughtful critics there.

This, it will be remembered, is the view, not merely of outside, though impartial critics, but also of one of the greatest, perhaps the greatest of India's ancient accredited and non-sectarian philosophers.

Now shall we, in India, who are so proud of our great and living religions, living theologies, and scholasticisms, our more live yogic mysticisms, intuitions and speculations, nay even some of our old sciences, we whose country had earned a reputation as a land of philosophies in the past, but which is now only a museum of dead philosophies – not religion – shall we not make any effort to rise to the level of "philosophy" in its modern sense?

Or shall we, in India seek satisfaction in calling any speculation we like, philosophy? Shall we continue to believe that mysticism (yoga) is philosophy so that we may say that it is illumining the hearts of mystics?

If philosophy in India had at any time risen to this 'modern' level so as to influence the life of the whole country or community, or humanity at large, is it not India's duty to regain her lost status so as to be abreast of general human progress, and say to the world that India also does possess Philosophy as such, nay, a living Philosophy that knows no racial or geographical boundaries?

FOOTNOTES ON ABOVE: (1) "Philosophy and science have the same spirit and the same purpose – the honest and laborious search for truth."

(2) "Now philosophy becomes the interpretation of life."

(3) The results of science are both the starting

The two outstanding features of Sankara's teachings are his doctrines: "The world is all Maya or Illusion" and "What truly exists is a Unity, not duality or multiplicity." Our purpose here is not to argue these metaphysical principles but to take them for granted and look for their practical application. In a splendid article "The Old Doctrine of Maya and Modern Science" in the April number of this magazine, Dr Ivor B. Hart has told us how Maya is a fact—an undeniable fact—of experience, and how remarkably the truth of Maya is being borne out by the science of to-day. But let us turn to some other fields.

The late Mr Tilak thought that, according to Sankara, one should ignore the calls of the world and flee to uninhabited jungles, to free oneself from what, in his view, is the glamour of Maya. But did Sankara really mean to teach this lesson? It is said that "one's philosophy is best interpreted by the life one actually lives." Nowhere do we read or hear of Sankara having betaken himself to forests, mountains and caves or having shut himself up in monasteries, to illustrate the philosophy he taught. From about the age of eighteen, till the day he departed from the world, he led a life of the most intense activity being always on foot, moving from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin and from Dwaraka to Jagannath, a distance of about 1,800 miles each way, and always teaching and discussing his doctrines or organizing and founding institutions. He over worked his physical frame that it completely wore out before he was thirty-three. For, to him, as to the staunchest realist, life was real, life was earnest. He says in his commentary on the Gita that the one business in life of the wise man (Vidwan) is "to seek the welfare of others." (Paranugraha eva kartavyah). And this he is not

(continued from the previous page) tired of repeating. For Unity (Brahman) is ever present in the midst of the variety which, no doubt, is an illusion. And if this Unity which ever dwells in the midst of the illusory variety is to be realised, it must be done in the presence of the illusory many. One cannot free one-self from the Maya of the manifold by merely cutting oneself off from the world. A man might as well think that he has wiped out the world of experience by closing his eyes. On the other hand, if the world were not there, why is any effort needed to realise Unity? Sankara holds that it should be one's aim to realise through experience (anubhava and Jnanam) one's "Oneness" with all human beings, nay, with all beings (Sarvabhuta) and finding delight (ratih) in working for their good (hita). To put the same in modern language "Disinterested Service" – to rejoice in rendering such service – was his slogan, which alone would help us to get at the truth of Absolute Oneness by overcoming the dislikes and ignoring the distinctions of the manifold created by Maya.

When then did he himself renounce the world and enter the monastic order, and that so early in life? He believed and taught that the renunciation (Sanyas), which aimed at purity of mind, was most conducive to the achievement of all life's great objects, which demand undivided attention and undeviating steadfastness. Even after assuming the yellow robe, he worked in and for the world whole-heartedly. To him Brahman, the Unity, was in the world. His philosophic idea of Sannyas was, therefore, far different from the religious or mystic idea of it, which alone is current and which, as he himself said, is often a means to eke out a living with ease (Udaranimittam bahu krta vesham). He never deprecated the natural seeking of peace in the evening of one's life by means of Krama Sannyas,

(continued from the previous page) the object of which is often confounded with that of the Sannyas of early life, the Sannyas of preparation for mystical or philosophic purposes (Vividisha). And it was Sri Ramakrishna Paramahansa that revived in recent years in India Sankara's philosophic idea of Sannyas.

What has sankra to say on the most vexed problem of caste. We need only look at what he did when his mother died. He performed the obsequies, thus infringing the rules of caste, and he was accordingly put out of it by his community. Did he then turn a Bohemian? No. A fence is an absolute necessity to protect a plant so long as it is tender, but it may be an obstruction to that plant when it grows into a tree and no more needs it. So long as a man is not able to judge for himself he must be bound by social restrictions such as those of caste. And one is said to arrive at discretion, according to Sankara, when one knows that the main purpose of practical life is to realise "Oneness" by rendering disinterested service in the best way. Should any caste or social rules obstruct the attainment of this object, one is at liberty to ignore them. In securing the "welfare of others" no rules of caste need be heeded. But nowhere encourages the breaking of social rules for purposes of mere sensual or self-gratification.

It was Sankara and not any political ruler or conqueror known to historical India that first gave her a sense of "National Unity." He it was that established four institutions of learning in the four distant cardinal regions of this peninsula, comprehending various communities, different faiths and different political states, under a sense of common interest, which developed later into a definite concept of Political Unity under the Mahrattas and the rulers of Vijayanagar.

What do all human activities in respect to

(continued from the previous page) family, home, political group, government, or human society mean, unless it be that they aim at one's realising the sense of a "Unity" (of interest) underlying differences and distinctions? From the family to the community, to the race and to humanity, there is an ever widening circle in which one feels called upon "to rejoice when others rejoice and to grieve when others grieve", unifying oneself with the circle. It is evident that the aim of government of a country is to realise its "oneness or nonduality" with the governed. The sense of identity or "Unity" is what matters. Among those who have done the greatest good to their fellow beings are those kings and emperors of India, as well as their distinguished ministers, who are most deeply imbued with the spirit of the truth of Sankara's teachings, i.e. who loved their fellow beings as their own selves by ignoring the Maya of the distinctions of power, position and wealth. Sankara was well aware that "Unity" was strength, not duality or multiplicity—strength in the physical as well as in the metaphysical world. For, Maya, as duality or multiplicity is ever changing or unstable. Hence it only makes for weakness.

All the great founders or resuscitators of the world's religions possess the distinction of having given to the world each a single faith. Jesus founded Christianity; Mahomed, Islam, Gautama, Buddhism; Mahavir, Jainism and so forth; whereas Sankara is known, by the unique name of SHANMATASTHAPANACHARYA, the establisher of not one but six faiths. Here he drew a line between philosophy and religion, meaning by the latter whatever implies belief in a moral deity and methods of worshipping it. Buddhism, Jainism, Atheism, and Agnosticism and many others he treated merely as schools of philosophy and discussed them according to his

(continued from the previous page) lights, agreeing with whatever in them conformed to Reason. He held every religion to be equally a pathway to Deity provided it has a moral basis, though he did not hold the same view in regard to the philosophical systems. With regard to religion he followed to the letter the teaching of the Gita:- "It is the path leading to ME that men follow, on every side.

His life and philosophy are a most emphatic protest against the doctrine that God has entrusted the keys of heaven to believers in any particular religion, any religion that believes in proselytisation. We say emphatic, because he declares in his Sutra Bhashya in the most unmistakable terms that men and women of all castes, creeds and colours, anyone provided that he is a human being (Purusha Matrena) can attain to the Highest. And even to this day among his followers may be found those who worship Vishnu, Siva, or Sakti or other deities, and that in various ways. According to Shankara the goal of religion is mystic experience which aims at the actual realisation of "All Selfness" (Sarvatma Bhava), like the most modern thinker: How do we know that the mystic realisation is the highest truth? For an answer to this, he says, one must have recourse to philosophy alone.

Sankara was not perfectly justified, it is said, when he forced his mother to permit him, the only son, to leave her and renounce the world. Did he not thereby encourage unethical conduct? Does not his theory of illusionism put a premium upon recklessness and immorality, seeing that it would be no serious matter to deprive another of his property or life, or to commit other heinous vices in as much as all are unreal, and even the very acts are a myth. But Sankara would ask: If one has the conviction that the manifold world, everything other than "Unity" is unreal, what can induce one to think that a

(continued from the previous page) second entity, like property or person, really exists, so as to make one eager to appropriate it for one's own benefit. In fact it is only those who believe in a duality or plurality of real existence that may feel impelled to deprive others of what they possess, for their own self-gratification.

Contrariwise, what greater stimulus could one conceive of for the very highest moral action, the sacrifice of one's self for the good of all, than the fact that the underlying Unity is the eternal reality? No lover of truth can honestly feel proud of, or take credit, for even self-sacrifice, which in truth is Maya. According to Sankara, Arjuna, who hesitated to fight or to do his duty so long as he believed that the body was real, cheerfully resumed his bow and arrows the moment he realised that the body-appearance was an illusion and that nothing that really exists, the Unity, could ever cease to be.

If men uphold the ideal of self-denial in any form, it is because it enables them to realise that everything other than the "Unity" within is not worth much, is but an illusion.

Let us not be told that there are and will be men who talk of "Unity" and "Unreality", and yet lead the most reprehensible lives. They are only talkers, not knowers of Unity. How could there be the duality of saying one thing and doing another in an Adwaitin (Non-dualist?)

At the present moment, if we look around, nothing seems to loom so large before our eyes as the problems confronting the League of Nations or conferences for communal, racial and religious harmony. And what would be Sankara's message to them? "Whatever good ye venture to seek, know that it is the call or the urge of Truth". For, the Good according to Sankara is the True. And Truth is ONENESS behind the differences and the distinctions that deceive us and set us each against

(continued from the previous page) the other, which are all Maya. And without diving beneath Maya no good can be attained. If ye heed not the urge, the call, woe will be unto all. Truth abhors the spirit of duplicity or multiplicity. No path but the one making for the Truth of Unity—the Atman, Brahman—can avoid strife and suffering which comes now to some, now to others, Who shall escape? No Mohah, Kassokah, Ekatvamanupasyatah: What delusion, what sorrow for him who sees ONENESS.

“WHERE DOES THE ARYAN PATH LEAD?”

(In Aryan Path Magazine)

Which people were originally classed as “Aryan” and what the word “Arya” originally meant may still be a matter of doubt. But that the term “Arya” means noble and that the Aryans were one of the most cultured races of the past are borne out by historical evidence. And “Path” here may mean their temporal, spiritual or any of their other courses in life. Under temporal may be included all that they did to preserve themselves and to make their life happy in this world which comprehends their arts and their sciences. Under spiritual may be included all the satisfaction they sought in their belief in God, Soul, heaven or other states after death, as well as what they did in this world to attain some spiritual end. Or thirdly, their path may imply some of their efforts to gain a rational knowledge of the ‘truth’ of all existence: for, there is ample evidence of their having made such attempts. The two former courses are common to all human races. It is this third feature that is peculiar and that distinguishes them from the rest. We shall here confine ourselves to this unique character.

One may ask: “Of what value is this “truth”? The Aryan answer is: Truth means the attainment finally and in this world, of the highest good,

(continued from the previous page) not of any individual, group, race of men, but of all beings. To the Western cultured mind this looks like religion or mysticism, which lies outside the pale of reason and which relies on mere faith or vision and ecstasy, suited to men's varying temperaments and tastes. But the Aryan points out that his 'truth' is purely rational and no less certain than the most certain of the Western scientific facts.

But this, even the cultured in the West do not know. Next, what does the Indian Aryan find to be? The truth of life or existence differs in certain respects from truth in mathematics, or science, history, or law, religion, or mystic experience. The Indian first tried to ascertain the meaning of truth, as a common factor of all the truths known and then proceeded to get at the truth of all experience or knowledge, by purely rational methods, and what is more he applied the best of the known tests for verification. The conclusion that he arrived at is put by him thus: "This when known, everything (in existence) becomes known" and "this when attained everything is attained." And let it not be forgotten that this goal is reached, "in this world" "in this life" and not after death.

It is not the object of this paper to go into any of the details of this subject, for, they cannot interest one unless he or she is possessed of the unshakable determination to get at Truth at all costs. The immense majority want only some satisfaction in life suited to their tastes and temperaments, which they can find without all this trouble. We may, however, glance here at the qualifications required for a seeker of this Truth.

The first of them is the capacity to doubt whether what one knows is truth and to test one's own knowledge on the most rational lines. The Indian Aryan definitely warns us against

(continued from the previous page) "I know" without caring to test the validity of what one knows.

The next qualification is the ability to have recourse to what the most rational of Western Scientists denote by the terms "depersonalization" or "Self-Eliminations." The Western thinkers confine this principle only to their own particular fields of enquiry, whereas the Indian Aryan applies it to the whole of life. He calls the self "Ego", and dreads it as he dreads the "deadly black serpent" as he describes it. While the Western thinker fully realizes the impracticability of attaining any rational truth so long as the self rules the mind, the Indian Aryan finds it utterly impossible to get even at the meaning of Truth, so long as there exists the least shadow of the 'ego'. The Western philosopher says that "Truth is on a curve whose anymtote our spirit follows eternally." In other words, "there is no perfect truth" as another author puts it. The Indian Aryan asserts with all the rationality that human beings possess that "there is nothing else so certain and so well known, and quite so near."

The third qualification is this. "Unless one has turned away from vice etc. and has all his senses under control" one cannot attain this truth. This is put somewhat mildly by the truth-seekers of the West thus: "The seeker after truth must himself be truthful, truthful with the truthfulness of Nature which is far more imperious, far more exacting than that which men sometimes call truthfulness," and so forth.

This truth of life is to be attained in the broadest day-light before the whole world. It tolerates no secrecy. It seeks not caves and mountain tops nor cushions and cots nor the extensive company of the opposite sex. It needs no controlling of breadth nor the uttering of

(continued from the previous page) mystic words. It is to be realised in this world, while in the midst of life's most unpleasant sufferings. The greatest of western minds have all seen all this, and still they have developed that "fanaticism for varacity" as they themselves describe it, which is so indispensable.

Had they done so, they would have been far ahead of the Indian Aryans, and would never have allowed their brethren to indulge in the deluge of blood that so horrifies the world outside.

Such then is the significance of the Aryan Path of the Aryans of India. Probably Nature or God has helped them to survive the struggle for existence, till now, only in the interests of mankind, i.e. of Truth.

A LEAFLET ON SCIENTIFIC METHOD.

The combination of the term 'method' with the term 'science' has led to some misconceptions which have been a hindrance to the free pursuit of knowledge all round—To many this method signifies its specific forms which relate to the several branches of science as distinguished from art, religion and philosophy. And by 'science' some understand 'applied science'. The fact is ignored that this 'method' has certain general features which are applicable to, rather inseparable from, all the processes of thinking that aim at the attainment of Correct knowledge anywhere. Its value is being increasingly recognised by humanistic subjects like sociology, economics, psychology, ethnology, education etc. Modern Western Universities have gone further and have made it a necessary part of every course of study including philosophy and even religion. To quote G.T.M. Patrick of America—a no mean authority—"To think our problems through, weighing carefully the opinions of the leaders of thought, both

(continued from the previous page) those of the present and those of the past, and testing our conclusions by experience and experiment; to do this is to extend the methods of science into the fields of human relations and human problems. I should say that the urgent need of the present is to widen the scope of the natural sciences to take all the subjects of human interest.... Our social, economic, moral, philosophical and religious problems must now receive more of the attention of science...and scientific thought. Any object of human interest whatever is a legitimate subject for scientific enquiry provided scientific methods are used." (the italics (underlined) are mine.)

Huxley says that his object in life was "To promote the increase of natural knowledge and to forward the application of scientific methods of investigation to all the problems of life...in the conviction...that there is no alleviation for the sufferings of mankind except veracity of thought and of action and the resolute facing of the world as it is, when the garment of make-believe by which pious hands have hidden its uglier features is stripped off" (the italics (underlining) are mine).

The London University Syllabus of this method covers the ground relating to economics and sociology. If the following topics be added it would cover the ground of philosophy. (1) "Philosophy differs from Science not in its method but in its subject matter." "Philosophy is the synthesis of the sciences." "It takes all knowledge for its province."

(2) Opinion, knowledge, imagination, intuition, ecstasy, truth, verification and communicability, explanation, interpretation value and meaning.

(3) Truthfulness, Alertness, Courage, acquisition of facts, Accuracy of observation, Exactness, and precision of statement, cautiousness, self-elimination, respect for facts and things, as

(continued from the previous page) compared with that for Persons and Traditions; clearness (the avoiding of Ambiguities and Obscurities), recognition of Inter-relatedness of all knowledge: Perseverance, Patience and Unemotionalness.

(Books to be consulted: J.A. Thomson's "Introduction to Science", "Clearer Thinking" by A.E. Mander, Clear Thinking by R.W. Jepson).

"CONSTRUCTIVE SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY".

The core of Upanishadic wisdom appears to have travelled far beyond the confines of India, before the commencement of the Christian Era. But since the days of Dara Shikoh, the elder brother of Aurangzeb, in the beginning of the 17th century, the body of the Upanishads themselves have found their way to the wide world outside their orthodox Hindu home. After Dara's famous Persian Translation came the French, the Latin and other renderings. The more widely these Vedic speculations are read, and the more serious-minded the readers, the greater appears to be the interest evinced in them. Sometimes they have been admired, sometimes adversely criticised. Dara, it is said, "ranked them above the Koran, the Pentateuch, the Psalms and the Gospels, all of which he had read." He himself wrote in the introduction to his translation, "which (the Upanishad) without doubt is the first of the inspired works, the fountain of truth, the sea of unity...not only consentaneous with the Koran but a commentary on it." What tributes the German philosopher Schopenhauer and some other European thinkers have paid to the Upanishads are too well-known to need repetition here. There have also been criticisms, which characterise the Vedic speculations as the babbling of the children of a primitive age. All the same, more translations and criticisms are appearing, which seem to cater to an ever widening circle of readers. In what does this growing

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(continued from the previous page) charm lie? According to Prof. Ranade, it is to be found chiefly in the ‘mysticism’ taught therein, which to him, “is the culmination of all philosophies” and which “alone is the goal and end of the life of man.”

In his “Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy” the Prof. has, after several years of careful study, given an estimate of these ancient speculations, from the “modern Western stand-points.” Mr Ranade’s name brings with it a guarantee of sound scholarship, deep erudition and accurate knowledge. The fact that the University of Bombay has entrusted him and one of his friends with the responsible work of writing a history of Indian Philosophy is another index of the high order of excellence that may be expected of his literary performances. In this book, he has broken much fresh ground and there is a most delightful originality of treatment of many an important Upanishadic problem. Above all, he has furnished the reader with the Sanskrit texts upon which he bases his conclusions—a feature not found in other critical works of the class. We therefore most heartily welcome this valuable addition to Upanishadic literature, which will, we hope, occupy a foremost place in the libraries of modern students of Indian Philosophy and Religion.

Prof. Ranade’s Survey is the Second of the sixteen volumes of an Encyclopaedic history of Indian Philosophy proposed to be published under the auspices of the Academy of Religion and Philosophy, an institution recently founded, with its headquarters at Nimbal in the Presidency of Bombay, and with branches in other parts of the country. In bringing out this great work, the Academy has secured the literary co-operation not only of the ablest professors of the Indian Universities, but also of other well-known authorities. Prof. Ranade, its energetic Director, has

(continued from the previous page) contributed most to its success. Some idea of the nature and extent of the work done there is given on pages 15 and 16. It is a unique institution which seeks to bring into focus the work of the best Indian talents in philosophy and religion. For exclusive original research and guidance in the study of comparative Religion and ancient Indian and Greek thought no other institution of the kind exists in India. Every lover of India, will, we have no doubt, wish a long life of an ever-increasing usefulness to it, besides giving it his sympathetic support.

After pointing out how prolific and versatile the minds of the Upanishadic Rishis were and after showing what latest phases of European Philosophy, such for instance as the views of Bradley, Bosanquet, Ward, Royce, Pringle-Pattison, Mc. Taggart, Bergson, Alexander, Lloyd Morgan, could find their parallels in these ancient scriptures, the author prefaces his work with the statement that his aim is to show how, "all the teachings of Upanishadic Philosophy converge towards the realisation of the mystical goal." Intending it to be "a systematic introduction to the problems of Indian Metaphysics", he treats it under the several headings of "Cosmogony Psychology, Metaphysics, Ethics, and Mysticism, in their logical sequence."

The introductory chapter entitled the "Background" covers a large number of topics of which the most outstanding are those relating to the "meaning of revelation", "methods of Upanishadic Philosophy," "Upanishadic Philosophers" and their types. In the learned author's opinion Revelation means a divine afflatus springing from within, the result of inspiration through God-intoxication." Here one is tempted to ask: what is the proof that the afflatus is divine? Is it the old, old argument that it is declared to be such in the revelations themselves? Again if they be the result of "God-intoxication" how are we to explain

(continued from the previous page) the inconsistencies, the puerilities and other defects which have been noticed in all revealed scriptures, in abundance? Had the Professor noted here all the defects that the ancient "Charvakas" and other "Nastikas" as well as the modern critics have pointed out and then defended his position, he would have thrown more light on this interesting question.

The different methods or ways in which the highest knowledge is approached or imparted in Vedic literature are next indicated with great clearness and originality. There may be some difference of opinion as to whether they could all be called "methods." But the author has done real service in drawing attention to them. The methods he refers to are, the Aphoristic, the Etymological the Mythical, the Analogical, the Dialectical, the Synthetic, the Monologic, the Ad Hoc, and the regressive. To these ten could have been added others, such for instance, as the Experimental.

The enumeration, the description and the classification of the philosophers of the Upanishadic period is also another special feature. Trisanku, Maitri, Rathitara, Paurusishti, Naka Maudgalya, Mahidasa, Kaushikaki, Pratardena Jaivali, Uddalaka, Prachinasala, Budila, Sarkarakshya, Indradyumna, Satyayajna, Raikva, Asvapai Kaikeya, Satyakama, Jabala, Gargya, Pippalada, Vamadeva, Sandilya, Dadhyach, Sanatkumara, Aruni and Yagnavalkya and many others have each been carefully described. No student of the Upanishads can ignore these highly interesting pictures. Though Yognavalkya is regarded by the author as the greatest of the Metaphysical philosophers, yet his ethics as an "idealist" who confesses his inability to live upon air, and accepts offers of the means for his and his pupils' maintenance, does not seem to win the author's whole-hearted approbation. (page 299).

The chronology of the Upanishads is discussed

(continued from the previous page) with much scholarly insight. Though one might agree with him in thinking that the test of 'inter-quotations' is fairly reliable, yet it is feared that in the absence of further investigation the attempt to fix the order in which the Upanishads were given to the world must remain inconclusive.

Books on ancient philosophy cannot ignore the subject of the coming into existence of our Universe. But who can tell us how this world first actually appeared. The myth of creation has an importance only in Theology or in fairy tales, but has little value as means of reaching the ultimate truth. The guesses of cosmogony only show how the human mind gropes and struggles at the early stages in its search after the origin of all that exists. But a history of philosophy has to note these various steps. And Prof. Ranade has displayed ability of a high order in discussing the various parallels in Greek Philosophy, of which also he has made a special study in the original. It is, however, a matter of doubt whether, as the author says, Indian and Greek thought ran independent but parallel streams, inasmuch as there is enough evidence to show that there was communication between these countries, which makes it more probable that there were borrowings and that at the same time, each country gave its own characteristic twist or turn to what was borrowed.

The Psychological reflections of the Rishis are considered by the author under the three heads: "Empirical," "Abnormal" and "Rational". Under the first, he deals with what the Upanishads say with regard to, "Mind in its relation to alimentation", "Mind and breath" – which subjects European Philosophy has yet to study – nature of fear, sensation, perception ideation, conception, understanding, insight, resolution, opinion, imagination, feeling, memory, volition, conation,

(continued from the previous page) will, desire, self-control and so forth. Under Abnormal Psychology are discussed such problems as those of death, sleep and dream. The last section contains topics relating to the seat and the size of the soul, its relation to the body, and some Theosophical views on the sheaths of the soul. The old subject of Transmigration naturally finds its place here. Eschatology and Immortal life after death are brought under Psychology though we should have preferred a separate head for them.

Before proceeding to the next subject in the book, we should like to refer to a point or two on which views different from those of the author are held by learned Pandits.

Sankaracharya, as the Pandits understand him, does not propound the doctrine of "Absorption of the individual into the Universal Soul": To him the Jiva is Brahman. It is the doctrine of the removal of the veil of ignorance that the Advaitic philosopher teaches. Again, on page 139, the Prof. refers to a 'fourth state', "Avasta Traya" the triad of states,—namely the waking the dream and deep sleep is what we find in Vedanta, though some of the minor Upanishads refer to four and more than four stages. What is indicated as the "fourth" in Mandukya is not an "Avasta" but a 'pada' comprehending the other three Padas which three alone are known as states. There is no such thing as a first, a second or a third "Avasta" to justify the use of the expression a "fourth avasta" or state. This 'pada' is ever present and all seeing; "Sarvadrik Sada". It is there, always along with the three states. The "Fourth" is "Atman" or "Brahman" (Sa.Atma).M.Up.7; which evidently cannot be an "Avasta."

The chapter on the Roots of later Philosophies is full of suggestive information. Yoga, Samkhya, Purva Mimamsa, Saiva Siddantas (Kashmirian and Southern) the Philosophy of the Gita, including

(continued from the previous page) the interesting controversy regarding Krishna, son of Devaki, the system of Sankara, Ramanuja and Madhava, are all dealt with. The discussion in regard to the origin of the Maya doctrine is scholarly. But one cannot help noting here one's inability to see eye to eye with him in his view of Sankara's system. The learned Professor says that "To Sankara the world is real, but only phenomenally real", that "the doctrine of degrees of Reality was implicit in Sankara", and that Maya takes a place "between the doctrines of lesser reality and illusion." Even 'Gaudapada,' he remarks, 'has to take account of the world as a verity...and to take cognizance of the world as real.' This view of Gaudapada, he bases on the Karikas I.7-9. So far as the latter is concerned it may be observed that his reference is beside the point, as these passages relate, not to the meaning of Maya, but to the process of Creation (Prabhava or Prasava) which are taken to be true and argued upon. The sage Gaudapada has no 'uncertainty' whatever in regard to his own positions, though Prof. Ranade thinks that he is wobbling. Gaudapada repeatedly avers, in unequivocal language, "This is the absolute truth" (II.12). "This is the highest truth" (II.32). "This is the highest truth" (III.48) "That...is the highest truth" (IV.71). Lastly, when, as the Professor admits (page 230) that according to Gaudapada's "Ajatavada" the universe was not created at all, how could he convict this advaitic teacher of holding the unborn Universe to be real? There appears to be a great tendency in modern Hindu writers to read Ramanuja, Hegel and Bradley into Sankara rather than to grasp him as the old European scholars tried to do. Sankara admits degrees of truth, but not degrees of Reality. Satyam as truth is often confounded with Satyam or Sat as Reality. In Brahman as Reality there are no

(continued from the previous page) grades or parts or kinds, as Sankara understands Brahman. Again the word “Appearance” is used in two senses, which are often confounded. It means either the effect, i.e. something depending on reality. It is in the latter sense that the word Mays i.e. illusion is used. The world looks like Reality, but is not such. Sankara’s reality or Brahman is undifferentiated (homogeneous). But Prof. Ranade’s Brahman is a “Triune Unity” (page 305). We would not have devoted so much space to this point, had not others, some of them scholars hailing from Bengal as well as in other parts of India, to whom, the illusory nature of the world of appearances is as patent as broad day-light, be cause it is rationally proved to be the truth.

“In the midst of all the metaphysical conflicts that we have witnessed in the last chapter, there arises one supreme question; What, if any, is the core of Upanishadic teaching? Shall our minds be tossed on the waves of philosophical conflicts or can we have a ballast which will give the necessary poise to our philosophical speculations?” In answering this question, with which the author commences the subject of Metaphysics he gives us a glimpse of his own philosophy. With the same frame of mind and the same resolve, we presume, did Sankara, Ramanuja, Madhva, nay, every other interpreter of Upanishadic Philosophy, start. As we respect their views, we respect Prof. Ranade’s also though our own may differ from his.

The three approaches to the subject of Ultimate Reality, namely the Cosmological, the Psychological and Theological are carefully examined. A passing reference is made—though in our opinion, it demands the strongest emphasis,—to the Epistemological aspect also. The conclusion at which he arrives is that “the reconciliation of the different schools must come, if at all, only through mystical experience” which position is sought to be

(continued from the previous page) finally established, in the last chapter of this book.

The Ethics of the Upanishads is excellently expounded. It makes little difference whether the goal is mystical or metaphysical. The author rightly adjudges its importance when he says that 'just as morality, to be ratiocinative, must be firmly linked to the intellect, similarly for its consummation it must end in the mystical attitude...' This valuable chapter shows how deeply the Rishis had thought on the ethical side of life. Their theories of the moral standard such as, Heteronomy, Theonomy, Autonomy and their theories of the moral Ideal, such as Antihedonims, Pessimism, Quietism, Satyagraha Spiritual and Phenomenal activism, Eudaemonism, and Beatificism are first considered. Then there comes the more important section on Practical Ethics, which deals with such topics as virtue and vice, veracity and freedom of the will. The last subject dealt with here is the Ideal of the sage. Here are however, two points which deserve to be noted. Our author in speaking of the Supermoralism of the Upanishads, distinguishes it from that of Nietzsche and Bradley. He says, "Nietzsche's supermoralism affects only the superman, who, in the possession of absolute strength, defies, and therefore rises above all conceptions of good and bad. On the other hand, the Upanishadic supermoralism affects the individual as well as the Absolute, and the individual only so far as he may be regarded as having realised the Absolute in himself." Next the Prof. rightly indicates the Upanishadic view of the supreme importance of Truthfulness in the seeker after Atman. The incident of the initiation of the immortal Satyakama Jabala, and the story of his Brahmin-hood are most effectively presented.

The coping stone of the work is to be found in the last chapter, that on Mysticism, which is said to be the goal not only of all philosophy

(continued from the previous page) but of all human existence. Here are discussed, what is known in Vedanta as the lower and the higher knowledge, the qualification for self-realisation, the position of the spiritual teacher, the precautions necessary, the meditations to be practised, and above all, the raptures of mystic ecstasy, besides other allied topics. The Upanishads, as is indicated here, "do not always insist upon Sannyasa Asrama as being the only fit mode of life for receiving mystic wisdom." But when the author interprets Mysticism, as "self-realisation" he rightly raises, what must be considered to be, a most important question: "Would it be possible for the knower to know himself?" And he says that according to Yagnavalkya, "It is possible.., the self can become an object of knowledge to himself...Self-consciousness is the ultimate fact of existence...the self is endowed with the power of dichotomising himself...In self-realisation the self is most mysteriously both the subject and object of knowledge." We do not question Prof. Ranade's right to interpret according to his own light. But we cannot help differing from him sometimes, as when, for instance (on page 296), "Pandityam" is rendered as "wisdom" which makes it meaningless to us, though it would have conveyed our meaning correctly if it had been translated into 'learning.' It is not the words that matter, but the view-points. So, his idea of "self-Realisation" appears to be different from ours. Yet, with this caution, we would point out what Yagnavalkya himself says in regard to "self-consciousness" or "the ultimate fact of existence." "It is where there is, as it were duality, there sees another thing..there knows another thing, but how does one, to whom all has mere Atman see anything..know anything? How should he know him by whom he knows all this?..The Atman is unseizable...How should one know the knower?" (Br.Up.IV.5-15.)

It must be admitted that the Upanishads do teach Mysticism, as contended not only by Prof. Ranade, but also by other authorities like Prof. Oldenberg. But that is no peculiar feature of the Hindu Scriptures. Every great Religion on earth does believe in this kind of "God-Realisation" or ecstatic experience and has to a greater or lesser degree developed it. No one has doubted that the Upanishads contain Religious Theological or Mystic lessons. But many have contended that such vedic wisdom is not of much value as philosophy of our own times. Prof. Ranade, has, to our mind, not answered this criticism beyond saying, that all philosophies must ultimately lead to mysticism.

Modern philosophy seeks to prove the truth of a thing before accepting it. Whereas, the mystic seems to hold, as dogmatically as possible that whatever he sees is the highest truth. What is Prof. Ranade's answer to the question: How do you know that what the mystic experiences is truth? There are seen hundreds of self-deluded religious begots and mad men also some of whom are the quietest and the most harmless of creatures, claiming that they are in direct touch with Divinity. And so does every mystic say. Students of philosophy do not think that the mystic tells an untruth. Nor do they contend that the mystic has not seen the truth, He may or may not have sensed the highest reality. But they, as pursuers of truth, have every right to hold that the mystic has not proved that what he has seen is the truth, not to say anything of "the highest truth". If Vedanta cannot prove that Atman is truth we must agree with our European critics, that Vedanta leads us only to dogmatic Theology, or at best to mysticism, but not to philosophy.

Here is what a well-known philosophic critic, May Sinclair, who has strong sympathies for mysticism, writes: "It cannot be denied that mysticism,

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(continued from the previous page) is suspect...mysticism and magic have a common traffic in the supernatural (and we may add, "super-conscious".) ..This is the region where miracles are said to happen..and nobody with the slightest intellectual caution will deny that it is a region of the utmost uncertainly."

It is true that even philosophers like Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Bradley, Bergson and Gentile, have been characterised by some of their critics as mystical. That is exactly because their philosophies appear to contain certain points which have not been proved to be true. Our professor is not unaware of the many conflicting accounts of the experiences of mystics. Which of them is true? Again, there are mystics like those of Buddhism, who do not believe in an Atman or God. What would self-realisation mean to them? If the Upanishads meant to teach Mysticism as the goal, the Rishis should have said nothing more than this, "Practice or meditate and realise Brahman." But they have held a hundred different views regarding Ultimate Reality, heated discussions in respect of which, have, as Mr Ranade thinks, ended most 'tragically'. Why should Shankara and others have wasted their precious life in intellectual battles, if the highest truth could be known by mystic practices?

Some minds, in their search after the Ultimate Reality, seem to seek a short cut, owing to their eagerness to reach the goal. And they develop a dogmatism which makes them declare that what they know must be or is the Ultimate truth, and that they do not need any other proof. But many who eschew mysticism are in no such hurry to find short cuts. They have patience enough to climb by the natural path, taking breath at each step, doubting and sifting their data. Not that these men do not recognise what are called intuitions. But there are intuitions and intuitions. And modern philosophy builds only upon intellectually

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(continued from the previous page) tested intuitions i.e. the intuitions of truth. Whereas mystics seem to rely upon intuitions divorced from intellect the instrument for testing truth. If the Upanishads have nothing in them to prove, the truth of what may be the intuition of Ultimate Reality, they must have only mysticism, to give us, but not philosophy in the modern sense.

Even Giovanni Gentile who believes that “Man...becomes God” repudiates mysticism. More authorities than one on the history of Philosophy hold that “Consecrations, theurgical superstitions, hallucinations of ecstasy, all (forms of mysticism) announce the end of Philosophy in Greece.” Is Philosophy also likewise dead in India which still clings to the Upanishads?

Our own ambition is to find, if possible, for Upanishadic thought a place, not in the universally fascinating realm of mysticism or theology, of magic or miracle, or even of speculative poetry, but in the plain prosaic world of modern rational philosophy.

Barring our own views on this one point of disagreement, we have nothing but unqualified praise for Prof. Ranade’s very thoughtful and highly, scholarly work, which we strongly commend to all students of ancient Indian culture.

APPROVED SELECTIONS BY V.S.I.:

“Nothing is ever right which cannot stand investigation. Nothing is true which fears fact. Nothing is smart which corrodes character. Nothing is wrong which is not afraid of time. Nothing is evil which is necessary. Nothing is settled which is not settled right.” – author unknown.

“It is only men having buddhi for their eyes that succeed in reaching that Brahman which is uncreated.” – Mahabharata.¹⁷

¹⁷ The original editor deleted para ““Knowledge, knower and knowable”--do not really --(Kasthuri ab is) exist: for all the Triputi disappear in deep sleep. How do you know Reality. All are thoughts ideas, you have to know and secondly that all ideas disappear in sharp, and hence they are” by hand

SRI RAMAKRISHNA AND THE MODERN OUTLOOK.

(in Vedanta Kesari 1932)

The immortal Shakespeare says, "What is in a name? That which we call a rose, by any other name would smell as sweet." Perfectly true as this is from one point of view, a name considered from another standpoint is found to possess wonderful power. Though it would have made no difference whatever in the personality of the great Guru had he been called Trailokyanath or a Devendranath, yet the name of Sri Ramakrishna is the key with which to unlock all the charms that have endeared his personality to us. My object, however, on this occasion is not to recount all those charms or all that the world has thought of him. During the forty-six years that have elapsed since he dropped his mortal vesture many have expounded his teachings and his life, not only in India but all over the civilized world. And one like me cannot add anything new. And what is more, not having had the inestimable blessing of seeing him personally, I could do no more than repeat what others have said or written. But inasmuch as his teachings lend themselves to individual interpretations I have ventured to make a reference to them from the standpoint of the characteristic thought of our own times which is pre-eminently scientific. I shall not aspire

(continued from the previous page) to the far superior privilege of dealing with those other features such as are of a purely spiritual character, which may be outside the province of scientific view, howsoever great a source they may be to us, of the highest delight. In other words my object is not to refer to whatever is a source of spiritual joy or satisfaction merely, but to deal with that aspect of his teachings that has a bearing on the search after truth, in the light of modern thought.

It is usually held that Sri Ramakrishna was but a Hindu religious revivalist or reformer. This view is as untrue as it is true. He, no doubt started as a Hindu, but he lived as a Mohammedan and a Christian at times. He was the first Indian teacher to realise in our day that the time had come for rising about sects and creeds, Samajas and denominations to a level in which one could be of all varieties of religion. He freed himself from the shackles of creeds and Samajas and followed Religion in general, which may otherwise be called Mysticism. The real mystic, while retaining the essence of religion, attaches little value to distinctions of external forms and rituals though he has his own methods of attaining to his vision or experience.

It is now often said that the Bhagavad Gita teaches Hinduism. Some even go to the length of declaring that it teaches this or that sectarian view exclusively. But no greater injustice could ever be done to it. Sri Krishna says that all religions lead to Him though from different sides. He is teaching no particular religion, but Religion in general, which Sri Ramakrishna actually lived. The Gita nowhere refers to Hindu, Vaishnava or Saiva Matam or Dharma. For, India's greatest need then was, as the entire civilised world's need now is, to lift its view-point from particular religions to Religion in general. Sri Ramakrishna was at no moment of his life under the

(continued from the previous page) that any particular religion could ever be made universal though he held that Religion in its essence is universal. Has not Christianity, Buddhism, Mohammedanism or Hinduism been divided, sub-divided and modified in a thousand ways as no one form could suit all mankind? Such attempts at making particular creeds universal have been and are being resorted to with the result that untold misery has been caused. For every religion or sect thinks that it alone is blessed with the merit of being fit to be universally accepted.

What then is the difference between religions on the one hand and Religion or Mysticism on the other? So long as men are adherents of particular faiths, i.e. Hindu, Christian, Mohamedan, Buddhist or Jain, Vaishnava and Saiva, so long as their love and active service limited to their co-religionists. But when they rise to Religion or Mysticism, they learn to love all mankind alike, their love then knows no bounds. They leave the world of discord behind them. This then is Sri Ramakrishna's first message. Every religion has its function in life. Start with any religion, and rise above it to Religion or Mysticism.

Religion has no doubt been the best means of securing the highest consolation for the individual man in the midst of sorrows and sufferings. But this is only one aspect of it, for, the religion of a man necessarily expresses itself in his relations with others, his neighbours and the world outside of him. He has also a philosophy, right or wrong, regarding the entire universe. His religious attitude often makes or mars his social relations. And we know how religion contributes to morality, its greatest strength. But this has its own limitations. Nevertheless this public aspect is more often overlooked, emphasis being laid on the other, the

(continued from the previous page) individual or private aspect in that it gives one inward satisfaction. The latter view cares not what becomes of the world so long as one's inward peace is secure. But this is only one half of Religion. Unless a person of this kind shuts himself up in a cave and starves himself to death, the other half of Religion will assert itself the moment he seeks food from what is outside of him. And it is the latter, the social and moral aspect of Religion, that specially demands our attention in our day.

The Hindus as a body are a most religious people. It is said, "The Hindus eat religiously, dress religiously, bathe religiously, drink religiously, bathe religiously and even sin religiously." Nevertheless the Almighty has sent to no other people of the world so many plagues, pestilences, wars and invasions, the consequences of which can never be better described than has been done by Arjuna, which is so familiar to all of us. God seems to have chosen India specially for eternal suffering and endless servitude, as Sri Krishna once remarked to Uddhava.

Hinduism is said to be free from the vice of aggressiveness and to pride itself on not being a proselytising or a militant religion. But its valour finds vent in mutual quarrels between members of its own fold: No two groups of men can hate each other more bitterly than any two sects or cults of this faith. Instances are not wanting in which highly cultured sectarians do not hesitate even at the public.

Nor are the other great religions in any way better. History impresses upon us nothing else more strongly than the truth that more human blood has been shed and more inhuman cruelties have been inflicted upon man in the name of religion than in that of any other cause.

(continued from the previous page) Two thousand years of Christian training and two thousand five hundred years of discipline in the most ethical of all religions, Buddhism or Confucianism, have not been able to soften the savage in the breast of the Europeans in the West or of the Japanese and the Chinese in the East. Human sacrifices are still offered to the God of War on ever increasing scales. Islam is younger and the blood in its veins is much more warmer. It is no wonder that it has also played and is playing its part likewise.

In spite of all that may be said in favour of Religion as a source of moral discipline, every sect has helped the exploitation of ignorance by intelligence, and faith has often been made a cloak by the more knowing. Let not the followers of Dr Gore, the famous Gifford Lecturer of Edinburgh, lay the flattering unction to their souls that the modern degenerate forms of Krishna and Sakti cults are found in India alone. What has the Dr Gore school to say of their Khlysitic creeds or of lights in lynching the coloured man? Great theologians like the learned Dr Otto of Germany have been seeking to establish peace on earth by organising a world's religious congress. But can it succeed if men still seek to establish the superiority of one religion over another? To many in the modern world, Religion is only another name for war or discord.

Lastly, if we turn to the question, how far do religions reveal what is Truth, the insuperable fact stares us in the face that as intellect advances, religions not only multiply but also beat a retreat, because irreconcilable differences arise. The theological dogmas of every religion and of every new sect are driven from pillar to post by the onslaught of scientific knowledge, so that nation after nation is attempting to

(continued from the previous page) relinquish religions, wholly or in part. Russia's attitude is too well known to need any description. And the greatest question of the day is how shall we know which religious experience or vision or knowledge is the highest Truth? Truth is the tribunal before which not only Science but also Religion is arraigned, however much Religion may plead the special privilege of private judgment and seek to avoid the public court of reason. The latest philosophers and theologians have contrived to bring about an amicable settlement, by setting up two separate standards of judgment: the one known as "Truth-value" for scientific subjects, and the other the "Aesthetic" or "Feeling" value for religious subjects. All the same, religions are being weighed in the balance and found wanting, especially because religions have lent themselves to be made an instrument for acts of the gravest injustice and cruelty, and because they fight shy of "Truth-value." Could we still, some critics ask, believe that it is the one chosen path to God, though it may be readily admitted that it has a real function to discharge in primitive life? This is what one of the most modern thinkers A.N. Whitehead, says regarding religions in general. "During many generations there has been a gradual decay of religious influence in European civilisation. Each revival touches a lower peak than its predecessor and each period of slackness a lower depth. The average curve marks a steady fall in religious tone. In some countries the interest in religion is higher than in others. But in those countries where the interest is relatively high, it still falls as generations pass."

Such being the religious outlook, we turn for a moment to Politics which seems to be a source of greater to men than Religion. While a common religious belief helps to unite individuals

(continued from the previous page) into small groups for common good, it is found that it fails to effect the unification of several groups into society, and the need for a higher outlook is then felt. Politics, though it does contribute to the welfare of large aggregations of men better than religion, yet it is not without its drawbacks. Political groupings for purposes of common good, fail to achieve their object when humanity at large is concerned. Politics, however refined, cannot be divested of its association with the natural instinct of self-preservation. And politics also invariably means in some form strife and war.

Seeing that Religion and Politics fail to secure for man all that he seeks in these days, he turns, when his intellectual awakening is sufficiently advanced, to Science which has also a two fold aspect? (1) Its practical value in manipulating Nature's forces and (2) Its helpfulness in the investigation of Truth. We shall see how far Sri Ramakrishna's teachings have a scientific interest in them. It is with regard to the latter aspect that his teachings have a significance or value. So far as the former aspect is concerned we can never be too grateful for the blessings of the various discoveries, especially such as have contributed to the alleviation of human suffering. We need not dwell here on the wonderful achievements of Science, which every educated man knows. We have only to observe that remarkable as they are, they have been not less productive of evil. What Science has done may well be put in the words of one of the most well-known scientific thinkers of the day, Bertrand Russell who says: "In the name of science we revolutionise industry, undermine family morals, enslave coloured races,

(continued from the previous page) skilfully exterminate each other with poison gases. Recent inventions have increased the power of attack much more than the power of defence...the most intelligent classes in the scientific nations are dying out...Equality, like liberty, is no more than a nineteenth century dream."

When disappointed with Religion as the best means of attaining social including moral amelioration, some men as indicated above seek their refuge in Politics or Science. And when Science and Politics, owing to their limitations, fail to secure all that they aspire for, they fall back upon Religion again. Such men either oscillate between these two or feel perplexed. There are, however, some others who tell us that a combination of Science, Religion and Politics is what is required. However judiciously such a mixture be made, it cannot bring in all the satisfaction of modern man. If past history is a guide for the future, we shall find all of them sharing the common defect of inability to check the sorrows and sufferings caused by factors unknown or unexpected, and beyond man's control. And the special remedies that religions usually prescribe for them are reserved for the world after death, the promises of which world do not appeal in our times to most of our brethren actually starving or otherwise groaning with mental or physical pain. Neither does an intellectual persons seek aesthetic delight in Religion, when he knows its manifold drawbacks. The cultured citizen of the modern world too does not seek peaceful satisfaction in the old moral codes based on the pleasures or the displeasure of unseen gods and unseen demons. Who does not know that it is the righteous man that often suffers most and that it is moral nations that are subject to the greatest trials? How many modern men bear all this patiently

(continued from the previous page) relying upon the old saying that the sufferings of the virtuous are a delight of the gods? And eminent biological scientists tell us that in the modern struggle for existence it is not the old moral code that helps one to survive. Wornout standards they say, must make room for better ones.

Now, turning to the other, the second or the Truth-seeking aspect of Science, we find that our Guru recognised, as well as any the most intellectual among us, that with the advance of the spirit of enquiry into Truth, which is also the aim of Science, there is no retracing of steps: for the old order changeth yielding place to new. He felt that Reason or Buddhi is no insignificant factor in life. It makes all the difference between a fool and a wise man. He knew that it would one day challenge Religion itself and seek the highest satisfaction or bliss in the goal of reason i.e. Truth. He knew that the time was coming, as has been indicated in Sri Krishna-Uddhava-Samvada, for asking whether what is called religious sense or mystic experience or vision is Truth. When God himself was actually seen and touched and felt, he was asked, "Art Thou Truth?" There can be no more misapprehension about the function of Reason or Buddhi. For, it is by Buddhi that the highest is reached and it is in Buddhi alone, as Sri Krishna himself exhorts Arjuna, that one should seek refuge.

Rational discrimination on which is based Science is as much the handiwork of God as religion is. If religions are attacked by Reason, it must be because God intends that thereby the follies and fallacies of religions should be corrected or exposed. In fact, in defending themselves or in justifying their attitude religions only appeal to Reason as the supreme judge. It is needless

(continued from the previous page) to point out how frequently we find that our inmost feelings mislead us. Religion deludes itself when it thinks that what it feels must be the final Truth and keeps Reason at arm's length. The modern philosopher's arguments of knowledge by identity appear equally defective. For, it is a question whether there can be any knowledge at all in real identity.

As everyone knows, while Science enables man to control Nature's forces and to turn them to his own account, it is yet far from turn them to ultimate Reality. Its results and its theories though considerably in advance of Religion in its search after Truth, are yet unreliable inasmuch as they vary every day.

Now if neither Religion nor Science, nor Politics, nor the Ethics of our day fully satisfies the man with the modern outlook, there must be something lacking in them. It is this deficiency that Sri Ramakrishna seeks to supply.

What Sri Ramakrishna aims at is not only That, the understanding of which makes things yet unknown understood, but the attainment of which brings to man all that he desires. The scientist on the other hand, is often elated with his achievements on the way, and rests on his oars, imagining the achievements to be of more value than the end, and labouring under the delusion that the ultimate recedes like the horizon, as he seeks to approach it. Certainly this end will remain as distant as ever to the scientist unless he pursues knowledge with a determination to stop not till the goal is reached, as Sri Ramakrishna has put into the mouth of Swami Vivekananda.

The respective positions of Religion, Science, and Truth are best pointed out by Sri Ramakrishna himself thus: To attain Truth or perfect knowledge, the 'Upaya' or the means consists of (1) Sadhu Sanga or the company of the wise, to enable

(continued from the previous page) one to know to look for and value in this world; (2) Iswara Chinta or any religious attitude of Bhakti; (3) Higher Iswara Chinta or the mystic attitude of Visvasa. i.e. universal love, by seeing God in everything; (4) Vichara of the first stage which deals with the knowledge of the phenomenal or the seen world, i.e. Asat, as he calls it, which is the field of scientific enquiry of modern times; and (5) Vichara of the second stage which pertains to the truth of the noumenon or unseen world or "Sat" as, it is called. This is perfect knowledge or the Highest Truth or Samadhi.

Though Religion undoubtedly prepares the way for the attainment of Truth, yet it is Vichara alone that leads directly to it. This enquiry into Truth is naturally preceded by Religion, Science and all the knowledge and all the experience that man can gain in life, i.e. in the perceptual or the phenomenal world. None of them can be ignored, though Russia is making the experiment of ignoring religion, failing to realise that a society consists of person at different levels of culture, and that religion appeals best to such of them as have the temperament only to be led. Evidently Russia took no lesson from the history of Buddhism which gradually declined to the level of Mahayana and of Heruka Vajra cults. That nothing in this world can be ignored, if Truth is to be attained, is again taught by Sri Ramakrishna in his parable of the Bel fruit. Though what we relish most is the kernel of the fruit, yet when our object is to ascertain the weight of the whole fruit, we must weigh, besides the kernel, the seeds and the shell, though the latter may not be good for eating. When we wish to know the Truth, of the entirety of existence, we cannot reject the knowledge

(continued from the previous page) of the seeds and the shell or fruit of Religion, of Science, or of any other knowledge of the phenomenal world, though they do not contain the final Truth in themselves. He adds: So long as one cherishes contempt (Ghrina) for anything, hesitation or shyness (Lajja) in seeking knowledge or cowardice (Bhaya) in pursuing it, one cannot attain the highest Truth. Lastly our Bhagavan says: "To Rama who wished to renounce the world as being the Asat, Vasishta said, "When all is Brahman what is there to give up?" This is Sri Ramakrishna's second message to the modern world. Everything, be it Religion, Science, Politics, Economics, or anything else, however insignificant, has a place in the world of true knowledge. He that omits anything cannot attain perfect or ultimate Truth.

Did Sri Ramakrishna know anything of modern Science to which reference is made by us here? If not, how could he have seen the bearing of it on religion or how could he be said to have got at the whole Truth? If he attained Brahmajnanam, it must be said that he reached it through Religion, ignoring Science. Further, his Brahmajnanam is suited for recluses like him. It makes one unfit for the world with its modern outlook. Such may be some of the thoughts likely to cross our minds.

Science, no doubt, leads man from a lower truth to a higher truth. But the pursuit has to be continued. What is of greater consequence really in Science is its method, as is well known. And what Sri Ramakrishna also values is the discipline needed for the pursuit of Truth and the determination to reach the goal. In fact, in his method he is as rigorous as the greatest of the scientists of our day. Repeatedly he said, "test me as the moneychangers test the coins. Test or verify before you

(continued from the previous page) accept me.” Is there anything greater than the principle of verification in all Sciences? Again, he said, “A Bhakta is sometimes a fool and is duped. But the seeker should never fail to test the truth of his knowledge.” We leave it to the scientist to say whether anything could be more rational. Such discipline, as Sri Ramakrishna requires, Science can give only when the determination to reach the end is combined with it. Both these are acquired through the harder path of Yoga, of which our Guru was a perfect master. We do not refer to the Yoga of attaining Siddhis which is discountenanced by our teacher. True Yoga is no end in itself. It only sharpens the power of Reason (Buddhi) so as to enable it to undertake Vichara. True Yoga is a preparation for enquiry in the same manner as scientific discipline is. But what science lacks at the present moment is the determination to get to the end, which Yoga supplies. A Buddhi so disciplined and so determined can unravel the mystery of the Mysterious Universe of Sir James Jeans or can solve the riddle of the Unseen World of Mr A.S. Eddington with far greater certainty. And though the later developments of Einstein, and Max Planck’s discoveries are sought to be undervalued from a philosophical standpoint by authorities like Sir H. Samuel, yet these discoveries of Relativity and Indeterminism, leading to the abolition of causation and of matter as such, could be seen to be nearer the Truth as taught by Sri Ramakrishna. In so far as Science is a pursuit of Truth, it is impossible for modern philosophy and for Brahma Vichara under modern conditions to make any headway without a knowledge of Science.

What would you learn if you reached the goal of Truth? Sri Ramakrishna replies in a parable. When a man wishes to reach the terrace, he has

(continued from the previous page) to mount up the steps, leaving each step behind him. But when he reaches the top he sees that the steps are of the same substance as the terrace. When we reach the Goal, Brahman, all the means that we use and all the Universe is found to be only Brahman, all the means that we use and all the Universe is found to be only Brahman. This is not Pantheism. Europe has developed as yet no concept corresponding to Sri Ramakrishna's Brahman.

His teachings are like a pyramid. He taught religion according to tastes and temperaments to those that wished only to be led, as Swami Vivekananda put it. He initiated into mystic faith those that could take a detached and a wider view of life. He gave training in Yoga to those few that intensely thirsted for Truth and possessed the determination to reach the goal. Lastly he taught disinterested Vichara to such microscopic few near the top, as possessed the sharpest reason or Buddhi. Among his disciples only Swami Vivekananda was found fit for this path; for he instructed only this disciple of his in the great Ashtavakra Samhita. And those who seek Truth for its own sake are necessarily imbued with the scientific spirit. The apex in the Truth, the one which is variously named.

Let us for a moment turn our mental telescope to that most distant apex, the Mount Everest of this knowledge. If, as Sri Ramakrishna says, everything is seen as the ultimate reality or Brahman at the apex, when one reaches it, what grief, what perplexity what confusion could there be? Whom can he strip of his gold, or whom can he deprive of his bread; when can he enslave? Whom can he flatter or fear? What thing or being and what knowledge can he despise? All men, all creatures, all things, all thoughts all knowledge, this "Sarvam" is Brahman.

Does this knowledge render us unfit for the world? Our Guru Maharaja asks us to tie up in a corner of our kerchief or cloth the Truth of Brahman and to enter the world. We shall then never fail to achieve what is reckoned as the highest or universal good.

It is not the attainment of mere theoretical knowledge that is the goal of this enquiry after truth or Brahman. Knowledge gives power. Theoretical science precedes practical achievements. Knowledge is ever pregnant with the practical. Why should we think that the knowledge of Brahman alone is devoid of practicality?

Whether we be workers in the fields, or wage earners in the streets, pupils or teachers, judges or jurors, merchants or doctors, soldiers or sepoy, rulers or subjects, – whatever we may be, and wherever we are, – at the dining table, or on the field, on the bench or at the bar, in the forest or in the prince's palace, in the peasant's cottage or in the market – let us keep this knowledge of Truth tied up in a corner of our cloth. And we shall achieve what man has not been able to achieve till now in this world, and what all men long for most intensely. This is the third message of Sri Ramakrishna to the modern world.

To put the whole into a nutshell: To one embarrassed in life by the modern outlook, the Prophet of Dakshineswara would say: "Whatever be your standpoint, Religion, Science or Politics, Ethics, Aesthetics or intellectual advancement – neither any of these singly nor all or many of them jointly can be of avail in solving the problems of mankind as a whole so as to give general or permanent satisfaction, unless you add to each of the standpoints a knowledge of the highest Truth." What gives vitality to each of them is this factor of Truth. And it is the lack of this that makes them inadequate,

(continued from the previous page) disappointing or perplexing. Since the highest Truth comprehends everything, even atheistic movement, nothing is hostile to it or outside of it. But if we cannot reach or even get a glimpse of this Truth, let us tie up in a corner of our cloth at least the key that opens the door to a view of that knowledge. And that key is the thought of Bhagavan Sri Ramakrishna, which is symbolised in his name. It will help one to cross the sea of life, despite the tosses that may threaten to overwhelm one there.

Remembering that what the modern outlook lacks is the requisite kind of determination to pursue Truth to the very end, may we meditate, as often as we can, not only on his name but also on these priceless words of his: "O Mother, here take back Thy knowledge and Thy ignorance (Which Thou hast given), Thy purity and Thy impurity, Thy good and also Thy evil. Thy virtue and Thy sin: but when I said all these to Mother, I could not say: "Take back Thy truth and Thy untruth." All these I could return to Mother, but not truth."

UNIVERSITY REFORMS FOR INDIA.

The able and vigorous article of Mr C.R. Reddy in the Special number of the Mysore Economic Journal on "The Idea of a Modern University" must have been read with considerable interest generally all over India, for, everywhere new Universities or University Reforms are in the air, and particularly in Mysore, where almost every parent is grown sick of some of the antiquated, and at times queer, modes of action from which the old Indian Universities are not able to wean themselves completely, that he is eagerly looking forward to the dawn of a new and a brighter academical era, in the State. Viewed from the standpoint of love of national advancement, the reforms advocated by Mr Reddy appeal most powerfully to the heart as

(continued from the previous page) the heart as well as to the head. But when they are considered with a view to actual adoption in any part of India, they are somewhat slow to produce the conviction that they could satisfactorily meet the situation. All the same, it is impossible to refer to this paper of Mr Reddy's without a high sense of appreciation of its distinguishing merits. His brilliant plea for Realism, and his trenchant attack on the evils of the Residential system are a most valuable contribution to the literature on the subject. There are, however, points in it with regard especially to the practical side of which, there appears to be a need for some further discussion. And I propose to say a few words on only one of them, viz., The Vernacular as the vehicle of University instruction.

Whoever doubt but that a Vernacular University is a consummation devoutly to be wished for? A perfect University cannot be other than a Vernacular one. A National University would be meaningless, if, at any stage, it ignored the language of the people or cared not for the enlightenment of the great body which forms the nation or the community. But whether the Vernacular of a country, ipso facto, could be made the language of University instruction, appears to be a highly debatable point. And it is a question, in India especially in its present stage of progress, whether a Vernacular University can satisfy all the educational and cultural wants of the people, and if so, whether its realization is within the range of practical politics or possibilities.

The three great primary functions of a University are:- (a) The collection of existing knowledge; (b) the conquest of new knowledge; and (c) the distribution of such knowledge.

Mr Reddy seems to think that the last is the most important, if not the only function in so

(continued from the previous page) far as he advocates a Vernacular University. For, the Vernacular is the only means of disseminating higher knowledge far and wide in a community. Perhaps, he lays so much stress on it, because, the existing Indian Universities have notoriously failed to fulfil this function. But the question is whether the last is really the most important, in the existing circumstances. To know which knowledge is new we must know which is old. And there can be no thought of a distribution in the absence of a sufficient stock of the old or the new or of both. Each succeeding step in the above series presupposes the preceding. The first point, then, for consideration, is, in what departments of knowledge has India to collect information and in what fields has she to seek for new truths? Is it in Theology, Metaphysics, Archaeology, Philology, Mythology and others of that class? Have we not already enough, if not a surfeit, of some of them? The supreme need of the day is, as Mr Reddy has so well pointed out, Realistic knowledge. Technological and Industrial Sciences. And in which language, Indian or European, is such knowledge. I mean knowledge of the methods of Research also embodied? Need it be argued that that language demands our attention first and foremost? Thoughtful men, not satisfied with one European language, have sought to learn two and even more, for this purpose. Have we not then to seek to attain proficiency at least in one? When we have collected enough of technical knowledge of the sort we require, when we have learnt to make independent researches in science, and when by sufficient familiarity we are able to think modern scientific thoughts in the vernaculars themselves, it will be time for us to think of the third stage, that of its diffusion, for which such languages are the most suited.

If, however, the aim be, to cultivate chiefly the literary arts, a Vernacular University

(continued from the previous page) would unquestionably be the right one. We have gathered enough of materials in the fields of religion, poetry, drama, history and other allied subjects; and the time is certainly come for spreading a knowledge of these by means of the people's mother tongue. And the experiment of teaching such subjects in the vernacular in the College Departments of Baroda is said to be a success. But for digging and delving into them further, as is expected to be done in a University, it is doubtful whether we have in our midst a sufficient number of competent men. We have as yet very few Anglo-Vernacular Professors of the highest order. In spite of the denunciations which it is becoming somewhat the fashion to hurl on the products of the indigenous system of education, the old Pandit, as the representative of a school of learning whose accuracy and encyclopaedic character have been the admiration of many an eminent modern scholar, is a factor without which a Vernacular, and particularly a Literary University would hardly appeal to the heart of the imagination of the Hindu. To digress a little, the West though far ahead of the East in its knowledge of the Psychology of Teaching, is still at the threshold of the science of the Psychology of Learning, in which Hindus made considerable progress long ago. And until sufficient advancement is made in this new department of Science the modern man cannot appreciate the value of the Pandit who is meanwhile fast becoming extinct. The true Pandit, alas: is already a *rara avis*: The latest Educational Resolution of the Government of India, that of 1913 says:—"The world of scholarship, they (the Conference) thought, would suffer irreparable loss if the old type of Pandit and Maulvi were to die out....." But this is only a matter of secondary importance.

Granting, however, that competent Anglo-Vernacular Professors could be found, where are the pupils to come from for such academies? A number of Vernacular High Schools and Colleges, though not Universities, have already been started and maintained, in this State, for instance, for years. Boys and girls have been deliberately tempted, if not decoyed, with scholarships; nevertheless the parent avoids such schools and the pupil shuns them, as long as they have any vitality left in them. The strength of such institutions, considering the huge proportion of the population they are intended to cater for, is still negligible. On the other hand, wherever we go, the cry is for instruction in the language which has in it the virtue of providing the best passport to success in life. The lowliest labourer, be he a Panchama or a Pinjari, seeks to learn English in preference to the Vernacular. Above all, the clientele of a University are, and must be drawn from the best talents, especially talents with ambition. Will the Vernacular degrees attract such men or women, so long as the vernacular is not the language of the highest courts and offices and of the paramount power? The analogy of Japan does not, therefore, appear to have much force.

Apart from the well known argument for a common unifying medium of speech for all India, there is the practical question of deciding which Vernacular should be given precedence in a University of the kind proposed, in areas in which more languages than one are spoken, by the people. Hardly a civilized corner could be found in India, where, in addition to the common tongue of the majority, some other, such as Urdu, is not the language of the home as well as of the business of the minorities. Unless, therefore some high-handed measures be adopted to

(continued from the previous page) force the minorities to learn the language of the majority, there would be no ground for preferring the Vernacular of the latter for University instruction. Again, take for instance, a city like Madras, where the Tamils and the Telugus, or Bombay, where the Mahrattas and the Guzeraties are found in such large numbers. All their languages have equally strong claims, in that they have developed an extensive literature of their own. Which of them should be the academical medium? And what about our Mahomedan brethren though they may be smaller in numbers? Will they give up Urdu? Or, is it desirable to compel all the Moslem parents to send their children to Aligarh? And granting that every parent of intelligent children is rich enough to send them to some distant educational centre, or that the State can provide with such scholarships all the poor pupils who generally form the largest number, it will be found that a Residential system of some sort is a necessity. But Mr Reddy himself deprecates it in the most unequivocal terms.

If linguistic and academical tyranny of this kind be undesirable, there must come into existence, simultaneously in each area or city, as many Universities as there are languages, or, if there should be only one University, as many professors as there are languages for each subject; or, every professor would have to know two, three or more languages, to do his ordinary duty, which is these days is too much to demand of any one.

If, on the other hand, to avoid such impracticable issues, it is thought that coercion of some sort is indispensable in this world of imperfections, and that some one language must be exalted at the coat of other tongues, where is the advantage, especially from the point of view of efficiency of learning, to the people who are in the minority is changing from English to another

(continued from the previous page) Indian Vernacular, especially to such as seek scientific and technical education of the highest standard?

Even in countries in which the language of the University is the language of its people, higher studies naturally develop a higher or technical dialect and phraseology different from that of the multitude, so much so, that each department of thought creates a dialect of its own. And when the question arises of spreading higher thoughts, a regular translation into what is called the popular dialect has to be made. Can this natural process be stayed or abolished by the fiat of a University order making the vernacular the principle language? The difficulty for the ordinary or the lay intellect to grasp higher truths will always remain. The men that soar to academic heights must naturally possess the capacity for learning a higher dialect or an additional language. The difference in the difficulty experienced in picking-up the language of higher thoughts is therefore certainly not so great as is magnified to be by the advocates of the vernacular. Though to men of inferior intellectual calibre, who form the majority and who cannot but be satisfied with the lower rungs of education, compulsion to acquire knowledge through a foreign tongue is a positive hardship, yet to those who have the ability to go up to the University the difficulty of learning a second language is comparatively less. And it will be remembered that we are dealing here with the University stage of education and not with that of the Secondary schools where the strain of studying all the subjects in a form of speech, which is not the mother tongue, is really great. In other words, all that the vernacularization of University studies can do is to bring within the reach of such men as possess superior intelligence, the higher knowledge that

(continued from the previous page) is locked up in a foreign tongue. But it can never make poor brains strong. And superior intellects have found it a pleasure to study two languages. Further the need for studying an additional language, especially, one that opens the door to the thoughts of the rest of the civilized world, is a most valuable feature of what is known as liberal education, in that it makes for a wider outlook.

This natural demand for two forms of language, one for the technical and higher and another for the lay and lower thought, has been met in a characteristic manner in India. It is nothing foreign to the Hindu mind. From time immemorial, Sanskrit was the language of the indigenous academies of all higher culture, and the vernaculars were the canals through which the academic waters were led to irrigate the fields of the masses. Sanskrit having taken the place of the technical or academical language, whoever sought the higher stages of learning had to rise above the average intellectual level and to study two languages. Now, English has only succeeded to the academical throne of Sanskrit. And the transition, so far as University education is concerned, has never made itself felt as a strain in India.

What Mr Reddy proposes, here, is a reversal of this natural situation. Make, he says, that which is the language of the lay public, i.e. the vernacular, the language of the technical or higher studies, though the vernacular has as yet developed no such literature, and give English or other European language a subordinate place, though it is the sole repository of higher knowledge, especially of the scientific world. Perhaps it will be said that the vernaculars themselves could be made to convey, in course of time, all the technicalities of higher culture. But the question is, till such a day dawns on India, what course should we pursue? The old

(continued from the previous page) store-house of academical culture, the Sanskrit tongue, is not wanted and the new fountain of higher culture, the English language, Mr Reddy disapproves of for the higher functions of the University. But, without a language of culture at the top, is a University worth the name?

If there is anything of which an Indian can be really proud, it is, to put it as briefly as possible, his ancient civilization, inferior though it be to the modern in certain respects. And that civilization, or the culture behind it, was built up, not by the Mahrattas or the Malayalis or the Tamils or the Bengalis, or even the Telugus or Karnatakas, or in a word by the natives of this or that part of India. The great men of the north and of the south, of the east and of the west, all laboured for it night and day. And such a contribution was made possible only by a common language of higher culture, viz. Sanskrit. Pandits of Kasi and Muddea would visit Kanchi and Kashmere and the scholars of Mysore and Tanjore would go all the way to Mithila and Maharashtra, to exchange their intellectual wares. Pupils in quest of higher knowledge would resort to the academies all over the peninsula, undeterred by the barriers of their vernaculars. In this, India anticipated centuries ago, some of the modern developments of European academical life. It is not unknown to the reader that students of European countries often prosecute higher studies in foreign Universities, and that French, German and English professors are now and then invited to lecture in Universities other than their own. This is an aspect of higher culture, which transcends the limitations of languages and politics. Such an interchange of thoughts and such a widening of human interests is a characteristic of progressive civilization. A common medium of mere speech to which Mr Reddy refers is not what is contemplated here. What is referred to is a common

(continued from the previous page) language of culture of the highest sort, which India cannot do without. When, therefore, English stepped into the place of Sanskrit, as a cultural language, India took another step forward in her course of evolution, in that the English language conferred on her the inestimable privilege of participating in the civilization, or culture not of all India, as Sanskrit did, but of almost the whole world. And now, what do the advocates of vernacular universities say? "As the language of higher culture let Sanskrit go, and let English also; let us have the vernaculars instead. Let us cease to think of an Indian culture as a whole, or of a wider world-culture. Let us rejoice in our homely, petty, parochial wisdom and light of the Kathi, Kashmiri, and the Konkani. Let us not hesitate to go back to the pre-English, nay, even to the pre-Sanskrit days for the sake of the pure Vernaculars. Let us build and raise the vernacular walls higher and higher till we see in each other the literal barbarian or mlechcha. For, "If I know not the meaning of the voice, I shall be unto him that speaketh a 'barbarian' and he that speaketh shall be a 'barbarian' unto me." India loves castes: social castes are not enough: let us have linguistic castes also into the bargain."

Till the time comes, therefore, when the Indian, Vernaculars shall have absorbed and assimilated the most advanced thoughts, scientific and literary, of the enlightened nations of the present day world, till they are made the languages of the Government in the land, and especially till the people are able to think modern and scientific thoughts in the vernacular, the educational system of every part of India cannot but be bilingual, the language of wider and higher culture naturally playing the leading part, in the Universities.

ANOTHER EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY.

One of the many interesting facts brought to the notice of the Mysore Economic Conference during its session of June last is the imperceptible growth, in the country of a new educational need. It was chiefly the non-official members, who may be presumed to know the actual wants of the people best that brought forward a series of propositions, which asked for (1) Higher standards of literary instruction in villages, (2) High schools for Taluk Towns, (3) Technical courses of study for the people in villages as well as towns, (4) Higher vocational and literary courses for such country folk as have already made some progress and as cannot leave their homes, and (5) Professional instruction to men and women in service, such, for instance, as Schoolmasters, and Mistresses. The problem presented for consideration here is not the familiar one of spreading education among the illiterate and the ignorant, but one of increasing or turning to better account the knowledge already acquired. It is a question of further education not merely on literary lines but also on Technical and vocational.

It is not the need for 'continuation' schools either, that was urged for. The discussion that ensued naturally elicited the fact that the number of persons that stood in need of such educational facilities was so small, and even they were so widely scattered that it was not possible, either for Government or for private bodies to establish any schools within their reach. The State authorities, however, fully sympathizing with the movers and those whose cause they espoused, said that the Government would gladly provide the requisite facilities wherever¹⁸ and whenever the number of such seekers after further progress was large enough to justify the opening of such

¹⁸ "wherever" was typed above the line and inserted with an arrow.

(continued from the previous page) institutions. Here, then, is a situation: (a) There are scattered over villages and towns, young men and adults, one, two, three or perhaps a few more, in each place, who have already received some education and who have a great thirst for more literary, technical, or professional knowledge. (b) They cannot leave their homes either because they are too poor, or because they are engaged in their business or calling. (c) they cannot get any public or private bodies to start organized institutions for them, in their own homes. And no Government, however rich, can possibly provide, if not Universities and Colleges, even High or Technical schools for individuals, in each village and town. (d) Above all, if we look at the situation in more advanced countries like the United States or Germany, we shall see that it is not likely that in India it would be possible to bring such facilities within the reach of every man, woman or child, for even a thousands years. The condition, however, of the people even in those enlightened countries is not, in this respect, far different.

How have they, then, grappled with the situation. Do they ignore the poor and the helpless who seek further education when they are scattered and are in small numbers? The two great lessons that the modern Sciences of Economics and Sociology have taught us are, as the reader is well a ware: (1) Not gold, not land, but man of all the sources of national wealth is the greatest. (2) No human being, howsoever poor or backward, can be ignored by any society, without injuring itself. For in him or her, in spite of the poverty or backwardness, are locked up immense economic possibilities, not to say anything of the intellectual or the spiritual.

It is a conscious or, may be, an unconscious recognition of these truths that has led progressive

(continued from the previous page) communities to adopt 'Universal' or 'Compulsory education. It is not merely the feeling of humanity that has prompted men to open schools for the deaf, the dumb and the blind, and the mentally defective. Such institutions are not without their Economic value. No thoughtful nation has been unmindful of the "waste", the loss, that results from a failure to develop further the talents of even the few forsaken and poor, who are eager to add to the knowledge they already possess, though they be scattered over the country, ever so widely. It is the consciousness of such a situation that has found expression in the memorable lines: —

"Full many a gem of purest ray serene,
The dark unfathomed caves of ocean bear;
Full many a flower is born to blush unseen,
And waste its sweetness on the desert air."

The countries of the West have accordingly organized methods of instruction by means of letters, in what are known as Correspondence Schools and Correspondence Colleges. The same degree of efficiency that characterizes the regular schools and colleges, is not claimed for these institutions. They lack (1) the personal touch, guidance and inspiration of the teacher; and (2) the laboratory or the practical element. Inferior as is this system, it is the next best to the regular college and school system and undoubtedly better than an absence of provision for widening the mental horizon of those who have already begun to look ahead of their uneducated brethren. To give an idea of the success of some of these institutions. The Scranton (America) Correspondence School has on its rolls about 100,000 pupils at present. 240,000 of the students who took courses there, were ignorant of even vulgar fractions, when they commenced. The Ohio School has 70,000. The Chicago Correspondence School has over 10000

(continued from the previous page) pupils. In England the International Correspondence School has over 275,000. C.R. Mann, an American authority, says that "more pupils are taking correspondence courses in this country (America) than are enrolled in all the Secondary and Higher institutions."

Now turning to our country, we find that the number of young men, not to say anything of adults requiring educational facilities of the kind contemplated here, though small, is yet appreciable. This number is bound to increase every year. Again, a great many of the poor students who somehow manage to complete the High School course, cannot find easy admission to the portals of the University, for various reasons. The young men who are thus compelled to discontinue their studies are, generally, in the prime of their youth. And it is their talents that are wasted. Such waste to say the least is "tragic" as Carlyle would put it. If only we could organize a "Correspondence Institution" in Mysore, we could give to all such young men and adults not only literary, but also such technical and professional instruction, as the local conditions of our country require.

All that is needed is only a body of earnest graduates possessing literary, technical and professional knowledge with competency to write suitable courses of study on different subjects, for different stages. The work done need not go without remuneration. It must, however, take time for making it a profitable business. At the commencement, the sympathy and support of the Government will be required, at least for recognising the instruction given thus given. And the body of workers must be one that believes in its work. What a splendid opportunity to the Social Service Leagues, particularly to their Graduate members, for rendering the best of all kinds of service, Educational service: What a

(continued from the previous page) valuable opportunity to the educational section of such bodies as the Theosophical Society and the Christian Missions: This indeed, is an opportunity for all such modern University graduates as can command leisure, to vindicate the sincerity with which they usually make, when they receive their degrees, the promise that they would "support and promote sound learning.....the well-being of their fellowmen."

FREE SECONDARY EDUCATION FOR MYSORE.

After the publication of the last article on this subject, another, or as it is generally termed, the Budget Session of the Mysore Representative Assembly was held in which the question of making Secondary Education free was discussed with considerable enthusiasm. And the debate on this occasion, it must be noted, led to a more definite understanding. The subject was once for all brought within the range of practical politics, the House signifying its willingness to vote the additional funds necessary, and a large majority recognising the need for the abolition of fees in Secondary Schools.

Now that the general principle has been thus far agreed to, the time has arrived for a consider duration, in some detail, of the constructive measures. All such practical steps, it must be borne in mind, will naturally be determined to a great extent by local conditions and they cannot apply to all places, at all times. But before proceeding further, it is necessary to remove a few misconceptions which found expression in the course of the debate. The arguments advanced against the introduction of this reform were: (1) That Secondary Education cannot be made free unless and until the Primary is made completely free; (2) that making Secondary Schools free would lead to so large an increase in the number of pupils as to make it impossible for the State

FREE SECONDARY EDUCATION FOR MYSORE

(continued from the previous page) to cope with the needs of the situation, the cost becoming prohibitive, especially because free education might spell the extinction of fee-paying schools and the suppression of the principle of voluntary payment; (3) that if free education were adopted, boys and girls of the City would benefit to a greater extent than those of the country.

Now, each of these arguments is based upon a misconception.

1. That Secondary Education cannot be made free before the Primary is a view opposed not only to fact but also to principle, practice and reason. In the United States, they never waited for making Secondary and University Education free till the Primary was made completely free. They developed the several free courses almost independently. In Denmark, for years after the University and Secondary education was made free, fees were being levied in the State Primary Schools. And in some of the Native States of India which have not given up the ancient Indian methods, higher grades of education were made free before the lower.

Though to superficial observers it may appear that the principle of 'free' education is the same in the Primary as in the Secondary stages, yet a little diving below the surface will show that in the case of the Primary, the fees are abolished, because of the necessity for making education compulsory, not because the fees are too high for the majority to pay. Whereas, in the case of the Secondary, payment is excused, partly because a majority of the pupils seeking Secondary Education are too poor to pay, but chiefly because the education of the more grown up and better trained body of young citizens bring to the State a more immediate and appreciable return. Such communities as realised the full significance of the latter aspect, adopted free

(continued from the previous page) Secondary and Higher Education, at the earliest opportunity.

Again, the countries which started by providing Primary Education gratis, and postponed the waiving of fees in the higher stages have realised that they committed a no ordinary blunder. The number of pupils passing out of the Primary stage, in these countries, are so enormous that they find themselves at their wits end in the matter of providing the requisite number of Secondary Schools, when they seek to make Secondary Education free. Some of them have been compelled to defer the adoption of this measure mostly by their inability to find the requisite funds and teaching force at once. It has been so in many of the European countries though in lands like England, religious and industrial difficulties have added to the complication. On the other hand, peoples who readily profited by such sad experience of others, or who have had greater prevision, made Secondary and Higher education free earlier, when the numbers both in the Primary and in the Higher grades were still of manageable proportions: in other words, when the numbers were so small as to enable the State easily to provide the necessary secondary schools without any abnormal financial or other strain. They have allowed these schools to develop *pari passu* with the development of the national resources of the State.

It is true that this theory of tackling Secondary Schools after the Primary is still seriously held by some Indian educationists also. But they do not appear to have followed the trend of modern events closely enough. If the present War has taught us any great and important educational lesson, it is this. Of what current value is it to the state or the community to educate all the five to ten year old children in the primary stages even at the cost of all the wealth of the

(continued from the previous page) wealth of the land? Can they earn for us now? Can they take our places now, if need be? Can they think for us now? It is such of our children as are able to add to our wages, such as are able to serve our families and our country, such as can think and act with us, now, not to say anything of those who may do so in the future, that can really be a support to the state or the country at the present moment. And they come from the Secondary and the Higher stages. It is for the lack of such young men that England and some of her sister countries have been suffering. The huge sums of money which countries spend on 'free' primary education cannot bring a return that can stand then in good stead, in the hour of need, though beyond all doubt such money is well spent as a preparation for the stage of usefulness.

Let us look for a moment at France in the hour of her sorest trial. Her Minister of Public Instruction introduced in 1917 a bill for Compulsory Education beyond the Elementary up to the age of twenty for boys and eighteen for girls. England, France, Italy and Germany are all contemplating reforms in this direction.

Further, it is meaningless, in practice, to say, that any education will ever be made completely free. For, there always have been, and there always will be, all the world over, some who will make voluntary payments, for the education of their own community; or at least some who would pay for having their sons and daughters educated after their own heart.

Now, should Mysore take the false step of waiting till all Primary Education is made completely free? The right and the rational course appears to be to provide all education gratis, and to leave it entirely to the parents to pay or not. If, however, one must take precedence of another, and one must be delayed, it is the Primary that

(continued from the previous page) must be delayed and it is the Higher that must be pushed forward first.

Will the introduction of free Secondary Education necessarily bring in immediately so large a number of pupils as to make it impossible for the State to provide schools for them all? When Primary Education has been made, throughout the country, compulsory, and free Secondary Education is then introduced, especially if the country be large, such difficulties as are contemplated will certainly arise. But, when Primary Education is made compulsory, only gradually, and that in limited areas and where the system has been in force only for a short time, the increase in the Secondary stages cannot but be of modest proportions.

To speak more definitely, in Mysore, for instance, there is every year the usual increase in the number of Secondary schools. And the usual provision is being made for this annually expected addition. Now, what unusual change would the waiving of fees in the Secondary schools make? Would all their classes have immediately such an accession of strength as to burst the school walls: If not, which of the classes would gain? What would be the number of those seeking admission? The answer to such questions depends, as has already been observed, upon local circumstances.

The Secondary stage consists of an upper and a lower division, either English or Vernacular. Now, very few 'English' pupils of the Lower Secondary stage have refrained in the past from proceeding to the Upper Secondary for want of means to pay the fees. For, it is mostly such as can continue their studies in the Upper Secondary English classes that bring up English. Others, especially the poorer, generally go in for the Vernacular course. The Vernacular

(continued from the previous page) Upper Secondary can only attract the usual number as it has been all along free and the change will not affect it. In fact it has now become necessary to induce pupils to join these classes by offering scholarships. Till, therefore, the large body of young men who have been kept back by poverty in the lower stages come up in the course of three or four years, the numbers in the Upper Secondary English classes cannot swell.

There may, however, be a few young men who have discontinued their studies in the high School forms owing to their inability to pay fees and who may now seek to rejoin. Their exact number cannot be ascertained. However, it matters stand hardly a single pupil who has passed the Lower Secondary stage is found without any employment. The rapid expansion of schools and the equally rapid increase of activities in other directions in the State just at the present moment have absorbed almost every available young man of this standard of education. One may not, therefore, be far wrong in inferring that the number of such young men as may be fit and as may be free to join the High Schools, if the fees be abolished, cannot be more than fifty the highest. And these would require no more than two additional teachers.

But, in the Lower Secondary classes, the case will be different. An immediate increase may be expected inasmuch as a large number of pupils do discontinue for want of means to proceed from their village to places where higher classes exist. It is not possible to give an accurate estimate of the number of those who at present after completing the Primary stage fail to proceed to the higher classes for want of means to pay fees. Last year, a letter was addressed to over 300 representatives in different parts of

(continued from the previous page) the State with a view to ascertaining how many unemployed young men with primary or secondary educational qualifications stayed away without means to prosecute their studies further. No replies were expected from those who had no information to give. And those which were received showed that not more than a score of such men were to be found. This is certainly not enough evidence as regards the actual number of young men of this stand available. All the same, it shows what paucity there is of such material at the present moment. Making due allowance for those primary stage pupils who cannot prosecute their further studies for reasons other than mere poverty, the number of those who might seek admission the moment the Secondary Schools are declared free, may be set down at 500. And they will require, on modest average of 25 pupils per teacher, twenty more teachers. If a nearer approach to actual figures were required, it may be stated that even 22 teachers will not be needed. For, there are scores of Secondary Schools in the interior which have in the higher classes not even twenty pupils per teacher, while the standard number for each teacher is forty. Such schools can readily absorb the new comers for the next two or three years. A few of the English High Schools also have only 20 to 30 pupils to a teacher in Forms V and VI.

Lastly, as to cost, there are three items to be considered:- (a) the fees to be relinquished, (b) the compensation to be paid to Aided Institutions; (c) The additional expenses to be incurred on account of the probable number of pupils.

(a) The apparent sacrifice which the Government will have to make, at first, will be that of the fee income of about Rs.1,40,000. But the amount so relinquished will be reimbursed out of the new tax proposed to be levied.

FREE SECONDARY EDUCATION FOR MYSORE

(b) Next, as regards the Aided Institutions, the amount of compensation immediately needed would not be very large if this change were effected gradually. The biggest Aided Institutions are to be found in the Cities of Bangalore and Mysore and by the side of State schools. There the fear is greater that children may desert the Aided Institutions. But in the cities there are also many who have the means to pay and who would prefer to keep their children in the Aided schools for several reasons. What is needed in these places, therefore, is not a total abolition of fees but a raising of the percentage of free studentships.

There were, in the Secondary Schools, last year 33,500 (in round figures) pupils whose parents earned less than Rs.16/8/- a month, and 22,500 whose parents had a higher income. But the limit of Rs.16/8/- a month intended to mark off the poor, was fixed several years ago. And every one knows how costly living is at present, especially in the cities. If, therefore, we draw the line somewhere at Rs.30/-, our figures, will probably be 38,000 poor and 18,000 in better circumstances. We may, then, fairly say that about two thirds or 66 percent should be free, because of their poverty, the remaining third being made to pay.

The compensation which may have to be paid must be determined by a number of factors, such as, (1) the efficiency of the school, (2) the actual fall in the fee-income, and (3) the ability of the school to survive the struggle for existence.

And this requires careful investigation. A rough estimate may however be given. Free schools have not killed and will not kill the tendency to pay as has already been pointed.

(continued from the previous page) It was shown in the above para that only about two-thirds are really too poor to pay. We may, therefore take it that to the extent of about two-thirds of the amount collected in the Aided Secondary Schools may eventually be lost to them on account of the proposed change. These schools collected last year Rs.76,449 as fees. Their loss will therefore probably be about Rs.51,000 at the highest. It will actually be much less, about Rs.40,000. In all, then, an additional expenditure of not more than two lakhs is what would be required at the commencement.

(c) As regards the third item, it has been pointed out already that there cannot be immediately any appreciable increase of expenditure inasmuch as the additional pupils can easily seek admission to the existing schools with a little re-adjustment. It should be remembered that this case of Secondary Education is different from that of free Primary Education, inasmuch as in the latter, a large increase would immediately follow the introduction of free and compulsory courses.

It is worthy of note that a number of Secondary Schools in the interior are starved, while the City schools are so overcrowded, as to be on the verge of inefficiency. If the privilege of free education be first extended to the interior, not only will the weak schools there gain in strength, but also will the City schools be bled to healthy sizes. And what is more, the compensation to be paid to the City Aided schools will be less heavy. As there is also a large number of very poor pupils in the cities a larger number of free-studentships should be provided for them.

(3) Now that the Vernacular Secondary Schools exist even in some of the remotest villages and English Lower Secondary Schools in every taluk

(continued from the previous page) head-quarter and big village, the benefit of free education would be gained by the rural pupils of this stage to a far larger extent than by the pupils of cities and bigger towns. As for the pupils of the Upper Secondary stage, the advantage to the residents of cities is unavoidable. This is a necessary evil for which there exists no practical remedy. In no country in the world has it been possible to establish a High School or a College in every village, however desirable it may be. All the same, a very large number of pupils do always come from the villages to the Upper Secondary Classes in the larger centres. And they will certainly be benefitted along with the rest.

AN EDUCATION DELUSION.

That the existing system of Indian Education has been somewhat too literary and theoretical is a complaint heard all over the country and that it needs early correction is generally admitted. But the question has still to be answered, what is the corrective? Does the remedy lie, as is sometimes proposed, in the adoption of schemes like Universal or Compulsory training in handicrafts, which, they say, largely obtain in some of the western countries?

That the hand is as valuable an instrument as the eye or the ear for the training of the mind, is the belief of many psychologists and "Manual" Training is accordingly becoming a part of the general Education, in the earlier stages. But whether "Industrial" training in handicrafts like Carpentry and Smithy, serves the same end, or whether it is advisable to make it compulsory, especially at the higher stages, are points on which there does not appear to exist much agreement.

Such as are by nature intellectually incapable of rising to a higher level than the Primary

(continued from the previous page) school, have necessarily to seek training in industrial work. Compulsory training in handicrafts for the great majority of such pupils would certainly be justifiable. And inasmuch as the use of the hand and the eye is an important item in the primary courses, Universal training in the elements of some handicrafts might serve a useful purpose. A measure of this kind would certainly be welcome.

When, however, this doctrine of Universal and Compulsory training in handicrafts, in the secondary and higher stages also is advanced, one cannot but demur to it. For, evidently, in so far as the pupils at this stage show that they are capable of higher intellectual work, it is inconceivable why every one of them should be forced to spend one's time in the shoe-maker's or tinsmith's workshop?

If Universal literary education is a mistake, it does not require a different logic to show that Universal Industrial training is equally a mistake. Does nature intend that all men should be manual labourers? Are all minds of the same mould? Are not the variety of aptitudes and tastes to be turned to account by being provided with appropriate opportunities to develop? Why should one with a mathematical or literary turn of mind waste time, and that the best part of his life, in plying bellows or in sawing timber.

Does not a community require non-manual services? Is it justifiable to ignore such needs and waste the talents of men required for such work on the acquisition of manual skill? Not that there is no dignity or joy in slinging brawny arms, the heavy sledge, or in merrily driving the yoked team afield. But is it not unfair to 'compel' every son of man to employ his talents in what will be of comparatively little use to him in later life?

Or, again, granting that every body or girl

(continued from the previous page) of a community sacrifices some of his or her best years and attains some skill in the handicrafts, where are all the trained men to find work? Are they expected to seek work in other lands? Such industrial education will no doubt yield an abundant crop of cheap but skilled workmen for other exploiters of labour. But is that the aim of our Education?

If the theory of Universal or Compulsory training in handicrafts in the secondary and higher stages is thus psychologically, sociologically and economically untenable, is Industrial education not a corrective?

Industrial training is invaluable, nay, indispensable. But it should be given to those that have an aptitude for it. And even then in the case of such as are destined to be manual workers, training in mere handicrafts on the lines hitherto follows in the West, is considered by competent authorities to be an undesirable course. For, the more the merely mechanical education in handicrafts is given the more mechanical the men and women become. The acquisition of manual skill is no indication of human superiority. For, even brutes with mechanical training perform wonderful feats in the circuses. Nicholas Butler, the well-known American authority on Education, not long ago said: "The war has taught the lesson that...to attempt to turn education into a merely mechanical process with a purely gainful end is nothing short of treason to the highest, most uplifting and most enduring human interests."

Nor is the Industrial Education of the kind now proposed to be given of any real value as an antidote to the existing evil. The schemes so far formulated are only an imitation of those adopted in western countries. And the results of such education those countries have already begun to deplore. Such education has been given

(continued from the previous page) for instance, in England and France and this is what Mr J.C. Paton (High Master, Manchester) has recently said, speaking of Secondary Education: "The war has opened the eyes of the nation as never before to the weaknesses of our Industrial position."

The situation is not far different in France which also has had its scheme of Industrial Education:

Writing on 'Industrial Art Training,' J.P. Haney of New York says. "France and England are now doing all that they can do to conserve every ounce of their own talent and prepare it for the commercial struggle coming with Peace treaty. Indeed all European countries are doing this and information which has leaked out indicates that Germany also is doing everything possible, with selected pupils in her three score of Industrial Art Schools to enable her art industries to enter the commercial field in the shortest possible time after the peace is signed."

What then is the defect in these systems? Such education in manual work as does not enable the workman to adjust not only himself but also his craft to the changing conditions around, is bound to be a failure. It is this that has tended, to a large extent, to kill the crafts in India in spite of the high degree of skill the workmen had at one time attained. What gives vitality to industrial education is technical intelligence, in other words, scientific knowledge as applied to the different crafts, trades and industries. To quote Mr Paton again:

"What has always been clear to a few is now patent to all, viz. that without a higher standard and a wider range of scientific knowledge our nation stands to lose not only its industrial position but even its power of self-defence."

Neither mere imitation of foreign industrial

(continued from the previous page) schemes, especially those that are now considered effete, nor Universal compulsion will be of any avail. The real antidote to an overdose of literariness or bookishness, is not merely Carpentry or Smithy which only multiplies manual labourers and starves them to slow death, but the training in science and in its application to every grade and kind of handicraft and of industries. It is this factor that directly increases one's efficiency as a workman in the worldwide struggle for existence. The application of science is not, as persons ignorant of science appear to imagine, confined to industries, such as, dyeing and weaving. It enters more and more into handicrafts, like carpentry and smithy also, where the scope for the use of scientific knowledge is growing every day.

It is a truism that in the world of Education "Uniformity" is death. And when it is combined with 'compulsion' matters become worse.

Compulsion in the matter of Education is different from compulsion in the matter curricula. The latter has to be avoided as far as possible. And it is a recognition of this fundamental principle that distinguishes modern from the old. And now, it is the old system that is sought to be reimposed, as if with a vengeance, by making mere mechanical training most obligatory.

If it is realized that intelligence or understanding is basic, ie., that it enters as a common factor into the individual's success in every branch or subject of study, compulsion would be justified only in so far as it promotes the growth of this common factor. In all else, compulsion would be folly. Further, in the Secondary and Higher stages such schemes as fail to provide first and foremost for the exercise of intelligence by the application of scientific knowledge not only to industrial arts but also to handicrafts of all grades and kinds, be

(continued from the previous page) they carpentry and smithy or weaving and dyeing, or agriculture and apiculture, will lack that which is really life unto them. To ignore science as a part of such scheme is to starve intelligence, and to seek to produce automatons and slaves. But the need of the hour is not Industrial slavery but industrial self-reliance.

In other words, the evil of modern education is, as has been often said, its excess of "intellectuality." And in fighting against this evil, reformers, not infrequently mistake "intelligence" for it, and seek to kill it forgetting that it is intelligence that is the most vital part of education. And there is no greater delusion than to think that the counterpoise to literariness is mere mechanical training in Industries. Woe unto the land that relies upon industrial or technical education without science:

ONE OF INDIA'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT.
(IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS)

The Final test of Truth and its criterion:

Of what value is any philosophy if it teach us not what is true? Every school, therefore, contends that its own position is based on truth, as it is known, and that others' conclusions are either not true or only approaching the truth attained by it. And there appears to be hardly a work on philosophy which in seeking to establish its own views and in demolishing those of others, does not make use of such language as "That is untenable," "This is unsound", "That is inconceivable, "That is irrational," "That has no proof," "This gives us no satisfaction," "that is absurd", "this conveys no meaning", "This serves no purpose", "That has no value" and so forth. It therefore happens that what appears erroneous

(continued from the previous page) to one is perfectly sound to another; and what is unthinkable to one is most easily conceived by another. But when critics thus attack one another they seem to appeal to some common or recognized tribunal. And every human being behaves as though there were in him an inherent capacity to discern truth from error. Does truth then mean the same for all men? If not, is there at least a common criterion of truth? If there be no such common ground of truth, a philosophical congress would only be a vain show.

This babel of philosophies, though it has multiplied grave doubts and irreconcilable differences, has been productive of a great good. It has brought once again into proper relief the central problem of philosophy (and may I add of Religion also) – the old question: What is truth and what is its criterion? Philosophy, therefore, is not merely the love of what the ancient Greeks somewhat vaguely termed wisdom (Sophia) but the love of what the ancient Hindus specifically indicated by truth (Satyam).

Nothing, therefore, would be more easy, but nothing more useless, in philosophy than to assert, in respect of any fundamental doctrine, that a Hume or a Kant is unsound or that a Ramanuja or a Sankara is absurd without the critics's stating his own idea of truth and without examining that of the philosopher criticised.

Now, is truth only a will-o'-the-wisp enticing us to a quagmire, or a horizon that every one sees but no one reaches? That is what the vast and formidable literature that has grown around it makes one fear. Even beasts and birds seem to be instinctively capable of distinguishing the true from the false. And every man, from the philosopher down to the fool, acts as though he could instinctively know truth though he may not be able to give the meaning of it.

(continued from the previous page) Let us therefore make a start by noting how man instinctively sets about when he seeks to ascertain the truth of any belief or judgment. The question of truth does not appear to arise till a doubt arises and a doubt manifests itself only when a contradiction is felt either in thought only or in practical life (in working). As contradictions increase the need is felt for testing every piece of knowledge. And the usual method adopted for testing is to see whether one's knowledge of any fact of experience is contradicted by that of others or by one's own, at different times and under varying conditions. The absence of contradiction gives him all the assurance that is possible, which is also the underlying principle of the Scientists method of ascertaining truth. But what is not contradicted at one time may be contradicted at another time or by another person. Unless, therefore, one could consult all men and all times, one can never get at what is absolutely contradicted knowledge. This instinctive method evidently demands that truth should be characterised by universal and eternal non-contradiction. And truth of this description is presumably unattainable. From this point of view what we in the work-a-day world would call truth is not truth, but only the way to truth.

This negative principle of non-contradiction, though instinctive, does not give us anything certain, which practical life demands; nor does it do justice to the instinct which prompts the continued pursuit of truth. The positive principle of agreement is felt by many as something more tangible as well as more reliable. But even in this case if truth demands perfect agreement, such perfection is as unattainable as absolute non-contradiction, though as before, degrees of agreement are within reach. For two objects or two ideas may agree in every respect, and yet

(continued from the previous page) differ in one. Two objects must occupy two different places and two ideas two different moments. Absolute agreement or non-difference is therefore impossible. This principle of agreement has been weighed in other respects also and found wanting. Based on it a number of theories have been suggested. The "copy", "correspondence" "compresence," "coherence" or "consistency" and the "harmony" theories as well as those of "workability" and mutual "adaptation" and "determination", with a view to the attainment of particular ends, all holds good, each in respect of a body of facts applicable to it. But that, as a universally satisfactory interpretation, every one of them has failed is too well-known to need further comment here.

As the correspondence theory has a hold on a very large number of men, we may glance at it before leaving this part of the subject. Originally it was supposed that there was a correspondence between ideas and objects. But the impossibility of establishing the truth of such a connection led to a modification which says that the correspondence exists only between relations. The relation between two ideas A and B in a judgement, is said to correspond to the relation between two objects A and B. But this does not in the least improve matters. For, we have no means of knowing the relation between the objects A and B nor between the idea A and the object A, and the idea B and the object B.

Having started with a reference to relations in judgments or beliefs we are naturally led to make further enquiries into the psychological implications, leaving for a moment the logical.

Psychology reveals some other aspects of truth such as "effort" and "satisfaction." Satisfaction implies a cessation of effort when the end is reached. Men almost universally rely upon

(continued from the previous page) satisfaction as the safest guide in their quest. But what satisfied a fool does not satisfy a philosopher. And it is because satisfaction is considered a criterion, that we have so many conflicting philosophies and religions; for, when satisfaction is felt it is often believed that the end has been reached, as in the case of the mystic and the man of religion. Satisfaction by itself is therefore the most unreliable of guides. The question, then is whether and, if so, under what conditions satisfaction could be considered a test or a criterion of truth? Efforts or mental motion is sometimes taken as a basic principle and theories of "workability", "mental determination" and so forth are formulated. But they fail, as is well-known to students of philosophy, when we find that truths exist, whose workability, etc. cannot be tested as contemplated by the theories.

Here in passing we may refer also the two psycho-metaphysical tests. "Conceivability" is found to land us in a world of uncertainties and inconsistencies. The 'inconceivability of the opposite' is limited in its application to the existence of the self only.

Since effort and satisfaction are further resolvable, we may probe a little deeper and ask what constitutes truth, i.e. what the contents of truth-concept are. An epistemological analysis of true knowledge gives us, at least four elements: (1) consciousness, or better, awareness; (2) content or object of awareness; (3) effort to comprehend it so as to get a meaning and (4) feeling of satisfaction. Awareness cannot be further resolved. And to the characteristics we shall refer in the sequel. Content or object may be what is called purely mental, characterised by internality or it may be material, considered as external.

ONE OF INDIA'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT

The effort to comprehend aims at a 'meaning.' We get a 'meaning' when what is believed to be foreign to, or different from consciousness or what was hidden from consciousness, is presented to it in terms of consciousness itself, or, in other words, is somehow converted to or assimilated (as some Indian philosophers would have it) to the same essence or stuff or nature or order to which consciousness itself belongs. Further, till we know the 'meaning' we feel that we are not on firm ground. With the realization of the meaning comes a feeling of assurance or certainty. When the full meaning is attained, i.e. when the assimilation is complete, the effort ceases and what is known as satisfaction ensues.

But in seeking to understand 'meaning' we take it for granted that an object different from or foreign to consciousness is translated into terms of thought or consciousness. If this be actually done, how are we to account for doubt or error? For, whatever is in consciousness and is of the same nature cannot but be known beyond doubt. Further, if knowledge consists in comprehending the contents of one's own mind what need is there for an 'effort' to know? Or, is the process of translation defective? For an answer to these questions we have to go to Metaphysics also.

The business of truth is to help thought to comprehend reality. If thought does not present Reality as Reality, to whatever extent it be, thought ceases to be true. Is such presentation by thought possible?

When we say that $2\frac{3}{4}$ is the same as 8, or that carbon is the Same as diamond, we prove the truth of our statement by converting $2\frac{3}{4}$ into 8 or 8 into $2\frac{3}{4}$, or by converting carbon into diamond or diamond into carbon. Or, both may be reduced to some common denomination or basic substance. The truth of their non-difference

(continued from the previous page) can be proved beyond all doubt only at a stage when their duality ceases. If truth is to reveal reality it can do so only when either of the two existents is converted to the other, when duality must cease or when both are converted to a third which must also evidently be common to the two and therefore non-dual. With non-duality alone comes absolute certainty. So long as there are dual existences such as thought and reality (as content of thought), no proof of truth is possible.

But truth is dependent on Reality as it is obliged to follow and reveal it. Reality determines thought, and is the pries of thought. It is independent and stands in its own right while thought is dependent on it. What gives validity to Truth is Reality. If the two factors have, therefore, to forego their dual existence to make proof of truth possible, it is 'thought' that has either to cease to exist or transform itself into Reality. But truth implies thought and if thought ceases to exist or commits suicide there can be no question of truth at all. If, on the other hand, thought is made dominant and Reality subservient, which often happens when imagination or fancy is specially active, we do not get at truth.

We have here, then, to face a dilemma. So long as thought and reality are there as dual existences no truth is possible. When thought alone or Reality alone exists, no truth is possible. This situation arises because of the static view that is taken of truth. Truth, however, is an effort, a process. It is a passing over of thought to Reality.

In truth-seeking, therefore, thought has but one course open to it and that is to so identify itself ultimately with reality as to make itself indistinguishable from Reality. Ultimately then, Truth or true thought is Reality. And several

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(continued from the previous page) thousands of years ago the Indian philosophers appear to have seen that the end of truth or the highest truth as it is sometimes called is not different from Reality and therefore used the same word "Satyam" to denote truth as well as reality.

Let us, further, see what the Scientist does in discovering his truth or reality. He does not start by laying down that what he proposes to discover is so and so. His reality or truth is independent and his knowledge has to conform itself to the result which may be what he did not expect at all. And the precaution he takes is the elimination of the errors due to what is called personal equation, i.e. the thought and feelings of individuals. A perfectly open mind without prejudices of any kind is what he wants as an absolute condition for knowing truth. In other words, he eliminates the play of individual emotion, will and desire, as far as possible. This also exactly is the method of sadhana laid down for the pursuit of truth by Indian philosophers, like Sankara, who put it in the language of Religion. For, in their days, Religion was mixed up with Philosophy, This is identically the course prescribed at the beginning of Sankara's Bhashya, under Sadhanachatushtaya. Of the four items referred to here, only the last has a religious character, the other three being purely philosophical or scientific. Truth thus ascertained shows that Reality is best known by so concentrating and directing thought as to make it follow implicitly Reality and disclose the fact that thought and Reality are not ultimately two different existences for, then alone, 'meaning' or 'interpretation' or 'revelation' of object or content, is possible.

Why should we use a negative term non-dual? Why not say that Unity, as it is understood in the West, is truth, as has been done by some

(continued from the previous page) European philosophers who speak of 'monism' 'wholeness' or 'individuality' or 'Absolute' as truth or reality? A little thought would show that unity is in fact duality. For when we think of Unity, there are two; thinker and the idea of Unity thought about. Further in truth-seeking, we proceed from the known to the unknown (not the unknowable) in terms of the known. It is the march of thought towards the not-known. Truth always implies, therefore, a negative. Further, the whole and the part, the individual and the many, or the relative and the absolute, is duality, though described differently. And as has been shown, truth is impossible in any kind of duality, however qualified. But without duality there can be no thought of an approach to Reality and no question of truth whatever. Whenever any intellectual process makes for a negation of different and duality there is an approach to truth and wherever there is an implication of duality, in whatever form, there is room for doubt and error. Truth is only an effort or a process at negating duality, non-duality being the ultimate test and characteristic of truth.

Further Metaphysical enquiry reveals the applicability of this same test of truth to what is known as mediate knowledge which implies the existence of external objects. It also shows how the sense of certainty arises in us in respect of our perceptual knowledge (pratyaksham) and inferential knowledge (Anumanam).

Pratyaksham:— There can be no knowledge where there is no awareness or consciousness. And consciousness implies a content or object, mental or material. What distinguishes this awareness from its content or object is that the latter is changing while the former notes the changes and co-ordinates them. This co-ordinating awareness, which implies invariability, functions as subject with reference both

(continued from the previous page) to the content and the external object. This awareness is what is known to me most intimately and therefore most certainly. And I call it Reality. I know of nothing else so intimate and so certain, and which functions as subject so that I could call it also real. The content or object which is bound by time, space and causality and therefore of a different order, is not the same as reality.

'Reality' is used in other senses also. Whatever is perceived is real: whatever exists is real: what is perfect is real: whatever changes is real and so on. All these, however, when analysed, seem to agree in this that, that on which thought ultimately rests is real. But that, we say, is awareness, for all thought presupposes it.

Truth is one's thought of reality. And validity of truth is determined by reality. But in Pratyaksham we consider that thought to be truth that reveals not merely the reality called subject but the content or object which is other than reality. And the question is: how does this sense of truth in respect of what is other than real arise? What is it that gives one the feeling of certainty in respect of this truth of Pratyaksham? Can what is not-real determine any validity of truth?

Now we know but one truth, that is, truth in respect of the reality which is awareness or subject. This feeling of truth is ever-present in thought. Wherever there is thought, there is awareness, this reality, and this sense of truth. Even when one thinks of the content or object, there is this awareness and this sense of truth, from which no thought can free itself. Hence this sense of truth is underlying the thought of the object or content also.

This awareness is called Atman and it is Atman's

(continued from the previous page) truth that is manifesting itself as the truth of Pratyaksham and gives it validity. And Truth, we have seen already, lies in the negation of duality. Reality or Atman is known only by negating the duality of existence, from which follows the truth which implies the negation of the duality of thought and matter.

Turning to Anumanam, one sees smoke at a distance and infers fire. The object here is to establish the truth of the existence of an unseen and unknown object 'fire.' But truth is what reveals Reality, the ever-existing and the most certain of entities. Can there be, then, truth of an unseen and unknown object? Though this is an impossibility, yet we have the sense of truth in regard to Anumanam and it is also considered to be valid. Whence does this arise? It is again the ever-present Awareness or Atman that gives the sense of truth and validity to thought in Anumanam.

But in Pratyaksham, there is, at least, an object. Here there is not even that, What makes us believe in the existence of fire, which we do not see or which may be found not to exist at all? We say that there must be fire, for wherever there is smoke there is fire. But how shall we hold this when we have not seen all the smoke and all the fire in the world, in the past, present and future? This notion of universality and invariability of relation must have its source somewhere in our knowledge. It is not to be found in the content or object which is bound by time and space. It must evidently have come from the subject, awareness or Atman, which is present as subject in every act of thought, including the thought in Anumanam, that gives one the feeling of existence in regard to unseen objects associated with existing objects. And the truth of the existence of Atman lies in the negation of duality.

The nature of error and doubt has not been considered here. It may, however, be sufficient for the purposes of this paper to note, as has been already indicated, that where there is duality, i.e. where thought and reality are considered as dual existences there is room for doubt and error. And where the test of truth is not applied to existences other than real or other than real and unreal, there is error. These, however, relate to the subject of reality. But the self-contradiction in which thought entangles itself, for the reason that thought implies reality which is non-dual and yet seeks to view it as different, is a prolific source of error.

Next in the application of this non-dualistic¹⁹ test to the knowledge of particular groups of facts or subjects, varying and appropriate adjustments will be necessary, as for instance in the case of the physicist, the chemist, the historian, the logician or the lawyer and so forth. The adjustment is governed by special laws determined by the nature of each province. Such laws, which are sometimes called truths, of one subject may contradict those of another. But they do not vitiate the truth within their respective provinces. The contradictions may, however, be explained by a more comprehensive law or may prove false from a higher point of view. Similarly there are many contradictions in the entire practical world which is called Vyavaharika and in which we do not consider ultimate truth and reality. The co-existence of contradictions like "Rest and Motion", "Sat and Asat", "Truth and Error," "Particular and Universal", "one and many" "Divisibility and indivisibility" and so on, is well known. A reconciliation of these contradictions of Vyvahara is not possible from the standpoint of Vyvahara. But when we go to the place of non-duality, i.e. take the view-point of Paramartha, we find a solution.

¹⁹ The original editor added ndash by hand

If the ascertainment of truth be so difficult and truth itself so complicated as to place it beyond the reach of even the most learned and acute of men, how does it happen that every human being possesses the capacity to know truth? And if truth were altogether unknown, how are we to account for the existence in man of the idea of the pursuit of truth. In the absence of suitable adjustments appropriate to the nature of subjects, the instinctive test may fail in respect of particular facts. All the same, the universal existence of the truth-instinct cannot be doubted. Philosophers may study, scan, analyse, apply successfully or do what they can with the concept of truth. They may also see what obstacles prevent the application²⁰ of the test, and even remove them. But they cannot create the sense or faculty to know truth. All these attempts presuppose the existence of the sense of truth in all men. Before the oldest known philosophers of the world, like the Vedic Rishis for instance, there must have lived hundreds of generations of men who went in quest of truth. And the inherited wisdom of the Vedic ages says that truth is such that often the learned miss it, while the unlearned find it, and that he who thinks that he knows it, knows it not, while he who thinks that he knows it not, knows it. Does this not mean that the capacity to know truth has no bearing on the vastness of learning or on the consciousness of the test or theory of truth, but that all mankind alike possess the capacity?

The intellectually great may know the applications of truth to a thousand subjects. But the truth instinct cannot but be natural to one and all. If so, its criterion must also be universal.

Now, is this test of non-duality merely²¹ theoretical with no reference to reality or life? The

²⁰ The original editor marked correction its not clear?

²¹ "merely" was typed above the line and inserted with an arrow.

(continued from the previous page) answer is that it has the firmest basis in experience. Its entire validity is derived from reality. In regard to such questions the divorce between theory and practice, between intellectuality and life, between logic and experience, is very common. The reason, according to Indian philosophers, is not far to seek. To draw correct inferences it is necessary to have all the data. Fractional data yield only partly correct inferences. To get a complete and correct view of truth, the totality of experience should be considered. Part of experience gives only partial truth. Man's experience covers not only what is called the waking state, but also the dream and the deep sleep.

European Philosophy which confines itself to the data of the waking state finds that logical truth and practical truth are at variance. But the Vedanta that co-ordinates the three states, reconciles all differences, Non-duality is universally experienced in one of the states, i.e. deep sleep. And it is a fact of facts.

Does truth, then, point to a blank of the nature of deep sleep? Can anything be more absurd? Taken by itself it would certainly be a blank. But co-ordinated with the other two states it is something (not nothing) from which differentiated thought proceeds as in the waking or the dream states. Life does not cease in deep sleep. The experience of all the three states gives us the totality of one's knowledge.

When we ask for a criterion we only ask for a fact of universal experience for that is the highest court of appeal. And the criterion for non-dualist's truth is not the fractional waking experience, but the totality of experience called Anubhava in its threefold aspect.

No theory of truth can be complete and convincing without discussion of the subject of reality.

(continued from the previous page) But the limitations of time prevent further enquiry here. All that is aimed at is only to point to the existence of an original Indian test of truth and its criterion, living their examination to others.

To sum up:— As has been shown above the Advaitic school fully recognises the validity of every other theory of truth in so far as each of them is applicable to practical life. But it is found on examination that in every case the criterion is vitiated by contradictions. Nevertheless they are valid for practical life called Vyavahara. These Vyavaharika truths derive their validity or certitude from the ultimate or Paramarthika truth of non-duality. The Vyavaharika truths are but approaches or processes suggesting the highest or Paramarthika truth.

While it is the Paramarthika truth that gives the character of certitude to Vyavaharika truths, it gives them their validity only as Vyavaharika or practical truths. Practical truths do not impart any validity to the ultimate or Paramarthika truth. It has its own validity because it is non-dual.

Non-duality is the ultimate test and characteristic of truth. Its criterion is 'totality' of experience, i.e. Anubhava based on avastatraya. This answers to the description of truth given by the oldest known philosophers of the world, the Vedic Rishis.

Where there are not two existents (things or thoughts), (1) there is no possibility of contradiction, (2) There does not arise the impossibility of perfect agreement. (3) There can be no thought of the possibility of any doubt arising. (4) There can be no room for anything to be desired for or any want of satisfaction. (5) There are in it the characteristics of Universality and eternity. (6) In as much as it is

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(continued from the previous page) based on fact or experience, i.e. a thought is inseparable from fact called reality, there is found in it the characteristic of necessity.

(7) There is the fulfilment of the instinctive negative test of truth. (8) And above all, there we find a reconciliation of whatever is true in all the philosophies, i.e. whatever is true for the Vyavaharika or practical world. For, it negates duality without negating reality and its validity is not antithetical to that of any other truth.

This test of non-duality is said to be the final or the supreme test, or as Sankara calls it, the Antya Pramanam, which is the subject of this paper.

I leave it to you to say whether there is any such idea of a 'final' or 'supreme' test of truth in any other system. Here, in brief outline, has been given the Advaitin's theory of truth on which is based his much maligned Mayavada.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS AT THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS. 1927.
Bombay.²²

Before we proceed to the main item of to-day's business, the reading of papers and their discussion, may I with your permission make a few preliminary observations of a general character on the latest work done in the field of Indian thought and on the criticisms made thereon. Excellent histories of philosophy have been written, to which such highly appreciative references were made yesterday, and critical studies of individual systems, topics, or authors have also been published. The most notable event, however, is the venture to bring out an encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophy, some of the splendid volumes of which have already appeared. But this is neither the place nor the occasion for reviewing them. Suffice to say that the work done so far has

²² The original editor inserted "1927. Bombay." By hand

(continued from the previous page) yielded results of immense value. There is, however, a point in respect of the criticism on them, which I think deserves our consideration. The greater emphasis that has been laid on language, the dress that thought wears, than on thought itself has, to some extent, as it appears to me also, diverted the course of enquiry from the main objective of philosophical studies, namely, the rational pursuit of Ultimate Truth. Though the work turned out is of very great interest to the historian, to the theologian and to the man of pure letters, yet the student of philosophy feels somewhat disappointed. Competent critics have held in respect of these labours that we in India still find delight in turning out the kind of work that our ancestors turned out during what may be characterised as the most stagnant period of the history of our speculative thought. For the past at least seven hundred years after the six Darsanas or systems were formulated, we have been employing our best talents not in giving to the world a seventh or an eighth Darsana but in interpreting and re-interpreting the words of our forefathers, including the 'words' of the ancient Srutis and building up a Vedantic or a logical technique chiefly suited for purposes of discussion appropriate to each school of word-interpretation, which generally goes by the name of Indian philosophy at present. We have been lost, they say, in admiration for the skill that we have developed in squeezing the texts of antiquity and in pursuing a kind of argumentation which is held in perpetual bondage to scriptures and which is becoming the despair of impartial thinkers outside the Vedantic world. This continuance of the enslavement of our mind to 'words' and the charms of their authority has, as the critics say, made it well-nigh impossible

(continued from the previous page) for us to realise what is meant by freedom of thought, the very soul of philosophy. As interpreters of scriptures we have elaborated distinguished schools of theology or mystic religion, which has no doubt roused the curiosity of many a western theologian or mystic. But turning to philosophy proper, some of our most recent critics ask: What are the special additions or the distinctive contributions of value which India alone has made to the world's rational pursuit of Truth? Our activities till now have been only such as to show that we also have achieved what thinkers in other parts of the world have. But the question is: What have we attained to which others have not, in the world of pure philosophy. There is much to admire in India as in many other countries. But what is there to learn from her which we cannot get elsewhere?

It will perhaps be said that in the light of the work done by well-known western oriental scholars, more examinations and estimates are being made now than were possible at any time in the past. But here we must distinguish between the western scholar and the western philosopher though the two may be occasionally combined into one. To the scholar the study of words is certainly of greater consequence. And he naturally studies words in all their bearings. And his love of originality sometimes sets him in opposition to what we call the traditional interpretation. In following such a scholar we sometimes lose ourselves in the maze of words, the cue, namely, the importance which the philosopher attaches to thought, whichever the language used, being often missed.

Let me refer to three or four instances to illustrate what I say. I shall confine myself to such cases as have received the imprimatur of some of the best authorities in oriental scholarship.

It has been declared (1) that Gaudapada was a Buddhist or that he was more Buddhist than Vedantic in his outlook, or that he at least drew his inspiration from the teachings of Buddhists (2) that Sankara, though he appeared to denounce Buddhism, was himself a Buddhist in his convictions; (3) that Sankara, the author of the commentary on Gaudapa, is different from Sankara, the commentator on Badarayana; (4) that Sankara believed in the reality, though of a lower degree or kind, of the external world and (5) that some of the Buddhists believed in an Ultimate Existent Entity which they called Sunya. Arguments drawn from the study of "words" do, no doubt, lend support to the above inference, though others draw inferences of a different kind based on literary, historical or linguistic grounds. But, all that concerns primarily the Oriental Congress; our business here is with philosophic evaluation of the data that the scholars give us. Now Gaudapada's thought, as a system, as a consistent whole, is altogether inexplicable on any Buddhist basis, whereas it is possible to see soundness in it, only in the light of the Vedantic Advaita. Neither does mere agreement in some common ideas prove that one has borrowed from another. Nor does it follow that because men in the same philosophic atmosphere agree up to a certain stage that their goals are not different. These points have been discussed by Gaudapada and Sankara themselves. The former most clearly indicates in the last chapter of the Karika what his position is as distinguished from that of the Buddhist. Again, the Nirguna Brahman of Sankara in which there is no Maya, or which has no relation to Maya, cannot be rationally or philosophically derived from Sankara's sutra Bhashya alone. To do so, the Sutra Bhashya has to fall back upon Sruti or Yoga Samadhi, i.e. mystic

(continued from the previous page) trance, which, though of very great spiritual value, is not of much consequence in the world of rational enquiry. For, how do we know that what the Srutis say, or what the Yogi or the Mystic experiences is truth and the highest truth? As Sankara himself points out and Anandagiri explains, the Sutra Bhasya takes the student of philosophy only up to a certain stage after which it is Sankara's commentary on Gaudapada's Karika that is the Advaitin's guide to Ultimate Truth. In other words, Sutra Bhasya and Karika Bhasya form an indivisible whole or unity. And though enquiry based on 'words' may lead one to the inference that Sankara, the commentator on Badarayana's Sutras is different from Sankara, the commentator on Gaudapada's Karika, making the former Sankara a kind of idealist and the latter a type of realist, yet a study of Sankara's thought, as a systematic whole, points to the utter futility of the attempts made to prove that the two commentators are different persons.

Similarly, if the word 'Reality' is understood in Sankara's sense, the least trace of reality, of whatever degree of kind, found in the objective world or in anything created by Brahman makes it impossible to establish, as a philosophical truth Sankara's eternal and absolute non-duality of Brahman, that is, that nothing but pure Brahman exists at all times. Our modern authors, relying upon the strength of their knowledge of words or language, sometimes see that they have to face an irreconcilable situation in having to explain the existence of Maya and of a Mithya Prapancha (illusory world) to tide over which they clutch at Mysticism or Yoga and seek to justify Sankara's position. This feat only proclaims the more loudly to the world that such Vedanta, whatever be its merits in the mystic world, leads but to a blind alley in philosophy.

(continued from the previous page) That it has little value as a path leading to Ultimate Reality on rational grounds is most trenchantly put by Lord Ronaldshay and others of his school.

Turning to the Buddhist, let alone his mystic experiences for a while. How has he proved, as a philosophic enquirer, the existence of any Ultimate Reality? That question does not appear to have been answered by the Oriental scholar.

The excess to which this infatuation for words, which relegates substance or content to the back-ground, is carried, is best illustrated by translations like "The touch of Untouch" used in some interpretations, the attempt to understand which expression has baffled some of the best students of philosophy in my part of India.

I shall not waste your precious time by references to any of the many articles which are based upon sentimental or poetic fantasies which have a most powerful fascination for mystics, but which do not conform to the requirements of rational truth, though they wear the mask of philosophy.

Let it not be understood that I deprecate the study of "words" or that I underestimate the importance of 'Language' as a vehicle of thought. And no scholar studies words apart from their meaning. But here I only appeal to those whose aim is philosophic truth, to shift the emphasis from language to thought—not thought in sections isolated from each other, which every scholar, nay everyone, does and which may really suffice for other than philosophic purposes—but thought as consistent whole and in its bearings upon truth. Gaudapada and Sankara state their view in regard to philosophic interpretation in Karika II—30. First, truth indicating the underlying unity of thought must

(continued from the previous page) be got at and then should the attempt be made to interpret so as to be in harmony with such truth.

So far as my limited knowledge goes, Gaudapada appears to have been the first Vedantin of historical times to have seriously considered the most significant fact that every school of philosophy, nay everyone, who has a philosophy of any kind, holds that his own view is ultimately true or nearest to the Ultimate Truth, though he sees that others are equally strong in their conviction that theirs is the highest truth. For centuries have the theological Vedantins fought, each claiming to possess the key to truth. So have theologians done all the world over. But it is not clear whether it has occurred to them to ask first what truth is so that they may afterwards test the truth of their own beliefs and of their own interpretations of the scriptures.

It is being recognised more and more in modern philosophy that the first question of importance that one has to find an answer for is, "what is the meaning and nature of Truth and of Ultimate Truth" so that we could explain the whole of life. As the ancient Indian thinkers hold, Ultimate Truth is that which explains all that exists; it is that which gives us a point of view from which not only religious life but also scientific pursuits or rather all phenomena, social, moral, mental, physical and others, get a consistent explanation. How to get at an Ultimate Truth of this kind was the problem that Gaudapada and Sankara over a thousand years ago set before themselves, so that such truth may be a guidance to men in this world. In fact, this part of their thought appears to me to be their greatest contribution to philosophy and to philosophical interpretation.

Now, have our modern investigators applied such a truth-test to the systems interpreted or

(continued from the previous page) examined by them, or have they merely taken words or passages here and there and interpreted them independently of it? As you all know the main thread that appears to run in all devious ways through the entire history of Indian thought including the atheistic, the agnostic and the nihilistic schools, is the thread of the evolution of the concept of Truth. And yet have we not remained far too long in the leading strings of "word-interpreters," unable to assert our right to pursue Truth independently, in spite of the philosophic searchlight that thinkers like Gaudapada and others before them placed in our hands centuries ago? It is not meant to argue here that the authority of the Sruti or the importance of interpreting its words is of no value. They serve a purpose of their own and that a no mean purpose. But they can have no place in philosophy, though such interpreters may be ranked among the foremost in the world of scholars, in the absence of independent and previous rational enquiry into the meaning of Truth. And to what extent our modern interpretations have failed in this respect, to that extent I believe our critics to be in the right.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am aware that we may not all be able to see eye to eye with one another in respect of what I have said. Yet I presume that we are all agreed on the one point that our aim must be such that the net result of our activities should show, by drawing a clear line between the work of the scholar and that of the philosopher, whether India, past and present, could make any addition of value to the world's stock of philosophical knowledge, i.e. knowledge based upon a rational study of Truth and Ultimate Truth.

EDUCATIONAL EFFICIENCY.
(In Mysore Economic Journal)

“The question is whether the instruction shall be simply good or good for Something.”

Reforms in almost every branch of education are being introduced or proposed for adoption, all over India. Undoubtedly valuable as are such measures, they cannot make for any real progress, so long as they lack in the fundamental factors of efficiency. It is not the efficiency of the administrative or the tutorial element, but that of the system or the courses of study that is referred to here. Now, in what does this educational virtue consist? “The efficiency-value of a school education to-day,” writes Thisleton Mark “consists in this:—It must bring the scholars up to date.. It must give the pupils an adaptability and suppleness of mind which shall put them on the quivive for new occasions and the arising of new duties.” Or, as President Butler of America says, “The first question to be asked of any course of study is, Does it lead to a knowledge of contemporary Civilization? If not, it is neither efficient nor liberal. In society as it exists to-day the dominant note running through all our struggles and problems is economic.” Dr Kerschensteiner, the great German authority who has been preaching the Gospel of “productive work” as the most efficient means of Education, lays down that, “the first duty in all education is to encourage each individual to realize his own work and strengthen his powers of devoting to it all his intelligence and all his might.” Viewed from this standpoint, exclusive Sanskrit or Vernacular Education having no bearing on the battle of life of our own times, which is so often advocated even now, though very good in its own way, is manifestly inefficient. And no greater proof is needed than the miserable plight and the abject dependence that characterise

(continued from the previous page) the life of the majority of the followers of this system. Again, a Technical or Industrial an Elementary or Secondary Education scheme, however excellent from an academic point of view, cannot lay claim to efficiency, so long as it does not assure itself that the son so educated will be better able to turn to account life's opportunities presenting themselves under new conditions than the father uneducated. How far have the existing schemes succeeded in increasing in the majority their earning capacity and self-reliance? If they have contributed to economic progress why are our own industrial schools languishing?

Now, before considering the positive means for the attainment of such efficiency, it is necessary to say a word as to some of the great obstacles in the way, which in the form of old notions or prejudices still possess men's minds, particularly in this country. Among the misleading doctrines that dominate their minds may be mentioned a few. (a) "Learning for Learning's sake." (b) "Educational work not to be judged by the results." (c) "General Education before Vocational."

(a) At that stage of world's progress when all letters were confined to the clergy or the priests or to a small section of the community, it was well to preach that knowledge should be sought for her own sake. And such students as devoted themselves solely to learning were fed and clothed, their families too, by the state or the community. Whereas, we are now living in the age of "Compulsory" or "Universal" Education. And if every one is to learn for learning's sake, without any thought of his or her children's bread, wherefrom is the means of maintenance to come? Even now, the few, the microscopic few, who can command the requisite

(continued from the previous page) means of respectable living and also, what is more, the necessary leisure, may pursue knowledge for her own sake. But for the majority, a majority that is almost co-extensive with the whole of a community, education cannot but be a means of securing all that is necessary to make life possible in this world. For them, an educational scheme, however perfect psychologically and pedagogically, if divorced from economic utility, is meaningless, not to say pernicious.

(b) A direct descendant of this doctrine is the other one which says "Judge not educational work by the results." Its latest and most eloquent application is found in the new Secondary School-Leaving Certificate Scheme of Madras.

Every educational system has to satisfy the claims of more parties than one: the state, the pupil, the teacher and the parent. Each views the subject from his or its own standpoint and condemns it according as it affects each. And the din of the clash of interests sometimes so frightens educationists as to make them seek a safe retreat behind the walls of such doctrines. The School Final Certificate Scheme does not tell a pupil, to speak literally, where he is or what he is, at the end of the Sixth Form course. He may obtain 60 per cent of the marks and be a most successful prizeman too. Nevertheless he must go back to the class, and like the beast in the field, chew the cud by reading the same subject over and over; and that for years, till the parent is either tired of keeping him on, or till his means are exhausted. True, an enlightened and well-to-do parent may easily know the situation and give his son a desirable change. But the poor and the ignorant father or mother, what is he or she to do when the educationist complacently says "Do what you will with your son; I cannot say what I have made of him;

(continued from the previous page) our work is not indicated by any results." Perhaps the greatest of all sins of educational policy is such a waste of one of the most valuable of economic assets, human energy, particularly the energy of the youth of the land.

(c) To cite one more instance. People have been long habituated to a mistake against which even one who is no educationist, Sir Robert Giffen, repeatedly warns his readers in his well known work on Statistics. It is the mistake of thinking that 'literacy' is the same as 'Education'. Many still believe that the three R's constitute real education. The old-school educationist is satisfied with the production of 'literate' or penmen, while modern conditions require not mere 'penmanship', nor even "manual dexterity, as some Practical Instruction theorists hold, but 'productive workmanship! It must be born in mind that productive work is not necessarily manual or mechanical work. And Prof. Du Bois Reymond's enquiries have shown that 'inventive productivity is determined not merely by the high proportion of literates in a country but by other factors. "Aim at utility and if the training be thorough no small amount of general culture will be secured as a by-product." Let vocational take precedence of the general education. Such is the modern view.

Having thus obtained some idea of the obstacles, we may turn to the constructive measures for efficiency.

1. What has contributed to the vigour or vitality of the 'contemporary civilizations' of our day? Their culture and their economic resources. And what has been the chief stimulus to their culture and their Economic development? The answer in a nutshell is "Their knowledge of the Sciences." In his Presidential address for 1914, at the British Association, Professor John Perry,

(continued from the previous page) said: "There is a lesson for England and indeed for all European races, in the recent history of Japan. The old structure of Japan was in many ways beautiful but it proved to be without...strength...Even the teachers of ancient classics saw that for strength it was necessary to let scientific method permeate the thought of the whole population....And now, at the end of the first chapter of Japan's modern history we find a nation which can not only defend itself, but which retains all of its spiritual life which was beautiful. Every unit of the population is getting an increased love for Natural Science so that it can reason clearly; it is not carried away by charlatans; it retains its individuality." Now, this is what Dr Perry says to Europeans who are so much ahead of us in scientific learning. Need it be said that it applies with a hundred-fold force to us in this country? One of the most important measures, therefore, to be efficient is to make the systematic teaching of science a compulsory and integral part of the curricula, from the lowest village school to the highest college class.

2. If, in the democratic age in which we are living, one of our highest aims is to make every member of the population a source of strength and not of weakness, he or she must first learn to know and to do, what is called 'productive' work, as has been pointed out. Till this problem is seriously tackled and solved, the introduction of Compulsory education cannot be fully justified. And education that gives only aspirations but does not provide also the means of satisfying them is, as has been often said, a dangerous one. In a word, one of the most urgent needs is the proper harnessing of the youthful energy available in the land, which is now running to waste. It can only be done by special curricula in which 'productive' work and 'vocational' study find

(continued from the previous page) proper place, the purely literary studies being assigned a subsidiary one, excepting in the lowest stages.

3. Our country has produced eminent lawyers, lawgivers, judges, administrators, poets, scholars, mathematicians and philosophers. Yet, in spite of all such fruits of education or enlightenment, we have not been able to rise above famine and want and disease. We have not acquired that "adaptability and suppleness of mind" that is characteristic of efficient nations. We cannot easily move out of our old grooves. And perhaps the greatest of our weaknesses is our inability to appreciate the value of Time. To the few that live for the sake of knowledge, time may be of little consequence. But to the great majority of us "Time is money" and Time is the measure of life. And yet how few know it? How many suffer for want of this kind of education, which is called business training? The days are come when a man of business-habits, an alert and active person, is required not only for the merchant's shop, or the Government's Secretariat, or the Judicial, Revenue or Financial services, but also for every professional or industrial concern. Some of our B.A.'s and M.A.'s have proved failures in life owing to their inability to adapt themselves to changed conditions. We want, therefore, not only ideals of 'efficiency' of the modern type to be placed before the young but also the training to apply their knowledge to any walk of life. To explain: we want the young man to learn not only the rules of Arithmetic but also their application to life's work, so as to be able to ascertain gains and losses, i.e. to keep accounts in the right way, be he raiyat, be he goldsmith, be he merchant, be he householder or lawyer, be his profession of calling what it may. We want a training that will enable one to manage on economic and modern likens, the business of a farm, a household, a state office, or a factory.

(continued from the previous page) We want men who could easily turn their hands to any allied occupation.

Now such a training is partly to be had in what are nowadays called "Commercial Schools." People often labour under the misapprehension that a "Commercial School" is meant for the merchant's son or the merchant's clerk or accountant. But in its broadest sense it is an institution intended for general 'business' training. Our curricula of studies, so far as they concern at least those that do not enter the university, should, therefore, contain a business element in it; or, as it is sometimes put, the course of studies should, to a certain extent, be "commercialized."

These are not all the factors, though they are some of the most important, that are likely to make for educational efficiency, in this country in particular.

FIRST STEPS IN COMMERCIAL AWAKENING.

Multiplication of wants: Who does not know the simple fact that with the advance of civilization our ideas of life undergo changes and our wants multiply? To the men who, a generation ago, would be perfectly satisfied with a single cumbli for their dress, a coat and a turban at least have now become indispensable. There is not a living house in the land but feels every day the need for matches. The old palm-leaf has altogether disappeared with the introduction of the modern paper, pen and ink. Even in the remotest villages kerosine lights have been usurping the place of vegetable oil lamps. Such changes are far too many and far too common to need any special mention. And, if one looks a little deeper one finds that a coat implies not merely cloth and varieties of it to suit different tastes, and a tailor to make it, but also needle and thread and buttons, which have all to be procured.

(continued from the previous page) Similarly, pen, paper, and every other item implies the need for other links in the chain of production.

Again, with an increase in the size of every family, the greater is the need felt not only for food but also for clothing and for those articles which have crept into use under changed conditions of life.

Need for commercial activities: Further, as there are some articles, like kerosene oil, which we can, by no effort of ours, produce in this country, and which must be supplied to us by others, so there are some things which other people require and which they cannot, or do not produce but which we can supply to them, not only making some profit, but also enlarging the field of employment.

Consequences of neglect. If, then, with the growth of our wants we do not ourselves develop the means of satisfying them, at least two serious consequences follow:-

- (1) Others must and do supply to us the articles that we require and make as much profit as they can;
- (2) So long as others do for us what we ourselves should, we do not feel inclined to change from the occupations of our forefathers and we cannot all of us find new and profitable employment. When we lose the gains that we could keep or make, we, as a community, though not as individuals grow poorer and poorer.

It is also evident that we, as a community grow weaker morally, in that we become habituated to a life of helpless dependence on others.

Need for business knowledge: The increasing multiplicity of human wants and the introduction of the Railway, the Steamship, the Telegraph, the postal and the Banking systems, and the development of other modern facilities for commerce have brought various peoples and nations into touch with one another. The business of the tradesman

(continued from the previous page) has thus grown complex and demands for its success a higher order of intelligence than it did a few generations ago. And we see how many an Indian merchant is handicapped for want of a working knowledge of the principles of Exchange, Commercial Law, modern Banking, Commercial Geography, Foreign Languages, the art of Advertising and the like.

Dignity of Commercial Career. Everyone knows that as a class the richest and the most serviceable in times both of war and of peace, is generally the merchant. The largest number and the most valuable of public contributions and charities come from tradesmen. And if helping those in need is real social service, nay, noble service, is it in any sense less noble than any other kind of public service, to procure for the use and comfort of our brethren, what they stand in need of, provided it is done at the cheapest cost to them, i.e. with all the self-sacrifice possible on the part of the tradesmen? What then can we do to awaken our countrymen?

Suggestions: Commercial life in rural areas is different from that in urban centres. In the smallest hamlets hardly a single representative of the trading class is to be found, while in town there are always a number of such men, and in cities we have thousands engaged in mercantile activities of various kinds. Though in the smallest villages this class is almost absent, yet buying and selling goes on. The producers of articles, for instance agriculturists, are themselves tradesmen at least to the extent they sell what they produce. The course, to be pursued for commercial advancement is not, therefore, identical in the rural and in the urban parts. All the same, some measures for advancement may be adopted alike in both:-

1. Every adult engaged in business of any kind, should inform himself regularly of what is going on in the trade-world at home and abroad, by reading journals, magazines, books, official bulletins and other publications, or getting them read, or at least once a week.
2. Every merchant or tradesman should, according to his means, arrange to visit periodically, other places and countries, with a view to developing business.
3. Every person interested in trade, should stimulate and strengthen the desire to make enquiries as to how the prospects of one's own line of business could be improved. He should seek and get all the available information from the Director or the Department of Industries and of Commerce besides collecting such information himself, of which he should never be tired.
4. Let every Indian tradesman ponder whether it is advisable any longer to remain passive, relying upon luck or fate and whether it is not imperative to take a leaf out of the life of his brother Chinaman who so patiently trudges along the alleys and lanes of the cities with his bundles of silk on his back, despite the hardships he has to undergo in a distant land to whose customs, manners, languages and life he is an utter stranger.

COMMERCIAL EDUCATION IN INDIA. (In Mys. Econ. Jrnl)

The latest statistical abstract published by the Government of India gives under commercial Institutions, for the year 1913-14, one College and 76 schools with 3,070 pupils for all British India. And if it be remembered that over two-thirds of the number of such pupils are generally enrolled for type-writing and Short-hand and that only about a thousand bring up purely commercial subjects, and if it also be recalled that the earliest schools of this kind were started in India, a little before the year 1885 these

(continued from the previous page) figures would indicate the progress made in the course of over thirty years. Now, is this situation, which is the achievement of generation, one that India can look upon with complacency? A comparison between this country and one or two others bearing some resemblance to it would best show where we are. Let us, for this purpose, choose one nation from the East and one from the West, which were as largely agricultural, as little commercially developed and perhaps as strongly inclined philosophically as India, before they organized their commercial schools and colleges of the modern type; and let us enquire what progress they made, in this direction, in about the same period.

It may be asked, here, whether such comparison can lead to any practical issues inasmuch as developments of Education, particularly commercial and industrial, depend upon a number of other factors, economic, social and political, over which the educationist has little control. In reply, it has to be pointed out that the object is nothing more than to show what each nation has been able to do for its own advancement, whatever its circumstances in other respects. And it may set many a mind a thinking whether in India the existing conditions do not allow of further efforts being made in this field.

In Japan, "until recently, cultivation of the land formed the sole basis on which the Japanese Society rested, the sole source of Japanese wealth. Even now, the farming classes constitute 60% of the population." Before 1867 (the Meiji Era) "Japan had virtually no industries worthy of the name....The manufactured goods exported in 1870 was nil....The development of a mercantile marine did not exercise a sensible influence upon the nation's prosperity until 1884 or 1885." Turning to the west, "In Germany

(continued from the previous page) Germany was an agricultural nation occupying a position of relatively little significance in the Industrial world, though in 1910 its foreign trade was second only to that of Great Britain." And had the great war not broken out, says an English Journal, the next decade would have seen Germany in possession of one half of the entire trade of the world, the other half being divided among all the other nations of Europe, America and Asia. "The major portion of this marvellous development of Germany" says Dr Farrington, in his Commercial Education in Germany, has occurred since 1884....It the quarter of a century between 1882 and 1907, while the agricultural population decreased by 8% the industrial increased by 65% and the commercial by over 80%." Rein says:- "Germany (Prussia) at the beginning of the nineteenth century has been pictured as sleeping on the laurels of her great kind. The Germans are said to have had no father-land, their interests being in the clouds of philosophy and poetry."

Now, in India, into which commercial training on modern lines was introduced about the year 1885, as well as in Japan and Germany, indigenous commercial education of the old type was being given from very early times. But the first modern school of commerce was started in the Land of the Rising Sun in 1875. And as Dr Johnson, Dean of the School of Commerce, New York University says, "The supremacy of Germany in Commercial Education is as generally conceded as her high place in commerce itself....Her growth and development in the two fields has been rapid and simultaneous since the latter part of the nineteenth century, especially since 1887 which marked the beginning of Germany's real advance in Commercial Education." Dr Farrington points out that "In Germany the present development of lower commercial schools is actually

(continued from the previous page) of recent date. Indeed it was not until after the unification of modern Germany (1871) at the time of the Franco-Prussian war that any considerable growth took place...One is hardly justified in setting the date of their foundation before the third decade of the nineteenth century". As regards secondary schools, it is said that it was the official recognition of 1882 that placed them on a proper footing. The Commercial Universities came into existence only about the beginning of the twentieth century, or to be more precise, about the year 1898.

In these countries, then, we may consider the progress achieved during a period of about 30 to 40 years: In India, 1885 to 1909; and in Germany 1874 or 1875 to 1909 or 1910 and in Japan, 1875 to 1909. In the case of Germany, however, we shall have to confine ourselves to Prussia, for, it is of that state alone that the requisite figures are just now available. And what is more, it serves as an example of a state where Commercial Education owes its development very largely to the exertions of the people themselves, without much of initiative on the part of the Government.

Country	Area in Sq. miles. (in round figures)	Population.	No. of Com. Institutions.	No of pupils.
India.	1,800,000	315,000,000	77	1,000 [@] 3,070 [¢]
Japan.	150,000	50,000,000	381	40,000
Germany. (Prussia)	135,000	40,000,000	508	65,000

[@] purely commercial

[¢] for commercial & other subjects.

Now, inasmuch as the figures given in the last column are fore purely commercial subjects, we have to take the figures at about 1,000 for these subjects for India. This will give:—

One Commercial	India	Japan	Germany.
One Commercial school for and	4,100,000 persons.	131,000 persons	79,000 persons.
One pupil in the commercial school out of	315000 do	(in round figures) 1200 do	615 do.

And as for the quality of work done in India, the latest quinquennial (Educational) Report of the Government of India (1912) says:- “The existing schools did not attain a high standard of education.” What further proof do we need, to show that India has been slumbering while other countries have been awake and have been awake and have been making strenuous efforts, in this direction? To what can her slowness of progress be attributed? Not to the caste system, the one commonplace target of all reformers’ attacks. Caste has its social drawbacks; nevertheless, far from being an impediment it has in it elements which in the hands of thoughtful men could have been and could be turned to the best economic advantage. Here is what Dr Farrington, writing in 1913, says:- “If there is any country in the world where specialization is rampant, that country is Germany. ...Indeed, the stratification of German social and industrial life is so rigid that there is very little movement vertically except within certain narrow limits. It is this very characteristic that makes the German educational problem so relatively simple and so marvellously effective. A boy is more than likely to follow the business

(continued from the previous page) of his father....The result is....that every body is forced to become a specialist." Nor can we hold the Government responsible. For, in many western countries, when the people became conscious of the importance of commerce they took the initiative themselves. The backwardness of India, has to be traced primarily to the ignorance that still so largely prevails. From the days of Solomon the wise, when Indian sandal, gold and peacocks were, it is said, eagerly sought for by Phoenicians, if not from earlier times, India has been trading with almost every enlightened nation of the world, but she has never been anything more than a passive agent or party. Active commercial enterprise has not been a special characteristic of her civilization. Setting aside for a moment, however, all those factors, with which the educationist is not directly concerned, the question may be asked whether the Indian system of modern Commercial Education has been satisfactory which is the main subject of this paper.

A comparative study of the commercial courses of training in different countries reveals a number of defects in the Indian system, which have considerably retarded her progress. The first of these lies in the fact that commercial education in India was taken by the wrong end and the strongest emphasis was laid upon the least important of its features, which has produced on the public mind the impression that commercial schools, though so called, have little to do with the development of business, but with the training of clerks. While neither in Japan nor in Germany are Short-hand and Typewriting subjects of any consequence in commercial training, they occupy the most prominent place in the great majority of Indian schools; and it is they that have the largest enrolment. In Japan, says Mr

(continued from the previous page) sharp "It is perhaps worthy of note that none of the public commercial schools seem to teach short-hand and typewriting.....in fact, a commercial school teacher could not tell me of any institution where shorthand or typewriting could be learnt unless it was from the Missionaries." In Prussia no programme of studies—in the majority of institutions—includes these two subjects though Short-hand is given a place in the Secondary Schools and though Typewriting is taught in commercial schools for girls. Only rarely in North Germany does one find Typewriting in these schools. The official regulations make no provision for it, unless the course has more than six hours per week, but it is offered very frequently in optional courses given during the week. Again, Stenography may appear on the programme of the continuation schools, although it is not frequently found at least in Prussia. And in India, as the Quinquennial Report of 1912 says, "General Commercial courses....are not popular because the immediate benefit is not discernible. Institutions which give instruction in Short-hand and Type-writing have increased and are sought after because they lead to immediate and comparatively remunerative appointments. A considerable number of the schools in the Presidency of Madras are reported to teach only Typewriting." In Bombay, except in the College of Commerce Type-writing and Short-hand are taught to the largest number of pupils. In Bengal, the Report "complains of the disposition of pupils to neglect all other commercial subjects for Short-hand, Typewriting and Book-keeping." The other parts of India in which this branch of education is of more recent growth have nothing better to tell. In Mysore which has just been developing her new scheme, there are as yet no pupils for what are known as commercial subjects

(continued from the previous page) proper, almost every one going in for Typewriting and Short-hand. Again, in Bombay and Calcutta, greater attention is no doubt paid to Book-keeping, Auditing, Accounts and the like. But all this only justifies the observation that the Government of India Resolution of 1913 makes, in summing up the entire situation: "The instruction given in them (commercial institutions) prepares for clerical duties in Government and business offices, rather than for the conduct of business itself."

Now, Graham and Hooper, who are among the best English authorities on Commercial Education, do not give a place, in their commercial courses, to Typewriting, except in those meant for girls. On the other hand this is what they lay down as the "five essentials for commercial education:- Modern Languages; commercial Practice; Commercial materials; Principles of Commerce and Commercial Law. And according to them a business man's requirements, from the British point of view, are:-

- (b) A knowledge of modern methods of importing or exporting goods;
- (a) An effective knowledge of foreign language;
- (c) A thorough knowledge of the goods dealt in and of the science bearing on them;
- (d) A knowledge of the markets at home and abroad and the customs of the trade;
- (e) A knowledge of foreign tariffs weights, measures, moneys and exchanges;
- (f) A knowledge of the technicalities of commercial documents, bills, etc. and of the general principles of commercial law;
- (g) Book-keeping and accountancy;
- (h) Economics bearing upon commerce and trade statistics.

Is there a single institution in all India, in which pupils get a comprehensive training in purely business courses, as outlined above? No doubt,

(continued from the previous page) some attempt has been made to instruct pupils in a few of these important subjects, in Bombay. But even in this imperfect or immature form the training has been aiming mostly at "clerical appointments, high or low. How many of the Bombay pupils have turned independent business men as yet? No system of commercial education can be accounted a success unless it produces some perceptible influence on the volume of business in the country. The institutions of Bombay are similar to the secondary commercial schools of Germany; and though it is not clear how many of her pupils became mere clerks, this is what we find there. Between 1899 and 1905, 63% of the Hamburg Commercial Higher school graduates went into business; in Bremen, between 1903 and 1905, 63% and in Cologne 73% between 1893-95 did so,

The second ground of complaint against the Indian scheme is that it has ignored the fundamental educational principle that the courses should be such as are suited to Indian conditions. It has failed to take note of the commercial opportunities, needs and drawbacks of the Indian merchant and tradesman. And as a result the Indian trading classes have little interest in commercial education of the modern type. In passing, it may be noted that for lack of such interest on the part of the mercantile community, the Government Commercial Institution in Ceylon was not long ago, reported to have been closed. Not only short-hand and type-writing, but also the western system of Book-keeping and Arithmetical calculations are of no interest for the generality of Indian merchants. The indigenous methods, particularly for instance, the Guzerati, are considered in no way inferior, And no attempt appears to have been made to impress upon the public in what ways the development of business in this country could be influenced by the modern system. The subjects that not only mark the distinction

(continued from the previous page) between the old and the new types, but also indicate the lines to be pursued for increasing the volume of business, subjects as pointed out for instance, by Graham and Hooper, have as yet received little attention except in the recently started Government College of Bombay. Few merchants or tradesmen in India think that the Commercial school can give their children a training that would be profitable to their calling. Which school or college in India teaches the study of commercial products or materials of commercial history or Commercial economics, with special reference to India's opportunities?

The third count against the existing scheme, is that a very narrow view has been taken of business instruction. It is thought that commercial education caters only for shop-keepers, large and small, and other merchant classes. That it bears an intimate relation to all the trades has never been impressed upon the popular mind. That every industry or trade, if it is to thrive under modern conditions has to be worked upon business lines, has not been fully realized. How many hundreds, if not thousands, of small tradesmen are being ruined by their adherence to antiquated grooves, in the blind belief that success is a mere matter of luck or fate, which misfortune they could, to a great extent, avert with a little knowledge of the elementary principles of commercial science and economics.? The kind of education that India in her present stage of Industrial development needs, more than many of the western countries is that to which Lord Haldane refers, though in a different connection, in his introduction to the famous book of Dr Kirchensteiner. "Take the case of a baker's apprentice; he is instructed in business correspondence and the art of writing advertisements. He learns how to order goods and to make out bills and get in his debts, as well as how to keep a baker's books. Besides this he

(continued from the previous page) is instructed in the trade of baking including knowledge of the kinds of grain, flour, and other materials used, and the chemical process on which bakind depends.....He also concurrently with these practical lessons, studies his right and obligations."

If the promoters of Commercial Education in India had only realized the need for impressing upon the people, its value to the trades and industries, they could have tapped a source, which would have increased the number of pupils tenfold, in her schools. And its effects would have been perceptibly felt in the world of industries also.

The fourth drawback relates to the use of the vernacular. It may be contended that the remarkable progress made in other countries in commercial education is due to the circumstance that the instruction is imparted in the language of the people. Whereas, in India, such training is possible almost only to those that possess a knowledge of English whose number is evidently very limited. However strong the argument of the mother tongue so far as general education is concerned, it loses much of its force in the matter of commercial education. The necessity to acquire a knowledge of a foreign language, far from being an obstacle, is a positive advantage. In Japan every school-boy who has risen above the elementary stage and every student of commercial institutions, brings up English or some other foreign language. The general situation is almost similar to that in India, only the foreign language is termed a second language. And in Germany linguistic study is specially encouraged in secondary and higher commercial schools. In fact, it has been observed that "In Belgium, Switzerland, Germany and France almost every educated man knows two or three modern languages." In commercial courses, therefore, he foreign language element

(continued from the previous page) cannot be considered as an impediment to progress. All the same, the use of the Vernacular is bound to attract larger numbers than at present.

However, when this circumstance is coupled with the impression produced by the other foregoing defects, the impression that commercial schools have little to contribute to the development of actual business in the country, it gains considerable force. The use of the vernacular would have dispelled and would certainly dispel much of the ignorance.

A fifth defect is that it has ignored the importance of instruction in foreign languages. In England as has already been pointed out, the first and foremost place in commercial courses is given to foreign languages. In Japan still greater emphasis is laid on the study of such languages. In addition to a compulsory course in Japanese and English and sometimes Chinese, one of the following optional languages are brought up by the pupils: French, German, Korean and Russian. As for Germany, "There is undoubtedly much truth", observes Dr Farrington, "in the English contention that the Germans are a nation of commercial travellers,....one secret of the German commercial success is that the foreign trader of Germany gives his customers what they want....Not only does the German merchant believe in giving the people what they want, but he also takes pains to ascertain this accurately, by sending out representatives who can talk with prospective customers in their native tongues." Even in the Middle Schools of Germany a foreign language is invariably taught. In the Middle Commercial Schools not only three compulsory languages German, English and French, but also one or two optional languages, such as Italian or Spanish are being studied. In the Secondary Schools, "linguistic instruction plays a preponderating role." For instance, "of

(continued from the previous page) of the 526 pupils in the Frankfort Institution, in 1912-13, 425 were enrolled in the classes of four modern languages." Leipzig is especially famous for the study of foreign languages of which no fewer than nineteen are taught.

It is needless to enter here further into the advantages of learning more languages than one. To quote Hooper and Graham again, "With the increase of the international communication and trades comes the keenness of competition for markets in which the language question plays a very prominent part. The enormous demands of modern trade and the rivalry of foreign countries render the effective acquirement of living languages a national necessity." It is impossible to gain a thorough knowledge of the requirements of other peoples, their tastes, temperaments, religions and needs without some acquaintance with their native tongues.

Whether the conservative and homestuck Hindu is not in special need of learning other languages than his vernacular, at least as an incentive to travelling, does not seem to require any discussion.

The sixth fault is that those responsible for spreading Commercial Education in India have not as yet adequately realised the supreme importance of the development of what is known as the Commercial "Spirit" in the student of a Commercial "Atmosphere" around him. While the aim in India has been to see the student merely pass through the examination gate, in America and Germany the object of the training is to develop the business "spirit". Dr Kurt E. Richter of the Special Committee on Commercial Education, United States, writes:- Professor Dr M.J. Bonn, Director of the Munich Commercial College has pointedly stated the object of these instructions, by declaring that the student should acquire the commercial

(continued from the previous page) "spirit" viz., he should be able to see the commercial situation in its true light, he should then possess the initiative to utilize the knowledge of the situation to his advantage, and finally he should have business sagacity enough to predict with fair accuracy the future trend of his own particular chosen business...This commercial spirit is the basis of all success."

Again, in the West, there are people's organizations by the hundred, for purposes of promoting sound commercial education, and for rousing the people's consciousness to the value and importance of such instruction. In 1902, there were at least 112 such bodies in Germany. And if among nations so far in advance of us such organizations are required for continually stimulating public interest in this subject, how much more is the need for them in this land which is still lagging so far behind?

Now, where in India is the creation of such Commercial "spirit" in the pupil aimed at? Sometimes, young men are sent out from different parts of India to England and other countries for getting what is usually called a commercial training. But such men invariably return only to seek employment in offices, as higher accountants or actuaries, on higher salaries. How many of the Indian commercial students have move even so much as their little finger to push forward her trade? What are the perceptible commercial developments that have resulted from their labours? How many are the associations that they have inspired or worked, with a view to devising means to turn to advantage India's opportunities of trade? What are their efforts in the direction of increasing the earnings of the nation, in this field? In a word, in what ways has the commercial "spirit" of their modern training manifested itself?

Among the suggestions for reform I would set down the following:-

1. Managers of Commercial Institutions outside Bombay have, no doubt, considerable difficulty not only in attracting a sufficient number of pupils, but also in commanding an adequate income for their schools, unless they make use of the baits of Type-writing and Short-hand. But the evil, or rather the mistake cannot be allowed to continue any longer. The first measure of reform needed, therefore, is a judicious dissociation of subjects like Type-writing and Shorthand, from those bearing on commerce proper. Or, two separate kinds of institutions should be organized:-

(a) "Clerical" Schools for training clerks for offices Commercial or Government, in which may be taught only Type-writing, Short-hand, Elementary Accountancy Office, routine, Penmanship and Precise-writing and indexing.

(b) "Commercial" Schools teaching pure commercial subjects such as foreign languages, Commercial Geography, History, Law, Products, Economics, Banking, Statistics, Higher Accountancy and Book-keeping, etc. Here the "clerical" subjects may also be taught though only as optional.

2. No certificates should be granted to "Commercial" students for proficiency in the "Clerical" subjects alone.

3. Indian Commercial conditions and her opportunities should be made the basis of teaching commercial subjects, as far as possible. And special emphasis should be laid on foreign languages. Every pupil should be required to learn in addition to his vernacular, one or more Indian and one or more European languages. The existing syllabuses for grouping subjects should also be recast so as to meet Indian requirements.

4. Bearing in mind what has been so beautifully

(continued from the previous page) put in the words "The all important factor of the situation is the fierce and extremely energetic competition with which we have to contend" no commercial scholarship should be given to any one who has not got the knack of picking up languages in addition to possessing an observant mind, and a clear head for statistics.

5. Seeing that in the commercial schools, if the "Clerical" subjects as noted above be eliminated, there will be very few pupils left, either a full remission or a considerable reduction of fees should be made with a view to attracting pupils, not only of the merchant classes, but also of the various trades.

6. Special importance should be attached to the use of museums for commercial products. Till such museums are formed the existing ones should be utilized for this purpose, as far as possible, in big cities. But the aim must be for each school to have its own collections, the pupils also being encouraged to bright in their own. To this must be added and gradually developed a department of the sciences bearing on commercial products.

7. With a view to bringing closer together Commercial Education and Industrial, every course of industrial and technical studies should incorporate into it a short and appropriate commercial syllabus.

8. Vernacular Commercial Education should be organized on a better and a larger scale with special reference to the laws of Economics as applied to India and with reference to the markets for her products. Otherwise the Indian merchant and tradesman will continue to shun it as they have done hitherto.

9. Not only more Associations should be formed, of merchants, as well as of tradesmen of all descriptions, but also active propagandist work should be carried on by means of leaflets contain-facts

(continued from the previous page) and figures bearing directly on Indian Commerce and Trade to bring home to the people, India's present opportunities and the consequent value of modern commercial education at the present time.

10. If young men and women take to short-hand and typewriting in large numbers it is because, as the Quinquennial Report says, these subjects pay and the demand for the services of such as are trained in them is great. Whereas there is still little scope for the talents of those possessing a knowledge of Commercial Subjects, unless they be sons of successful merchants. The creation of a demand for men with such technical training depends upon the development of a proper environment and atmosphere which is the work not of the educationist, but of the people, and of the State in particular. It is they that can co-ordinate and stimulate both Commercial and Industrial activities and developments which are so intimately associated with each other.

Though all these are matters that fall outside the province of the educationist, yet the commercial teacher needs the help of the State most. In the absence of Indian facts and figures to base his instruction on, no real progress in Indian Commercial Education is possible. At present the teacher merely adopts the figures of Western Countries or uses books meant for European or American conditions. The official statistics or other information published in India are often found inadequate for the purposes of the Indian Professor. It is of the first importance therefore that the State should furnish the requisite information to the Educationist. And it is equally necessary that a combined body of representative Indian Merchants and tradesmen as well as leading Indian Commercial Educationists should be formed that they may point out

(continued from the previous page) from time to time the heads under which information may be furnished by the teacher but also for the edification of the general public.

Into further details of curricula and syllabuses which will chiefly be of technical interest, I shall not enter here. This paper will have served its purpose if it should disillusion the public mind of the notion that "Clerical" Education is "Commercial" education, though the former may, in a sense, be "Business" Education; Clerical Education is no more Commercial Education than charcoal is diamond, valuable though both of them are, each in its own sphere.

How often it is forgotten in this country, that the place that commerce occupies in modern life is of paramount significance. The truth, or truism it may be, still bears repetition, that the history of modern civilization is synonymous with the history of modern commerce. What part of commercial education plays in Germany is best judged by the following words of Dr Richter already referred to: "The Commercial Colleges of Germany, however, are not only training the leaders in business life, but are also destined to be real training schools for the men of public affairs, for City and State Officials, for domestic and diplomatic services."

It may not be given to the present day dreamers of India's future prosperity to awaken into the reality of a system of commercial education working up to an ideas so high as this. But such dreamers should feel immensely gratified if, as a first step of progress, Indian Commercial institutions should in a year or two cease to be under the direction of those who palm off "clerical" as "Commercial" Education, and if they should come under the influence and inspiration of men who have realized, in howsoever small a measure, the underlying greatness of the truly national service rendered by honourable merchant-hood,

(continued from the previous page) and who, in a word, are imbued with the real commercial "spirit" which, when viewed from the higher, spiritual standpoint of India, is esteemed as a Dharma.

EDUCATION EAST AND WEST.
(In Mysore Economic Journal).

The need for further reform: The cry for Educational reform is not confined to India alone. Countries far more advanced have their educational defects and drawbacks, for which they are eagerly seeking remedies. The Educational supplement of the Times says in one of its recent issues that "the educational situation is passing slowly from bad to worse," and demands the appointment of a Royal Commission. Almost every man interested in Education, in this country has probably read the great speech made by Lord Haldane a few weeks ago. An association has been formed under the name of "The Educational Reform Council" of which Sir Henry Miers, M.A., D.Sc., F.R.S, is President; Prof Gilbert Murray and Dr M.E. Sadler are Vice-Presidents and about sixty well-known educationists are members. The need for it has arisen, as the Secretary Mr Daniell puts it, "Because education in schools and colleges plays so large a part in national development and because the future will make increased demands on the public spirit, citizenship and productive ability of the people of England." The Council has a number of highly important and interesting subjects for its consideration, for which it has appointed nineteen committees. One of them aims at studying the position of the London University and the technical institutions and the disproportion between the number of their advanced students to the needs of the Empire. Other committees are enquiring how far public

(continued from the previous page) schools (and examiners) are guilty of using outworn instructional material; how to introduce a wider outlook and more purposeful work; how the Elementary school curricula should be recast with a view to further education after fourteen; how to get more efficient work out of the school masters and how to pay them better and so forth.

Now, comparing small things with great and considering the situation in Mysore, not to say anything of India outside, may it not be remarked that the Mysore Economic Conference has not anticipated such movements a minute too soon? The Education Committee of the Conference, there is no doubt, will find, when the reports are published, much valuable food for thought, in the London Council's literature. The President's observations at the last session of the Economic Conference on the urgent need, for training men for economic work, viewed in the light of current Western Educational movements gain additional significance and emphasis.

University Education: Passing from the general subject of Educational reform to specific aspects of it, we find that the Welsh University Commission is now considering an important question, similar to the one that engaged the attention of the people of Mysore till quite recently; which type of University Wales should have, the Unitary or the Federal? Welsh public opinion appears to be divided. The answer to such a question seems to lie in the truth that the type of a University, especially in an old country, is to be determined not by the creative fancies of political theorists, but by the hard realities of various local conditions and other practical considerations, a fact which has been well put by the Central provinces and Berar University Committee, in the words "The University should grow naturally out of existing institutions rather than spring ready made from the brains of

(continued from the previous page) some University constructors.”

It may be noted here that the Times has a good word to say for the Mysore University though it considers the scheme premature. “The scheme seems well suited to produce Indians who will imbibe Western culture without that disregard of their own ancient civilization and literature, which has had baneful results in recent years. Mysore is to be congratulated upon setting an example which some of the larger States or groups of States may be eager to follow.”

And we have already heard of a University for Hyderabad.

War and Education: Since to the fore. Many are the lessons the war is said to have for thoughtful men and women, especially Educationists. One of these is an interesting item of educational news from England. It has taken the form of a movement for securing for science special encouragement and a proper place in the curricula of schools. A memorial was addressed on the subject of “Government and Science” by the professorial staff of the Imperial College of Science and Technology, South Kensington, to the Governors of that institution. Further a meeting of the leading scientists of England was held with Lord Rayleigh in the chair, who said that “sufficient time for teaching science must be found by displacing classics.” Sir Ray Lankester said that “mistakes in various administrative quarters were the result of defective scientific knowledge. The whole subject of chemical products our reliance on Germany before the war and our failure to get materials point to the same cause.”

The resolutions demanded the following among other reforms, for the purpose of increasing the efficiency of the public servants:-

(1) The assigning of capital importance to the natural sciences in the competitive examinations for the home, Indian, foreign and Colonial Civil

(continued from the previous page) Service.

- (2) The requiring of some knowledge of the natural sciences from those seeking admission to Sandhurst.
- (3) The making of these sciences an integral part of the educational course in all the great schools, especially those preparing for University Entrance Examinations.

Science and Industry: At the Annual Conference of the Association of Teachers in Technical Institutions in London, Dr Garnett delivered a very thoughtful speech, the principal points of which are:-

- (1) That leaders of industry must place a higher value on Industrial Scientific Research, which is the greatest need of British industry.
- (2) That teachers in Technical Institutions must be more closely associated with individual leaders
- (3) That time and other necessary facilities must be given to teachers in Technical Institutions to enable them to carry out industrial research.
- (4) That consumers must be willing to make a sacrifice in order to contribute to the nursing of infant industries so as to avoid entire dependence on foreign sources for the necessaries of life or civilization.
- (5) That the war has shown that our Universities and Technical Schools are able to render services to the State which very few persons two years ago believed to be possible.
- (6) That Trade Associations and Technical Institutions should combine to co-operate with Advisory Council for Research.
- (7) That a better connection is required between the Elementary School and the Technical Institute, and this will, in part, have to be supplied by a compulsory continuation school for boys leaving the day school at fourteen and by extension

(continued from the previous page) of the leaving age in Central and Higher Elementary Schools.

(8) That a more complete organization of the educational system is required so as to provide suitable training for all ranks of industrial workers, making appropriate distinction between the manual workers and the thinkers.

(9) That a more liberal system of scholarships is necessary, especially to enable University students to engage in post-graduate research.

(10) That reasonable prospects of suitable promotion must be offered to students who have passed through a course of training intended to prepare them for higher industrial appointments.

(11) That science should be taught to all the pupils of Secondary Schools, but that the course of instruction for boys in classical forms should differ from that for boys who are intending to pursue the study of science after leaving school.

(12) That in Civil Service and other public examinations a general knowledge of physical phenomena and the applications of science to industry should be required of all candidates, but that science should not be pitted against the humanities in competitive examinations.

(13) That with elementary students practice must almost always be in advance of theory; and theory should not be introduced into Elementary teaching until the pupils have been led to recognize its necessity.

(14) That much of the equipment of the schools must and some of the methods of instruction will be modified in consequence of experience gained during the war, and that it is desirable that all teachers in Technical Institutions should be prepared for these changes.

Manchester has already made a start by establishing a department for post graduate research in coal-tar products and dye-stuffs and by providing a number of scholarships of £100 each.

(continued from the previous page) At the annual meeting of the Secondary Teachers' Association in London, Sir Philip Magnus drew attention to the importance of science in schools.

How far behind we are in India and Mysore: One can pass the Mysore Civil Service Examination without knowing a syllable of any of the natural sciences and can hope to make an efficient public servant; and that in times, when knowledge of science, more than anything else, makes or mars the life of a nation!

Fact or Fancy? Turning our eyes next from Europe to America for a moment, we are struck foremost by the growing importance of laboratory work there. The days of those who say "This is what I think" are at an end, and of those who say 'this is what I find and know' are coming on. Still, not a few of the Indian Educationists act in the belief that they have an instinctive genius for hitting upon the right remedies for India's Educational ills, without any of scientific enquiry. But in America we find ourselves in company with a different sort altogether. They are ever after experiments and results. Two valuable heads under which very useful information has been recently collected are:-

- (1) Why children drop out of school early,
- (2) The ideals of Western children.

Unless a thorough enquiry is made under the former, no satisfactory curricula under modern conditions which are characterised by the socialistic and democratic tendencies can be formulated. The latter subject is of the greatest practical importance, in developing character which, as has been so often pointed out, is of the highest object of education.

Similar enquiries in India would be highly useful at the present moment. In Mysore, especially, they would help the Government in laying down definite policies of action in regard to elementary, secondary and university courses of

(continued from the previous page) study.

I do not wish to speak irreverently of those who have a natural abhorrence of statistics, but I only wish to point out that we are now living in a world which wants 'facts' not fancies to proceed upon.

EDUCATIONAL TOPICS OF TO-DAY.
(IN MYSORE ECONOMIC JOURNAL)

English Education: Professor M.E. Sadler, who is given the place of honour in the Contemporary Review for September, writes, as may be expected, an excellent article on "An English Education for England". He touches on two of the "principal questions" which are now pressing upon the minds of those concerned with English Education: (1) The improvement of the Elementary Schools and (2) the reorganization of Continuation Schools, on the discussion of both of which he brings to bear considerable practical wisdom.

After pointing out how the discoveries of the four most educational workers of our day, the German Dr Kerschensteiner, the American Professor John Dewey, the Italian Madame Montessori and the Englishman Sir Robert Baden Powell have influenced modern Educational thought, he observes that the influence of Elementary Schools may be answerable to the true needs of the nation: (1) a reduction in the size of the classes to thirty children, (2) a reduction in the number of hours of sedentary work in the class-rooms with the creation of a love for workshops and out-of-class work and (3) an arrangement for increasing the number of teachers, chiefly by holding out better prospects, are absolutely necessary. As regards "Continuation" schools, he says that all employers including the heads of shops and offices and employers of domestic servants, should be put under 'statutory obligation' to allow their younger

(continued from the previous page) work-people of both sexes up to the age of 17 to attend Continuation classes.

Turning to Mysore, one cannot say that these suggestions have no bearing on the questions before us. There are Elementary classes here, not of 30 or 40 but of 70 and 80 children with a single teacher on Rs.7 or Rs.10/-. Urgent reform is needed, though it is largely a question of funds. A revision of the curricula so as to provide more time for systematic open-air and manual instruction is still to be made. No wonder then that people not only in England but also in this country, should say that "often modern educational methods seem to destroy common sense"; "they produce mediocrities making it almost impossible for great men to develop"; "they create a knack for hunting for academic titles but with little or no originality"; "boys degenerate when the Educational strait waist-coat is placed on them"; and so on and so forth, though all these may be somewhat exaggerated statements. As for "Continuation" schools, it must be said that though more than once attention has been drawn in these pages and elsewhere, to its great importance, it has not as yet received anything more than a passing thought. The underlying seriousness of the idea has not yet dawned upon the thinking public.

"Education and Humanism" is a learned contribution by Professor A. Darroch, Professor of Education in the University of Edinburgh, to the July number of the Hibbert Journal, which deserves more attention in Central Europe than in India. Here we have already erred too much on the side of Humanistic studies and have been feeling the effects of famines and plagues far too severely to pin our faith solely to classics. A swing of the pendulum to the science side must commence as early as possible, but certainly without effecting a divorce from Humanism.

In the highly interesting paper entitled "The Educational Opportunity" in the same journal, Mr J.A.R. Marriott says that the "Moral unsettlement" caused by the War, "provides the opportunity to the teacher," which ought not to be neglected. He applies as tests three well-known Educational principles from Aristotle, to the systems of England, Germany and France and points out in what respects they satisfy. It is a philosophical discussion of the question regarding the nature of the interests of the State in the education of the citizen. It will well repay perusal. Mr Marriott lays emphasis, and that rightly, on the truth that "of all the problems which this country (England and for that matter any country) has to face, the largest and most insistent is that of Education.....it is the supreme problem which lies ahead and which in its significance overshadows all other problems."

The Nineteenth Century for July has two strong articles, "Science and the Public Schools" and "The public service and Education." In the former Mr D.R. Pye argues "(1) that a universal adoption of a scientific education is not what is called for by our (England's) educational aims, the classics can put up a better claim than science. What we do want to see is that all shall know enough of science to appreciate what science stands for, what scientific method is, and what are the questions which science and science only can answer effectively." He puts in a strong plea for the employment of competent teachers of science. He holds up, for adoption, the French plan of "crowning the classical education with a year of philosophy in which a considerable allowance of time is devoted to natural science."

In the second mentioned above article Sir Harry H. Johnston enters a most vigorous protest

(continued from the previous page) against classicism in Education. He says "the outcome of our (England's) lack of modernity in Education has been our bitter disappointment in the Government conduct of the present war...this small band of University College masters and dons create the class of mind of the statesmen who under the present conditions of British Government reach the highest places in these States. In turn they appoint Civil Service Commissioners and out of love of Oxford or the Oxford spirit (which virtually considers classics shall be thrust into all examinations for the Army and the Civil service. We have boys who may be destined to be engineers, insurance managers, bank actuaries, store managers, architects, farmers, silk merchants, manufacturers or to engage in a hundred other useful avocations, wasting three days but of six on translating, paraphrasing, parsing, verse-making and studying the language and literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. "We all live under a tyranny of shams, in a fragile palace of make-believe."

After reading the powerful indictment in this article, one in Mysore call not help asking in which direction we are making progress: towards the Scientific or the Classical?

Thirty-four years ago, when the Rendition of the State was effected, the public, with one voice, demanded the introduction of "Science" when the late Mr John Cook was appointed principal, believing that was the one subject that the country needed most urgently. And now, the cry is for 'languages' and 'metaphysics', in response to which we have a Civil service scheme, which aims at giving us administrators, whose distinguishing forte is their Sanskrit, Prakrit, Hale-Gannada, Anglo-Saxon and all that sort of knowledge, without an inkling of physical or natural science.

In the numbers of Education for August is to be found a brief report of the proceedings of the notable Oxford Conference, "On New Ideals in Education." Professor Patrick Geddes, who was recently in our midst, is said to have spoken on "Universities and their replanning, a Retrospect and a Forecast." Dr Sadler in his introductory speech said that the war was giving to the English Universities according to their needs a new social ideal and that the social ideal was the strongest force in education. Its central idea was that every man, woman and child should be revered, guarded and allowed to unfold as a human personality, and never to be thought of as a mere 'hard' or 'economic' tool. Professor Geddes after tracing the history of universities up to the present day wound up by saying that the problem of the modern University was to be defined as not only conserving and in a measure continuing all the varied contributions of the past and in developing the University towards its "civic and regional service towards that wider usefulness which was not only national and imperial but of universal and human aim." Then, the lecturer's draft plan for the University of Benares was outlined and explained.

SCIENCE EDUCATION IN MYSORE.

"That there should one man die ignorant who had also capacity for knowledge, this I call a Tragedy. The miserable fraction of science which an united mankind in a wide universe of Nescience has acquired, why is not this with all diligence imparted to all?" – Carlyle.

Everyone who has been watching the progress of events outside this country, in America, France, and Germany and Japan and particularly in England, knows what an amount of interest the question of the place of Science in Education

(continued from the previous page) has often roused. At the present moment, however, there is hardly a respectable Journal in England, which has not devoted some of its pages to the discussion of this serious subject. Leading citizens and thoughtful men there have met and voiced their unanimous and emphatic opinion that Science should receive much more attention than it has received till now in the schools and colleges. At the meeting held under the chairmanship of Lord Raleigh important resolutions were passed urging (1) that the study of Natural Sciences should form an integral part of the educational courses at all the great schools of the country and of the Entrance Examinations of the Universities, old and new; (2) that the Government should encourage this study by assigning capital importance to scientific knowledge in the competitive examinations for the English and Indian Civil Service and for admission to Sandhurst. And the British Government have appointed a Committee of the Privy Council as well as another committee to consider the steps necessary to be taken in this behalf. We further learn that many people in England believe that the very administration of their country has showed signs of perceptible weakness for lack of men with adequate scientific knowledge in their Government, their Legislature and Civil Service.

Now, whatever the study of Science may have signified to men in other lands it has had for the people of this country no more than an academic interest, excepting perhaps in the case of those few Physicians, Surgeons and Engineers, the nature of whose special duties demands something more than a mechanical application of set formula. It has almost entirely served the one purpose of providing an intellectual discipline for a few school and college pupils who possess more than average intelligence. But the time is now come, thanks to the good offices of the great evils,

(continued from the previous page) the war, the plague, and the poverty of the present day, when men's eyes are being opened to the indispensable necessity for every man, woman and child to possess, in howsoever small a degree, some knowledge of modern science. For, every educated man now sees how Science helps to ward off many a danger to life and many a sickness too, and how it also makes men turn to the most profitable account the economic resources of a country. Nay, it specially teaches us how to get out of our own intellectual and physical powers a better return than we usually do. And it is the neglect of Science that has made modern India, bankrupt of originality and initiative in the practical world.

Here we may recall, for a moment, what Professor Perry said in his Presidential Address of 1914 at the British Association. "There is a lesson for England.....in the recent history of Japan.....Its extreme weakness proved its salvation. Even the teachers of ancient classics saw that for strength it was necessary to let scientific method permeate the thought of the whole population. And now at the end of the first chapter of Japan's modern history, we find that every unit of the population can read and write.....and that it is getting an increased love for natural science so that it can reason clearly, it is not carried away by charlatans, it retains its individuality. One result of this is that in time of war Japan has scientific armies. Not only are its admirals and generals scientific but also every officer and every private is scientific. Everything in the whole country is being developed scientifically. And we Europeans hagridden by pedantry in our schools and universities refuse to learn an easy lesson." And we in India, far from learning even this easy lesson, though our country is nearer Japan than Europe, are developing

(continued from the previous page) a sort of contempt for materialistic science.

If in countries where almost everyone knows how to read and write, where every boy and girl of the school-going age passes through a school, where almost everyone gets some instruction at least in the elements of science, and where, as a result, the average length of human life is 45 to 50 years, men should feel dissatisfied with the amount of science knowledge they possess what shall we say of ourselves among whom 95 out of every 100 is illiterate, 75 out of every 100 boys and girls go without any chance of attending a school, 999 out of every 1,000 pass through the world without even elementary instruction in Science, and only about three in a lakh go through an ordinary regular course in Science and as a result, our average life's span is not more than 23 years?

This is not all. While during the past 30 years the countries that have paid attention to science education have shown signs of rise both in their average longevity and in their average income, this country of ours has showed unmistakable indication of decline in our physical, which is inseparable from our economic, vitality. While in those countries the average expectation of life at age 0 rose from 44 to 46 or 48, it fell in India from 24 to 22 during the years 1891-1911.

Thoughtful men in India have been quite alive to the importance of the study of science. Invaluable help has been given the Messrs. Tata, Curimbhoy, Rashbehari Ghose and Palit to the advancement of this knowledge. Their attention has, however, been rivetted to University and post graduate courses. No effort has as yet been made to improve the educational system of the country with respect to Science, though it cannot be denied that Bombay has taken a very laudable step by appointing a special Inspector for Science,

(continued from the previous page) who has already introduced some reforms. Nor have any steps been taken for the dissemination of scientific information among the lay public. So far as the village folks are concerned, a beginning has been made only in a few places in British India for lectures being delivered on Sanitation and Hygiene. The Indian Universities have yet to effect reforms in the matter of science study, on the lines of the modern French and American Universities. The recently organized Indian Science Congress which holds its session this year at Bangalore promises to do much useful work in pure science. But it has yet to show what it is capable of achieving in science applied to Indian art, industries and commerce. It has, however, been awakening the Professors of Indian colleges to a fuller sense of their responsibilities. For, may we not ask how many of our past Professors of science have brought honour to their positions by giving to the world any new truths of consequence? Among Native States, Hyderabad has given some attention to this subject, by giving it a more important place in the class examinations, than it occupies in those of Madras and Bombay.

Now, coming to Mysore, some time ago Sir. M. Visveswaraya, President of the Mysore Economic Conference, having made a suggestion that the subject of the spread of scientific knowledge in the State should be taken up by the Education Committee, they have proposed to formulate a suitable scheme. And their report is eagerly awaited. Meanwhile an attempt is made to indicate here the general lines on which development should proceed and to offer in some detail a few practical suggestions.

In this state we have at present a Primary school curriculum, which provides the preliminary steps to the study of science, in the shape of object lessons and Nature study. But for all

(continued from the previous page) that we know they are about the most unsatisfactory features of our Educational scheme. For, till now, not a single native of the country, with scientific knowledge of the local fauna or flora and the local seasonal conditions, has attempted to write even a scrap on the subject. What now obtains is a poor and slavish adoption of lessons or courses meant for children of other lands. Again, at the Lower Secondary stage all the science that is taught consists of an epitome of hygienic rules with nothing more than a list of verbal illustrations appended. In the Upper Secondary or High School classes, portions of a book on the elements of science are read here and there, without the pupils having any chance to make even a single experiment. A beginning is then made with the elements of Chemistry, Physics or Botany. But it is only the few that get through regular and systematic courses in these subjects. It is so even in the college or the University; only a handful of young men get such instruction. Neither in the High School nor in the College does there exist a provision for such training as would be helpful to those who do not intend to pursue a more academic course but who are likely to take to industrial walks of life. There is no institution where science as applied to local industries can be learnt. Science as taught at present here does not minister to any material or economic wants of man.

It is true that in the recent discussions emphasis has been laid by some on the scientific "method" rather than on the "training" in physical or natural sciences. But as has been pointed out they forget that this "method" is but partially applied in other fields such as those of the Historical and other Humanistic subjects. The scientific method is best applied in Physics, Biology, and Chemistry. Further, as Sir Henry A. Miers says, the pursuit of science develops a

(continued from the previous page) certain amount of "intellectual responsibility," which no other study produces in the same degree. Above all what we in this country specially lack in is a knowledge of the physical and natural sciences and their application. Our progress in other departments of knowledge is such that we may not feel ashamed. The need for teaching, therefore, physical and natural sciences, as a separate subject is imperative.

A development somewhat on the following general lines appears to be necessary.

1. A larger number of children should be given instruction in science by introducing it into the curriculum at earlier stages.
2. More comprehensive and suitable syllabusses must be drawn up by qualified men for all stages up to the High School standard.
3. Properly trained teachers must be appointed and more up-to-date methods of instruction adopted.
4. All school instruction must keep in view, as far as possible, the practical application of science to life and to economic development.
5. Organized efforts should be made for the delivery of definite courses of lectures in popular language at district and if possible at taluk head-quarters, the assistant masters of High Schools, the local Medical and Sanitary Officers being made to co-operate.
6. For village and small taluk towns special vernacular courses of lectures should be arranged. They may be delivered by the Agricultural and Sanitary officers.
7. Special inducements should be held out to competent men to translate into, or write in, the vernacular books on science.
8. Public examinations other than those conducted by the University should be arranged to be held for non-university men.
9. Special encouragement should be given for experimental work in laboratories.

10. Though the question of arranging for investigation in the field of applied science is one that has to be dealt with separately, yet the Mysore University or its colleges may, in accordance with the latest tendencies of the modern Universities of the West, prescribe courses for the study of Science applied to Industries, with or without a provision for granting university degrees in them.
11. Provision may also be made in the Universities for men who have not passed through the examination gates being permitted to take a course in any science, especially applied science, if a Board or a Committee think that such men could benefit by it.
12. Considering our present needs the University ought to give in its programme of public lectures more prominence to science subjects than to humanistic and literary which generally loom so large in the schemes of lectures of Indian Universities, particularly of the Madras University.

As regards science applied to industries we have learnt now that in the present state of the world, go where we will, end beg as hard as we may, even the most friendly nations cannot and will not lay bare their bosoms to us exposing themselves to the risks of economic depletion. The one piece of knowledge that we can gain is to struggle as others have struggled, to wring from nature some more of her secretas, which we may call our own. It is in making such encroachments on the yet untrodden demains of science and carving out for ourselves new colonies there that we can secure for ourselves the only means of survival, of which no malignity of fortune, individual or national, can rob us. Failing to find there some of this elixir of knowledge, we must, sooner or later, be wiped out of existence, if not by wars, at least by plagues and famines.

The following suggestions somewhat of a detailed character are mostly taken from two excellent contributions: one a paper by Dr J.A. Fleming, F.R.S. to the Journal of the Royal Society of Arts and another an address to the Oxford Conference on New Ideals in Education, by Sir Henry A Miers, Vice-chancellor of the University of Manchester. Wherever their views are adopted as being suitable for this country, their own words are used, as far as possible.

The young child is naturally vastly conscious and interested in its new surroundings and asks to be instructed, but the majority of children are deliberately educated into stupidity by the greater stupidity of adults around them, who cannot answer the child's questions and will not take the trouble to learn how to do it. Right methods of education take advantage of this to enable the child to educate himself. The cardinal and disastrous error made in elementary education, as administered by the State at present is that it begins with language, words, and books, instead of with realities and natural phenomena.

As regards school instruction in scientific knowledge, this should begin with elementary facts of astronomy and natural phenomena, such as the properties of air, water and common substances, the effects of heat and cold, the simplest facts concerning light and sound, and the growth and structure of familiar plants and trees. All this should be taught by appeal to the eye and by motion pictures or models. The main thing is that the child should be taught to do things, or effect practical achievements, and not simply to store its memory with words, or the analysis of them.

For those whose general education under present condition is confined to elementary school, science can be little more than common sense thought about and intelligent interest in the

(continued from the previous page) ordinary events and objects of life. This can be acquired through simple and attractive observations and experiments without the specialized apparatus of the laboratory. The purpose throughout should be to encourage a sense of responsibility, the necessity of personal trial and effort in understanding what is seen and done. It is this sort of training which helps to make more intelligent workers in all trades and professions.

Turning then to a more advanced stage of education, we find there are four great groups of educational subjects which should be put on an exactly equal footing, and claim each a quarter of the whole working time of the schoolboy. These are: (1) Language and literature, considered chiefly as a means of expressing thought and experience; (2) science or a knowledge of the facts and laws of the physical universe; (3) mathematics and graphics, or the study of number and form, including arithmetic, geometry, and algebra, and drawing in various forms, geometrical and free-hand; (4) civics, or the preparation for citizenship, which includes history, both of the world and of the native country, elementary political economy, religious or ethical instruction, elocution, and military drill or exercises. The expression of emotions in music and some training of the aesthetic feelings should not be neglected.

The study of science used to commence in the past, with chemistry which is by no means the best subject for initial instruction. It provides, of course, attractive experiments and requires no very expensive appliances, but it lends itself almost too readily as a subject for cram knowledge, whilst its necessary theoretical basis is difficult to expound. The chief object of school instruction in science should not be mere acquirement of cut-and-dried information as to facts, but the cultivation of the student's powers of

(continued from the previous page) observation and experiment and drawing correct logical deductions there from. Hence it is far better to begin with mechanics and elementary physics. A skilful teacher, provided with the proper apparatus such as that described in the late Sir Robert Ball's *Experimental Mechanics*, can make mechanics an excellent introductory subject for school instruction. A properly equipped physical laboratory should form part of every school, and boys taken through a carefully selected series of practical exercises. The effort should be to make the boy rediscover for himself, under guidance, the elementary facts and laws of the subject under study.

It is advisable to postpone the study until a little training in experimental work has been acquired. In some schools a great show is made with carpenters' or engineering workshops. But there is little or no real scientific training in it. The making of a model steam-engine is an amusement for leisure hours or wet half-holidays but is perfectly useless as a means of scientific education for boys. The mode in which a subject is taught is even of more importance than the subject itself. Chemistry can be so imperfectly taught as to be of little use as a mind-training. It is possible to give a very scientific lesson on a Greek verb, and also to give a lesson on an electrical machine which is not scientific teaching at all.

Hence here as elsewhere the man counts for more than the machine or apparatus. Nevertheless, the good teacher is wasted unless he has the necessary appliances. For this reason every public school should be provided with a museum containing geological, mineralogical, botanical and zoological specimens; and these should be continually increased and well arranged. The physical and chemical laboratory accommodation should be ample and well equipped. Every school

(continued from the previous page) should also have a small astronomical observatory, with an equatorial telescope, clock, and an outfit of surveying instruments, such as a theodolite, chain, level, and surveying staffs. Trigonometry as a mathematical subject should be taught in a practical manner by the aid of these last-named appliances, and not merely made to consist in the memorising of formulae. Instruction in elementary astronomy, comprising a practical knowledge of the constellations and movements of the sun and moon, should form part of all school education.

In the case of those whose general education is not carried beyond the Secondary school the training must, as a rule, include a systematic course of experiments especially in the physics and chemistry of ordinary life, and the pupils must know how to reason from these. But this course should be preceded by some more general introduction to scientific facts and ideas. The use of such books as Real Things in Nature which serves as an excellent introduction is strongly recommended. But it should be co-ordinated with a proper course of practical work.

Assuming, however, that a reform in public-school methods will lay the foundations for this increased sympathy, it is then essential that men of science should continually endeavour to place the results and methods of their work in such a form as to encourage and justify public interest. The principal method by which this can be done is by public lecturing and also by written communications to the public press, chiefly the great daily newspapers and the more widely circulated general magazines. Public lecturing is by far the more important, because this can be illustrated by actual experiments, diagrams, lantern slides, projections, or specimens. In India particularly it is the latter that is specially needed.

We reach the core of the matter when we come to consider the place of science in the university and technical teaching. Here the principal object in view is, as I have more than once in these pages emphasised, not merely the dissemination of information, but the instruction and training of men who can create new knowledge. Of late years the universities and colleges have added greatly to their equipment in laboratories and museums. Nevertheless, too much of it has been devoted to the purpose of making graduates rather than investigators.

The chief function of a university is to increase our knowledge. The obsession of the written examination paper and degree still holds us in its grip. The duty of advancing purely scientific research is the particular responsibility of the science teachers and advanced students and graduates in it. No one is fit to fill the post of a university teacher who is not actively engaged in research in his own special department of knowledge. His success ought largely to be gauged by the degree to which he gathers round him students who can take part, and assist in new investigations.

The value of this work has to be measured by its quality as well as its quantity. "There is at the present time an enormous output of published researches, but a great deal of this work which is concerned with minor questions, quantitative measurements, and with the gleaning of corners of the scientific field." The really great investigations are those which open for the first time some novel and rich mine of scientific truth.

A most important matter is the consideration of the conditions under which this stimulative originality can be fostered and increased. One thing is certain, that too much devotion to the

(continued from the previous page) study of what others have done is apt to diminish original powers. The great inventors and discoverers instinctively turn to new fields of research. When a man has this noble originaive power, everything should be done to facilitate his possession of the necessary material means. It is the most wanton waste of rare gifts if an experimental genius is allowed to spend much of his life in a heart-breaking struggle to acquire merely the implements of research. We have yet to learn of the immense resources which in Germany, and also in the United States, are being put at the disposal of those who have proved powers of scientific investigation.

To stimulate and encourage scientific and industrial research State grants have to be made to universities and colleges and to individuals and committees for definite or special research work. By the assistance of research scholarships and fellowships it will be possible to give the necessary financial assistance to trained men who have exhibited the necessary qualities of mind. We have to search diligently for this capacity and cultivate it, not simply to wait for it to turn up, and we may then hope to increase greatly the systematic pursuit of advances in scientific knowledge. The direction in which all the above effort must tend is, however, in the application of this knowledge in commerce and the arts.

I Mysore, though the Indian Institute of Science has started work and though anything on a large scale cannot be attempted at once, in this direction, yet a beginning can be made by instituting courses in Applied Chemistry immediately in the State Laboratories.

If our educational methods are directed sufficiently to the production of men who can do new things, and not merely know about old ones,

(continued from the previous page) we shall provide the manufacturer with the men who can give him efficient assistance.

So long as our Universities will not make the hall-marks of their degrees an index of originality and so long as our intelligent public will not value our scientists according to the actual worth and usefulness of their new contributions to knowledge, whatever their other merits, so long will there be no hope of any appreciable advancement in science in India.

Lastly, in the matter of the production of science books in the Vernacular, very earnest and special efforts have to be made. Literature of the sort that will appeal to the masses and to the lay public, is required on a large scale. Higher works are not of immediate use though they are also needed.

We require (a) original works, (b) translations and (c) text-books for schools, which may be either original ones or translations. Only such men as are proficient in one or more departments of science and as also possess a good knowledge of the Vernacular should be encouraged to undertake works of the first sort. As for translations, lists should be made of the best and the most suitable books and the lists should be revised from time to time. It is only a rendering of these into the Vernacular that should be paid for by the State. The translation by whomsoever made should be approved by a Committee of experts before publication. In the case of school books, there are already some models, published by the Bombay Government, and there are also excellent originals like Real Things in Nature, in English. But they should all be adapted to local conditions and requirements. The subject heads may be fixed by competent Professors. For all this a special committee is needed.

Further details of a working scheme, such as syllabuses for the different courses, estimates

(continued from the previous page) of cost for apparatus, methods of training science teachers, arrangements for and estimates of cost of organizing popular lectures at Taluk and District Head-quarters, are matters which fall within the province of the Professors of different sciences and of the officers of the Educational and the scientific departments. And to a representative committee of such men, therefore, should be left all the technical and administrative details.

“ON CAUSALITY: SOME ADVANCED WESTERN AND EASTERN VIEWS.” (Indian Philosophical Congress [1940]).²³

“Since all experiments are subject to the laws of Quantum mechanics the latter definitely proves the invalidity of Causal Law.” – Heisenberg.

“Cause and effect is irrational appearance. If the sequence is different how is the ascription of the difference to be rationally defended? If, on the other hand, it is not different, then Causation is a farce. There is no escape from this fundamental dilemma.” – Bradley.

“There is no such thing as cause and effect.” – Swami Vivekananda.

INTRODUCTION: An attempt is made in the following paras to present chiefly what may be considered the most advanced—not merely the latest—phase of the philosophical interpretation of the Concept of Causality, without ignoring its bearing on the doctrine of “Indeterminacy” in science. This paper being necessarily brief, it has to pass over much of the historical aspect as known not only to the West but also to the East. From Lucretius to Aristotle in Greece, from Descartes and Spinoza to Kant and Bergson in modern Europe, from Hume to Bosanquet and Bradley or Wildon Carr and Turner in England, and from the predecessors of Gautama and Kanada to the latest

²³ The original editor moved from top to bottom

“ON CAUSALITY: SOME ADVANCED WESTERN AND EASTERN VIEWS.”

(continued from the previous page) Jain, Buddhist and the several Vedantic thinkers in India, no philosopher worth the name has failed to deal with or refer to some of the implications of this concept. To add to this, the Western scientists from Newton to Heisenberg, Max Planck, Bohr, Schoedinger, Huxley, Jeans, Eddington, Einstein, Bertrand Russel and several others have also thrown much fresh light on it. Though therefore a historical study of the development of thought relative to this subject will undoubtedly be of immense value, not only from the standpoint of philosophy and science but also from that of religion, it is not possible to go into any such details here. Nor is it the object of this paper to present the arguments for and against everyone of the several interpretations or views, nor even to point out the fallacies in each. For, the result of all the discussions or enquiries made from the dawn of human thought up to the present moment is that the subject is ridden with contradictions. Even to this day men talk of ‘Soul or Mind’ as something different from ‘body’ and yet know not how the one is causally connected with the other; or as C.D. Broad puts it, “We are not agreed still on the right analysis of ‘Cause’ ”. So, here it will be no more than a waste of energy and time to go into the details of all exploded surmises though mankind clings to causality along with so many other unrealities. It is the final phase that we are concerned with chiefly. WHAT IS CAUSALITY? (1) In the words of some of the modern authorities this question may be answered as follows:-

“One thing follows upon another, not simply in the sense that one comes after the other, but in the sense that there is a certain regularity in the relation between the one kind

"ON CAUSALITY: SOME ADVANCED WESTERN AND EASTERN VIEWS."

(continued from the previous page) and the other." ...Mackenzie.

"In physics and Psychology such phenomena are said to be causally related as invariably succeed each other in time. The perception of succession is all that is really observed here. At any rate an inner connection, a necessity that binds these together is not a matter of observation. I perceive that a certain state follows upon a given state. I expect that the event to succeed it the next time it occurs. Here we have the Causal Conception." (Paulsen).

"Cause is the totality of conditions in the presence of which an event occurs and in the absence of any member of which it does not occur. The sequence must be under definitely known conditions." (A.J. Thomson). He adds—"The question of causality involves an entry into a difficult and dangerous territory."

"A cause is an invariable antecedent. Armed with this conception of cause as mere sequence and with the assumption of the uniformity of nature, the scientist is in possession of all that he needs to control the phenomena and predict the future. But still we do not know what a cause really is. There must be, so it seems to us, something more than mere sequence;...which philosophy seeks." (A. Eddington).

"Cause is an attempt to account rationally for change. A becomes B; and this alteration is felt to be not compatible with A. Mere A would still be mere A, and if it turns to be something different then something else is concerned. But the endeavour to find a satisfactory reason is fruitless."..(Bradley).

"What the principle of causation does for us is to enable us to bring together things that are in themselves different as being connected by relations that have certain regularity." (Bradley). Some Modern presentation of the Indian View. Karana (cause) is a necessary antecedent which is

(continued from the previous page) not taken up in the bringing about of something else. Karya (effect) is that necessary consequent which is not brought about by something else." (Keith).

Ancient 'Philosophic' Views: Both in India and in Greece there were thinkers that bestowed considerable thought on this subject and formulated their interpretations. They viewed cause from different stand-points and classified them as "Material", "Formal", "Efficient", "Instrumental" "Accessory", "First", "Ultimate", "Final", and so forth. Some substituted "ground and conclusion" for cause and effect, as being more comprehensive and accurate. There are many other varieties such as "occasion", "Unwinding" into which we cannot go here as it is needless for the purpose of this paper. All these have been criticised by later philosophers and scientists, though the religiously minded have clung to some of the items of the old classifications. A few recent thinkers hold, as has been indicated above, that we know only the "Formal" aspect of this law or of change. But another of the old views is still current. According to it causal relation has three aspects:-

- (1) One may think of the cause from the standpoint of the effect i.e. think of the past;
- (2) One may anticipate the effect from the standpoint of the cause i.e. think of the future;
- (3) One may view the same event as both cause and effect, combining 1 and 2.

Now, religion has clung to the beliefs in a "First" or "Ultimate" cause as well as in a "Final", which stress the Past, and which have led to its doctrines of Creation, Predestination and Predetermination. Those that laid emphasis on the future aspect were led to Free Will, Indeterminacy, Uncertainty, Probability etc. of the modern scientists who are interested more in controlling and directing the future.

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The Common Man's View.: Human beings in the earliest times, do not seem to have reflected on the relation between events. It is said that there exist people even now that know nothing definitely of any connection between phenomena. At a more developed stage man seems to have recalled his past personal experience and reflected thereon. He willed and produced some results in himself. And he seems to have thought that all physical or external phenomena were similarly governed. Influenced by religious faith he clung to this belief though experience taught him that there was a lack of uniformity or certainty in this respect. He believed “That there is a destiny that shapes our ends, rough-hew them how he will.” This interpretation is evidently anthropomorphic in its origin.

Even from very early times man has found it necessary to believe in miraculous happenings, unexpected turns, accidents, chance, luck, fate, vis major and the like.

Modern Tendencies: With the advance of scientific knowledge the critical spirit has naturally developed. More exactness and precision are demanded in our thinking. At first, scientists wholly relied upon “causal” relation, as a certainty or necessity, as did Newton and others who made some great discoveries, especially in astronomy. Now they find that there is not the same certainty to be found not only in the physical world but even in the psychological.

That Hume did not believe in the causal relation as an objective fact, that Kant did not believe in anything of the kind in “things-in-them-selves” though he clung to causality as a form of thought, that Spinoza and Descartes held that the cause contained the effect and perhaps something more, that some modern thinkers like Bergson hold that the effect has something in addition to what is known to exist in the cause, in

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(continued from the previous page) so far as they believe in "Creativity" are well known. There is also Lloyd Morgan's theory of the "Emergence" of²⁴ new features. All these only increase one's doubts in the certainty or definiteness of the causal law.

The following quotations will reveal the tendency better.

"If we state the law of Causality in the form of 'if we know the present we can calculate the future' it is not the conclusion but the premise which is false, for we can never know the present completely in full detail." (Heisenberg).

"When we come to differences of kind, the gulf between them seems so impassable that it seems hardly possible even to conceive of any means by which the existence of those particular distinctions could be made intelligible." (Zimmer).

"Cause is not yet defined in such a way as to satisfy the enquiring mind." (Patrick).

"The cause of anything is everything else, the universe itself." (Mackenzie and others).

"The tough minded realist will insist on the universal religion of determinism and the absolute validity of the law of Causality while the more tender minded idealist or neo-positivist will welcome the new studies in physics as a vindication of some kind of freedom even in the world of physical reality. But I suppose that science is itself now towards a greater degree of tender mindedness than was formerly suspected. (Mackenzie).

"Causation implies change and it is difficult to know of what we may predicate the change." (Bradley).

"A genuine cause always must be the whole cause and the whole never could be complete until it has taken in the universe. And this is impossible." (Bradley)

"Causal determinism by something pre-existing is, though a very common idea, yet one that

²⁴ The original editor deleted "the" by hand

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(continued from the previous page) proves logically incomprehensible when it is closely studied.” (W. Windelband).

“Causality is a principle which has not been experimentally verified.” “It cannot be demonstrated.” (Eddington).

“The denial of determinism or as it is often called the law of causality does not mean that it is denied that effects may proceed from cause”. do.

“An assertion or denial of causation can hardly be proved.” do.

“It is empty talk that every event has a cause.” ..Maxburn.

The Present Situation (in the West). (1) The common man cannot ignore the causal principle in life or in any one of his actions though he is aware of its uncertainty, and believer in accidents, miracles and the rest. Everyday man has to sow that he may reap. In the world of religion also which follows in the footsteps of the common man, causality holds its sway as ever before. The belief in God’s Creation of the world and in God’s purpose and His freewill Predestination is there. Further, there can be no order or govern-men in society unless men are held responsible for actions done by them and believe in causality, as well as Freewill.

2. In the world of scientists the validity of determinism or causality seems to be losing its force. This does not mean that they hold that only chance or irregularity characterises Nature. “A profounder experience has now taught us.” says Zimmer, “that it (the causal law) must be replaced by a law of more general character which allows to predict from a state known with a certain degree of certainty what will happen within certain limits in the future.” But a few scientists have taken a jump into Freewill. This has made the believers in religion jubilant for they think that science won back for God the powers,

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(continued from the previous page) which others have wrested from Him.

Nevertheless there are a few scientists who believe that causality or determinism has not collapsed. Some others like Bertrand Russel hold that though for the time being the causal law is under a cloud yet it will emerge in full glory in the future, when further advance is made.

(3) Physically or psychologically no definite relation, mechanical i.e. mathematical or measurable is known to exist between cause and effect, or more accurately, between phenomena. Nevertheless the indefinite behaviour of atoms or electrons, may be due to causes still unknown. Neither can we predetermine or foresee definitely the future even though the antecedents are known. All the same, this does not disprove the possible existence of some definite connection between phenomena.

It is thus seen that there exists no agreement among the Philosophers and Scientists. But what is more, every human being finds some contradiction or uncertainty in his or her own life, and yet cannot help acting.

The Inconsistency or Contradiction. The common man's as well as the religious man's explanation of the contradiction in his belief in the causal law and its failure is that man has not been able to understand as yet all about causality and that God's ways and Freewill are inscrutable. The causal law is not invalidated but its implications are not fully understood yet.

But what is striking is that scientists though they say that the old notion of “causality” has been exploded and that it has given place to uncertainty or indeterminacy, yet they also are obliged everyday to have recourse to experiments relying as ever before on the value of causal relation. This inconsistency has been noticed by some of the great leaders of modern thought.

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(continued from the previous page) In this respect the most advanced scientific thinkers and philosophers are on the same level as the men of religion or the common men i.e. in so far as their experience reveals inconsistency and indefiniteness or uncertainty.

The philosophers however seem to realise that they should think deeper to get more light. They see that when those that look at life from one standpoint find causality to be reliable, others that view it from another, find uncertainty reigning. The ordinary man or the religious man stresses or is obliged to stress one aspect at one time and another at another time, as it suits his mood.

Some of the philosophers have therefore rightly asked themselves the higher question: what does this impulse to rely and act upon causality though it is seen that it is uncertain and unreliable, imply?

The answer is best given in the words of Mackenzie “what the principle of causation does for us is to enable us to bring together things that are in themselves different.” Both the physical and the psychological worlds are characterised by difference and multiplicity; but causality points to some inner connection or unity.

Europe gives no final or verifiable solution of this problem of contradictions. Jeans and Eddington, the great scientists do see that there exists uncertainty or indeterminacy. But these thinkers have unconsciously fallen victims to their religious complex, which has made them rely upon the doctrines of the “Mathematical architect” and supreme “freewill”, both of which convey no meaning unless they are co-ordinated with the causal notion. Both the terms “Architect” and “Freewill” imply agency and the doing of something, which is the same as ‘effecting’. Even God has to be ‘causing.’ Causation is a part of His nature. If so,

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(continued from the previous page) how are we certain that He Himself is not effect. These thinkers have not disproved the eternality or the validity of the causal principle. This has been pointed out by the ancient philosophers of the East as well as the West.

The Hindu View. (1) As has been hinted at the beginning, modern Europe has given us nothing that had not been known to the ancient Hindus in respect of the concept of causality. It has only repeated what India said more than a thousand years ago. And there is still something in India Europe can learn if it cares to. Gautama and Kanada lived long before Aristotle and what is more Gaudapada and the Buddhist Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti lived at least a thousand years before Heisenberg or Eddington. These eastern men have thought more deeply on this subject than their modern representatives. Like Aristotle, the Indian thinkers had classified the kinds of causes and also criticised them. The disputes between the Tarkikas and the Samkhyas, as well as the Mimamsikas may be briefly summed up as follows, it being admitted that ‘mind’ does not exist by itself apart from ‘body’. If it be ‘form’ alone that changes, and not ‘substance or matter,’ where does the new form come from? Has this ‘new form’ no cause? If both substance and form change where exists the connecting link between “Cause” and “Effect”. If effect be contained in the Cause we cannot predicate any change of substance or form. Besides these “Arambha” and “Parinama” vadas as they are termed in India, which try to escape the fallacy of regresses ad infinitum which in turn conflicts with God’s creativity and which, as indicated above, are known in Europe also, there is the doctrine of “Vivarta” which says causal relation is something similar to mental construction or superimposition. This is akin to the

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(continued from the previous page) Kantian view and has likewise been refuted. The concept of "Apurva" vada which holds that something new or unforeseen comes into existence in the effect, has forestalled centuries ago the "Emergence" and "creativity" theories of the West.

Much deeper, however, goes the thought of Sri Harsha, who observes as follows:—In as much as causality implies change and sequence, at what moment of 'point' of time does Cause change into effect—a something different from cause? When we spot that point of time we shall be able to see how cause becomes effect, not till then. Change itself is inexplicable.

The Indian Buddhist Nagarjuna has also pursued the enquiry on similar lines and come to the conclusion that 'causality' is no more than a common characteristic of human ignorance. He says:- "No causes there, no non-causes, since (altogether) no result." "The world has neither a beginning nor an end."

The coping stone is finally placed by the great Gaudapada in the following verse:—

"Nothing whatever is produced (is an effect) either of itself or of another. Nothing is produced whether it be being or non-being or both being and non-being."

"Nothing of this (manifold universe) is an effect in as much as creation or evolution cannot be established as a fact."

"The inability (to explain), the ignorance (of the nature) and the impossibility (of proving) the order of succession or sequence only lead the wise to shed light on the truth of non-causality." (Ajati).

"Ajati". Negation of the causal concept, is the last word of the philosophic view in India.

Thus much for the philosophic interpretations. (2) Though the work-a-day world and the religious Hindus believe that whatever happens is

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(continued from the previous page) directly the result of God's will as its cause, and the world as His creation, yet the thoughtful among them modify this belief in various ways each according to his own taste or temperament. The view that is generally held by the latter is the universe is beginningless (Anadi). It does not hold God to be the Creator of man and to be responsible for the production of this world so full of evil. Good and evil are also beginningless as well as infallible. It believes in the unforeseen (adrishta), fate, luck, accident and so forth. The Hindu generally says that the laws of Nature are also immutable. The causal law is one such. What are known as its failures as indicated above are in perfect consonance with the causal law. They are also caused by causes, which are still not known and which have to be traced even to prenatal or some far off antecedent existences not known yet. Nothing is seen to come out of antecedent “non-existence.” No child is born without a mother and a father. It should have existed in some form in the parents and they in turn in their parents. This unbroken continuity of the causal chain is evident in the physical and psychological worlds. There is an ethical side also, which says that just as a man reaps what he sows, man's actions in a previous life are the causes not only of his birth but also of many of his joys and sorrows in this life. This causal view is known as the “Karma” doctrine, into the metaphysical details of which we cannot go here. It will suffice to note here that it is irrefutable by anyone in this world, so long as one acts, to the least extent, relying on causality, as valid.

According to this view God's laws are perfect. Good and evil are man's own creations based on the causal law. The Hindu seeks to be perfectly just to God. For in the absence of positive evidence he will not blame Him as the creator or

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(continued from the previous page) cause of evil or of one man’s prosperity and another’s sorrow in life. On the principle of the beginningless causal principle he explains the existence of evil, consistently with God’s omniscience as well as His mercifulness or goodness. Europe has to learn this lesson that as one man sows one reaps, i.e. the “Karma” doctrine.

(3) Then the most important question naturally arises as to how the Hindu explains the contradiction i.e. reconciles the philosophic truth of the negation of causality with the belief in religion and in its certainty or probability relied on in practical life, which demands faith in the causal law. In other words, how does he reconcile Karmic determinacy with the free-will efforts to overcome or ward off evil and to shape one’s future?

Here again the ancient Hindu philosopher has something to offer to the West for consideration. He asks: What is thought? How does this arise? He enquires whether it is possible to have a meaning for the term ‘cause’ without connecting it, in thought with ‘effect’ and vice versa. Similarly with the terms ‘indeterminacy’ or ‘Uncertainty and their correlatives. He finds that the human mind fails to find a meaning for any term when it is divorced from its opposite, or correlative, in thought. So are the concepts of ‘freewill’ and ‘architect’ and the like. It follows from this that the universe as ordinarily viewed by the human mind is subject at one and the same time to determinism and indeterminism (uncertainty.) Man takes only partial or side views as it suits his moods or purposes. But when the whole in other words both sides are seen, that is, when ‘truth’ is known and verified, the reality is found to be beyond both determinism and indeterminism. These concepts or

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(continued from the previous page) terms have no meaning then. The entire universe or existence is found to be either bound by relations or devoid of any such relations, according as one views it from the standpoint of either ignorance (of truth) or of knowledge (of truth) respectively. Just as truth is beyond both Idealism and Realism though people keep fighting about them, so truth is beyond causality and indeterminacy, though men are seen to differ and have doubts with reference to them. This fact, let it²⁵ be remembered, can be directly verified though only by those that make deeper enquiry.

The above solution looks somewhat like the Hegelian way of synthesising ‘thesis’ and ‘antithesis’. But in Indian philosophy synthesis is not the ultimate stage, nor even the ‘Absolute’. There is something still higher i.e. truth as such which is not the ‘Absolute.’

Why has not the West seen this truth? The answer is that the West does not wish to see it. It is averse to deep thinking, in this respect. As Patrick says, “We have acquired too much wealth and not enough wisdom...Stop, look and listen—the prudent caution at rail road crossings—must be amended to read “Stop, look, listen and Think”, not for the saving of a few lives in rail road accidents but for the preservation of the life of humanity.”

Further, with some very rare exceptions the thinkers in the West seem to cling tenaciously to that view of truth that declares: “Whatever agrees with what I like, is truth and whatever disagrees with what I like or with whatever agrees with what I dislike cannot be truth.

The Hindu philosopher Gaudapada says: “When attachment (due to egoism) is gone causality vanishes; and cause and effect “become non-existent.” In other words, though the West knows that truth seeking demands “self-elimination” or

²⁵ The original editor changed “is” to “it” by hand

(continued from the previous page) "de-personalization" yet it knows not how to do this to perfection.

The Hindu philosopher however persevered in the teeth of innumerable obstacles or difficulties and reached Truth as such, and verified it i.e. the truth beyond all possibilities of contradictions and conflict. The West however seems to think that the Hindu that relies upon such a doctrine is in the primitive stage, though he be not crazy or foolish. For, the test or standard of wisdom in the West according to its own view of truth seems to be still confined to politics, especially of self-advancement. The West has no time to think deeply on any other subject as yet. But contradictions in thought and conflicts in life cannot cease till "truth" as such is known and realised. Truth abhors differences and limitations of any kind.

Some are of the belief that such truth is the Absolute which is attained only in mystic ecstasies or transcendental intuitions, or when one sees not this world as we see it. But nothing can be a greater delusion. "Philosophy" – not mysticism or religion – in India holds that it is only when the phenomena of the universe are before us as in our normal state that the causal connection between them is proved to be not a fact and that this truth is verifiable. Indeterminacy is but the first step leading to Ajati. If the scientists will only make up their mind to "think" deeper they can reach it. Conclusion. What causality or indeterminacy in all its modifications really means cannot be known till the meaning of "truth" as such is known. And the meaning of truth cannot be known till what the great scientists term "Self-elimination" or "De-personalization" or as the Hindu puts it "Ego-eradication" is brought about completely. Till truth as such is reached causality or determinism as well as the law of Karma in

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(continued from the previous page) some form will be a fact inseparable from life and irrefutable. But non-causality, indeterminacy, freewill, fate, luck and the like unforeseen occurrences though they involve us in contradictions and conflicts will also be as much a fact; but do not invalidate the former. They only direct our thought to something higher, stimulating further or deeper enquiry. The more we advance the greater becomes our doubt and stronger our desire to bet at “truth”. For, doubt is the best incentive to seekers after ‘truth’. Till causality is understood the wrangles of scientific and philosophic ‘isms’ will not cease.

I have had the good fortune to meet in the course of my travels, eminent thinkers in the West who in our talks showed the keenest interest in seeking ‘truth’, though they had not the same interest in defining ‘truth’ as such. But in connection with talks on causality, only two were able to divest themselves of their ‘ego or ‘superiority’ complex as demanded by the greatest seekers after truth in the East as well as in the West, both in science and in philosophy, and to enquire into the Hindu view of ‘truth’ and its bearing on causality. They were Prof. Max Planck of Berlin and Prof. Bergson of Paris, both of whom evinced their deepest appreciation of the same.

Truth, like the Sun, is not visible, so long as man is eager to keep his eyes on his own shadow (the ego) and as in some parts of the world, or in some seasons or when the sky (mind) is clouded. But it is there shining, all the same, always. When this sun of truth is seen, all contradictions, causal or non-causal or other, and all conflicts cease, says “Philosophy” in India.

WHAT DOES VEDANTA SIGNIFY TO A MODERN MIND?

(In Kalyana Kalpataru).

What little I have been able to grasp of the teachings of Vedanta, I entirely owe to my most revered Guru Sri Sachchidananda Sivabhinava Narasimha Bharati Swami, the late Jagadguru of Sringeri, who, while in his mortal body, was held in the highest esteem, even outside India, as one of the real Jnanis of our times, at whose feet I had the invaluable privilege of sitting as a pupil and to whose feet I bow again mentally.

It was he who drove into my heart three unforgettable lessons, the three objects of Vedanta: (1) Vedanta seeks the perfect happiness or well-being of all that exists – the entire universe – (Sarva Sathvo Suko Hitha), (2) Vedanta is never in conflict with any other school of philosophy or religion (Avirudha), (3) Vedantic truth has no room in it for dispute with others' beliefs or views (Avivada). And it does not seek victory over any other person or system in the world; for it regards all views as only its parts or limbs.

Accounts of Vedanta have been given to the world a thousand times already. And there is, it may be said, nothing new to add to the truth stated in them, and there is no need for multiplying the summaries in existence. But the fact that it has been, and has had to be, presented in so many different ways by so many men in the past shows that the ever-changing world demands fresh descriptions to suit the culture or enlightenment of the times and the growing or changing powers of men's comprehension. There is at the present day a new outlook consequent on the fusion of the ancient Eastern culture with the present-day Western culture. Further this age is characterised as pre-eminently scientific. An attempt is therefore made here to approach Vedanta from this "Modern" standpoint.

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The term "Vedanta" has been interpreted in a variety of ways in the East as well as in the West. To most men it signifies religion or theology. To some it consists of scholastic disputations. Those that are tired of these believe that Vedanta means mystic experience, Yogic Samadhi, or some visions obtained through the grace of superior beings. But, as the word itself implies, Vedanta is the end, not merely of Veda but of knowledge in general. It seeks that knowledge on which all knowledge. In other words it comprehends all human knowledge and experience which is termed philosophy. Religion, theology, scholasticism, mysticism (yoga), arts and science are its factors or steps leading to the goal (anta). Naturally under each of them there are numerous subsidiary steps suited to the innumerable varieties of tastes (ruchi), knowledge (Jnana), capacities (Samarthya) etc. of men. Though the largest number rest satisfied with the religious stage and believe that to be the end (Vedanta), yet it is not intended here to enter into religion, i.e. meditations, (Upasanas) forms of worship, rituals, and their significance; nor into theology, i.e. the beliefs and the traditions regarding the nature of the spirit, its past and future, including heavens and hells, good and evil, and the various views regarding the Creator and man's relation to Him; nor into the scriptural texts or other authorities and their interpretation based on grammar, rhetoric and logic; nor into Yogic or mystic disciplines, ecstasies and supernatural powers or illuminations attained by some; nor into the refutation of different schools or dogmas such as those of the Mimansakas, the Logicians or the Sankhyas, all of which contribute in various ways to the evolution of Vedantic thought. The object of this article is to give a brief account of the basic principle underlying all those efforts of the human mind to attain to the

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(continued from the previous page) Ultimate Reality, which concerns the philosophy of Vedanta

Vedanta is meant only for such as prefer truth to everything else, such as want only truth at any cost—not Ananda or the like at any cost. For truth alone is the means to everything. The foremost question, therefore in the philosophy of Vedanta is: WHAT IS TRUTH?

All these factors or steps or stages are known as Matas (personal views), whereas Vedanta as philosophy is concerned with Tattva (Ultimate Truth), which is independent of man's likes and dislikes. As two plus two is four for all men, so is the highest truth the same for all men. Truth is, therefore that in which there is no room for actual difference or contradiction, or for a possibility of them. Among what are known as steps or stages to the highest Truth, the lower the step, the greater the difference or possibility of difference of views, as for instance, in the multiplicity of religions or mystic experiences. Further the object of Vedanta is to get at that knowledge, knowing which everything becomes known and all doubts vanish. Therefore from Mata we rise to Tattva.

It may be asked: Of what use is such knowledge as is called Tattva? Men with such knowledge are seen to be subject to the same laws of nature as others. Vedanta replies: When this goal of knowledge is attained, everything desired or desirable will have been attained. There exists then no want or fear, nay, it is perfection not merely in knowledge but also in life. It is the fulfilment of the object of existence. (Parama Purusartha).

There being no experience or knowledge that Vedanta does not take account of, it evaluates every item or aspect of all life. It seeks to comprehend the universe of thought and matter and to make one realise perfection in one's own

(continued from the previous page) life. All efforts of man are, according to Vedanta, but steps towards this perfection.

The WAY: For attaining this object, Vedanta pursues the course known as enquiry (Vichara) based upon reason (Buddhi). It starts with what is perceived in the world (Idam) before us and as known to us. It does not commence, as religion or theology does, with an enquiry into the unknown or the imperceptible, God and the like. It accepts nothing as truth unless such thing stands the test of reason. All efforts and kinds of knowledge, other than Vedantic, believe "satisfaction" (Ananda) to be truth and the goal, ignoring the fact that ether also may bring joy or satisfaction. Vedanta seeks truth beyond such satisfaction. It treats Ananda as a Kosa i.e. a "covering" only.

The seeker of the truth beyond "Bliss" or satisfaction must be a hero (Dhira) which even the best scientists of the West at present are not. For even they cannot divest themselves of all their preconceptions which bring them the satisfaction in life that they seek, above all else, but which naturally colours the truth attained by them. Complete detachment (Vairagya) from preconceptions is an indispensable condition for attaining the highest Truth.

The characteristic of the heroic seeker is this. He asks: How are we to know that what is contained in the Veda, the Bible, the Koran and the like scriptures, or what is uttered by the Rsis of the past, or the scientists of the present, or by the great teachers like Krsna, Buddha, Christ, Mahomed, Sankara, Ramanuja, Madva and others, is truth? Some of the most reliable of modern enquiries seem to show that mystic or yogic experiences are merely self-delusions. (Vide such books as Bradby's Logic of the Unconscious or Bernard Hart's Psychology of Insanity).

Those that possess only the slave mentality

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(continued from the previous page) (ina Drsti or Krpana smrti) and that take without testing what scriptures, traditions or other authorities declare, for truth, are not qualified for Vedantic Enquiry, which demands the heroic pursuit of Truth based on Reason. This feature of their attitude cannot be put better than has been done in Bhagavata and Bharata. Those that are heroes (Dhirah) would ask God: "How are we to know that you are God and that what you say is Truth?" To this summit very few other systems of thought known to history, appear to have risen. When one is fully imbued with such heroic spirit in the pursuit of Truth, one is said to be fit for Vichara, otherwise known as the philosophy of Vedanta. Vedanta does not accept anything as true unless it stands the test of reason. Sruti is the first step; Yukti (intellect) is the next higher; and Anubhava (when universal or non-contradictory, it is called reason) is the highest court of appeal.

THE METHOD: The student of Vedanta begins by enquiring into the nature of the material and mental world known to him. Experience teaches him that pain and ignorance exist in life. Then he seeks to eliminate by degrees the sources of suffering and of error. And in gaining the knowledge needed for doing so, he finds that the fewer the facts or data he has for consideration the greater are the chances of error. Fullness of data makes possible the perfection of the trough sought. He also learns that the less the ignorance the greater the possibility of eradicating fear and pain, nay, of attaining happiness.

Taking philosophy to mean a study based on all the data of life or existence, and that solely from the point of view of reason, — not of tradition or scriptural authority, — we find the philosophy of Vedanta radically differing from all other systems in one supremely important respect. All the other systems make their study by

(continued from the previous page) taking into account the data of waking state alone or viewing everything from the standpoint of the waking, whereas Vedanta considers all the data of the three states of waking (Jagrat), dream (swapna) and deep sleep (Susupti) and viewing all the three states as equally valuable in furnishing data. Europe has made a deep study of dream and deep sleep from the psychological and physiological standpoints, but it has not till now approached them from the metaphysical or philosophic viewpoint. All the other schools of thought, European or India, take for granted that the 'objects' of waking experience are real and consider dream entities as either unreal or real. But Vedanta does not proceed on this assumption or preconception. The limits of this article preclude our going fully into this enquiry, whose result alone can be stated here. Waking experience is exactly like the dream, and both, though they appear real as long as they last, are in fact unreal. The waking world, however, is as pure creation of the mind as the dream world is. That the world we perceive is an idea is the finding, not only of some of the greatest scientists, but also of some of the foremost thinkers of all ages,—to mention a few: Plato, Shakespeare, Schopenhauer, Berkeley and Kant.

This is the eternal secret of Vedanta. Maitri Upanishad says: "The world is just one's own thought; with effort he should purify it then; What is one's thought, that he becomes. This is the eternal secret."

Panchadasi says: "The mind is virtually the external world. Endeavours should be made to purify it. It is an ancient truth preserved as a secret, that the mind assumes the forms it is engaged in perceiving." (For details vide Mandukya Upanishad, Chap.2 Verses 1 to 16).

The mental world of ideas which constitute the

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(continued from the previous page) world of waking and dream disappear in deep sleep, with our ego, though we are so deeply attached to it. One cannot say that the world exists during our deep sleep, if one knows modern science enough to see that the world is only thought. Eddington says: "To put the conclusions crudely, the stuff of the world is mind stuff." "The familiar world is a mental construction." "The external world of physics has become a world of shadows. In removing our illusions (of the concrete physical world) we have removed the substance, for indeed we have seen that substance is one of the greatest of our illusions." Jeans agrees with Eddington in this respect. Here science stops. But Vedanta asks: What about the ideas (constituting this world) in our deep sleep? The entire universe (of ideas) including one's personality or ego disappears in deep sleep (Susupti) as everyone knows. This solid, substantial and material world, which appears so real and yet disappears completely in susupti is therefore unreal. This fact is known as illusion (Mithya or Maya).

Here is what some other eminent scientific thinkers say: "Can this self, so vividly central to my universe, so greedily possessive of the world, ever cease to be? Without it, surely, there is no world at all. And yet this conscious self dies nightly when we sleep, and we cannot trace the stage by which in its beginnings it crept to an awareness of its own existence." ... (Julian Huxley and H.G. Wells).

All the three states consisting of ideas and appearing and disappearing continually are illusory (unreal); but that which is aware of their coming and going is called the Witness, (Saksi), which is necessarily constant. Else the changes of the states could not have been cognized. It should not be forgotten that what is known as

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(continued from the previous page) the I or ego is a part of the universe seen in the waking or dream states, and that as such it is also unreal, i.e. something witnessed as appearing and disappearing. The coming or the going of the witness is never known. It is therefore said to be eternal. Its nature is different from all that is witnessed or seen. It cannot be described by words that apply to the unreal world. It is consciousness per se which is ultimate and fundamental, as the foremost scientists like Max Plank, Schrodinger, Einstein, Eddington, Jeans and others hold. Further, when ideas disappear, as in deep sleep (Susupti) and reappear, as in waking and dream, they are realized as being of the same substance as consciousness or witness. The word "substance" cannot, strictly speaking, be used. Owing to this fact the witness or consciousness is indicated by a special word Atma. When again the world appears in the waking and the dream states, if it is seen that all that exists, including consciousness, is one and the same in essence, this universal essence would be Brahman.

Then is all our knowledge of the waking world, especially of the several sciences of no use? The answer is: All the sciences are of the highest value as pointing in the direction of the Ultimate Truth. Philosophy, cannot exist, and never existed, except on the foundation of scientific knowledge. But how it existed on such knowledge in the past and how each science now contributes to this end are matter beyond the scope of this paper.

TRUTH: How are we to know that what Vedanta reveals is the highest Truth. As has been pointed out already, the nature of truth is such as not to admit any contradiction or doubt. Now, to give an illustration, in deep sleep no ideas exist, there is no thought of anything regarding

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(continued from the previous page) which a contradiction or doubt may ever be conceived to exist. Such a state is that in which there is not a second to differ from or doubt. No dual existence alone stands this test. When, therefore, all that exists in the waking and dream states also is known to be non-different from the witness in substance or in its nature, i.e. when non-duality of all that is known to exist is reached, the highest Truth or Reality is attained.

The basic principle of Vedanta here is that whatever depends upon man's thinking or personality (Purusa-trantra) is necessarily coloured by his thoughts or idiosyncrasies. Truth being that which is independent of all personal colouring, it exists in its own light (vastu-tantra). To eliminate all such colourations (personal equations) is the object of truth-seeking. This is the principle that underlies what the Vedantists term the complete effacement of Ahankara (Self) or what the scientists call "self-elimination" or "depersonalization". Next, the Upanisads and the Gita say that the highest Truth is Buddhigrahyam. The disciplines (Sadhanas) needed for sharpening or purifying the Buddhi (Reason) are many. The chief is "concentration of mind" (Ekagrata) which cannot be attained without calmness, patience, moral purities and the like virtues. With the effacement of the 'I' (Aham) or with Vairagya, will go all the attachment to things and beliefs.

DOSHAS (OBSTACLES OR FAULTS). There are many obstacles in the path of the pursuit of truth, which have to be guarded against. They are all due to ignorance. But ignorance is not mere negation of knowledge. Doubtful knowledge, (Samsaya), absence of correct or full knowledge (Abhavana), want of definite knowledge (Asambhavana) and fanciful, imaginary or contrary knowledge (Viparita Shavana) and misleading affirmative thoughts in

(continued from the previous page) waking state also constitute ignorance.

CAUSE, KHYATI, VARIETY AND OTHER TOPICS. When the Vedanti, though he knows that truth is non-dual in character, yet has to meet the arguments of those who stick to the waking experience alone as the only reliable one, whose idea of truth therefore cannot be divested of the sense of duality, he is obliged to deal with innumerable aspects of waking experience. They are literally endless. For the doubts arising are endless in as much as they refer to fractional data (the waking state). We shall however, deal with a few salient ones here.

1. Causal Relation: The first question is as to the nature of the relation between the witness and what is witnessed. The causal relation which apparently obtains between objects in the world witnessed, suggests itself as the answer. But thorough enquiry establishes the purely imaginary character of the cause-and-effect relation. (For details see Goudapada Karika). Ajati (Causelessness) is the last word of Vedanta. This is supported by the latest pronouncement of science. The principle of 'indeterminacy' of the Quantum Physics unmistakably points in that direction. The merely mental character of the causal relation has been rightly upheld by Kant also in modern times.

2. KHYATI. If causal relation is a myth, how does the Vedanti explain the appearance and disappearance of what is perceived and also error in perception? Several theories of perception has been advanced to explain these phenomena, such as Akhyati, Atmakhyati, Satkhyati, Asatkhyati and so forth. But each refutes the other. According to the meaning of truth indicated above, they have to be rejected. How mind and matter are related, it is impossible to state. So the Vedanti's view is labelled Anirvachaniyakhyati (the indescribable) and associated with

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(continued from the previous page) it the theory of Drsti-srsti, (seeing is creation). For thinking implies space, time and causal relation (Desa, kala, nimitta), which are all found to be purely mental creations. And no explanation of ultimate Truth or Reality not involving these, is possible.

3. VARIETY. If there be no proof of the existence of more than one, the Atma, the witness, how does the Vedanti explain the variety of thinking beings (jivas) in innumerable bodies seen in the waking state? The reply is suited to the preconceptions of the enquirer, which imply mental associations with either space or time or cause, all of which are one's creations. Explanations like Avachchedavada, Abhasavada or Bimba-pratibimbavada and so forth are mere hypotheses. Each of them is refuted by the other. None can stand the test of truth. For variety is unreal appearance. Some of these topics are parallel to the theories of perception and knowledge in Western philosophy, whose solutions are equally inconclusive. The best yet offered is that mind and matter are only one entity. The reason is not far to seek. The fallacy lies in confining oneself to the waking state alone.

4. AUTHORITIES AND INTERPRETATIONS: There is a huge mountain of literature in India devoted to the elucidation of scriptures and other works on traditional thought. Valuable as they all are in setting human mind a thinking on the highest problems of philosophy, they are valueless as revealers of the Ultimate Reality. For the nature of Truth has to be independently determined to enable one to see whether any scripture and its interpretations reveal the truth. The value of scholastic discussions is limited because of the circumstance that scripture and the like belong only to the world of witnessed in the waking state. All such things exist in the waking state alone. And, as in the Brahadaranyaka Upanishad

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(continued from the previous page) itself says, “scripture is no scripture” in the world of Truth.

Literally endless is the list of topics of this kind which crop up and are discussed when the purview is limited to one state only. They are therefore said to be of supreme value only to those in the stage of childhood. When the stand-point in which the three states are taken into account,—which is the standpoint of Vedanta—is reached, a new conception arises. THE PURPOSE OR UTILITY (PROYOJANA) The aim of Vedanta is to enable one to attain the Ultimate Truth, which when reached, completely frees one from all sorrows, whatever the cause. It leads one to the realization of—not immortality after death, which all religions teach,—but immortality before death, which alone is true immortality. Vedanta does not beg of men to do good by forcing one’s own creed or dogma on others or by enticing them to an acceptance of it; for all creeds alike belong to it, they being all pathways leading ultimately to Truth. It does not make one seek happiness at the cost of another, for every other is one’s own self. HOW IS VEDANTI KNOWN? As the Upanishads, Mahabharata, Bhagavata and many other authorities on the subject unanimously declare, he who has realised Brahma cannot be distinguished from other men in his behaviour of life. The realizer of Truth may be a man or a woman, a prince or a peasant, a youth or an adult, of any race or creed. Such an one is not known by any peculiarities or characteristics. The Vedanti wears no external or special marks or signs of dress or appearance.

WHAT DOES THE VEDANTI DO IN LIFE? He sets an example to the world by doing all that lies in his power to wipe out pain and sorrow (duhkha) where ever found, so that whoever seeks the Truth by doing good to all alike may follow in his foot-steps. His object in life is at all

(continued from the previous page) times "To see himself in all, and all in himself."

SANKARA AND HIS MODERN CRITICS.

(In Prabuddha Bharata.)

Among the great teachers of Vedanta, who are being studied by the modern scholars of the West as well as of the East, Sankara seems to have claimed a larger share of attention than others. Some of his admirers and critics have been drawn to him by his religion, some by his theology and scholasticism, some others by his mysticism. Excepting a few, whose number could be counted on one's fingers, none appears to have realised the significance of his philosophy, though in reality he is first a philosopher and then the rest. For, his entire life and whole attitude towards the world have been determined by his philosophy. Now some of the most recent observations of his critics seem to offer an opportunity for placing before you a few thoughts of mine regarding his philosophy for your consideration. In doing so, I hope to present an aspect or two of Sankara that appear to me to have been incompletely understood if not entirely misunderstood. As representatives of these critics, I have taken two, one from the West and the other from the East, both sincere admirers of Sankara and both accredited Sanskrit scholars. From a study of their and others' criticisms, I am led to think that the most fruitful source of misunderstandings has been the confusion that still prevails in this country in regard to the distinction between Religion, Theology, Scholasticism and Mysticism, on the one hand, and Science and Philosophy on the other, i.e. between "Matam" and "Tattwam", the former comprehending faith, Karma (Nitya, Nimittika, etc). Upasana, Yoga and the latter dealing with Tatwa Vichara. All of them go under the name of "Philosophy" in ordinary Indian Literature. Men, whether of the East

(continued from the previous page) or of the West, who are wedded to any of these attitudes, see in Sankara only that aspect in which they are specially interested. Dr Otto's standpoint is the mystic and he believes that to be the highest. For, as a true theologian, he relies upon intuition and belief based upon it. He therefore naturally undervalues philosophy as well as science but gives Sankara in all fairness of mind the rank of a mystic. From the mystic's or the theologian's standpoint one may set the highest value upon what pleases one. In as much as it makes reason subordinate, it is convenient for a mystic or a theologian to assign to another (like Sankara) any place or value he chooses without finally appealing to Reason, on which science and philosophy take their stand. Sankara deals with a world of thought in which we find a variety of elements corresponding to the several attitudes referred to above. How all these are comprehended under his philosophy is a subject on which I shall not enter here, though as a matter of fact his philosophy appraises the worth not only of religion, Theology, Scholasticism and Mysticism but also of Science as means or steps leading to the Ultimate[@] truth. With Sankara Science does not reveal the Ultimate Reality or Truth, which is

[@] In Sankara there is no antagonism between Philosophy and Religion. Nor have they each the independent status which Europe and America are still fighting about. In his Vedanta, Religion is the child that passes through the stages of theology, scholasticism, mysticism and science for growing into the adult called Philosophy or Tattva Vicharam. All these are on the high road to Ultimate Truth or Reality. But Philosophy is directly concerned with this goal. Let it not be thought that Religion is outside the province of even Science; for science studies Religion also.

(continued from the previous page) the special concern of Philosophy. But science prepares the way for philosophic enquiry.

Some twenty years ago, when I had the honour of speaking in this very hall on a similar occasion I had to contend that Sankara is not merely a theologian in as much as the then extant literature and the best authorities on Indology, as well as the accounts in the Encyclopedia Britannica described him as a theologian, and not as a philosopher. To-day the world seems to have made some further progress. Dr Otto of the Hamburg University, one of the greatest of Sanskrit scholars of the West, thinks Sankara to be a mystic and that of the classic type. The other is Prof. Nagaraja Sarma of Kumbakonam whom I consider a representative of those that devote most of their criticisms to scholastic interpretations, be they of Sankara's own statements or others' presentations of Sankara's thoughts. The Professor sees in Sankara more of the scholastic theologian than of the philosopher. My object to-day, therefore, is to show as far as I can that Sankara is primarily a philosopher, but not a mystic or a scholastic.

Turning first to Dr Otto, we find that in his recent work on Mysticism East and West, he reveals a most profound study of Sankara's theology, perhaps a much deeper study than that of Dr Deussen who is still unquestionably the greatest of the Western expounders of Sankara's system. It must however, be acknowledged that so far as the system of Advaita Vedanta is concerned, Dr Otto is a more sympathetic critic than Dr Edgerton of America who considers it to be no more than a "magic philosophy" of the primitive mind. (vide his recent Presidential address at the Oriental Congress)

Among Dr Otto's observations in this work are (1) Sankara is "not so much a philosopher as a theologian; for, his impelling interest is not

(continued from the previous page) 'science'...He is not concerned for knowledge out of curiosity to explain the world, but he is impelled by a longing for salvation...His interest is not a scientific interest in the Ultimate, in the Absolute and its relation to the world resulting in some extraordinary statement about the soul and its metaphysical relationships, but he is guided in his interest by something which lies outside the scientific or metaphysical speculation...It is the idea of salvation, of Sreyas etc., and of how this is to be won...That the soul is eternally one with the eternal is not scientifically interesting statement."

(2) "When Sankara is asked about the origin of Avidya" says Dr Otto, he quietly ignores the insoluble problem or answers it roughly and incompletely." "This is", he adds, "by the by, a new proof of the fact that the interest of his teaching is not a scientific one but is an interest in salvation."

Thirdly, "For Sankara the world remains world—painful, miserable, to be fled from and denied. Samsara and Brahmanirvana stand in sharp contrast to one another. Nirvana is a condition purely of the beyond. Samsara could never be Nirvana and therefore salvation in Brahman is for Sankara realised only after death."

The grounds on which Dr Otto bases this estimate of Sankara are that Sankara in the main agrees, as the learned Doctor thinks, with what he seems to consider as the doctrine of the Gita that salvation is attained by Grace. Next, he holds that Sankara's Brahma-jnanam is attained by means of 'intuition' which is the most distinguishing characteristic of mysticism. Scientific and philosophic knowledge is attained, as he believes through the intellect which can give only a "Theoretic" explanation of the world and of life. The ultimate truth in Sankara

(continued from the previous page) is therefore attained, according to Dr Otto, only through Grace and through intuition. His other noteworthy criticisms are: (1) "The goal for Sankara is the stilling of all Karmani, all works, all activity or will; it is quietism, it is tyaga, a surrender of the will and of doing, an abandonment of good as of evil works, for both bind man to the world of wandering." (2) "Sankara's (conception of Brahman) is the India 'static' conception." (3) "Sankara's teaching has no ethic because the background of his teaching is "India" and not Palestine. That which torment Sankara are the vexations of Samsara—wind, gall, slime, old age, endless rebirth but not sin, unworthiness, unrighteousness." (4) The proper expression of the feeling of at-one-ness is not a mystical pleasure, but agape, a love of a kind which neither Plotinus nor Sankara mentions or knows.

"Sankara could never be the profound discoverer of the rich indwelling life of the soul, which is only possible on a Christian basis."

Now turning to the subject of salvation or Moksha, or Sreyas and of the world being full of sorrow and suffering, there are certainly innumerable references to them in Sankara's teachings. But these words are only intended for those who are of a theological or mystical frame of mind. When Sankara is in his philosophic element, his goal, he repeatedly says, is the attainment of that knowledge which removes all doubts (Chhidyaanta sarva samsayah) and which when attained or understood, everything in existence becomes understood (Tasmin vijnate sarvam vijnatam bhavati). One of the stumbling blocks in the way of grasping Sankara is the difficulty due to the non-recognition of the fact that Sankara follows the tradition and adapts his teachings to the different classes of students. He uses language

(continued from the previous page) suited to the instruction to be given to each of the several kinds of such Adhikaris. Therefore Moksha and the like terms are meant for those who approach philosophy through the portals of Religion and Theology. But for Sankara, Moksha and the highest truth mean the same and Moksha or the highest truth is a thing attained in 'this' world.

Turning to his contention that the essential or the most characteristic doctrine of the Gita is that of Grace and Bhakti based upon intuition and that in so far as Sankara agrees with it his thought is based upon intuition, we find that he refers to Sloka 54 of Chap.18 of the Gita. He could have added Slokas 58 and 62 also. This doctrine is no doubt maintained by a school of thinkers and its value is fully recognised by Sankara. But this view is different from that of Sankara's school of Jnanam. The main subject of the enquiry in the Gita commences from the 7th verse of Chapter 2 wherein Arjuna starts the subject by saying that he is overcome by confusion of mind as to what he should do. With him, "to act or not to act" that is the question. And he adds that he is already a Bhakta of Sri Krishna: he only prays that his confusion may be removed. Next, the very last words of the Gita with which the subject is wound up are contained in the 73rd verse of Chapter 18, in which Arjuna says "My confusion of mind is gone and my doubts have disappeared." What Sri Krishna therefore appears to have done in the 18 chapters is that He has removed Arjuna's doubts. How has he done it? What is it that removes doubts and confusion and gives knowledge of certainty? Sri Krishna answers this question repeatedly in almost every one of the 18 chapters by pointing to the supreme importance and significance of what is known as Buddhi.

(1) In.2.49 He says, "Seek refuge in Buddhi."

- (2) In 2. 51 He says, "The wise possessed of Buddhist go to that state which is beyond all evils."
- (3) In 2.53 "When thy Buddhi..has become immovable and firmly established in the self, then thou shalt attain Self-realisation."
- (4) "And from the ruin of Buddhi he perishes...2.63.
- (5) 3.42 "Superior to all faculties is Buddhi and superior to this Buddhi is only Atman."
- (6) 5.17 "It is the Buddhi in That, that takes one to the supreme goal."
- (7) 6.25. "And what he has to attend to in attaining Brahman is the discipline of Buddhi."
- (8) 6.21. "This infinite joy of Brahman can be realised only by Buddhi which keeps one steady in the Highest Reality."
- (9) 6.43. "What does not die with this body but is continued in the next birth is the Buddhi which seeks Brahman."
- (10) 7.10. "Of all the faculties of man, the most adorable is Buddhi because "I am the Buddhi of intelligent men."
- (11) 10.10. The greatest gift that God himself can or does bestow on the man that worships Him with Bhakti, is not Bhakti itself, is not Brahma-Gnanam, but only Buddhi-yogam.
- (12). 12.8. "If one wishes to live always in God or Brahman one must apply one's own Buddhi to the object of devotion."
- (13). 15.20. Above all the most secret science taught in the Bhagavat Gita is that the man who knows the highest truth is made by God not as Bhakta or Yogavan but a Buddhiman.
- (14) 17.24. "On the other hand, those who are devoid of Buddhi cannot attain to the Highest Brahman."
- (15). "The attainment of Buddhi is the secret

(continued from the previous page) of all secrets". Lastly, at the very end, Arjuna is asked to resort finally to Buddhi-Yoga that he may not perish.

This is enough to show that to Arjuna the Gita teaches the doctrine of Buddhi as the highest lesson. Further when we consider the Bhagavat Gita as teaching Brahma-Vidya, we find it inculcating the lesson that it is through Buddhi alone that we can attain Brahmajnanam. This lesson of the Gita is based upon the rock of Upanishadic statements. The Kathopanishad says, "It is realized by the sharp Buddhi of wise man." (1, 3, 12) Further, the sharpness required is described as being greater than that of the edge of a razor. The Mundakopanishad says, "Through the grace of knowledge one attains the purity of mind. Then through meditation that Absolute is realised." (3.8). Other Upanishads also speak in this way about the supremacy of Buddhi. It is for instance said in Kena that the Dhirah alone reach Brahman in this life, in this world, where Dhi means Buddhi. In other Upanishads are found such terms as "Guha" "Hridayam", which are also interpreted as Buddhi, the abode of Brahman. Should it be argued that these are only external authorities and that Sankara himself may have held a different view, it may be pointed out that in this commentary on the Gita but particularly on VI, 12 of Katha Upanishad he most clearly states what his own conviction is. "Buddhi is our sole authority in comprehending the real nature of existence and non-existence."

Now, does Buddhi or Jnanam mean intuition leading to mysticism, or intellect leading to science; or does it imply something else leading to philosophic knowledge? Dr Otto himself says that intuitions are varied in their character. His intuition gives him a knowledge which places Christianity on a higher level than Vedanta. We

(continued from the previous page) know that Bergson's intuition tells him that change is the Ultimate Reality, Kant's intuition gives him his categorical imperative. A Vedantin's intuition reveals, as it is said, a Brahman unchanging or 'static' as Dr Otto prefers to call it. An Eckhart's intuition posits a dynamic Godhead. A Croce's intuition presents special aesthetic values. Were the question asked which of these intuitions is ultimate or whether all of them are equally true, seeing that psychological investigations show that intuitions are fallible, it is not to intuition by itself that we can appeal for solution but to something else like the intellect which can distinguish one kind of intuition from another and assess the worth of each. And if a difference arises between intellect and intuition themselves, we can only fall back upon a co-ordination of the two as did Fichte and Schelling in Germany. But in Vedanta we appeal to what is called "Buddhi"; a concept peculiar to Indian Philosophy, especially Vedanta. What then is "Buddhi?" Is it different from Intuition or Intellect? What is its place in philosophy?

It has been said however that Sankara is not a philosopher inasmuch as his interest is not a "Scientific" one. We shall have to enquire what relation there is between Science and Philosophy before we proceed to questions regarding Buddhi. And here comes the need for considering the criticisms of men who ignore the scientific value of Sankara's thought.

Prof. Nagaraja Sarma, no doubt, refutes the theological arguments of Dr Otto and defends Sankara as a theologian. The learned Professor in his latest article on Sankara attacks other interpreters of Sankara's attacks other interpreters of Sankara's teachings holding that the Professor's own version of Sankara is the true one. May we not ask on what grounds the Prof.

(continued from the previous page) holds his own interpretations of Sankara's words to be true? If he had given us anywhere in his writings on Sankara an indication of the nature of his test of the truth, that justifies his interpretations, we should have thought his interpretation of Sankara the most reliable. I do not refer to the Mimamsic rules of interpretation. I am asking for a test of the truth-value which is the same as philosophic value, of interpretation. His criticism of Otto and of other Indian writers on Vedanta mark him, no doubt, as an excellent Sanskrit scholar. His theological and scholastic arguments are splendid. But as a philosophic critic aiming at truth he has yet to show that his interpretation reveals Sankara correctly. Only when he publishes to the world his test of the validity of his interpretations one can know whether his contentions as regards Sankara's teachings are true to Sankara. Till then we shall not be in a position to accept his statement that "Sankara's doctrine of Adhyasa is the rock on which the entire structure of Monistic Metaphysic is grounded; that Adhyasa is fundamental and foundational in Sankara's system." For, there are others equally, if not more authoritative, who hold that Avastatraya and Causality form the bases of Sankara's Advaita.

How far critics of Prof. Nagaraja Sarma's school take the scientific standpoint is thus a most relevant question. For, he gives no evidence either of appreciation or condemnation of Sankara as a scientific thinker. If Sankara's mind be unscientific, both Dr Otto and Prof. Nararaja Sarma would be perfectly justified in making Sankara no more than a mystic or a scholastic theologian.

Nor can we say that Science has nothing to do with philosophy as it was once held and is still being held by many. It is Theology or mysticism

(continued from the previous page) that undervalues or ignores science but not philosophy. In many a modern University, Philosophy which ignores Science fails to attract men, not because philosophy bakes no bread, but because scriptural authorities, quotations and grammatical or other interpretations of words or phrases do not convince or satisfy the enquiring mind of to-day. The theological or scholastic defence of Sankara that so frequently appears is more a condemnation of him as a Philosopher than an appreciation. Whether such critics like it or not, Science is making itself recognized in philosophy. Here are some of the latest views regarding the attitude of philosophy in modern thinkers.

One of them says, "Philosophy must be scientific in the sense, that it cannot but accept the proved results of science. These results are both a starting point and the crucial test of the validity of its speculations. But philosophy because of the innate limitations of pure science must soar above the formulations which are presented to it by science. It must also return to the same formulations in order to check up the truth of its own thought constructions. In both ways, therefore, science aids and even controls philosophy on the road to truth, and it calls her back to this road, whenever she strays into the bye-paths of error and falsehood or what is worse into blind alleys which lead nowhere." (J.H. Ryan)

"In the historic role of philosophy, the scientific factor, the element of correctness of verifiable applicability has a place, but it is a negative one. The meanings delivered by confirmed observation, experimentation, and calculation, scientific facts and principles in other words, serve as tests of the values which tradition transmits and for those which emotion suggests. Whatever is not compatible

(continued from the previous page) with them must be eliminated in any sincere philosophising. This fact confers upon scientific knowledge an incalculably important office in philosophy." (John Dewey).

A third philosophic thinker of a different school says:-"It cannot accept either the extreme of experimentation or the extreme of deductionism. Taken as an exclusive method of approach to problems of philosophy, both views are inadequate and false. Each, however, has a great deal to contribute to an ultimately achievable synoptic view."

Yet another authority says:- "In philosophy we take the propositions we make in science and in every-day life and exhibit them in a logical system."

A fifth, a modern philosophic author says:- "Philosophy is the attempt, by use of scientific methods, to understand the world in which we live." (Patrick)

A sixth, an accredited historian of philosophy says that philosophy is a summary of scientific knowledge and a completion of it. (Weber).

A seventh, a most popular as well as an authoritative writer on philosophy, of our own day declares: "Modern science is its (philosophy's) starting point and pre-condition...What is not in accord with this thought lies outside the sphere of modern philosophy. The modern definition of philosophy rejects two errors, which result from a wrong conception of it: the error that philosophy can exist without science and the error that science can exist without philosophy." (Paulsen).

An eighth, a well-known philosophic thinker and writer holds that "The first characteristic of the new philosophy is that it regards philosophy as essentially one with science....It conceives all knowledge as scientific knowledge to be ascertained and proved by methods of

(continued from the previous page) science...It regards knowledge as a natural fact like another, with no mystic significance and no cosmic importance." (Bertrand Russel).

This error (that philosophy can exist without science) has almost entirely disappeared. We may find the remnants of it in opinion which is occasionally advanced that a special study is possible without a study of sciences...however instructive such a study may be in itself, it cannot fail to be barren and empty unless it is supplemented by scientific studies in other fields. "A purus putus metaphysicus (without a knowledge of science) is a chimera or an empty babler." "It remains a settled fact that a man is the better fitted to be a professional philosopher, the more familiar he is with...fields of Scientific Research." (Paulsen).

In his latest (1931) articles on philosophy Dr Wolfe of the London University, not only combines philosophy and science but also says, "The original union of Philosophy and science became loosened..In the course of the 19th century, there emerged something like a definite antipathy between Science and Philosophy..This was largely due to some of the German Idealists...This kind of hostility gradually disappeared."

These are enough to show that in modern world, that philosophy that is not coordinated with Science is not of much value. It would be relegated to the region of Religion, Mysticism, Theology, or Scholasticism, in so far as it does not get the support of scientific method of enquiry. If Sankara be not a scientific thinker he must be called either a mystic, as justly pointed out by Dr Otto, or a theologian. Critics like Prof. Nagaraja Sarma only make Sankara a scholastic theologian which is no better than Dr Otto's estimate.

A more fundamental question therefore is: Is Sankara a scientific thinker? This alone could help us to answer the question whether he is a philosopher in the modern sense of the word.

As Dr Otto rightly holds, philosophy in the modern sense of the word is inseparable from Science. And if Sankara's thought be not scientific he cannot be a philosopher. We have, therefore, first to ascertain whether he is a scientific thinker. In making this enquiry we shall necessarily be led to the question of the place of intuition, intellect and Buddhi in his philosophy.

By science, we generally understand that kind of knowledge that relates to the acquisition of power over nature and the consequent achievements which have a bearing on human life and which are often proving more baneful than beneficial to mankind.[@] We also think of science as being concerned with the pursuit of truth. It is no doubt dealing with both. But when we speak of it with reference to philosophy, we are not concerned with the latter aspect, namely, we are concerned with the pursuit of truth and particularly the method of such pursuit.

The well-known scientific thinker, Whitehead says, "the greatest invention of the 19th century was the invention of the method of invention...In order to understand an epoch, we can neglect all the details of change, such as railways, telegraphs, radios, spinning machines, synthetic dyes, etc. We must concentrate on the method itself. This is the real novelty, which has broken up the foundations of the old civilization." An equally good authority, Karl

[@] When science is divorced from morality, it is put to diabolical uses. But the pursuit of philosophy especially of the highest kind which seeks a truth higher than that which science gives, demands moral training as a pre-condition.

(continued from the previous page) Pearson says, "The unity of all science consists in its method, not in its material. The man who classified facts of any kind whatever, who sees their mutual relations and describes their consequences, is applying the scientific method and is a man of science...It is not the facts themselves which form science, but the method in which they are dealt with. To truly apprehend any object is to apprehend the totality of its relations. The discovery of this totality is the goal of science."

One of the most modern scientists says, "We have already pointed out that Science is independent of any particular order of facts. It takes the knowable universe for its subject: it deals with psychical as well as physical processes with man as well as nature: it has to do with everything to which its method can be applied. What makes a study of scientific is not, of course, the nature of the things with which it is concerned, but the method with which it deals with these things. A study of a skylark is not necessarily zoological." ... (Thompson's Introduction to Science.)

It is the method of science that is said to be vital to philosophy by modern philosophers from some of whom I have quoted already. Both these subjects have for their object the ascertainment of Truth. Science studies the world of experience in compartments. Its materials come from the sense-world or rather the objective world. What therefore characterises first the scientific method is that it seeks a knowledge which depends upon the object itself, not upon ourselves, that is, upon our own feeling, wish or imagination as for instance in poetry. Next, the knowledge so derived from the objects of the phenomenal world is tested and verified. This method is not something accessible exclusively to those that are called scientists

(continued from the previous page) though only a few know how to apply it. Mr Bertrand Russell says, "This method is in essence remarkably simple...but has been acquired with great difficulty...and is still employed only by a minority." Nor is it new to the world. It is as old as the man that was first troubled by what is known as doubt.

The two terms Purushatantra and Vastutantra used by Sankara indicate his method most clearly. The knowledge of the Ultimate Reality, Brahman, depends, like that of objects in this world, upon Brahman itself. Its knowledge is of the character of Vastutantra knowledge. And this we find at the very threshold of his Sutra Bashya. In other words, the knowledge of Brahman being dependent upon the Vastu (Brahman) does not depend upon the knower (Purusha). Sankara says in the Gita Bashya and elsewhere that Brahman, to attain which is the aim of his philosophy, is an existing entity, like an apple in the palm of one's own hand, and that in so far as it is an existing entity its investigation is amenable to the methods applicable to the world of Pratyaksha (Cognition). This is made more explicit in his commentary on the Gita, Chapter VI, verse 26. Here, he says that one ought to begin with a study of the phenomenal world and convince oneself of what the nature of all such objects is and then proceed to a knowledge of the other parts of the Existence, the Self or Consciousness considering that also to be a "Vastu". Here is a close translation of his very words: "By convincing oneself of the illusoriness of sense-objects through an investigation into their real nature and by cultivating indifference to such sense-objects the mind can be restrained from such objects and brought to the Self wherein to abide firmly." Now what does the 'investigation' into the 'real' nature of sense-objects indicate, if it does not mean a scientific study of the

(continued from the previous page) of the phenomenal world? It enforces the elimination of all personal factors, and emphasizes the entire dependence of all truth knowledge upon the object of enquiry. This is further corroborated by the conditions laid down in his "Sadhana Chatusthaya" such as those of "Iha amutra Phalabhoga Viraga." In fact, it is such an investigation as was anticipated by Sankara more than a thousand years ago that has led modern scientists like Sir James Jeans, and even those like Bertrand Russell, to the view that what we know is confined only to appearances, in the objective universe. This as well as the modern scientific discovery of Max Planck that no such thing exists as a causal relation explains best what Sankara meant by Maya. These are not mere theories, but hard facts, as real as the rest of the world we live in. Sankara only goes one step further and observes that what does not exist or is not real appears to exist or to be real. This is a wonder! This is Maya. And in speaking of Maya he only states a fact which Dr Otto seems unable to see. If causal relation as such does not exist in reality, the question regarding the 'origin' of Maya or Avidya has no meaning. This is what 'scientific' investigation leads to. What science reveals as real nature of the sense-world or the objective world, philosophy co-ordinates with the knowledge of the nature of consciousness (self). Those, on the other hand, who do not make a deep study of the objective world and who, therefore, do not know its real nature can never understand what maya or avidya is; much less can they ever get rid of their Avidya or Ignorance, so as to attain Brahman. Now, what prepares the modern student to realize this fact is what is called the scientific method. Sankara, in his Bashya says, as indicated above that the method of investigation adopted in regard to the external objects is applicable to

(continued from the previous page) the investigation of Brahman to the extent to which Brahman is an existing entity and to the extent to which Brahman is imperceptible to the sense though existing, the same method has to be applied but modified so as to meet the requirements of philosophy or metaphysics, as we shall presently see.

The elimination of the 'Purusha' or personal factor having been considered so far, we shall now turn to the other important feature of this method, that known as verification. In the absence of verification, though it is no more than speculation or hypothesis, in Europe, so far as the reaching of the ultimate reality is concerned the attempts are mere guesses. Hence is the contempt of philosophy and science that men of the Dr Otto school exhibit. But Sankara as a philosopher has applied "scientific verification" to his doctrine. This is unknown in Europe.

Bergsons, Croces and all theologians like Dr Otto may ignore the intellect of science as an indispensable factor of the means of attaining to their ultimate reality. But their ultimate is not Samyag-jnanam—perfect knowledge of the All. If their ultimate were Samyag-jnanam, how could they omit or dispense with even an iota of human knowledge, of whatever nature it be—be it science, religion or anything else. Brahman is here with us, outside as well as inside. As Sankara says, all efforts to get at truth in the internal or in the external world, the subjective or the objective world, are only efforts to attain Brahman.

Verification in philosophy is naturally applied not only to the phenomenal world, the province of science, but also to that of metaphysics to consciousness or the perceiving self. The scientific method applied to philosophy as a whole is called "Avastatraya" the states of

(continued from the previous page) waking dream and deep sleep—a method, let me repeat, yet unknown to enlightened Europe or America which is often so presumptuous as to think that the world outside those continents knows no more of philosophy than they themselves do. The “Avasthas” it must be noted, are studied as phenomena scientifically. Avasthatraya simply tells us that any investigation based upon partial data leads to defective or imperfect inferences and that which is based upon a totality of data yields valid conclusions. Western philosophy considers the experience of the waking state alone as important. Hence it cannot arrive at what is called perfect knowledge of Brahma-jnana. But the most valuable feature of Avasthatraya is that it applied the scientific principle of verification to the metaphysical knowledge of Self also, which no European or American system does. In those countries philosophy is still theory or speculation. This peculiar approach to philosophic problems has been possible till now to a greater degree in India than elsewhere.[@] For it demands an amount of self-elimination which does not seem to appeal to minds in other parts of the world. The self-elimination needed in science has to be carried to its perfection in attaining truth in Sankara’s system. And it is this method that he calls the system. And it is this method that he calls the rational or logical method applied to philosophy. For Sankara Brahman is an absolute fact only because the existence of the entity, Brahman, is proved beyond all doubt (vide Sankara’s Commentary

[@] Here I must say that in having brought to the notice of the Western world the importance of Avasthatraya from a philosophic standpoint in his book Vedanta or the Science of Reality Mr K.A. Krishnaswamy Iyer of Bangalore has rendered a service deserving of highest praise.

(continued from the previous page) on Brih. Up. I, 4, 10 for instance). The moment we fully know the real character of what is perceived as the Avasthas we realise Brahman. All that science has to do is to press its method forward into the realm of philosophy till the goal is reached. Rightly says a German philosopher; "Science is potential philosophy and philosophy is science in action."

Science is sometimes discredited as a stepping stone to philosophy on the supposition that scientific enquiry is possible without moral discipline while true philosophy is inseparable from the highest morality. Persons without moral culture may possess the highest scientific acumen. This no doubt is partly true. For it is the science of such men that has caused harm to the world. But one that has read any work on scientific principles, in our own day, could see that scientific thinking needs the help of great virtues, such as absolute truthfulness, dispassion, patience, non-attachment to personal views or self-elimination and the like. The well-known Grammar of Science of Karl Pearson, for instance, emphasizes their importance. When such is the need for moral discipline in studying any single branch of science how much more should the need be for it in philosophy which is the 'completion' of all sciences? Sankara says in the Gita: "To one whose mind is subject to the passions of desire and aversion there cannot indeed arise a knowledge of things as they really are, even of the external (sense) world. And it needs no saying that to a man whose Buddhi is overpowered by passion, there cannot arise a knowledge of the inner-most self. He recognised the fact, as the best scientific investigation of the sense-objects, we need not only intellectual (Buddhi) acumen, but also moral virtues.

Without the qualification of "Sadhana Ghatustaya" is impossible to approach the philosophic

(continued from the previous page) study of Brahma Vidya. It is true that men without such qualifications do talk and write on Brahman. But what such men say or write would be either a piece of imagination of their own, or a repetition of what has been said elsewhere. For, let us remember the term "Vastutantra" which means that a knowledge of Brahman comes from Brahman only. And I am only repeating here what is said in Kathopanishad,—“Brahman can be taught only by a knower of Brahman.” What has to be born in mind is that without the requisite moral equipment, the mental or rather intellectual acuteness needed for the pursuit of the highest philosophical truth is an impossibility which is one of the reasons why Europe, till it realized the full importance of self-elimination cannot attain to the highest philosophic level but has to be satisfied with mysticisms or theology or a positivistic attitude. Western science and particularly philosophy must till then be only speculative in this respect.

It is said that science and philosophy have only theoretical value inasmuch as they are within the province of the intellect. Whereas mysticism and religion, they say, have an actual and higher value because they are based upon feeling and intuition. The controversy regarding the relative merits of faith (or feeling or intuition) and thought (or reason or intellect) has gone on for ages. Even in India, we find the largest number saying, “Why should we worry ourselves about intellectual enquiries or disquisitions, while we can rely on our feeling that we are in actual touch with God, who is the highest Reality? The intellectualists have, however, not given up their contention. Recently, a school of philosophers has tried to ease the situation by emphasizing what is known as the doctrine of values. They say that there are different kinds of values in life. Some men seek truth values;

(continued from the previous page) others seek feeling, aesthetic, i.e. religious or mystic values; others, economic values and so forth. To every man that which he values most is dearest and highest. The mystics say that they have little concern with intellectual values and therefore they care less for truth values. It is "feeling" or aesthetic value that they esteem most and seek. On the other hand, scientists and philosophers may hold the latter values inferior, or even all values to be equal. But this philosophy of values proceeds upon an assumption which though it holds good in the practical world, fails in dealing with Ultimate Reality. It supposes that thought or thinking is separable from Being or Existence. In fact every kind of thinking implies Being. But unverified thinking is certainly unreliable. It is such unverified thought that is said to be 'theoretic' or purely intellectual. A divorce between feeling and thought appears possible only in the lower stages of knowledge but not in the highest. In India, we have recognized their basic unity, and we do not, therefore, hold that science and philosophy are 'theoretic,' after the verification stage is passed.

In India, mystic intuition or Yogic experience has been weighed in the balance of philosophy and found wanting. What have the Yogis and mystics to say to the questions: How do we know that what has been realised by them is the highest existence? Where is the assurance that what they have realized as God, or the Ultimate Reality may not in the future be replaced by something different?

Having seen the Sankara attitude towards the scientific method, we shall turn to the other topic as to whether Philosophy leading to the highest truth or perfect knowledge is a matter of intuition or intellect or Buddhi. Intuition

(continued from the previous page) is[@] defined as immediate knowledge gained without the help of reason or intellect. The word reason itself has been variously interpreted. In Germany it is interpreted as either "vernunft" or "verstand." The German thinkers have rightly started the enquiry. But they have not pushed it so far as Sankara. To avoid ambiguity, we shall use the word 'intellect' as distinguished from "reason."

While Dr Otto tells us that Sankara bases his system of thought on intuition, we find that the very first topic that Sankara deals with in his Sutra Bhashya is his repudiation of the position that Brahmajnanam is based upon intuition i.e. knowledge independent of reasoning.

Now Sankara says that Brahman is in a way known to every one. But Brahman is held to be of different natures by different persons. And the object of philosophic enquiry is to ascertain the 'true nature' of this Brahman. In other words, every one has an intuition regarding Brahman or the Ultimate Reality, but the intuitions differ and contradict each other and are fallible. The ascertainment of the 'real nature' of Brahman is to be made by 'Jijnasa' or enquiry. This Jijnasa or enquiry is the work of the intellect, of science or philosophy, not of intuition or mysticism which repudiates reason. This enquiry is similar, as has been pointed out, to the investigation into the nature of all existing objects including those perceived by the senses, in so far as Brahman is an "existing" entity. If, therefore, one be not an expert in enquiring into the nature of the sense-objects, how will his mind be fit for investigating matters beyond

[@] Kant's place in the world of philosophy is too well-known to need any words of appreciation here from me. But while he has done the greatest service to philosophic thought by analysing the intellect, he has misled the world by trying to effect a divorce between intellect and intuition.

(continued from the previous page) the province of the senses. Sankara says in the Sutra Bhashya that in all such investigations Yukti or reason, is indispensable. Intuition as providing the matter for investigation and intellect or scientific enquiry as being the means for removing the errors in which intuition is involved are both indispensable. What Sankara himself says is that "Anubhava" or Sakshatkara of Brahman has for its "Anga" or limb "Tarka" or Yukti, Sankara puts the same most clearly when he declares that intuition divorced from reason gives us erroneous knowledge. "If knowledge springs up in the mind of itself...it is mere error. True knowledge on the other hand is produced by means of true knowledge and is conformable to its object. And what is it that tests this conformity. How that which determines truth from falsehood which are both mixed up in intuition is what is called Buddhi, for which the nearest equivalent in the English language may be pure reason or better still the Vedantic Reason inasmuch as the Pure Reason of the German Philosophers differ from the Vedantic Reason.

Intuition is no doubt the basis of religion, theology and mysticism. But intuition by itself is a mixture of the true and false. The truth has to be discriminated by the intellect or science or philosophy. Mysticism which relies upon intuition solely, has a fallible basis, as is evident from its contradictions.

Here I may perhaps invite your kind attention to the fact that the word Buddhi has been translated into the English language by at least 17 different words. Intuition as translated till now, seems to have for its equivalent seven different words, in English. There may be justification for using so many of them, but they never lead those that rely solely upon translations to the fact that at bottom, it is Buddhi that is

(continued from the previous page) rendered into intuition in some places and intellect or reason, in others, according to the whims of the translator. The confusion resulting there from has been enormous. For, many a modern writer, and many a professor in Indian Universities has thought intuition or mysticism but not philosophy to be the goal of Vedanta. And all such modern philosophers of Europe as have relied upon intuition subordinating intellect to it have been characterised only as mystics. For in the West there are two classes of mystics not only religious but also philosophic. But in Advaita Vedanta of Sankara there is no kind of mysticism whatever, though it is common for people to call anything mystic which they do not understand. Sankara admits the existence of intuitional knowledge in every man, but holds that it needs to be purged of its errors by the intellect in attaining Truth. The joint effort of both leads to Truth, which is perceived by Buddhi alone, which is then called Maha Dhi or Maha Buddhi.

Is Anubhava the same as intuition, though it has been translated as such? The expression "Anubhava Avasanam" indicates that Anubhava and Brahman are not different from each other. What leads to or reveals this anubhava is Buddhi. Intuition is defined as a means of knowledge of Brahman. It implies a duality of knower and known. Brahmanubhava is non-dual. Europe and America do not seem to have yet developed concepts corresponding to Buddhi and Anubhava, which are unfortunately rendered into words which only cause confusion. As regards intuition what the author (Will Durant) one of the most modern histories of philosophy says is:- "It was unwise to offer intuition in place of thought as would be to correct the fancies of youth with the fairy tales of childhood. Let us correct our errors forward, not backward. To say that the world suffers from too much intellect

(continued from the previous page) would require the courage of man. The romantic protest against thinking from Rousseau and Chateaubriand to Bergson and Nietzsche and James, has done its work: we will agree to dethrone the Goddess of Reason if we are not asked to relight the candles before the ikon of intuition. Man exists by instinct, but progresses by intelligence." Or, to quote another well-known modern German philosopher, Windleband: "Mystic intuition which forswears a conceptual knowledge of its subject also ends in picturesque language and glowing imagination, but it yields no firm and distinct result;...as history repeatedly teaches us, it merely loosens the soil for substantial dogmatism, to see its seed and reap the fruits of its own domination." Finally let me invite your attention to the words of a great European philosopher held in high esteem in India also. I mean Schopenhauer: "And endeavour is being made to smuggle palpable sophisms in place of proofs, appeal is made to intuition.. But thought, that is to say, the reasoned knowledge, judicial deliberation and sincere (proper) demonstration—in a word, the proper and normal use of reason is disliked; a supreme contempt is proclaimed for rational philosophy; meaning by that all the series of linked and logical deductions, which characterize the work of previous philosophers."..."There is only one method of reaching truth which brings the result of intuition into accord with logic and the study of facts. This is the positive method which admits only rational inductions as valid." Does this not read almost like a verbatim translation of a part of Sankara whom Schopenhauer had never read.

When Sankara in his commentary on Gaudapada argues the doctrine of "Ajati" or the unreal nature of the causal relation from a mere investigation into the character of the phenomenal world, it is clear that only one who does not understand

(continued from the previous page) Sankara would feel puzzled as to the origin of Avidya or of Maya. If Maya or Avidya is the world and if men of Dr Otto's school like Eckhart wish to connect Brahman or even God with the creation of it, they do so at the cost of verifiable fact. If Sankara does not answer such questions, it is because he is too scientific a philosopher to think of palming off falsehoods as truths. For, which philosopher has seen God actually creating the world? Or who can prove that it has been created at all? Let alone the ineffectual and childish surmises of the logician. Such is the mistake often made by scholars like Dr Otto. In fact, there can be no understanding of Sankara till one's mind is purged of all misconceptions regarding causality. It is only the non-scientific or non-philosophic mind that is oppressed in a thousand ways by the bugbear of the causal relation.

Lastly, there is an impression not only in Europe, but also in India that philosophy can be divorced from life and that therefore, people ought to fall back upon what they conceive to be more real or of higher value, i.e. what they find either in religion, in mysticism or in applied science. It is needless to go very far to explode this fallacy. From the day the word philosopher came into use, the world's curiosity has ever been to know the life led by one called philosopher. What we admire most in a Socrates, a Plato, a Kant or a Sankara is not merely the intellectual worth of their teachings, but also the moral and rational content of their lives. It is the lives of great men that remind us that we can make our lives sublime. What has been possible for them, we feel, is possible for us. Life is inseparable from thought, And in a true philosopher thought and life are both Brahman. There can be no contradiction in Brahman or Perfect Being. And perfection in

(continued from the previous page) in thought is attained only through philosophy or Tattva Vichara.

Further, philosophy is meant for this world and this life; for one who actually lives in the midst of Samsara and ignorance, not for one who has no sorrows or worries or who is wise. He who has no doubts or troubles or who cares not for this mortal body, needs no help of philosophy. The moment one stepped in sorrows or fears realizes the highest truth, one sees everything including this body as Brahman, the Ever-Existent, and then there is no such thing as sorrow or death. It is for this reason that a Jnani living in this world is said to be a 'Jivanmukta.' And it is for this that men wallowing in Samsara or ignorance seen Brahman. Sankara has put this fact in the cleverest language in his commentary on the fourth Sutra of the very first Pada. But he is most emphatic in 3.3.32 where he says: "The passage 'That art Thou' cannot be interpreted to mean 'Thou wilt be That' after thou hast died."

Further, the Upanishads repeatedly say that the realization of Brahman comes 'here' and 'now' but not after death as Dr Otto imagines through sheer ignorance of the most fundamental doctrine of Vedanta as taught by Sankara.

"There is no ethic in Vedanta" is another observation of his. I do not think that Dr Otto was serious when he wrote this. When the golden rule, "Do unto others as you would wish them to do unto you", from which an entire code of ethics is developed, has its foundation laid in the Upanishads, in the words, "That Thou Art", it is impossible to think that Dr Otto knew not this fact. What is more, Dr Otto was in India. He must have seen how deeply the entire life of its people is influenced by the teachings of the highest ethical doctrines. May we ask, how many Europeans have shown the other

(continued from the previous page) cheek when they were smitten on the one, as taught by the most ethical of teachers, Christ? If the Europeans have not learnt this lesson after two thousand years of training, should we Hindus not doubt the utility of any mystic ethic of which Dr Otto may be proud? Comparisons are always odious.

It is true that Sankara harps upon the sorrows of life and of Samsara. But he does so because it is they that make men most earnestly think and seek truth, be it scientific, be it philosophic. Sorrows are among the best incentives to progress in general in the world as it is constituted.

To put the whole matter briefly, Sankara's Vedanta aims at an explanation of existence in its entirety. But he who would be a truth-seeker ought to be a hero, and ought not to stop till the goal is reached. If one cannot reach it, one has to be satisfied with whatever is possible for him to attain. If everything is Brahman all attempts made by men in all ages and in all places to get at It by looking behind what is seen at first sight, are only attempts, though at different levels, of attaining the truth of Brahman. Hence a follower of Sankara has no quarrel with any school of thinkers. He looks upon those who differ from him as comrades or as brother pilgrims proceeding to the same summit of truth. And all men working in any capacity in life even outside the field of philosophy, he knows, are working towards the same end, though under the impression that they are proceeding towards a different goal. The Gita says, "Men approach Me alone from different sides." Though we have here had to defend Sankara against the misunderstanding of critics we know that they are with us and that we are with them. Such clashes will only draw Vedantins nearer each other, and make them seek each other's good. The aim of Vedantic teaching

(continued from the previous page) is to make the knower of truth rejoice in working for the good of all. For, all are Brahman.

“The philosophies of different schools, contradicting one another, are the cause of making the world appear real and are as such full of partiality and aversion...The Advaita being not inclined to partiality and aversion, and being therefore, by nature all peace, is the true philosophy of Existence.”

If by science as applied to philosophy we understand, as the modern philosophers do, the scientific spirit in the pursuit of truth and the scientific method, and again if we understand by scientific method its two most essential features, (1) that of eliminating all personal (Purusha or Kartri) interests, making true knowledge dependent upon the Vastu itself, and (2) that of verifying our results by going back to life, as a whole (in Avasthatraya) as is done in India, we find in Sankara one of the most scientific of philosophers. Europe has not yet seen the like of him.

Men of Otto's school discount science and philosophy. It is because they do not know what possibilities there are still in philosophy, yet unknown to them. We, students of Sankara, shall not seek to teach them the self-delusion of mysticism or the word-juggling of scholasticism but shall present method of attaining to the Ultimate Reality, Brahman, in the broadest day-light, by a method open to the criticism and scrutiny of the entire world, in any manner it likes. There is no secrecy in Sankara's Vedanta. It stands or falls by universally recognised tests of Truth.

At no time in the history of the world has mankind felt the need for the truth of Advaita more than it does at the present moment. As Swami Vivekananda once observed, “It has saved

(continued from the previous page) India twice already” and the time has come for its application to the solutions of the problems now confronting the world for a third time. The solution for all the differences and struggles between man and man in the political, economic and social life lies in the pursuit and realization of truth that all are Brahman and that the well-being of one is the well-being of the other, and the suffering of the one is the suffering of the other. To recognise one’s own Self—that is the message of the Gita which has drawn its inspiration from the Upanishads which has again been taught by Sankara, who as Dr Otto quotes, is considered the greatest philosopher of all times and countries.” So let me wind up in the words of Swami Vivekananda: “Let the Lion of Vedanta roar.”

REVIEW OF BUCH’S²⁶ “THE PHILOSOPHY OF SANKARA.”#

To the modern student of Indian philosophy who approaches the subject under the different heads of Ontology, Psychology, Ethics, Epistemology, Logic and so forth, the Editor of the series of Gaekwad Studies has rendered a useful service by publishing this little manual of introduction to Sankara. The distinguishing merit of the book lies in the careful selection and collection of references, bearing on topics like the above to the more important of Sankara’s works, and for this, the author Mr Buch deserves all praise. No exposition, however, of this Eastern philosopher from a Western standpoint can do justice to him, unless it recognises a fundamental difference between his and Western Metaphysics. To Europe and America Metaphysics is still “speculation”, a pursuit of the unverifiable phantom called Reality. To many it is even now a “Letting down of buckets into deep

²⁶ The original editor changed “BUSH’S” to “BUCH’S” by hand

In Mysore University Magazine.

(continued from the previous page) dark wells and drawing empty." But for India Metaphysics, – not Theology – means the actual acquisition of what is more substantial, more certain, and more enduring than life itself. Being dominated by Western notion, Mr Bush's presentation does in some respects fail to convey a correct impression of some of the characteristic tenets of Sankara's Advaita. Nevertheless, he appears to have nearly caught the spirit of this Indian system when he distinguishes it from others in the words, "The idea of absorption in the Absolute is a veritable abomination to the Western brain. Personality is conceived to be the highest category known to us. It is, therefore, the essence our ourselves. Hence our distinct personality must survive in the scheme of ultimate redemption...The eastern sages consider this stage as a very imperfect one. Personality implies limitation, difference,...and is incompatible with...perfection. But to the Western philosopher the soul apart from its life in thought, feeling and willing is an abstraction in a mere \underline{x} of which we have no idea whatever." Sankara's Brahman, however, does not absorb anything.

Of the seven chapters of the book the best appear to be the second, the third and the fifth, which deal with Advaitic metaphysics and its relation to other Indian schools as found in Sankara's Bhashyas. Chapter V tackles the subject of Ethics. Here Mr Buch makes a vigorous and rational refutation of the charge that the Advaitic system of thought is fatal to ethical life. The sixth chapter deals with a few points of similarity between Sankara and such European Philosophers as Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Spinoza and Bergson. Why Hegel has been ignored here is not clear. The author does not perhaps think much of dialactics, though it plays no mean part in Sankara's system. In a comparative

(continued from the previous page) study of this kind the author's omission to discuss why Sankara's Vedanta is characterised the negative title of "non-dualism" instead of the positive one of "monism" is somewhat conspicuous. And after all what is the object in instituting such comparisons between him and Western metaphysicians? Is it to show that this Indian thinker also has erred in good company? If not, where is the proof that what these men say regarding any vital question is the Truth? That is the crux. Evidently to Mr Buch Sankara is to be measured, as in the case of his brethren, by the boldness of fancy and imagination displayed in concocting, or (as it is technically put) constructing hypothetical ultimate existences, and by the fineness of the verbal or mystical cobwebs woven to prove that they are not unreal. He has not a word to say about the scientific verification of their actuality, in making a rational attempt of which nature consists the special feature of this philosopher's system.

The rest of the essay, Chapters I, IV, and VII, appears to us to fall below the mark. The seventh chapter in discussing Advaitic Epistemology seeks to support the popular tradition that Sankara's school is ultimately based upon the authority of the Vedas, and in doing so has recourse to an argument as ingenious as fallacious. "The dependence of the Hindu Philosophers upon the Shrutis was to a great extent a dependence of this type." "It would be no less absurd for a Hindu Metaphysician to discard altogether the basis of the Upanishads than for modern philosophy to ignore absolutely and completely the whole course of philosophic development from Plato down to Hegel." But for absolute truth, and that because it is the inheritor of all the wisdom of a great past? Is it not, on the other hand, a chief characteristic of modern thought

(continued from the previous page) to refuse to accept any statement of its predecessors, however great, without challenging its truth? Does any modern philosopher hold even Plato to be infallible? And our author here, when asked what his grounds are for asserting that Brahman is the cause etc. of this world, that Brahman and Atman are identical or that there is no Maya in Brahman, directly points to the infallibility of the declarations of the Veda in regard to these matters. Nor does he leave us in doubt as to why Sankara had recourse to such "Fundamental assumption" as Mr Bush calls them. "He (Sankara) took his stand on them because these appeared to him eminently reasonable." To every man, be he the veriest fool, the sweet reasonableness of his own beliefs, however irrational, is unquestionable. How is Sankara wiser for manifesting, if he did so at all, such an attitude of mind?

Next, to that central doctrine of Advaitavad, the Maya theory, is rightly devoted a whole chapter, the fourth. But it would have been less disappointing had Mr Buch stated what "Maya" actually is, even if he did not find it easy to give a convincing proof of the origin of Maya, beyond reiterating, in his own words, the worn out Kantian dogma that time, space and causality have no place in the world of Noumenon. Where is proof that there exists such a Noumenon or Brahman? He devotes several paragraphs to bringing out how Maya is said to work and how it is said to cease. But he has not met a single argument of the opponents, who can never be safely ignored when so vital an issue is concerned, and that in a modern treatise. What is worse, he has read into Sankara the Western doctrine of the Degrees of Reality, which may be refuted at the very threshold by the well known fact that Sankara's Brahman knows neither degrees

REVIEW OF BUCH'S "THE PHILOSOPHY OF SANKARA."

(continued from the previous page) nor distinctions, which as he holds no thought can reach. With Sankara it is not Brahman but Maya that has degrees. But Mr Bush is not the one that has mistaken a doctrine of Ramanuja's for Sankara's. Our author has further erred, but with other reputable writers, in holding that the highest Advaitic knowledge is attained only through mystic processes. "The state of intuition is a "Unio Mystica" in which all duality ceases...It is a state of peace." But nothing can be more untrue of Advaita than to say that it seeks final satisfaction in Yogic mysticism. Sankara has most deliberately and emphatically declared his disagreement with the yogic or mystic dogmas, in Chapter II of his Bhashya. Even a casual acquaintance with Goudapada would show that the Advaita does not end in mysticism. The Advaitin says to all mystics: "Where is the proof that what one sees or experiences in the 'Unio Mystica' is the Absolute Truth, Reality, or God?" Where is the proof that such mystics are not self-deluded? What a caricature of Sankara it is to declare that he erected his philosophic edifice upon the dogma of mysticism! It is only when our eyes cannot bear the sunlight of universal reason that we seek solace under the shaded lamp of individual intuition. For it is then that the great truth that Ultimate Existence is beyond the ken of the ken of the intellect comes in most handy in drawing a veil over our impotency and in encouraging us to rest upon individual idiosyncracies or communal feelings rather than upon the all-embracing knowledge of Gyan. It is not that mystic experience is false or devoid of value. The path of mysticism is a path open to the million, the pigmies as well as the giants. Its democratic simplicity has a fascination for all. But whither does the path lead? Who shall answer?

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(continued from the previous page) Who shall say whether the goal reached is the true or the false, unless it be the man of Reason?

Turning last to the first chapter and the introduction, which indicate the general trend of the treatise, it has to be observed that whoever is wedded to the belief that "Philosophy explains both sides of Reality, finds out their harmony and reconciles them in a deeper unity" is a disciple of the school of Ramanuja, not of that of Sankara. The Advaitic Reality has no sides or parts or elements to be harmonised or reconciled.

Again, when Mr Buch holds that the aim of Hindu philosophy is emancipation from all definite existence, which is fraught with suffering (page 33), he misses altogether the standpoint of Sankara's philosophy. The Advaitin neither runs away from pain nor runs after pleasure. The world is full of joy or full of sorrow as one makes it. In itself it is neither. The Advaitin neither grieves nor rejoices. Some Eastern systems have their roots embedded in pessimism. Some Indian and most European schools pride themselves upon the sanity of their optimistic reading of the world. In Sankara the pleasures of the world have no higher value than its pains, though they may serve different purposes.

"The method of Hindu philosophy" says the author, "is the a priori method by which we proceed from the whole to the parts, not the empirical one of rising from the parts to the whole." "This is the method of Sankaracharya". But this, it must be emphatically said, is not the method of Sankaracharya though it may be that of Badarayana. Sankara's philosophic method is evident in his introduction to the Bhashya on Badarayana Sutras. Sankara, however, does not

(continued from the previous page) reject the dogmatic method of the latter, in so far as it serves a useful purpose. To refer to an instance, Mr Bush devotes considerable space to proving that Sankara holds that "the Vedas are claimed to be our only authority in matters of such fundamental importance as Atman." Here our author, has, unfortunately placed the emphasis on the wrong word and lost the clue to the real import of Sankara's argument.

When Sankara says (and he repeats the view in a hundred places) "Through scripture alone as a means of knowledge, Brahman is known to be the cause of the origin, etc. of the world" the stress is to be laid not upon the cause. Not one of the passages quoted by Mr Buch in this connection appears to us to be relevant to the point at issue. For it is with respect to the "cause of the origin, etc. of the world" that the Shastra is the sole authority and that one has to accept the dogma that Brahman is the cause, etc. of the world, if one is to follow Badarayana.

We do not blame Mr Buch for these and similar inaccuracies. No one who is obliged to rely upon verbal interpretations of Sankara can escape them.

Lastly, our author's choice of English equivalents for Sanskrit words has sometimes led him away from the truth of Advaita as it appears to us. For instance, in trying to oppose the view that Sankara's ultimate court of appeal is reason he says "This (intuition) is the high-set ground upon which all our knowledge of reality is based." But Sankara's reason does not exclude "intuition". Mr Buch evidently mistakes "Tarka" for "Reason". Sankara's reason covers more than what is known as logic in the West and more than "Tarka" of India. It is based upon "experience in its totality" i.e. Anubhava as it is termed, which is the last word in Sankara's disquisitional Philosophy.

REVIEW OF "PSALMS OF MARATHA SAINTS."@

A Quest for the 'true' God: Among the legacies that old India has bequeathed to her sons there is certainly none of which they are prouder than the wealth of her spiritual experiences and knowledge. And as a specimen of what has been just given to the world, is a most welcome addition to the already well-known and popular series of books published under the very suggestive title of "The Heritage of India."

The appearance particularly of this, the sixth number of the series immediately after the Great War is of special interest. The value, however, of this publication seems to lie not so much in the translated texts as in the critical introduction of the learned author Dr Nicol Macnicol. In producing this work, his main object appears to be to bring home to the reader the force of his conclusion that "Indian Saints have no vision of a world judged or a world redeemed." Their horizon is very narrow and their God is their own "personal" God—not the "nation's" or the "world's", and "the Hebrew saints and prophets realised earlier and with a profounder grasp than any other people that it is only the pure in heart that can truly see God, that it is in the 'mortal, moral strife' that He is alone aright revealed." In other words this is an attempt at viewing the comparative merits of Hinduism and Judaism from the special standpoint of saints and seers. And it must be acknowledged without any qualification, that this book fulfils in a pre-eminent degree one of the main objects of the series—that of approaching Indian religious thought with a broader sympathy than is ordinarily found in criticisms of alien faiths. Nevertheless, whatever impression the contents may produce upon the followers of other creeds, they strike a new key in the heart of such modern Hindu as try to keep their eyes open.

@ In Mysore University Magazine.

If after the Great War the necessity has been most keenly felt for recasting into new moulds our old ideas of politics, industry, education and whatever else vitally affect society, the call appears not less imperative for a reconstruction of our religious notions also. The vicissitudes through which the history of some of the leading nations of the earth has passed during the last four years have stirred to the very depths some of the theological convictions of the modern Hindu. His ideas of the efficiency of religious faiths have undergone no little change; and his eagerness to purge the old faiths of the effete dogmas of the past has been quickened.

If we ignore for a moment the more common, but the less logical, "personal" measure of the worth of religious beliefs, the most important of the remaining tests is undoubtedly the "national" or the "world" standard, as Dr Macnicol points out in adjudging the superiority of the Hebrew conception of divinity. It is also the most practical and the most convincing in that it gauges the extent to which the general well-being of a community or of humanity as a whole is promoted by the faith in a "national" or a "world" God.

As enlightenment advances, the prospects of a post mortem admission to the audience of the Almighty or of a post mortem immunity from the infection of sorrow and suffering, lose their charms. Such assurances, howsoever emphatic and howsoever tempting, are being, in so far as they shun the light of reactional proof, more and more relegated to the regions over which myth, fable, delusion and others of that ilk exercise their dogmatic sway. And should a Hindu or a Mahomedan venture to declare that the Christian or the Jew is doomed to perdition, after death, it is equally open to the latter to predict, with no less force of logic, that a similar future awaits the former. Or, if it should be urged that God has

(continued from the previous page) put his favourites of a particular persuasion in sole possession of the keys of His heaven, that they may enter it directly after the shuffle off their mortal coil, the same divine partiality can without the least fear of any sane contradiction be claimed to have been vouchsafed to every other creed on earth. Leaving, therefore, such ultra-mundane matters to those who are said to have colonized the immeasurable and dark continent from whose bourne no travellers have yet truly returned to tell us of the wonders there, if we should confine our attention to this our prosaic side of the stage of life we should be led to think that the value of a "National" God creed lies in what He does to promote the general prosperity and the general moral well-being of His adherents as a body, the 'personal' or 'individual' satisfaction arising from communion with Him being left out of account as being of lesser importance, as indicated by Dr Macnicol.

What then, are the contributions of the God of Hinduism, of Mahomedanism, of Judaism, or for that matter, of the God of any other religion, to the general or 'national' well-being of the communities devoted to Him?

Have the prayers of the Hindus and the Mussulmans to their respective Gods saved them from the jaws of the plagues, pestilence, famines and other dire calamities that have visited their lands in such endless number and succession? Or, has their God helped them to thrive and multiply, as their brethren of other creeds? On the other hand, in spite of their most pitiable cries these adherents have been allowed by their God to remain steeped in greater ignorance of that knowledge that helps men to combat poverty, disease and death than the followers of the God of other faiths have been. Turning to the Hebrews, we know that no religious community on

(continued from the previous page) earth has probably suffered greater persecution. The children of Israel are being slowly wiped out of existence, at any rate independent existence. They have not even a home of their own to flee to in times of distress. No doubt it is argued that the fulfilment of the promises of their Jehova is in Christianity. But that is what the Christians, not what the Jews themselves, think. Nor have the results of the labours of the Lord of the Christians been less depressing or disconcerting. The history of mankind can show few parallels to the utter disregard of morality, humanity, culture and whatever is held sacred by the human heart, which the Great War of the Christian nations revealed. In this hour of the greatest trial, what became of "Morality" the keystone of the arch of the Hebrew Religion, the one feature in which Dr Macnicol thinks the faith of the Hebrews or the Christians, excels the faith of "any other people?" Which of them – was there even one? – when smitten on the one cheek readily showed the other? An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth was still the supreme law. And how shall we ignore the most glaring fact that the greatest war known to History was that fought under the auspices, not of the god of 'morality-lacking' Hindus but of the God of 'morality-loving' Hebrews or Christians?

How shall we explain the occurrence, among the followers of that God, of the terrible accidents that carried away so large a number of His most promising children during the war? How shall we justify, above all, the ways of that "National" God who permitted thousands of the pure and innocent babies and helpless women of Christian Armenia, Russia and Belgium to suffer and die. Where then is the guarantee that by following Him we shall not be similarly deserted when we need his help most? Retribution may come

(continued from the previous page) later. But of what avail is it to the innocent that have been butchered already and have been made victims?

The "National" God either knew of what was going to happen or knew it not. If He knew and yet did not save the children, He must be impotent, not having been able to avert the danger, and what is worse He must have dissembled, in that He kept them in ignorance of the most serious dangers ahead, an attitude which not even the sinful mortal parent could coolly contemplate with complacency. If He did not know the future and if He could not save, He was no better than our puny selves. And if He was, as Dr Macnicol, would make Him, a "World" God, was He 'moral' in egging on His own faithful followers to destroy each other and particularly in teaching them every day, new secrets of the vile art of destroying life and property, and ultimately involving even that part of the world that was no party to the war, in an indescribable economic ruin?

It may be argued that like unto a loving father, He only chastises His beloved children that He may shape them into righteous beings. But what is the ethical or spiritual training that He hopes to give to the infants after their heads are chopped off, or to the youths after they are buried in the grave? If this be the kind of love that the Hebrew Fathers bears to His children, how is He superior to the Hindu, Mahomedan, or other God who has likewise allowed His followers to become a prey to the other ills of life? And that the "National" God of these communities appears to have done from His ethereal throne on High is to teach His crawling, cringing creatures of this earth, who on their knees beg of Him for help in times of sore distress, to keep crying "peccavi" and "Thy will be done" when the ravenous wolves of poverty, disease

(continued from the previous page) and war are gnawing away the vitals of the worshippers! What are the sins that suckling babes on the mother's breasts have committed that they should also suffer? And how far is that God, this "King, ruling a people in righteousness" more 'moral' than the Hindu's Brahman "Whose rule" as Dr Macnicol has it, "if it be called rule, may extend widely, but extends over an empty and silent land, a wide, grey, lampless deep unpeopled world?" Yes, if this is King Log, that is King Stork. Which is the better?

Of God, as "personally" realised by individuals, we have nothing to say here. And we cannot dispute the inherent and inalienable right of every human being to fashion his personal God according to his own lights and tastes. But as regards the notion of a "World" God, a God common to all mankind, who, the learned doctor suggests, is superior to a "personal" God, we cannot help asking, as we have a right to do, whether a "World" God truly exists, whether it is a reality. If 'true' in Him must be found all the characteristics of truth.

Now, the existence of the wall before me is true, not merely because I 'personally' have a knowledge of its existence but because the "world" also outside me recognises it as such and deals with it as such. Should any one differ and think it is a big loaf of bread and set to munching bits of it, we should not hesitate to account him mad, though he may 'personally' believe himself to be perfectly sane. Again the truth of my knowledge of the existence of the wall does not depend upon my moods or attitudes. There is in it a something which constrains me, as well as every one else, to take it as it reveals itself: i.e. I cannot change it even though I may imagine it to be a loaf of bread or a something else. Thirdly, my knowledge of it must show no signs of change; for, if it changed with

(continued from the previous page) time, if what I see is a wall at one time, a loaf of bread at another a dragon at some other time and so forth, my knowledge would be inconsistent, and such knowledge, false knowledge. If then, a "world" God exists in truth, He must be known to be such to the whole "world" and that especially because He is said to be omnipresent. Next, our knowledge of Him must be the outcome not of our imagination but of something that compels all men to take the knowledge of Him as it is given to us. And if He is truly known, time cannot change our knowledge of Him. For, if it did, we should have no means of knowing him as He is. A "world" God, therefore, who is known only to a particular section of mankind or who is known differently to different bodies of men, a "world" God whom we could conceive as we please, but whose independent reality is unknown to us, or who is comprehended differently at different times, cannot be proved to be true. Even if Dr Macnicol holds the other view, that God has 'infinite' aspects, and that He is "constantly changing" like a chameleon, that He is ever "becoming" no one knowing what He may turn out to be to-morrow – a Satan or a Belial, – and that men realise some one aspect or more of Him at different times, it has to be proved that it is one and the same Being that appears in manifold forms throughout the 'world' and at all times. Till these indispensable proofs are found the learned doctor's world God would be but a 'phantom' God. And the comparison instituted by him between the Hindu and the Hebrew ideas of divinity can have little value in the world of "Truth" or "Reality."

Therefore, asks the modern Hindu, is it not high time that the world revised its pre-war notions of a "National" or a "world" God and His ways? Let not Dr Macnicol think that the Indian prophets have no idea of a "world" God. In the

(continued from the previous page) greatest of the Hindu Psalms, the Bhagavatgita, an entire section, the eleventh, is devoted to the Universal aspect of the Almighty Ruler. And it was at the time of the Great War of the Mahabharata that the old religious notions were once before challenged, and recast, as in the Bhagavadgita. The more reason, therefore, for the Modern Hindu to ask once again—how long shall we be suckled by creeds so outward?

After so effective a disillusionment by the Great War of our own times, shall we hesitate to throw into the melting pot of Reason all the old creeds and to pour the purified mass into better moulds?

If one could read aright the signs of the times, an encouraging answer appears to come from various sides. And one of the most re-assuring indications is that in the shape of the publication of the "Heritage of India" series, whose volumes on religious subjects evidently proceed upon the principle that every religion, before it is consigned to the crucible, must be carefully weighed in the balance. And it is hoped that this process will ultimately lead to a juster appraisal of whatever is good in each.

So far as the attainment of this object goes, the labours bestowed on the production of this book of Psalms, do not appear to have been in vain. When it is said that the translation has passed through the hands of scholars like Prof. Patwardhan of Poona, and Dr Sukhtankar of Indore it is a guarantee that the spirit of the Mahratti texts has not been sacrificed in the translation. And that there has been no unfairness to the saints of Pandharapur in the selection of their Abhangs is evident from the very fact that no less an authority than the esteemed Sir Ramakrishna Bhandarkar is responsible for the choice of nearly half. There are in all 108

(continued from the previous page) of them, a number so auspicious to the Hindu. The most renowned of the saints, Jnaneswar, Muktabai, Janabai, Namdev, Ekanath and Tukaram are all represented. And the English metrical dress in which the learned Doctor has set them out is so dainty and charming that one is hardly tired of reading them over and over again. We have not seen many translations of Hindu religious poems so sympathetic, so felicitous, so effective.

The thoughts contained in the texts are not the exclusive property of Maharashtra. They form the staple of some of the best poetical compositions in Hindi, Bengali, Kannada, Telugu, Tamil and many other Indian languages. And Dr Macnicol rightly prefers not to confine himself to Maratha saints but to speak of 'Indian' saints in general, in his inferences. But we think he should not have ignored in his introduction the common source from which all these have drawn their inspiration, the Bhagavatgita. Without some idea of this fountain head, it is hardly possible to realise the full meaning of such poems. For, as has been pointed out, the Gita would have shown that the notion of a "world God" was not unknown to India. Neither the apparent inconsistency between the Advaitic Jnan of Jnaneswar, Namdev and Janabai, and the Dvaitic Bhakti so pronounced in Tukaram, nor the seeming incompatibility of the ideals of the man of action, "urged and passionately moved to discharge his duties" and that of the man of thought, satisfied with a "passive" "placid mind" and a "life of tranquillity" would have been considered a flaw in the Indian religious system. The Hindu idea of Bhakti or love of God is supposed by Western critics, like Dr Macnicol, to be inconsistent with "Advaita". But if they could see, like their own great poet, Tennyson,

(continued from the previous page) what the highest kind of love means they would realise that duality of "Dvaita" cannot be opposed to it.

"Love took up the harp of life and smote on all the chords with might, Smote the chord of self, that trembling passed in music out of sight." (Locksley Hall).

But above all, the learned author would have seen that the essential difference between the conception of the Hebrew or the Christian God and that of the Hindu God lies not in the features upon which he has dwelt at such great length but upon the respective Gods have revealed about themselves.

The God of the Bible says:- "Thou shalt have no other Gods before me", Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them, for I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation." Ye shall destroy their alters, break their images, and cut down their groves." – (Exodus: XX & XXXIV).

And the God of Gita says:- "Even those who, devoted to other Gods, worship them with faith, worship Myself." "The same am I to all beings." He who hates no single being, who is friendly and compassionate to all, he is dear to Me." (Chap. IX & XII).

Such extremes, where else are they to meet, if not in the melting pot of reason? For, who shall be the post-war God of the "World" of men with eyes open, if not the True?"

REVIEW OF JOADS "COUNTER-ATTACK FROM THE EAST."@

No one that has given any thought to the supremely interesting subject: Whither goes mankind? can help paying a tribute of unqualified praise to Mr C.E.M. Joad for his excellent book "Counter Attack from the East." It is one of the most

@ In "Triveni".

(continued from the previous page) original attempts made, in recent times, at an evaluation of the civilizations of the youthful West and of the grey-headed East. What has called forth so thoughtful an enquiry is evidently the appearance of the series of remarkable speeches and writings of Sir S. Radhakrishnan, the greatest of modern exponents and interpreters of ancient Indian thought. That Radhakrishnan combines in himself extra-ordinary learning and intellectual acumen, besides striking originality, is universally acknowledged. In weighing Radhakrishnan's exposition in the balance Mr Joad has excelled all his predecessors in point of fairness, acuteness and independence. He is singularly free from the blinding colour-complex which has so often vitiated the judgments of most Western critics of the East. Joad's exceptional success, in spite of Leonard Woolf's hostile criticism, is not a little due to his estimates being based upon the most impartial of standards the conclusions of science. Had he only chosen, like Dr Gore, the view point of the dogma of religion, he would have given us nothing but a windbag of passion and vilification. Mr Joad does not seek to hide whatever appears to him to be faulty in the culture of the East or of the West. His determination to call a spade a spade reveals that his sole objective is the search for Truth. He is unlike Bishop Barnes, the Gifford lecturer, who though a scientist of no mean order missed the glaring fact, which Joad has seen, that the Hindu ideal is less disgraced by the point of proselytisation than most religions, by the anomaly of proving their superiority by "roasting, racking, disembowelling." This book, whose refined humour is not its least interesting feature, is therefore one that no serious minded thinker can afford to ignore.

In the extensive literature that Radhakrishnan

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(continued from the previous page) has already produced, which Joad has so patiently and carefully studied it is not merely this Indian thinker's wonderful mastery of language, literature and thought of the West as well as of the East. Radhakrishnan warns the world against a continued pursuit of the doubtful and false ideals in both, without discrimination. He is therefore said to have made a "Counter attack from the East." on the West. Now, Joad examines this attack in the book under review.

Turning first to the characteristics of Western culture Mr Joad himself sums them up in the words: "In general the spirit of the West is hostile to religion. It repudiates what the Victorians called their morals as a preliminary to the adoption of a frankly avowed Hedonism...(there is in it) a fundamental scepticism as to the reality of those values which have been traditionally regarded as the ends of human action...The result is that nowhere in the Western world to-day is there any accepted view as to what men ought to believe, how they ought to act or what things they ought to admire...In a word the ideals of good life in the West are so "self-stultifying" as to produce a positive sense of "deep dissatisfaction" or mental "depression."

For this disease of the West, which is beginning to infect the East also, Radhakrishnan prescribes the remedy of Eastern religion, in more concentrated and powerful doses of it than has been administered till now. But Joad, after a most thorough-going investigation of the Eastern prescription, comes to the conclusion that there is nothing new in it. A rose would smell as sweet called by any other name. What the West calls Scientific or worldly wisdom, the East denominates spiritual or religious. He says: "Thus Radhakrishnan invokes the religious insight of the East to

(continued from the previous page) give a spiritual background to the recommendations of worldly wisdom of the West. Taking the intimation of the aesthetic experience, he interprets in the light of religious experience, which transcends our vision, and of his spiritual theory of the universe, in a word, by the light of the spirit the practical ethic which we in the West have hammered by the experimental method of science." (the underlining is mine.)

Next turning to the East, both the authors agree that the East is "decadent", that "there is (in it) a lack of vitality and a spiritual flagging, that it is drifting, and that it is clinging to the shell of religion. It is in danger of being swamped by vigorous tides of the West." "Each (East and West) lacks something that is essential: each has something to give. The East has some virtue which has conferred on it a certain 'longevity' while those civilisations which devoted their energies to politics, patriotism and aggrandisement have destroyed themselves. The members of the East have their own ideals of 'good life' which teach them 'how to employ leisure', 'how to sit down and listen' and 'to meditate in solitude', while the Westerns are often ill at ease and ever on the hunt for ways of spending time.

In the course of his examination of the Eastern recipe, Joad has gone so deep into the subject as few other critics have till now done. Joad approaches it from the agnostic or non-religious—not anti-religious—standpoint, while Radhakrishnan stands by religion as Joad himself admits. There seems to be such a wide gulf between them in their viewpoints that the only common ground seems to be that of Hedonism, i.e. happiness in life before death of the body, though Radhakrishnan seeks happiness in the next

(continued from the previous page) world also as a man of religion. But inasmuch as the criticism covers an extensive ground, it is not possible here to do more than glance at a few salient features of their respective views.

Joad appears to be labouring under the misapprehension that, in the East, religion is philosophy, though religion is certainly recognised as a step to it. He does not appear to discriminate between the philosophy of religion (or religious philosophy) and philosophy in general, i.e. philosophy of life as a whole. The aim of the former, as he himself indicates is to seek the satisfaction of losing the self or the soul in something greater—and of the latter is to seek that unity of knowledge or ultimate truth that explains the universe as a whole, which Joad dismisses with the light-hearted observation: How is this oneness to be achieved? An ungenerate child of my age and civilisation, I do not know. Nor in the last resort can Radhakrishnan tell me. If Joad were serious here, a whole book of the size of his "Counter Attack" could have been written by him on it. Radhakrishnan's aim appears throughout to be to present Eastern thought in the form in which the largest number in the West and also the Westernised East could understand and interest themselves. Religion is what appeals to the immense majority. And intuitive or "aesthetic" experience and mystic ecstasy are the strongest citadels, erected on the highest peaks of religion, where fully protecting himself Radhakrishnan delivers his attacks. Radhakrishnan, the man of religion, is evidently applauded by a great majority, who value religion as the dearest possession in life. Yet he does not seem to have carried conviction to scientific minds of the type of Mr Joad and Mr Woolf. Philosophy proper would have been, I admit more effective than the philosophy of religion in such cases. But Indian philosophy proper is still "caviare to the general"

(continued from the previous page) as Joad himself would admit. (Page 167). Radhakrishnan could not have recourse to it in as-much as the Western mind is not as yet rationally prepared for it, though a few could certainly grasp it. Indian philosophy could show Joad not only how most of his criticisms have already been rationally met, but also whether India could offer anything of real value to the world, the like of which the sciences and philosophies of the West have not as yet revealed. To grasp it an intellect or a reason (buddhi) disciplined to that pitch of concentration that is characterised as "one-pointedness" (ekagrata) and of a sharpness keener than the edge of a razor (kshurika-dhara) is needed, which the general Western, and I may also add the general Eastern mind so deep in the distractions of the world finds it hard yet to attain. And even the few superior intellects of the West are so obsessed with their colour or race prejudices that they have probably scoffed at Radhakrishnan had he displayed some of these unfamiliar wares of philosophy. I do not refer to miracles but solely to scientifically verifiable or rationally proved achievements.

Again, much older is the distinction between Monism and non-dualism. And yet Europe and America have not the least idea of the difference between these two concepts, which are as far apart from each other as night from day. The want of this knowledge has led Joad into a maze of arguments about 'unity' and 'multiplicity.'

Nor have Europe and America yet sounded the depths of the meaning of Truth and Reason, though so often they talk of this being real or rational and that not real or rational, as though all men would assent to the verdict of a "private" judgment, unrecognised by the public, whereas India has the unique distinction of having attempted a definite elucidation of

(continued from the previous page) these matters.

This is not all. The West, while it has carried the analysis of the material world to a most amazing depth and accuracy, has not gone beyond the a b c of the mental world in its study. What has it to say of the psychological – not the physiological – value of sleep, the commonest of psychic phenomena? The realists of the West, qualified or non-qualified brandish "givenness" as an invulnerable argument. But what about the "givenness" experienced in dreams? Have they yet even so much as thought of it? What is meant by the "given"?

The West has yet to realise the full implications of the negation of the causal relation, and the negation of duality of existences. How could the West, without understanding these, comprehend the full significance of Maya or the rationale of Karma and rebirth? Unless the West has a definite meaning for its truth and Reason, how can they see the truth of Radhakrishnan's observation that Pluralism is nothing but a vestige of ancestral religion and dogma still lingering in the blood and clogging its free flow? The philosophy of such truths has therefore to be kept in reserve till Europe and America grow older. When Bertrand Russels and Whiteheads, Max Plancks and Einsteins, Jeanses and Eddingtons, Woolfs and Joads feel like all true scientists that even a most insignificant speck of dust trodden under feet reveal truths of the highest value, and when they with such superior intellect in them make up their mind to seek truth, be it hidden in the proud places of the West or in the ragged cottages of the East, in other words, when the scientific spirit takes a much stronger hold on them than at present and makes them heroes (Dhira), as the Hindu Philosophers say, in the pursuit of Truth at any cost,

(continued from the previous page) then will they be able to see what value there is still left in decadent India. Till then men like Radhakrishnan must use only of the highest concept of the philosophy of religion in interpreting the East to the West.

In this philosophy of religion (or religious philosophy) Radhakrishnan makes intuition the pivot of his thought. But Joad is perfectly justified in refusing to subscribe to the whole of Radhakrishnan's view of intuition. But the latter who has entrenched himself behind it, has not been so much as shaken, much less overthrown, by his Western critic. As Radhakrishnan has pointed out, 'intuition' and 'intellect' are not independent and separate faculties of the mind. Their activities are inter-dependent. But as Sankara so repeatedly and so clearly points out, intuition unchecked by intellect is of no value in pure philosophy, though intuition uncontrolled by intellect is of supreme value in religion. In India's pure philosophy, reason or intellect reigns supreme, not scriptural or sacred or semi-sacred authority. And in mysticism intuition is supreme. But reason or intellect always implies intuition, which is never ignored. Hence when thus co-ordinated the intellect is called in Indian philosophy Buddhi. And whenever the intellect ignores intuition, it leads to what is known as barren verbal wrangling.

In regard to intuition not subordinated to intellect, let me quote a very recent thinker, Mr Jastrow. In his "Effective Thinking" he says, "The temptation to make of it (intuition) a marvel or a mystery is often present. If we yield to it, we do not strengthen but impair our thinking powers. With transcendent sources of knowledge we have no concern. Those who believe in inspired doctrines do so. By loyalty to a faith they may attribute such inspiration to prophets, seers or saints. Because of the prevalence

(continued from the previous page) of that tradition, there has been a wide dissemination of the belief in supernatural knowledge, in prediction of the future, revelation by way of dreams, second sight, premonitions. But Indian philosophy never divorces 'intuition' from intellect, nor does it subordinate the latter to the former.

Next, the term 'spirit' has a positive meaning in religion. Radhakrishnan is again left unshaken by Joad in spite of his repudiation of 'spirituality'. But certainly in philosophy its 'woolliness' as Mr Joad contends is most evident. Unless Croces, Gentiles and the religious Radhakrishnans rise above their mysticism and state definitely and exactly what spirit is, spirit cannot have a place in philosophy. If it only means mind or psyche, why do they want another word? Nor do I know what Hegel or Radhakrishnan, who use the concepts or terms current in the West mean by the Absolute? Is it a concept? If it be non-conceptual, what does the intuition of the Absolute convey? How do we know that the Absolute exists if this Absolute be different from an aesthetic feeling? Here, does the word "exist" convey any meaning or is it a meaningless term? And what does meaning mean? I presume that if Joad had confined himself to philosophy, he would probably have more effectively met Radhakrishnan. What the Idealism of the West has failed to answer, is the question: Is the spirit or the Absolute merely a hypothesis or an actual entity? If actual, the West has given no means of verifying it.

Another important point for consideration in Joad's criticism is his final standard for judging civilisations, that of Hedonism or happiness in life. He says, in the concluding chapter: The only thing that can give permanent satisfaction is the employment of our highest faculties at maximum intensity...The doctrine of effort and

(continued from the previous page) activity that I have sketched is pre-eminently the doctrine of the intelligent Hedonist. It alone, on the balance sheet of life, can give a credit of pleasure over boredom. Throw yourself body and soul into your work, lose yourself in an interest...lift yourself up out of the selfish little part of vanity and desire which is the self, by giving yourself to something greater than the self, and on looking back you will find that you have been happy...devotion to impersonal ends offers the only escape from a fatal self-absorption.

This is no doubt, to a great extent true. But how do we know that this happiness is, or will be permanent? When owing to any cause my faculties are impaired, or when I have not the faculty to enjoy music or when I see that pain and death surround me, and when there others whose faculties are not so far developed, are there no other means of making myself or others happy? If, according to Joad's biologists, death should be a merging of the individual in the greater universe, why should this losing or merging cause fear and why should we seek to save others from death as we do? How am I to lose or forget myself in something greater and yet experience what is called satisfaction? What does satisfaction mean on the disappearance of the self? Or again, is there no higher standard than that of happiness? Is deep sleep a happy or an unhappy state? If happy what are the things in which our highest faculties are employed then? If unhappy, what is it that makes us happy? And if neutral, why do all mankind, nay even animals, seek sleep or feel unhappy if they be deprived of sleep?

It is true, as Joad observes, that Radhakrishnan is not without detractors. But the attacks on him only rise him to more conspicuous heights. There are millions, nay hundreds of

REVIEW OF JOADS "COUNTER-ATTACK FROM THE EAST."

(continued from the previous page) millions in India, who know not the difference between Philosophy and Theology, including scholasticism and mysticism and who have not even dreamt of Science. To such quacks, to use Woolf's language, who so often appear in leading journals, philosophy based on science is always sour grapes. Their glory lies in their Sadhanik (mystic) experiences leading to incandescent intuitions. We bow to them from as great a distance as we are permitted to stand at and say "May they rejoice in their anti-scientific achievements.

As my object is not to expound Indian Philosophy here, I shall content myself with observing that the fact that Radhakrishnan's exposition of Indian thought has evoked such valuable criticism from intellectual (not merely emotional or religious) men is a matter for the most sincere congratulations. If the passion it has roused for the pursuit of truth in men of the type Joad should continue, and should they be determined to reach the goal, there is every hope that they will attain to the truth of philosophy (Satyasya Satyam) and that through reason or intellect (Buddhi).

Both Mr Joad and Sir S. Radhakrishnan have by their brilliant, informing and invaluable publications on the philosophy of Religion, really rendered priceless service to the cause of truth, and the thinking world cannot be too grateful to them. They can never give too much of such thoughts to the world. Not that they have said the last word on such supremely serious subjects, but certainly they have provoked most serious thought in a manner that is really remarkable.

REVIEW OF AUROBINDO GHOSE'S ESSAYS ON THE GITA.@

Although the earliest interpreters of the

@ (In New Era Magazine)

(continued from the previous page) Bhagavadgita have held that it presents a consistent thought, yet some modern critics have seen in it contradictions and irrelevancies, which have led them to suspect that interpolations must have been made by later generations. However, as the poem now stands, it lends itself to a number of different interpretations. Some aim at inculcating Karma (Works) as the main object of the teaching, some hold that Bhakti (Devotion), some others Sannyasa (Renunciation), others Raja-Yoga (mental discipline), others still Hatha Yoga (Physical discipline) others again Dharma (Ethical discipline) a few Tantra (Mystic practice) and lastly, some hold Jnana (Knowledge of truth) to be the essential teaching of Gita. Now Sri AUROBINDO Ghose says that the core of the teaching is to be found in "The Triune way of knowledge, works and devotion...The first step is Karma Yoga, the second is Jnana Yoga the last step is Bhakti Yoga which leads to union with the divine being and oneness with the supreme divine nature." And the "supreme divine nature" is thus described by him. "Brahman the one indivisible existence resides as if divided. The unity is the greater truth, the multiplicity is the lesser truth, though both are a truth and neither of them is an illusion." He also speaks of it as being "True truth" and "real reality". But what is "truth" and what is "reality"? Our difficulty in understanding him is increased when he says that Brahman is both "mutable" and "immutable" at the same time. And we are not permitted to ask such questions. For he says that his object in expounding the Gita is "not a scholastic or academical scrutiny of its thought, nor to place its philosophy in the history of metaphysical speculation, nor to deal with it in the manner of the analytical dialectician." Then, what does the learned

(continued from the previous page) author promise if we should accept his new interpretation and guidance? He assures that "The supreme eternal superconsciousness will be yours. You will dwell for ever in the highest status of the supreme spirit; for, here you will have accomplished the expression of the God-head and your soul even though it has descended into mind and body, will already be living in the vast eternity of the spirit. Further, "the heart spiritualised and lifted beyond the limitations of its lower nature will reveal to you most intimately, the secret of God's immeasurable being, bring into you the whole touch and influx and glory of his divine powers and open to you the mysteries of an eternal rapture."

May we not pause for a moment and ask whether this may not be self-delusion or hallucination of the effect of some self-hypnotization? But as he tells us that Bhakti, not Jnana implying rational enquiry, is the highest aim of the teaching, he seems to demand implicit acceptance of his words whatever they may mean.

It is one thing to make use of the Gita to teach a great lesson or rather some important lesson that the country, or world is in need of and another thing to get at the meaning of the author irrespective of all other considerations. An instance of the former, probably the best of its kind, is Sri Bal Gangadhar Tilak's Gita Rahasya. And there is relevancy between his view and Arjuna's resumption of arms to fight. Our learned author too appears to belong to the same category. For he says that his object is to "extract from the Gita what can help us or the world at large and to put it in the most natural and vital form and expression we can find that will be suitable to the mentality and helpful to the spiritual needs of our present day humanity."

Here may we not enquire, which scripture, for

(continued from the previous page) instance, the Bible or the Koran, as interpreted by its modern exponents has a different aim? And the best proof of the truth of any teaching lies in its practical effects as we see them. Sri AUROBINDO 's Bhakti Yoga has been before his countrymen for thousands of years and yet the majority of the people in Bengal have been gradually drawn away into the folds of Mohamedanism and Christianity. Substantial numbers in other parts of India have deserted "Bhakti Yoga" of the Gita to the faith of Koran and the Bible. If we are not to test the worth of Gita's teaching either by the standard of its "philosophy" or by its effects on the hearts of the people, in what other way are we to measure it? Not that we underestimate the value of Bhakti or devotion as such. But our question here is as to how far the "Bhakti" of the Gita is of any special significance to human society.

What fascinates the largest number of men in all countries and at all times is the mystic creed whose first democratic article of faith is contempt for the intellect and whose second is the abandonment of the thought of physical well-being which two are the causes of all the ills of life. This creed raises in every individual the hope of realising all that one aspires for. And it also gives a teacher the privilege of pleasing the majority of mankind without having to prove the truth of one's statements. It is the shortest and the easiest route to popularity. What distinguishes its modern form from the old type of it is that in our own times it is clothed in such gorgeous literary garb that it passes the simple lay man's powers to get at its true meaning. There may have been Mahatmas of this kind in countless numbers in India. We do not question the greatness of their internal or personal and

(continued from the previous page) and private achievements but how have their ecstatic visions helped the poverty-stricken and sorrow-laden millions who are not mystics? We could appeal to the only court, we know, the history of India of the past thousand years. But such intellectual scrutiny is inconsistent with mystic faith.

This is the delusion under which India has been labouring for centuries. Does Sri Aurobindo Ghose's new exposition help to free ourselves from this delusion? We have found no answer. Tilak's Gita-Rahasya appears to be more practical in this respect, though we do not subscribe to its view. For our part as for a layman, the question with which the Gita starts and the reply with which it ends are quite simple and plain. Bhakti does not appear to be the special or the last point of instruction in as much as Arjuna says at the very commencement that he has complete faith in Krishna and that he will do Krishna's bidding. On the other hand, verses 7 and 8 of Chap. II contain the first prayer of Arjuna in which he says that his mind is "confused" as to what his duty is and as a consequence he is overcome by grief which makes him seek Krishna's advice. And at the end of the Gita in XVIII, 72 Sri Krishna asks him whether his delusion (Mona) and ignorance (Ajnana) are gone. Arjuna in the following verse replies that he is freed from "delusion and ignorance." There is no reference here either to Karma, Bhakti, Sannyasa, Dharma, Dhyana, Yoga or Tantra to indicate that that is the main teaching. What the Gita inculcates is what removes ignorance and delusion that is Gnana (Knowledge) as the highest object to be acquired so that delusion and ignorance may be dispelled. And what India really needs is knowledge or Gnana; more Jnana be it philosophical or scientific or to put it in other words, the spirit to

(continued from the previous page) pursue truth in all fields. She has to free herself from that mentality which accepts anything as truth without proof.

Though we thus disagree with the learned author of the Essays on the Gita, we have no doubt whatever that the book will be exceedingly popular among those who are of an emotional temperament. His poetical interpretation covers two volumes which are full of literary merit and in which the wings of imagination soar to the highest altitudes. The chapters on the Sankhya-Yoga, and the Vedanta as well as his views on "Avatars" and "Sacrifices" have much originality which will repay perusal. We heartily welcome this delightful addition to the World's Gita literature.

REVIEW OF CORNELL UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF NIKHILANANDA'S
MANKUDKOPANISHAD."

The author of the translation cannot but be deeply grateful to the learned Reviewer, though he may not agree with all that is said in the review; for, the criticism is most sympathetic and praise is given where the reviewer finds it deserved. Lest the criticism should mislead others, attention is here invited to some of the points of difference.

(1) The first misapprehension of the learned Reviewer consists in this that he thinks the work to be scholastic philosophy. In fact, it is the very opposite of it. There is absolutely no question of reliance on or interpretation of any scriptural or personal authority. The appeal is always to common human experience. This is the unique feature of this Upanishad and the Karika. And this fact is evident on every page of it.

(2) It is true that there are a "variety of types of philosophy based on the Upanishads, but they are all scholastic, excepting this

REVIEW OF CORNELL UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF NIKHILANANDA'S
MANKUDKOPANISHAD."

(continued from the previous page) one. The reviewer has failed to notice the distinction between philosophic speculation and philosophic truth, as pointed out both by Gaudapada and Sankara in this work.

(3) The reviewer has not seen that the philosophy of this Upanishad seeks Truth similar to the Truth: that the whole is greater than its part, which cannot be contradicted by any one.

(4) He thinks Maya is a concept probably borrowed by Gaudapada from Buddhistic literature. Nothing can be more untenable. "Maya" occurs in the greatest of the Upanishads, the Brihadaranyaka (Chapter II), in the Svetasvatara Upanishad and above all in the oldest of the Vedas, the Rig Veda. That the word is used in this sense is more than proved by the context of these sources.

(5) That Dr Das Gupta whom the Reviewer quotes (re Buddhist views of Gaudapada) is entirely mistaken is evident from what both Gaudapada and Sankara say under Karika 4-99. "This is not the same as what the Buddhas say." These are their own words.

(6) Regarding my statement "Endless will be the systems of philosophy if based on the waking state only", the learned reviewer has not seen the central feature of the Upanishad and the Karika, in other words, of Philosophy in India. We know what "sleep" or "dream" means, only when we are in the waking state. Even if we refer to dream and sleep in a dream, the dream at that moment is taken to be the waking state. When we look at the waking state as comprehending all the states, we get philosophy that is Truth as understood in India. When as in Europe and America we exclude the states of sleep and dream as something apart from the waking, we get only philosophical speculations i.e. endless systems of philosophy as in the West, but we never get at truth. This is what India seeks to teach the rest of the world. If we take

(continued from the previous page) the waking state alone and we only imagine what sleep and dream mean, we get imaginary as in the West.

The learned reviewer does not distinguish between philosophy and philosophical speculations. And that is because Europe and America are still thinking that 'Truth' as such is unknowable. But they fail to see the contradiction in their thought. Every man while thinking, proceeds taking it for granted that he is thinking points in the direction of Truth. But what is Truth? That is the question. How does anyone know that what he knows or thinks is truth and points in the direction of Truth, if such a person does not know what Truth itself is?

This is the keystone of the arch of Indian philosophy, which reveals the truth of the whole life and of all existence. This is what is taught in the Mandukyopanishad and the Karika. And this alone can do good to humanity as a whole, as pointed out by Gaudapada.

THE MEANING OF TRUTH OR PHILOSOPHY IN INDIA.@

Every man or woman, scholar, scientist, religionist or philosopher thinks that what he or she knows, i.e. thinks, feels or intuitis is Truth or must be Truth. Indian Philosophy starts by asking, how does he or she know that what he or she knows, is Truth? It approaches this same subject in another way also. It attempts to interpret life as a whole, and asks such questions as: What use should one make of all that this life on earth offers? What is the object and purpose of existence? What was this Universe before I was born? What will the same be after death? And in this quest the first step it takes is to make sure that its interpretation is "true", but not mere guess, theory, imagination,

(continued from the previous page) faith feeling or opinion. If there be no idea of Truth, the whole enquiry would be a mere wandering in a wilderness of thought and words. That is why such aimless or indefinite attempts are often treated with indifference, if not contempt, though they are said to be philosophy. Truth, it defines, as that which must be beyond all contradictions. It must be, like two plus two are equal to four, universal and necessary. It then tests the Truth by applying it to life and finds that what does not actually tend to bring about the well-being of all mankind, nay of all that exists, cannot be Truth. To what extent men live a life of effort to bring about the good of others to that extent, they approach Truth. To live for the sake of one's own good, or that of one's own kith or kin, race or country, however beneficial from other points of view, is not to realize Truth, which demands the effort to seek the good of all. Such a discipline alone makes for Truth.

It may look strange, if not foolish, to hold that a knowledge of the meaning of Truth should have a bearing on the well-being of mankind. But it appears so only to those, though they be the immense majority, that do not know what Truth really is. The majority of men confine their attention to the data or experiences of the waking state alone, but not to the totality of the experience or date of the three states of waking dream and deep sleep. Unless the whole of experience be taken into account Truth cannot be known, nor its bearing on life. This then is the unique feature of Indian Philosophy, a feature not yet known to the rest of the thoughtful world. The doctrine of the "Three States", leading to the impossibility of anything else than "Nonduality" being Truth, is what Philosophy in India relies on. It cannot be fully comprehended without the requisite discipline in the method

(continued from the previous page) of philosophy or the pursuit of Truth, as indicated above.

What, therefore, is peculiar to philosophy in India is its determination of the meaning of Truth and its bearing on all the experiences of life, resulting in the good of all mankind. This is what it finds to be the goal of existence.

LETTER TO "THE HINDU" ON INDIAN YOGA. (4-1-'36).

With all deference to Yoga Sashttras and its teachers, ancient and modern, we wish to have a few questions answered by those who believe in the extraordinary efficacy of Yoga in solving the problems of daily life. We readily admit that an intelligent practice of Yogic discipline results in developing the will and power of concentration, and that these in their turn help in making a patient and accurate study of any problem and in arriving at a correct solution of it. But unless proofs are given, with the help of facts based on careful inquiry, it is childish in this scientific age to consider Hinduism as equivalent to yoga and proclaim that this yogic "science" can cure all the ills of life through mystic practices. If the Nectar trickling from the brain were the proper remedy for all the troubles including unemployment and economic and political aggression, why has our country come to this state of slavery at all? Why could not any yogi give at least a hint of the coming earthquakes of Quetta and Bihar, even if he could not prevent or check them? They have had ample opportunities of rendering useful service at the time plagues and famines visited our country; why have they been so indifferent? Has there not been any adept in yoga till now? And why has not any modern yogi expert already combated the present situation in India by his mystic methods? Yogis perhaps hold that advanced steps must be taken

(continued from the previous page) only under the direct guidance of a master. If there has been no master at all so long, how can the science be revived? If by independent research revival is attempted, who has made the research upon which he can claim that it could remove all India's ills? In the absence of any such evidence is it not imprudent to make people believe in the efficacy of an unproved and unverified hypothesis of yogic miracles, and to that extent divert their attention from the necessity for pursuing the natural and usual course, adopting the established principles of decent unslavish daily life? Shutting one's eyes to the painful surroundings and taking refuge in an imaginary world of glory and power may have charm for a timid and lazy temperament but yoga certainly does not help in curing such a temperament and infusing the courage, the assertive spirit and the intelligence reputed to have belonged to our ancestors. And unfortunately our country delights in superhuman powers and "supramental" forces shutting its eyes to what is actual and normal. It is sapping our life-energy as a nation and, as individuals, of the majority among us. To take two Puranic examples, why did not Sri Ramachandra, who was divine in nature, adopt Pranayama to recover his wife and conquer his enemies? Why did he take the trouble of learning the art of warfare and risk his life in all his encounters with the Rakshasas? Why did he also put innocent monkeys to needless pain of the blows by wicked Rakshasas? Why did Sri Krishna induce Arjuna against his will and love of peace and quiet to fight against his own dearest kith and kin, instead of using the Kundalini Shakti himself or asking some yogis to overcome the opponents instead of subjecting so many lakhs of innocent women to widowhood? As devices to induce lazy people to take to mental discipline, one may eulogize the possibilities of yoga, but as substitutes

(continued from the previous page) for the courage to fight out the battles of life the value of yogic Vibhuti is nil, unless they can be demonstrated through experiments. May we know how many yogic Hindus there are who have lived for more than a hundred years, not to say anything of the promised thousands of years of life which yoga is said to bestow? How many Hindus are there that have remained invulnerable against shots and spears in the battles fought during the past thousand years? Nay, how many yogis have been able to tell us at least, by means of their vision, all about the plans of conquerors who overthrew us or killed our ancestors? The most reputed yogis of our own day are men who have only developed organized methods for collecting money, instead of adopting the old method of earning their livelihood by naturally simple means.

Those who would proclaim Hinduism is "Scientific" would be wiser if they should suspend their judgment about the value of yogic vibhuti[@] and miracles and stand truly by the scientific method of verification, lest the world, already distracted by a thousand troubles, should be distracted the more by the hopes of achievements which are still in the world of imagination, if not of delusion.

That yoga is of the highest value in disciplining not merely the body but also the mind, so as to make them more serviceable than they are at present, is readily admitted. But beyond that whatever is claimed for it still belongs to the unknown.

[@] Vibhuti: Power to see the whole universe in yourself: It also means occult powers, generally.

LETTER TO EDITOR OF QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, LONDON.

In the very interesting article, "The Relations of Philosophy," by Prof. Jared S. Moore, in this Journal (Vol. XIII, No.51), he says: "Religion is unlike both philosophy and science in that it is a way of living whereas philosophy and science are theories about life. In other words, the aim of philosophy and science is knowledge, the aim of religion is personal fellowship with God and the inspiration of daily life". May I here point out that in India, which has devoted thousands of years to the pursuit of religion and philosophy, the opposite view is held. In India, philosophy is pre-eminently a "way of living." It is knowledge based upon life based upon knowledge. Philosophy is nothing if not lived. It is theology, dogma, scholasticism and the like, so often mistaken for philosophy that are mere "theories" or "opinions", and they contradict each other. Religious beliefs being based upon faith, and mystic life are likewise held to be of the nature of opinions (matam) in so far as their experiences contradict each other and are not ordinarily verified or verifiable. Philosophy is what is based upon Truth (Tattvam) actually verified and verifiable, by ordinary facts of Life, as being something beyond contradictions, like two plus two are equal to four.

Philosophy being an interpretation of the facts of life, it is of value in India solely as that which enables one to make attempts to live a life as perfect as possible, it being based on a knowledge of the truth of All Existence. This truth is tested only in practical life, taken as a whole. Every kind of activity, social, political, religious, intellectual, and emotional, is comprehended in life, as interpreted and lived by the Philosopher. This Truth is illustrated

(continued from the previous page) in Indian Philosophy from the lives of rulers, politicians, warriors, tradesmen, hunters, butchers, menials, priests, ascetics, housewives—nay, men, women, and even children, in all walks of life. In fact, the greatest and the most widely known philosopher of India was a king and a warrior who taught philosophy on the battle-field. Philosophy in India is most emphatically no theory, no speculation.

Religious beliefs, on the other hand, are opinions formed by men according to “tastes”, “temperaments” and “capacities”. Such opinions have undoubtedly their influence on men’s lives, which makes them feel religion to be a necessity. This influence is, however, limited to individuals or groups only. It often becomes an endless source of hostilities among men, when they become conscious of the differences in their beliefs. In spite of the contacts than men are said to make with Gods, in their religious life, it is the religious differences that have been the causes of a larger number of wars, a greater amount of bloodshed, cruelty and homicide in the world, than mere economic distress or other circumstances. The unimpeachable facts of history point to the fact that it is not religion that helps most to promote the social good of humanity in general or as a whole, but philosophy whose objective is Truth, verified in actual life, as known to all, here, in this world, not in the next or a different world. One’s life is the best exposition of one’s philosophy, as understood in India. Philosophy is not the spinning of yarns out of one’s own mind from within.

In the same issue of this journal is published another thoughtful article on “The Concepts of Politics” by Mr J.D. Mabbott. It deals specially with the implications of the terms “society” and “Common Good.” Though modern Indian Philosophy has not much to contribute to discussions

(continued from the previous page) relating to such topics, yet her ancient wisdom appears to contain something that may be found useful.

The ancient Indian goal in political life is summed up in such formulae as "Sarve Janah Sukino Bhavantu" "Sarva Satwa Sukho hitah," "Sarva bhuta hite ratah" and so forth. They indicate that individuals cannot attain any real or lasting good unless all humanity (Sarva Janah) attain it. In other words, no individuals or groups can attain any real or lasting good unless they realise that all human beings form a single "body". It may be remembered by some of your readers that this was the message sent to the last international Congress of Philosophy, held in Paris, by His Highness the Maharajah of Mysore (India), as the message of Indian Philosophy.

This shows that the concept "society" acquires wider and wider significance as man progresses till it comprehends the whole of humanity. We are now somewhere on the way. So are the Totalitarians at the stage of the "State" and they have yet to reach that of "all humanity."

Next, the term "common good" takes us further. Since "good" and "common" are topics dealt with in pure Indian philosophy, I shall not go into that subject here. It will be enough to refer to the Indian view that Ultimately the "individual" implied the "all." As such, unity is always implied in multiplicity. It is only what is "good" for all that is good for the individual. Otherwise, the "good" is not "real". "Common" implies "unity". Hence Indian philosophy holds that "common good" is not what is good only for a body of individuals as a body, but to each and every one. It is good to each in the same degree. Here also there are different stages through which man passes before he realizes this truth. The real "common good" is attained only when every individual realizes

(continued from the previous page) his identity with all humanity. This looks like mere theory, and that of a most impracticable kind. But that it can be most practicable will be evident only when we go deep into Philosophy – not religion, which is beyond the scope of this note.

LETTER TO DR JUNG. ZURICH. (1939)

So far as the subject is concerned, the older I grow, the more conscious I am forced to become that the inevitable end is nearing, the keener grows my eagerness to get at the ultimate Truth of existence. I see that consciousness is the fundamental fact of life, and everything else must be derived from it. One cannot get beyond it, though one can imagine thousands of things. Even as one cannot know how and when one's own physical body came into existence, one cannot and does not know when and how one's consciousness originated.

Now it is the greatest consolation to me that so acute a thinker like your good self agrees with what Indian philosophy says on this subject of consciousness. I feel my visit to Europe is amply rewarded by my acquaintance with so eminent an authority as you, on this most vital subject.

Turning to the other points raised in your kind letter, pray, permit me to say a word or two. We, in India distinguish between consciousness per se as such and consciousness which is aware of a thought or thing. Consciousness per se is the state between two successive thoughts or ideas, or, the state in which I realise the meaning of deep sleep, whenever I think of deep sleep. To know the meaning of "deep sleep" while I am awake, I eliminate all thoughts, ideas or feelings.

Next, when the idea of thought or feeling of the Ego appears in a dream and when I

(continued from the previous page) think in the waking state of that 'I', or the Ego, that was present in the dream, I say that the "Ego" was created by consciousness or mind in the dream; for, nothing else is known to have brought the ego into existence or into my consciousness. Again, when I am not aware of the Ego even when I am fully awake, as when my mind is deeply engaged in admiring a landscape, it is absent. So, it appears and disappears like any other "thought" or "feeling". We in India call it a content of consciousness, an inconstant content. What you call the great unconscious, we call the great contentless consciousness. We say that we are unconscious of an object or a content, but not of consciousness itself. Even when we think of the meaning of the term "unconsciousness" we are conscious. "Unconsciousness" cannot even be thought of and it conveys no meaning if we are not conscious. This is the keystone of Indian philosophy, which is based upon the "enquiry into the three states of Waking Dream and deep Sleep.

As to whether the "Ego" is a creation, or a find, we may use either term provided the meaning of "causality" is made clear. We have no objection whatever to the term 'find'. But the question has to be answered: How did it come there? This takes us to the subject of "causality" in the three states, which is too elaborate to be dealt with in a letter.

Lastly, it is not held in Indian Philosophy that the physical world is a metaphysical entity. What Indian Philosophy asks is this: What is the Ultimate character of both physical and metaphysical entities? We may analyse the physical to the farthest extent possible. We shall still have to rely upon what our mind tells us about them. We know nothing more than what our mind tells us about them. When it is said that there are "things" in themselves, they are also items of information

(continued from the previous page) given to us by the mind. Everything known so far is only what the mind has intimated to us. This is what is meant by saying that the world is mental. The physical world is not metaphysical. The physical world is physical, that is, percept of the senses, but all that you know about it is through the mind and hence mental. And there is another different world called metaphysical but that is also mental. All existences, whatever their characteristics, are known to us only as presented by the mind, and are, therefore mental. Hence consciousness or mind is supreme, fundamental and all embracing.

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LECTURE TO MUSLIM YOUNGMENS' ASSOCIATION.

Pray permit me also to join you in offering my humble tribute of profound admiration and respect to the great Prophet of Arabia on this highly auspicious occasion when so many have met to do honour to his blessed memory. The name of Prophet Mahomed is nothing new or foreign to me though I was born and have been bred up in a different faith; nor is this the first occasion of this kind that I have taken part in. We, of the Ramakrishna Mission in Mysore, meet every year to celebrate his Birthday and to tell the public how deeply not merely the Muslims but humanity in general is indebted to him for his priceless teachings. And let me add that hardly a day passes without our thinking of them, for Sri Ramakrishna actually lived the life of a Muslim for a time.

But it is an irony of fate, that human nature has been so constituted as to make every great man liable to be misunderstood and mis-interpreted even by his very admirers and followers. The teachings of Krishna, Buddha, Jesus, Mahomed, not to mention others, have been so interpreted wholly or in parts only so as to divide the followers into various sects, often

LECTURE TO MUSLIM YOUNGMENS' ASSOCIATION

(continued from the previous page) most antagonistic to each other. And that is because of the universal weakness which makes every one think that what he knows is truth and his own interpretations correct. So, to-day, I fear I may also have misunderstood the Prophet. Many of you that have made a deep study, and that of the original, may entirely disagree with me. I beg of you, therefore, to pardon me for any erroneous misinterpretations.

In other parts of India, many that have a right to speak with authority on this subject have referred to the social and political benefits derived from Mahomed's teachings. But, however, admirable these may be, to my mind these are liable to change, with the changes in the world. Highly estimable though they are, I prefer to think on something of more permanent value in what he taught. For the Holy Quoran itself says: *Hagyaq-ul-sabirum* etc. which is rendered thus: The Essence bides, the world is a passing dream. All else than God is null and void.

May I ask which scientist and which philosopher can doubt that so far as this visible world goes? Change is a greater fact than anything else. May we not then seek that which is abiding.

Next I turn to the universal outlook from the religious standpoint, taught in the Holy Quoran. "*Wa Ma Argalana Mir Masulin Wakazalika Auhina ilaikate* etc." Teachers have been to every race. All have been sent but one truth to proclaim. Teachers are sent to each race that they may teach it in its own tongue so that there may be no doubt as to the meaning in its mind. An Arabic Quoran is thus revealed that Mecca and the cities around may learn the Truth with ease. "The Prophet does not say that truth is confined only to one race or to the words of one teacher. What is more significant still is the Quoranic exhortation: "*Kul Ta'lan elakala Matim* etc. "Let us all ascend towards and meet together on the

LECTURE TO MUSLIM YOUNGMENS' ASSOCIATION

(continued from the previous page) common ground of those High truths and principles which we all hold." What is wanted here is not that we should stay away from the paths we are treading but to rise to the "common ground." For the Quoran says: "La ekrata fiddin etc. "There must be no compulsion in matters of religion. Unto you, your faith be welcome; so my faith to me."

Again, Li kullin Jaina Minkuru shiratan etc. "To every people we have given a law and a way whereby they may reach to God. If God had wished it so, He would have made you all people of one Law. He has not done so. Therefore let every people, on the way prescribed for it, press forward to good deeds. And let none laugh at any other man; perchance they be better than themselves." Let us then press forward to good deeds as our goal. But what is the "common ground" referred to by the Quoran? The ground on which we can all meet? It may be said that it is Unity of God. What is meant by it. But that cannot be. For we see that there are now religions without "God". And there are aetheists and agnostics without any religion. The only other alternative, as the Quoran says, is the brotherhood of men, the doing of "good deeds" for the well-being of all.

Mahomed does not think that he is the last teacher. His "Hadis" says: "At the beginning of each hundred years, God will raise up for peoples of the earth some one to take religion free and fresh for them." Evidently Mahomed does not expect to seek all men having the same face, the same mentality and the same religious outlook that at all times and for ever.

The noblest religion as the Hadis says: "Afzal ul imani etc." The Noblest religion is this: That thou shouldst like for others what thou likest for thyself. And feel the pain of others as thine own." "If villati – Recompense

(continued from the previous page) evil, conquer it with good." There is the common ground.

These words of mine may lead some here to think that I am standing for Hindu Muslim Unity. I am not pleading for Hindu-Muslim Unity. No, I am not seeking the union of a fractions. I am here exhorting you all to seek the unity of all creeds, colours, and races, in a word all humanity. For, the Holy Quoran says:—

"All creatures are members of one family."

Pray remember this everyday; nay, every second and act accordingly. Wait not for the day when you hope to see men thinking in the same way and believing in the same religion. The Quoran says allow every one to seek truth according to his capacity which Nature has bestowed. Pray, remember this, my brethren, brethren of the Muslim Youngmen's Association: "Act, act, in the living present" — Haya ust, Hama dost.

"DR SKINNER'S RETIREMENT."@

No event that has occurred in the educational world of Southern India since the publication of our last number has greater interest for Mysore than the retirement of the Rev. Dr W. Skinner, C.I.E. from the Madras Christian College. For nearly two generations before the University of Mysore was founded and for years even after the establishment of the College at Bangalore and Mysore, large numbers of such students as sought University Education were being attracted to this institution. The names of Rev. Dr Miller and Rev. Dr Skinner have singular charm for many a parent of this State. For the "Old boys" of this College have in no small measure contributed to the making of Modern Mysore...There has been a continuous stream of Free Church and Christian College men employed in almost every Department of Public Service. They have also distinguished themselves in other walks of life in this State. And, they

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(continued from the previous page) are not a little proud that at the present moment, the highest executive office in the State, that of Dewan, and the highest executive office in the University, that of Vice-Chancellor, are presided over, respectively by Rajesvadhurina Sirdar M. Kantaraj Urs, C.S.I and Rajamantrapravina H.V. Nanjundayya, C.I.E. both alumni of the Christian College. A number of other high and important positions are still held by those who have sat at the feet of these two eminent teachers. And now, the news of the retirement of Principal Skinner, would naturally be received with a heavy heart however reasonable such separation might appear. The learned Doctor and teacher has laboured in the cause of Indian Education for over 35 years and that in a trying climate, often under equally trying circumstances he has given the best of his life to the youth of this country. And, though he has built for himself an enviable reputation as a most successful Principal of one of the largest of Collegiate Institutions in India, yet the noblest part of his work will be we believe, the high ideas he always set before himself and his pupils, which will influence not this generations of students alone, but many more yet to come and which he so beautifully summed up on one of his last public utterances in Madras. "In the days to come, the Alumni of this College may be found up-holding the ideal of a United India, an India growing impartially for the good of all her children, and an India, in which privilege means service and service privilege." We need hardly say that he will be long remembered and with deep gratitude, in Mysore.

THE LATE MUSHIR-UL-MULK MIR HUMZA HUSSEIN.®

If for a moment I turn the telescope of my memory back and look at the firmament of the student world of Bangalore of forty years ago, I see a number of stars of various magnitudes, of which none is more familiar than that of the late Mr Mir Humza Hussein who has played so prominent a part in the history of Mysore of our own times. A Mahomedan pursuing mathematical studies at College was then, as is even now, a rara avis. And it was felt that "Humza" as he was called by his friends had in him something of that stuff of personality that marked him out from many others of his generation later in life. His geniality of temper and his conviviality attracted to him a large circle of young men of all communities from among the students of the Central College, to which he belonged. Next, having been the first Mahomedan of Mysore to take the Law degree in those days, he naturally drew the attention of Sir. K. Seshadri Iyer, the then Dewan, who appointed him forthwith as a Judicial Probationer. How he subsequently climbed the rungs of official ladder, passing through different departments: the Police, the Revenue and the Judicial, and how he rose to the position of a Judge of the Chief Court and ultimately to that of a Member of Council and Acting Dewan, the highest office to which one could rise, do not very much concern us in this place. Our interest lies more in what he did in the world of education, especially in the University. Suffice to say that on the bench he gained the reputation of having been a very upright and bold judge. What, however, characterised him most was his independence. And as an administrator he brought to bear upon his work an all round experience illumined by a

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(continued from the previous page) by a vast knowledge of details.

As one of the few highly educated and enlightened Mahomedans of his day, he was invariably put on every important public body or committee appointed for the educational advancement of the people of Mysore. This long association extending over 35 years gave him so deep an insight into the country's educational needs, that he came to be considered an authority on many a question connected with education, which naturally led to his being consulted in matters connected with the University also from its very inception.

He was a member at first and then the Chairman of the Board of Education. His achievements there were really such as are worthy of being remembered for ever. He played the most prominent part on the formulation of the famous scheme of scholarships for Backward communities which they justly regard as the greatest educational boon conferred on them by the State. The Mysore Mussalmans however, owe him a still greater debt of gratitude, which they can never repay. The spread of education among the Mahomedans as compared with that among the other Backward Communities, is the most marked during the past 35 years. And this they owe almost entirely to his untiring and selfless efforts. Having had opportunities of working with him on several of such bodies for over quarter of a century, I cannot forget how suggestive and valuable his criticisms were, which helped most the disposal of highly controversial points.

He was a member of the University Council and the Senate from the very beginning, with a short break till the last day of his life. What great respects his views commanded and how highly his services to the University were esteemed are evident from the growing tribute that the Vice-Chancellor Dr Sir. Brajendranal Seal

(continued from the previous page) has paid to his memory.

This is not the occasion for me to refer to his political views and activities. But it must be said that his sympathies for the poor of all communities and complexions were so great that he threw himself heart and soul into the "Khaddar" movement of Mahatma Gandhi during his stay in Mysore.

A word may be said here as to how we were drawn to each other in early life. It was his keen interest in Sufism in its relation to Vedanta, and his adventures in the world of Journalism that appealed to me. Often were long hours were spent in the evenings over discussions on some of the thoughts of Hafiz, Omar Khayyam, the Gita and Bhartrihari. And when his blood was still warm he contributed several articles to journals some of which are now defunct, on many a burning topic of the day. They were full of the fire of intolerance of whatever was mean, unfair, and underhand. It was then that Mr Humza Hussein looked most noble and loveable in my eyes. But with the advance of years, his enthusiasm in this direction naturally cooled. All the same his caustic writings did bear very good fruit in their time.

In his private life he was an exceedingly amiable friend free and frank in his talks. He rose above the narrowness of creed and caste though he respected the religious temples of others. He was always attached to his old friends, whom he never forgot and whom he invariably tried to help in times of difficulty. He was not without failings as a human being, and as there is nothing peculiar in them, I shall not refer to them. But his prejudices were rather strong.

Taking here, then, a measure of the man as the author of many beneficent acts, the fruits

(continued from the previous page) of which will be enjoyed by the present generation—acts for which he has been rightly honoured by His Highness the Maharaja with a worthy title,—I may conclude that the name of Mushir-Ul-Mulk Mir Humza Hussein will be long cherished with the greatest regard, by his numerous friends inside as well as outside this University.

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